






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JANUARY, 1864.

ARTICLE I.

ATHANASIUS AND THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY.¹

BY REV. C. F. SCHAEFFER, D.D., PROFESSOR, ETC., THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
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§ 1. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

No doctrine that combines both philosophical and also religious elements, has ever engendered such violent contests in Christendom as those which succeeded the introduction of Arianism. They convulsed alike the Oriental and the Western church; they were maintained during a period of more than half a century; and, while they continued, political influences were as actively exercised as those which proceeded from the church. The struggle necessarily assumed, during its progress, such vast proportions. For Arianism was not simply a heresy which a single individual—an energetic agitator—endeavored to promulgate, but is rather to be viewed as a new conflict between the spirit of the world and the spirit of revelation. That conflict had originally possessed an external character during the three

¹ This Article presents the substance of Chap. I., Second Division, of H. Voigt's recent work: *Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien* [The Doctrinal System of Athanasius]. The author exhibits in the First Division the general points of faith, as held by Athanasius, and in the Second describes, in detail, his controversies with the Arians, the Sabellians, the Pneumatomachians, and the Apollinarians.

centuries which closed with the public recognition of the social rights of the church; it was now renewed in the very bosom of the church, and imperilled her doctrinal life. It was in reality the whole spirit or character of the oriental people, who had been only partially converted to Christianity, that rose up in opposition to the fundamental truths of the Christian revelation, and which merely assumed the form of Arianism. The party which adhered to the views of Arius long after his death, had not been created by him; he had only been the first who gave a distinctly defined form and body to prevailing hostile sentiments respecting the doctrine and the authority of the church.

The intellectual and spiritual atmosphere of the East contained at that time two opposite elements: the one was from above — from the Spirit of God; the other was from below — from the spirit of the natural man; the former was the Christian revelation; the latter, pagan philosophy. The two had, during three centuries, been compared by many thoughtful minds, and their respective value had been determined with different degrees of success. At the present era, when other theories had been either modified or discarded, two opposite systems divided the interest and zeal of men between them. The one held that philosophy constituted the substance, and that the Christian revelation was simply an *accident* — a non-essential quality; the other, which was fully developed and sustained by clear and satisfactory reasons, held that the truths of revelation constituted the substance, and that philosophy was a mere *accident*, by no means essentially necessary to the existence of the substance. The former was embodied in Arianism; the latter, in the Athanasian creed. That these were the relations which the two parties sustained to each other, is demonstrated alike by the difference in the sources from which they respectively deduced their arguments, and by the difference in the essential character of their respective doctrines.

Arius adopted philosophy as his teacher and guide, in so far as he declared that reason was the original source of our

knowledge of divine truth, and he noticed the scriptures in those cases alone in which they appear to confirm the results which the processes of his understanding had already furnished. He and his associates believed that the chief element of success consisted in the attempt to represent the doctrines of their opponents as contrary to reason. Athanasius, on the other hand, and with him the church, recognized, unalterably and unconditionally, the scriptures as the true source of all our knowledge of divine things; the question whether the latter could always be comprehended by the human mind, he regarded as of no essential importance, inasmuch as the answer could not essentially affect the convictions of a believer, or the doctrine of the church. The difference in the essential character of the doctrines of the two men respectively is still more striking. Arius viewed God as *the absolute Simplicity*, as opposed to that which is composite or complex; as a Being sustaining relations to no others, tolerating no distinctions in himself, and immeasurably exalted above the world, or the kingdom of manifold life. Consequently, as God is absolute *Existence* and can admit of no internal distinctions, he cannot be both Father and Son, and therefore the Son cannot be *true God*. But he gladly welcomes the Son as an intermediate being, since the latter now occupies the vast chasm between God and the world, and thus brings these two into a certain relation to each other. Nevertheless, he distinctly admitted the *reality* of God, while he maintained that no distinctions or relations could be predicated of him.

The church, on the other hand, guided by the testimonies of the scriptures, and enlightened by the progressive revelations of the latter, viewed God as the fulness of life, on whom the world with all its manifold life depends, and with whom it is already intimately connected, without the intervention of any third existence. While it, accordingly, received the doctrine of the unity of God, the church found no difficulty in distinguishing, in accordance with the plain doctrine of the scriptures, the three persons, Father, Son,

and Holy Spirit, although the limits of human thought did not permit it to solve the mystery of revelation — the unity and the tri-unity of God. These appear to be the fundamental differences in the Arian and Athanasian systems.

§ 2. ORIGINAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

We proceed, after these introductory remarks, to present the Arian doctrinal system in detail, and the mode in which it was controverted by Athanasius. The direct sources from which our knowledge of the former is derived, are, first, an epistle addressed by Arius to Eusebius of Nicomedia; it has been preserved by Epiphanius (Haeres. 69. 6) and by Theodoret (Hist. I. 5); secondly, an epistle of Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, which has been preserved by Athanasius (De Synod. 16), Epiphanius (69. 7. 8), and Socrates (Hist. I. 6); thirdly, the treatise written by Arius, and entitled *Thalia*, undoubtedly the latest of his writings, and preserved in substance by Athanasius (c. Ar. I. 5, 6, 9; de Synod. 15); fourthly, an epistle addressed by Arius to Alexander, and preserved by Athanasius (de Synod.) and Epiphanius (69. 7). The writings of the former contain, besides, numerous quotations from Arius, without special mention of the precise source (contra Arianos, Orat.; Synodi Nic. Decr. contra Haeres. Arian.; de Synod. Arim. et Sel.). The writings of Arius himself primarily claim our attention.

The epistle to Eusebius has not descended to us without various readings. Voigt, to whom we are indebted for our materials, adopts, for instance, immediately below, a reading which differs from the usual text. The translation of the Greek ecclesiastical historians (Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Evagrius) published by Bagster in 6 vols. London, 1844, presents this letter in Vol. V. p. 23 sqq. The translation, when compared with the portion furnished by Lardner (Credibility, etc. Vol. III. p. 576. London: 1838) shows that the respective texts varied, or that the translator of Theodoret performed this part of his work in a somewhat slovenly manner. We furnish the original, after the model

of Voigt, where the *ipsissima verba* of Arius are technical and important. Arius says :

“Inasmuch as Ammonius intends to visit Nicomedia, I considered it my duty to inform you, through this opportunity, of the severe sufferings and persecutions which the bishop [Alexander] causes us to endure ; he has even expelled us from the city, as if we were impious men. The cause lies in our refusal to concur with him in the following propositions, which he publicly maintains : ‘Αὐτὸς ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ’ ὁ υἱός· ἅμα πατήρ, ἅμα υἱός· συνυπάρχει ἀγεννήτως¹ ὁ υἱὸς τῷ Θεῷ, ἀειγεννῆς ἔστιν, ἀγεννητογενής ἔστιν· οὔτε ἐπινοία, οὔτε ἀτόμῳ τινὶ προάγει ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ· ἀλλ’ ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ’ ὁ υἱός· ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔστι τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱός. And as thy brother [bishop] Eusebius of Caesarea, Theodotus [of Laodicea], Paulinus [of Tyre], Athanasius [of Anazarbus], Gregory [of Berea], and Actius [of Lydda, afterwards called Diospolis], and, in general, the bishops of the East maintain that God had an existence without beginning prior to that of the Son (ὅτι προϋπάρχει ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀνάρχως), they, too, have been condemned, with the exception of Philogonius, Hellanicus, and Macarius, who are unlearned, heretical men, of whom some say that the Son is an effusion, others, that he is an emission, and others, again, that he is [like the Father] unbegotten (τῶν τὸν υἱὸν λεγόντων, οἱ μὲν ἐρρηγνῶν, οἱ δὲ προβολῆν, οἱ δὲ συναγεννητον). But we teach that the Son is not unbegotten, nor a part of the unbegotten in any manner. Nor is he made out of any pre-existent (lit. *subjacent*) thing; but by the will and counsel [of God] he subsisted before times and before ages, fully God,

¹ ἀγεννήτως = in an unbegotten manner, ἀγεννητογενής = beginning to exist without having been begotten. Voigt holds that these forms constitute the correct reading, and neither ἀγενήτως nor ἀγεννητογενής, since Arius afterwards introduces the antithesis: “But we teach that the Son is not begotten, ἀγέννητος. Arius, as Voigt adds, regarded the terms “not come into existence” and “unbegotten” as equivalent, and hence ascribed both to Alexander, who adopted only one of them. The verb εἶμι, as in the Arian formula ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, admits of both translations, *to be* and *to exist*; the verb γίγνομαι, — to which the German *werden* corresponds, if translated with strict precision, in this controversy, — should, for want of an English verb that exactly corresponds, be rendered *to become*, according to the style of the translators of the English Bible, e.g. Matth. xxi. 42; Mark i. 17; Rev. xi. 15, that is, *to begin to be*, *to come into existence* (Robinson’s Lex. ad verb.). In such a New Testament sense, as illustrated, for instance, in John i. 3, rather than in a classical sense, the word was employed in the Arian controversy.

only-begotten and unchangeable; and, before he was begotten or created, or designed or founded, he was not (did not exist), for he was not unbegotten. We are persecuted because we say that the Son has a beginning, but that God is without a beginning. For this we are persecuted, and because we say that he is from nothing (out of non-existent things). We thus teach, inasmuch as he is neither a part of God, nor of any pre-existent (subjaacent) thing. (ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀγεννήτου κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς · ἀλλ' ὅτι θελήματι καὶ βουλῇ ὑπέστη πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων πλήρης θεός, μονογενής, ἀναλλοίωτος, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι, ἦτοι κτισθῆναι, ἢ ὀρισθῆναι, ἢ θεμελιωθῆναι, οὐκ ἦν · ἀγέννητος γὰρ οὐκ ἦν · διωκόμεθα, ὅτι εἶπαμεν · ἀρχὴν ἔχει ὁ υἱός, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἀναρχός ἐστι · διὰ τοῦτο διωκόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι εἶπαμεν, ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐστίν, οὕτως δὲ εἶπαμεν, καθότι οὐδὲ μέρος θεοῦ ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς).

The Epistle to Alexander, which is fuller and more important, is preserved by Athanasius and Epiphanius (l. c.) in the following form :

Ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν ἢ ἐκ προγόνων, ἢν καὶ ἀπὸ σοῦ μεμαθήκαμεν, μακάριε πάπα, ἔστιν αὕτη · οἶδαμεν ἓνα θεὸν μόνον ἀγέννητον, μόνον αἰῶδιον, μόνον ἀναρχον, μόνον ἀληθινόν, μόνον ἀθανασίαν ἔχοντα, μόνον σοφόν, μόνον ἀγαθόν, μόνον δυνάστην, πάντων κριτὴν, διοικητὴν, ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν, νόμον καὶ προφητῶν καὶ καινῆς διαθήκης τοῦτον θεόν. γενήσαντα υἱὸν μονογενῇ πρὸ χρόνων (begat an only-begotten son *before eternal times*) δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ τὰ ὅλα πεποίηκε · γενήσαντα δὲ οὐ δοκῇ, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ (not in appearance but in truth), ὑποστήσαντα (setting him forth) ἰδίῳ θελήματι ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον κτίσμα τοῦ θεοῦ τέλειον (a perfect creature of God), ἀλλ' οὐκ ὡς ἐν τῶν κτισμάτων (but not as one of the other creatures) ; γέννημα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐν τῶν γεννημάτων (γέννημα = that which is *begotten*) ; οὐδ' ὡς Οὐαλεντίνος προβολὴν τὸ γέννημα τοῦ πατρὸς ἐδογμάτισεν, οὐδ' ὡς ὁ Μανιχαῖος μέρος ὁμοούσιον τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ γέννημα εἰσηγήσατο (a part of the Father, that is, of the same essence), οὐδ' ὡς Σαβέλλιος τὴν μονάδα διαιρῶν υἱοπάτορα εἶπεν (dividing that which is unity, oneness, speaks of a Son-Father), οὐδ' ὡς Ἰέρακας, λύχνον ἀπὸ λύχνου, ἢ ὡς λαμπάδα εἰς δύο, οὐδὲ τὸν ὄντα πρότερον, ὕστερον γεννηθέντα (nor that he who already existed, was afterwards begotten), ἢ ἐπικτισθέντα εἰς υἱόν, ὡς καὶ σὺ αὐτὸς, μακάριε πάπα, κατὰ μέσσην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ ἐν συνεδρίῳ πλειστάκις τοὺς

ταῦτα εἰσηγησαμένους ἀπηγόρευσας, ἀλλ', ὡς φάμεν, θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων κτισθέντα καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰληφότα, καὶ τὰς δόξας συνυποστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς· οὐ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ δοὺς αὐτῷ πάντων τὴν κληρονομίαν ἐστέρησεν ἑαυτόν, ὦν ἀγεννήτως ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ· πηγὴ γάρ ἐστι πάντων, ὥστε τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποστάσεις, καὶ ὁ μὲν θεὸς αἴτιος τῶν πάντων τυγχάνων, ἔστιν ἀναρχος μονώτατος (there are three hypostases, but God, the author of all, is most emphatically alone without a beginning). ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἀχρόνως γεννηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς (before time was), καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων κτισθεὶς καὶ θεμελιωθείς, οὐκ ἦν (did not exist) πρὸ τοῦ γεννηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἀχρόνως πρὸ πάντων γεννηθείς, μόνος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπέστη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστιν ἀίδιος, ἢ συναίδιος (co-eternal), ἢ συναγέννητος (unbegotten like) τῷ πατρί· οὐδὲ ἅμα τῷ πατρί τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ὡς τινες λέγουσι τὰ πρὸς τι, δύο ἀγεννήτους ἀρχὰς εἰσηγούμενοι· ἀλλ' ὡς μόνος καὶ ἀρχὴ πάντων, οὕτως ὁ θεὸς πρὸ πάντων ἐστί, διὸ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐστιν, ὡς καὶ παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθήκαμεν κατὰ μέσσην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κηρύξαντος· καθ' οὖν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει καὶ τὰς δόξας καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὰ πάντα αὐτῷ παρεδόθη, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀρχὴ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ὁ θεός· ἀρχει γὰρ αὐτοῦ, ὡς θεὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὢν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκ γαστρὸς καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἦκω (expressions like those in John viii. 42) ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ ὁμοουσίου καὶ ὡς προβολὴ ὑπὸ τινων νοεῖται, σύνθετος ἔσται ὁ πατὴρ (would be composite, made up of parts) καὶ διαίρετος καὶ τρεπτός καὶ σώμα κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀκόλουθα σώματι πάσχων ὁ ἀσώματος θεός.

These epistles present the following as the doctrine of Arius when he first came in collision with the church:—The Father alone is *God* in the proper sense of that word. As such, he alone is the unbegotten One (*causa sui*), and he alone is eternal, without beginning and immortal, alone wise and good, alone almighty, the Ruler and Judge, and, in accordance with his nature, alone unchangeable. The Son, on the other hand, is the begotten One, that is, created, and then existing by the will of God. He is a creature, but nevertheless of a peculiar nature, and not like other creatures, so near to God that he is *πλήρης θεός* and *ἀναλλοίωτος*. At one time he did not exist: he had a beginning which preceded all the ages of the world, but God was before him. He came forth out of nothing and, accordingly, did not

proceed from God by emanation nor by any partition of the divine being or essence; neither was he a special manifestation or modification of God. Hence Father, Son, and Spirit are indeed three divine beings or hypostases, but God the Father is the cause or author (*αἴτιος*) of the second and third, while he himself is absolutely God. Arius evidently has a twofold object in these epistles: first, to establish the point that the Father alone is God, and, secondly, to assign to the Son the highest possible position within the sphere of the Deity above all created objects; hence he employs the terms *πλήρης Θεός*, and *ἀναλλοίωτος, ἄτρεπτος*. There is obviously a discrepancy between these positions of Arius respecting the unchangeableness of the Son, and those which are assigned to him in the contemporaneous epistle of Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, his earliest opponent, addressed to Alexander, bishop of Constantinople. It is given by Theodoret, *Hist. Eccl.* I. 4. Alexander makes the following charge:

“ They (Arius and his associates) say: *ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, γέγονεν ὕστερον πρότερον μὴ ὑπάρχων, τοιοῦτος γενόμενος ὅτε καὶ ποτε γέγονεν, οἷος καὶ πᾶς εἶναι πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος* · πάντα γάρ, φασίν, ὁ Θεὸς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησε, συναναλαμβάνοντες τῇ τῶν ἀπάντων λογικῶν τε καὶ ἀλόγων κτίσει καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ · οἷς ἀκολουθῶς καὶ φασιν, αὐτὸν τρεπτῆς εἶναι φύσεως, ἀρετῆς τε καὶ κακίας ἐπιδεκτικόν · καὶ τῇ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑποθέσει καὶ τὰς θείας συναναιροῦντες γραφάς, αἱ τὸ ἄτρεπτον τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὴν θειότητα τῆς σοφίας, τοῦ λόγου, σημαίνουσιν, ἃ ἐστὶ Χριστός · δυνάμεθα γοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς, φασίν, υἱοὶ γενέσθαι Θεοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ κείνους · . . . οὔτε γὰρ φύσει υἱὸς τίς ἐστὶν τοῦ Θεοῦ, φασίν.

“ They say, that there was a time when the Son of God had no existence; and that, not having existed from eternity, he must have had a beginning; and that when he was created, he was made like all other men that have ever been born. God, they say, created all things, and they include the Son of God in the number of creatures, both rational and irrational. To argue consistently, they, as a necessary consequence, affirm, that *he is by nature liable to change*, and capable both of virtue and of vice. Their hypothesis, of his having been created, contradicts the testimony of the divine scriptures, which declare the immu-

tability, the divinity, and the wisdom of the Word, which Word is Christ. We are also able, they say, to become, like him, the sons of God for God, say they, has not any son by nature." —Bagster's *Ecl. Hist.*, Theodoret, Vol. V. pp. 8, 9.

Here Alexander accuses Arius of holding the doctrine that the nature of the Son was liable to change. As the statements of the former are as fully entitled to credit as those of the latter, Voigt explains the apparent contradiction in the following manner. Athanasius specifies among the errors of Arius which led to his excommunication, the proposition: "The Son is capable of change (*τρεπτός*) as to his nature (*φύσει*), but as to his own free will (*αὐτεξουσίου*) he remains good (*καλός*)," Athan. Ep. *Enycl.* 12. Such terms might allow Arius to maintain with apparent consistency, that he regarded the Son as unchangeable, and the circumstances under which he composed the Epistles requires a distinct expression of the latter view. Alexander could, nevertheless, according to his conception of the subject, with justice ascribe the opposite opinion to Arius; for, if the nature of him who is unchangeable only by virtue of his own free will, still remains itself subject to change, that free will may at any moment determine itself otherwise, and hence to describe merely the free will as unchangeable is a *contradictio in adjecto* [as if, for instance, a man should speak of a *square* globe]. Arius became aware of this circumstance himself, and aimed at greater accuracy and precision in his language in his *Thalia*. He composed this work when all his attempts to reconcile his views with those of the church, and to be restored to fellowship with Alexander had been unsuccessful. He addressed himself in this feeble essay to the public in general, and courted the favor of the latter by adopting a low and inelegant style — ἔγραψε Θαλείαν ἐκτέθνηλυμένοις καὶ γελοίοις ἤδεσι κατὰ τὸν Αἰγύπτιον Σωτάδην, *de sent.* Dion. 6. From this work Athanasius (*l. c.*) quotes the following:

Οὐκ αἰὲ ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἦν ὅτε ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἦν καὶ οὐπω πατὴρ ἦν, ὕστηρον δὲ ἐπιγένεγε πατὴρ · οὐκ αἰὲ ἦν ὁ υἱός · πάντων γὰρ γενομένων ἐξ

οὐκ ὄντων, καὶ πάντων ὄντων κτισμάτων καὶ ποιημάτων γενομένων, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γέγονε, καὶ ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ κτίζεσθαι ἔσχε καὶ αὐτός. ἦν γάρ, φησί, μόνος ὁ Θεός, καὶ οὕτω ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ σοφία. εἶτα θελήσας ἡμῶς δημιουργῆσαι, τότε δὴ πεποίηκεν ἓνα τινά, καὶ ὠνόμασεν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ σοφίαν καὶ υἱόν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργήσῃ. δύο γοῦν σοφίας φησὶν εἶναι, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν τῷ Θεῷ, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ταύτης μετέχοντα ὠνομάσθαι μόνον σοφίαν καὶ λόγον. ἡ σοφία γάρ, φησί, τῇ σοφίᾳ ὑπῆρξε σοφοῦ Θεοῦ θελήσει. οὕτω καὶ λόγον ἔτερον εἶναι λέγει παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ τούτου μετέχοντα τὸν υἱὸν ὠνομάσθαι πάλιν κατὰ χάριν λόγον καὶ υἱὸν αὐτόν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς αἵρεσεως αὐτῶν ἴδιον φρόνημα, δηλούμενον ἐν ἑτέροις αὐτῶν συγγραμμάσιν, ὅτι πολλαὶ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ. καὶ ἡ μὲν μία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἰδία φύσει καὶ αἰδῖος, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὴ δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ μία τῶν λεγομένων δυνάμεων ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτός, ὃν μία καὶ ἡ ἀκρις καὶ ἡ κάμψη οὐ δύναμις μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλη προσαγορεύεται. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι πολλαὶ καὶ ὅμοιαι εἰσὶ τῷ υἱῷ, περὶ ὧν καὶ Δαβὶδ ψάλλει λέγων. κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων (Ps. xxiv. 10). Καὶ τῇ μὲν φύσει ὥσπερ πάντες οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τρεπτός, τῷ δὲ ἰδίῳ, αὐτεξουσῶ, ἕως βούλεται, μένει καλός, ὅτε μέντοι θέλει, δύναται τρέπεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, τρεπτῆς ὃν φύσεως. διὰ τοῦτο γάρ, φησί, καὶ προγινώσκων ὁ Θεὸς ἔσσεσθαι καλὸν αὐτόν, προλαβὼν αὐτῷ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν δέδωκεν, ἦν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔσχε μετὰ ταῦτα, ὥστε ἐξ ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὧν προέγνω ὁ Θεός, τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν νῦν γαγονέαι πεποιήκεν. εἰπεῖν δὲ πάλιν ἐτόλμησεν, ὅτι οὐδὲ Θεὸς ἀληθινός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος. εἰ δὲ λέγεται Θεός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθινός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ χάριτος, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰ ἄλλοι πάντες, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς λέγεται ὀνόματι μόνον Θεός. καὶ πάντων ξένων καὶ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τοῦ Θεοῦ κατ' οὐσίαν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀλλότριος μὲν καὶ ἀνόμιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ιδιότητός ἐστι, τῶν δὲ γεννητῶν καὶ κτισμάτων ἴδιος καὶ εἰς αὐτῶν τυγχάνει. ὥς ἄρα καὶ τῷ υἱῷ ὁ πατὴρ ἀόρατος ὑπάρχει, καὶ οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε γινώσκειν τελείως καὶ ἀκριβῶς δύναται ὁ λόγος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ γινώσκει καὶ ὁ βλέπει, ἀναλόγως τοῖς ἰδίαις μέτροις οἷδε καὶ βλέπει, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς γινώσκομεν κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ υἱός, φησὶν, οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀκριβῶς οὐ γινώσκει, λείπει γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ καταλαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίαν οὐκ οἶδε. καὶ ὅτι μεμερισμένοι τῇ φύσει καὶ ἀπεξενωμένοι καὶ ἀπεσχαισμένοι καὶ ἀλλότριοι καὶ ἀμέτοχοι εἰσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ οὐσίαι τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, καὶ ἀνόμιοι πάνπαν ἀλλήλων ταῖς τε οὐσίαις καὶ δόξαις εἰσὶν ἐπ' ἅπειρον. τὸν γοῦν λόγον φησὶν εἰς ὁμοιότητα δόξης καὶ οὐσίας ἀλλότριον εἶναι παντελῶς ἐκατέρων τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου

πνεύματος · καὶ διηρημένον δὲ εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀμέτοχον κατὰ πάντα τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἔφησε. ταῦτα μέρη τῶν ἐν τῷ γελοίῳ συγγράμματι κειμένων μυθιδίων ἐστὶν Ἀρείου.

Arius proceeds in the *Thalia* on the principle that the Son is a creature of the absolute God and Father in every aspect, and now maintains the changeableness of the Son without any reservation. His general theory may be thus expressed: The Father is God, the Son is a creature; the latter at one time did not exist, and had a beginning of existence. He was created from nothing. Without him God has reason and wisdom and power, and he bears the latter name only in an improper sense, like the locust and the palmer-worm mentioned in Joel ii. 25. [Arius here refers to the text of the Septuagint, which renders חַיִּי, “my host,” or “my army,” thus: ἡ δύναμις μου: comp. his words as given above, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς πάλιν, κ. τ. λ.]. In his nature and will he is changeable, and remains good (καλός) only during his own pleasure. But as God foresaw that he would remain good, he bestowed his own glory on him anticipately, and the Son also gained that glory subsequently, as man, by his virtue. He consequently bears the name of *God*, not as being true God, but as all others, because he shares in the divine grace. Like all creatures he is in his nature different from God, and co-essential with other creatures. Therefore he does not know God with entire accuracy, nor indeed does he know himself perfectly.

No essentially new features were afterwards added to this theory by the representatives of the heresy of Arius, who himself disappeared at a comparatively early period from the field of battle. The most obstinate among them, as Aëtius and Eunomius, paraded indeed their sophisms in connection with the technical terms *begotten* and *unbegotten*; and it is worthy of notice, that, when they discussed the abstract conception of God, and the degree in which he may be known and understood, they ultimately adopted views that were precisely the reverse of those of Arius; for Eunomius boasted that he knew God perfectly. Other Arians

resorted to the expedient of teaching the *similarity* of the nature or essence of the Son to that of the Father [the Homoiousians] instead of the difference, and thus attempted to approximate to the church doctrine.

§ 3. THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE OF ARIUS, AND ITS REFUTATION BY ATHANASIUS.

Athanasius does not specially examine the various modifications of Arianism in his controversial writings, but discusses the system itself in its ultimate principles, as an aggregate of errors. The contest was not confined to a single department of theological science, but involved speculative philosophy, exegesis, doctrines, and ethics. The manifold and abundant materials before us cannot be satisfactorily exhibited in their true relations to each other, unless they are previously arranged according to some system. In the opinions of Arius a discrimination must be made between his fundamental doctrine and the inferences which he deduced from it. We propose to exhibit primarily the mode in which Athanasius assailed the former by arguments derived from various sources; we may then observe his mode of dealing with the inferences of Arius; and, lastly, listen to the appeal which, in reference to the entire Arian system, he makes to the established doctrine of the church.

The leading proposition of Arius, which comprehends in itself all the details of his system, is the following: *The Father alone is God, and the Son is his creature*; the latter is distinguished from all other creatures by three circumstances: the Son, as a creature, is morally perfect; he is exalted to divine glory, and through him all other created objects were made. Of the significance and importance of this proposition, the parties were fully aware at the commencement of the contest.

It assumes a prominent position in the epistles of Arius given above. Athanasius expressly says (c. Ar. 2. 19) that Arius had maintained against Alexander that the Son is a creature; he traces the other two propositions which Arius

maintained against Alexander — first, that the Son was produced from nothing, and that at one time he did not exist — to the fundamental principle that he belongs to the class or kind of creatures (c. Ar. 1. 19). When Athanasius further quotes (c. Ar. 1. 5) the entire heresy of Arius, as exhibited in the *Thalia* of the latter, he asserts that Arius denies the Son of God, and counts him among other creatures; he describes the whole tendency of Arianism when he says. (c. Ar. 1. 22) that it separated the Son from the Father, and held the former to be like a creature. It was at this point that the combatants made their most vigorous efforts; while the Arians labored chiefly to maintain this position, it was assailed by Athanasius in the following manner.

The entire Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Athanasius proceeds to say, must be abandoned, if the Son of God is a creature, as such did not exist at one time, and was produced from nothing. For if he is a creature, the Triad itself is of the nature of a creature, belongs to time, is dissimilar in itself, and subject to change; hence, the Triad must be still further capable of an infinite accretion, and, conversely, of a decrease also, even to a monad (c. Ar. 1. 17). The Arians have, however, in reality, two Gods — a created and an uncreated God; and, on account of such a plurality, as well as of the creature-like nature of that which they worship, they must be regarded as pagans (c. Ar. 3. 16). The doctrine of Arius, further, destroys the whole Christian doctrine respecting man's salvation. For, if the Son is a creature, man must continue, even after the Son finished his work on earth, in a state of separation from God; for, how can one creature restore other creatures to communion with God, since all are alike needy and helpless in themselves? If the Son is a creature, and, as such, had been made the Son of God, then God the Father would have sent us no *Mediator*, but could have at once converted us also into his sons. But if, on the other hand, our help comes through the Son alone, if we receive the adoption through him, he cannot be simply a creature, for as such he could not have been capable of

aiding us (c. Ar. 2. 67-70. 41). But, as the Arians allege, God had himself created the Son *immediately*, and all other objects through him, that is, mediately. What an absurd explanation! Had God, perhaps, grown weary of the work of creating? Or did he deem it beneath his dignity to give existence to the other creatures? Surely that God who led Jacob to Egypt and "spake unto Moses face to face" (Gen. xxxiii. 11), is not a haughty God. Who then shall dare to discriminate between the works of creation which God himself made and those which the Son made? He, the one God, creates alike that which is great and that which is small, in his Logos, the Son (de Decr. 7). He still preserves the whole world by his protecting care, provides for the fowls of the air, does not forget the sparrow upon the house-top, and cares even for the lilies and the grass of the field; so that the whole world protests against the declaration that it is unworthy of God to occupy himself with the world (c. Ar. 2. 25). But it would be unworthy of God to allege that he needed a mediator in producing a creature, for he would then resemble the carpenter who cannot proceed in his work without the instrumentality of his axe or his saw (c. Ar. 2. 26). But they now pretend that the other creatures could not have endured the direct operation of the mighty hand of God. But we ask: How then could the Son have been created without a similar intervention? The creation of him would, by a parity of reasoning, have also required a mediator, and ultimately no creature could have come into existence (de Decr. 8). Further, if the Son was created only on account of the other creatures, he really owes his existence to us; and now that we do exist, his own continued existence has become unnecessary; indeed, we would occupy a higher rank than his own is, for the means are always subordinate to the end (c. Ar. 2. 30). If, however, the priority of his creation elevates him to a higher rank than our own, Adam, the head of our race, must have essentially differed from us; but such a view would be contrary to the whole tenor of the scriptures (de Decr. 9). But the Arians

attempt to secure themselves by borrowing from the Greeks the term ἀγέννητος, and hope to be able by its aid to count the Son among creatures. But they do not seem to be aware that the Greeks applied this term alike to the absolute and sovereign Good, and also to the νοῦς which proceeds from him, and, indeed, likewise to the ψυχή which proceeds from the νοῦς (de Decr. 28). For they inquire : ἐν τὸ ἀγέννηταν ἢ δύο;¹ When any one who is unacquainted with their craftiness, replies, ἐν τὸ ἀγέννητον, they suddenly spit out their poison, and quickly retort : “ Then it follows that the Son belongs to the class of the creatures, and we are correct in saying that he did not exist before he began to be.” For they confound all things together for the purpose of separating the Logos from the Father, and counting the former among creatures.

While the Arians accuse the Nicene Fathers of having employed expressions which do not occur in the scriptures, they are themselves guilty of the same fault, without however understanding the several significations of the expression which they borrow from the Greeks. For ἀγέννητον signifies, first, that which is possible (τὸ μηδέπω μὲν γινόμενον, δυνάμενον δὲ γενέσθαι), as, e. g. wood which has not yet become (been made into) a vessel, but can become a vessel; it, secondly, designates that which is impossible (τὸ μήτε γινόμενον, μήτε δυνάμενον γενέσθαι ποτέ), as, e. g. a triangle cannot become a square, nor an even become an uneven number; it designates, thirdly, that which exists, but which proceeds from nothing else (τὸ ὑπάρχον μὲν, μὴ γεννηθέν δὲ ἕκ τινος, μὴ δὲ ὅλως ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ τινα πατέρα), as indeed the sophist Asterius, who belongs to their party, says : it is τὸ μὴ ποιηθέν, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ ὄν. In which sense shall we, then, receive the word? If ἀγέννητον designates, in the sense of Asterius, that which is no creature, but always is, then the Son must likewise be called ἀγέννητος. But if the Arians take it in the sense of

¹ Voigt here rejects the reading of some manuscripts, ἀγέννητον, *unbegotten*, on the ground that the course of the argument and the antithesis to γεννητός (from γίγνομαι, not γεννάω) require the reading given above in the text.

that which exists, which is not born of another, and has no father (κατὰ τὸ ὑπάρχον μὲν, μήτε δὲ γεννηθὲν ἐκ τινος μήτε ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα), then we answer that the Father alone is ἀγένητος, meaning, at the same time, not that the Son is γεννητός, but that he is a γέννημα. For the word γεννητός, which may be applied to all creatures, does not describe the Son as the image of the Father, which he really is, since the Logos is like the Father who begat him. Precisely as the terms "Almighty," "Lord of hosts," refer to the relation of God to his creatures, and not to his relation to the Son, so, too, the word ἀγένητος refers to his relation to the creatures, whereas in reference to the Son, God is called the Father. The term *Father* is far exalted in sense above that of ἀγένητος, as the Son himself is exalted above all creatures. Whatever use the pagans may make of the word, our Lord has taught us to pray, not Θεὸ ἀγένητε, but Πάτερ ἡμῶν, and commanded us to baptize, not in the name of the ἀγένητος and the γένητος — the Creator and the creature, but in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Hence all the Arian arguments, as Athanasius says, which are derived from the word ἀγένητος are absurd and frivolous (c. Ar. 1: 30 – 34; de Decr. 28 – 31).

The Arians were conscious that if the Son is merely a creature, God the Father, in view of his spiritual nature, cannot be said to need the existence of the Son. Arius accordingly, while appealing for support to Dionysius of Alexandria, asserted that, in addition to the Son, God possessed in himself a Logos, viewed as reason, wisdom, and power, and that the Son, like the world, had received existence through this Logos. The latter was without beginning, and consequently did not come into existence in time, whereas Christ, although he was the first-born, and the only-begotten, belonged to the class of the numerous *wisdoms* (σοφίαι) and powers which this Logos had called into being. Athanasius replies thus: The scriptures speak of only *one* Logos of God, through whom all things were made, and who was made (ἐγένετο, *became*) flesh (John i. 3,

14). The word of God recognizes no other wisdom save the Son, and none of the Fathers had knowledge of any other. That wisdom which Arius describes as ἀγενήτως συνυπάρχουσα τῷ πατρὶ and as δημιουργός is solely the Son (c. Ar. 2. 39, 40). It is in vain that Arius appeals to Dionysius of Alexandria, whose views he does not understand, since that writer had distinguished the Logos of God only from the νοῦς of God, as the stream is distinguished from its source; he did not, however, *separate* them, but taught that the Logos and the Son were alike in essence, being born of the essence of the Father, and also eternal and inseparable (de Sent. Dion. 23. 24). It hence appears that Arius made so wide a distinction between the person of the Father and that of the Son, that, as a result of his theory, each was a complete being, an ego, in itself, whose self-consciousness and self-determination were independent of the other. Consequently, as Arius was unwilling to expose himself to the charge of Dyotheism, his theory compelled him to assert the complete subordination of the Son to the Father, and assign to the former the rank of a creature.

The controversy, however, on the subject whether the Son was or was not a creature, was not conducted with arguments furnished exclusively by philosophy: both parties sought for all accessible exegetical aids; and here the churchly character of Athanasius gave him greatly the advantage. When the Arians attempted to demonstrate that the *origin* of the Lord was that of a creature, they appealed to passages in which he seemed to be described as one that had been created or came into existence in time (Prov. viii. 22; Heb. iii. 2; Acts ii. 36; Heb. i. 4; Phil. ii. 7; John i. 14). The *nature* and *character* of his being and his life as a creature, they endeavored to prove by passages which refer to his bodily growth, trouble of soul, defective knowledge, weariness and sleep, etc. (Luke ii. 52; John xii. 27, 28; Matt. xxvi. 39; Mark xiii. 32, etc.). Athanasius repelled such arguments by showing that all these passages referred to the human nature in the person of Christ; and he characterized the

Arian mode of interpreting them as a revival of the old Jewish delusion, that the divine and the human were incapable of being united (c. Ar. 3. 27).

He discusses the passages of the former class in his second discourse against the Arians. "If the Arians," he says (c. Ar. 2. 1) "had understood the character of Christianity, they would not have been taken captive by the unbelief of the Jews; they would have learned that the Logos was in the beginning, that the Logos was with God, and that God was the Logos; they would, further, have understood that when it pleased God that the Logos should become man, it was rightly said of him : ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, and κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν αὐτὸν ἐποίησε (Acts ii. 36); and κύριος ἔκτισέ με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ (Prov. viii. 22); and τοσούτῳ κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν ἀγγέλων (Heb. i. 4); and ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε μορφὴν δούλου λαβών (Phil. ii. 7); and κατανοήσατε τὸν ἀπόστολον καὶ ἀρχιερεα Ἰησοῦν πιστὸν ὄντα τῷ ποιήσαντι αὐτόν (Heb. iii. 2); for all these expressions have the same sense; they refer to the deity of the Logos, and, because he also became the Son of man, to the predicates of his human nature (τὴν θεότητα τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπίνως λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτοῦ)."

According to this general principle Athanasius then proceeds to examine each of the passages in detail, after premising the following general proposition: It is an erroneous procedure to form a conclusion respecting the nature or being of the Son from expressions like ἐποίησεν, ἐγένετο, ἔκτισεν, κ. τ. λ., as the latter are obviously to be explained in accordance with the true nature of the Son, and are not themselves the authoritative guide in defining that nature, since the characterization of any object is not anterior in time, but posterior, to the object itself. If the Son were really a creature, then expressions like ἐποίησεν, etc., should be literally understood; but if he is γέννημα and υἱός as to his essence, then ἐποίησε is not to be literally understood, but is used instead of ἐγέννησε. The scriptures, Athanasius continues, often term sons δοῦλοι, and servants τέκνα; Sarah

called Abraham *lord* (1 Pet. iii. 6; Gen. xviii. 12), although she was not his bondmaid, and Paul terms Onesimus a *brother*, although the latter was a slave (c. Ar. 2, 3). Now if we, nevertheless, do not call servants sons, nor sons servants, nor employ the other terms just mentioned as they are employed in these exceptional cases, neither ought we to deny the true nature of the Son and Logos of God, when the scriptures employ the language respecting him which has been adduced. And yet, when the scriptures apply to Christ the terms *γέννημα* and Logos of God, the latter are misinterpreted and denied; while, on the other hand, when the scriptures speak of Christ as *ποίημα*, the Arians disingenuously at once declare that the Son is by nature a creature (l. c. 4).

Athanasius then explains the words in Heb. iii. 2 as teaching that the Father had made his Son a human being, and sent him to be our high-priest; this was the result when the Logos, although he was the creator of the world, assumed a body that was created and that had a beginning of its being. Hence, in the beginning the Lord was the Logos, was with God, and was God; and then, when it pleased God that he should become a sacrifice for us, he was made flesh. Now, even as it could be said of Aaron on a certain day: "To-day Aaron is made [has become] a high-priest," without thereby conveying the sense: "To-day Aaron has become a human being," so, too, the language: "The Father has made him, the Son, a high-priest," cannot be interpreted to mean that then the Logos had been first created, and, as the Logos, had had a beginning (c. Ar. 2, 7, 8).

While Athanasius referred Heb. iii. 2 to the sacerdotal office of Christ, he explained Acts ii. 36 as an indication of his kingly office, which the Lord also acquired through his incarnation. He appeals to the Greek version of Gen. xxvii. 29, 37, where, as he maintains, the phrase *κύριον ποιῆν* refers, not to the *οὐσία*, but to the *ἐξουσία* of Jacob and Esau; so, too, the words in Acts ii. 36 specially refer to the Lord's

authority over us, and his royal rank, which he gained through his incarnation. "He was previously already both Lord and King (Ps. cx.); but after the law, with its curse, and death, had acquired dominion over us, he was made flesh, completed his redeeming work for our benefit on the cross, and communicated its blessings through the mission of the Holy Spirit; in this manner he became our Lord, and we became his subjects in a special sense. His eternal dominion over us, which he possessed as the image and Logos of the Father, and as the creator of the world, was manifested anew through his incarnation and redeeming work" (*τὸ ἐποίησεν ἴσον τῷ ἀπέδειξεν*, c. Ar. 2. 12-18).

No scriptural passage, however, occupied so prominent a position as Prov. viii. 22-25, and specially vs. 22: *κύριος ἔκτισέ με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ*. The Arians appealed to this passage, not only for the purpose of substantiating their general doctrine that the Son is a creature, but also for that of proving that God had created the Son for the work of completing the creation of the world. As the Arians regarded the passage as their stronghold, Athanasius devotes almost the whole of the succeeding portions of his second discourse against the Arians, or eighty-two chapters, to the work of exposing the errors of the Arian interpretation. Voigt, who has hitherto been our guide, occupies more than eight pages with a statement of this particular controversy. As neither party, however, appealed to the original Hebrew text, and as the Septuagint, on which both depended, does not here reproduce the original with entire accuracy, we omit this portion of the controversy in its exegetical form.

The Arians had also appealed to Col. i. 15: *ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*; they maintained that, while the Son was here termed the first-born of the whole creation, he was still regarded as belonging to that creation, as a part of it, and was classed with other creatures in respect to his nature. "But if this were really the case," Athanasius replies, "he would, with respect to

his nature, be a brother of irrational creatures also, and could be classed even with inanimate objects (*ἄψυχα*), being in that case distinguished from all these only by the difference in the time of his origin. The passage obviously calls for a different interpretation. The Son is both *μονογενής* and also *πρωτότοκος*; now he could not receive both predicates, unless the reference in each case were peculiar and respectively different. The term *μονογενής*, namely, refers to his generation by the Father, while *πρωτότοκος* is to be understood as indicating *εἰς τὴν κτίσιν συγκατάβασιν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀδελφοποίησιν* (creation and redemption). As *the only-begotten* he has no brethren, but as *the first-born* he has many. He receives the former appellation from his relation to God (John i. 14; 1 John iv. 9), the latter, from his relation to the world. The latter relation he assumed in consequence of the love of the Father to men, since God desired not only that all things should “consist” (Col. i. 17) by his Logos (creation), but also that through him “the creature should be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God” (Rom. viii. 21). By such a process he becomes the *first-born*, not only of those who are the children of God, but also of the whole creation” (c. Ar. 2, 62–64).

The words in Heb. i. 4 (*τοσοῦτῳ κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅσῳ διαφορώτερον παρ’ αὐτοὺς κεκληρονόμηκεν ὄνομα*) were also involved in the controversy. The Arians laid an emphasis on the word *γενόμενος*, which, as they alleged, implied that the Son began to be in time, like the angels, although he is of higher rank than they are. Athanasius replies that *γενόμενος* is to be interpreted, not as an independent phrase, but in its intimate connection with *κρείττων*, which latter term marks a difference, not in degree but in kind—a difference in the nature or being of the Son. Thus, in Prov. viii. 11, where wisdom is compared with precious stones, the language [of the Septuagint] is: *κρείττων σοφία λίθων πολυτελῶν*, while there is confessedly an essential difference in the nature of wisdom and of precious

stones respectively. The Son, accordingly, describes the Father, in John xiv. 28, not as *κρείττων* but as *μείζων*, because they are not different in their nature or being. There is no affinity between the nature of the Son, on the one hand, and that of angels or creatures, on the other; for the apostle could not have otherwise described the former as God, the creator of the world, and eternal (Heb. i. 8, 10, 11). The contrast here made between the Son and the angels presupposes, not a similarity, but a difference, of nature or being; the sense is: The service of the Son is as much exalted above that of the angels, as the Son differs in rank and character from a servant. For the law, which was ordained by angels, made no one perfect (Gal. iii. 19; Heb. vii. 19), whereas the incarnation of the Son perfected the Father's work. Furthermore, during the time of the law, which was received by the disposition of angels, death reigned, from Adam to Moses (Acts vii. 53; Rom. v. 14), whereas the manifestation of the Logos abolished death (2 Tim. i. 10). At an earlier period God was known in Judea alone, but now the whole earth is full of the knowledge of the Lord; the disciples have taught all nations, and the words are fulfilled: "They shall be all taught of God" (John vi. 45). So, too, in other passages of the epistle (Heb. vii. 22; viii. 6; vii. 19; ix. 23), the apostle refers to the exalted character of the office of Christ as compared with that of the angels, as well as to their essential difference, and again employs the term *κρείττων*. Thus this term is applied, throughout the whole epistle, to the Lord, for the reason that he is different from all creatures (c. Ar. 1. 55–59).

The Arians also adduced Heb. vii. 22 (*κατὰ τοσοῦτον κρείττονος διαθήκης γέγονεν ἔργον Ἰησοῦς*), as they claimed that the conception of Christ as a creature lay in the expression *γέγονε*. Here, too (Athanasius replies), the word does not, in the most remote degree, refer to the *οὐσία* of the Son, but to his incarnation and to his redeeming work, in view of which latter he was made [became] flesh; inasmuch as that which, according to Rom. viii. 3, the law of the old covenant

could not do, was performed by him, when he redeemed us from sin and death by his vicarious sufferings, and enabled us to walk in the Spirit (c. Ar. 1. 60). Even as we cannot assert of the Father that he had begun to be in time, in respect to his nature or being, when we read in Ps. ix. 10 (Sept.): ἐγένετο κύριος καταφυγὴ τῷ πένητι, or elsewhere meet with analogous expressions; so, too, expressions like the one just described in Heb. vii. 22, cannot be referred to the nature, being, or essence of the Son, but are to be explained in reference to that salvation which he wrought out for man (l. c. 62, 63).

No passage of the New Testament was, however, more frequently quoted by the Arians than Phil. ii. 5–11. The controversy, as far as this passage is concerned, was conducted by Athanasius, c. Ar. 1. 37–45. The Arians, he says, attempt to prove from Phil. ii. 9, 10 and Ps. xlv. 8 [Sept.; vs. 7 in the Eng. trans.], that the Lord was exalted as a reward of his virtue, and that in view of this exaltation he was called the *Son of God* and *God*. But if this be true, the Son would not be *the Son* in any other sense than that wherein others are such; he would be the Son, not by nature but by grace; he would continue to be the Son only so long as his moral deportment did not exhibit any change (l. c. 37). He would, moreover, be the Son of God only since the time of his incarnation, and of the obedience which, after that event, he rendered to God, for such is the source or ground of his exaltation, according to Phil. ii. 7, 8, 10. But then, what was he previously to his incarnation? Either he was somewhat else than the Son, or he did not yet at all exist. Now the latter is precisely the heresy of the Jews and the Samosatensians [adherents of the doctrine of Paul of Samosata], and, consequently, the Arians should, like the Jews, submit to circumcision, and resign the name of Christians. If Christ did not exist before his incarnation, or in consequence of that event acquired a higher character, how could all things have been made through him, or how could the

Father have been well pleased in him who had yet no complete existence? Or how could he himself have spoken of a glory which he had with the Father before the world was (John xvii. 5)? Accordingly, he was not a man, who, as such, afterwards became God; but he was God, and afterwards became also man. Athanasius next proceeds to interpret the passage itself, in order to demonstrate still more clearly the unchangeable divine nature of the Son. The apostle, he says, thus addressed the Philippians: *Τοῦτο φρονείσθω ἐν ὑμῖν ὁ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ πατρός.* What can be plainer than these words? He did not, as an inferior, become greater in rank or character, but rather, while he was God, he took upon him the form of a servant, and thereby he did not become more perfect, but rather “humbled himself.” Where is there, at this point, any mention made of a reward of virtue, or of any progress, improvement, or aggrandizement in this state of humiliation? As God, he could not possibly be exalted. If God is the Most High, his Logos must be the same. He who is in the Father, and is in all things like unto the Father, can need neither any increment nor any exaltation. Why should he humble himself in order to receive that which he already possessed? What grace can he need who liberally communicates his grace to others? How could he *receive* an adorable name who had always been adored in his own name? Even before his incarnation the angels worshipped him (Heb. i. 6). In the beginning the Logos was, and the Logos was with God, and God was the Logos; but afterwards, for our sakes, the Logos was made flesh. Hence the term *ὑπερύψωσε* does not imply that the nature of the Logos had been exalted, for he always was and is equal to God; this exaltation, therefore, refers only to his human nature. Hence the exaltation denotes, not the period preceding, but the period succeeding, his incarnation. A state of exaltation can follow only a state of humiliation; and if the assumption of our flesh gives occasion to the mention of an exaltation, the

latter also can refer to the flesh or human nature of Christ alone. It was man who needed an exaltation. Now as the Logos assumed the form of a servant, and suffered death for our sakes, in order that he might thereby bring us to God, it is said in reference to these events, that he was exalted for our sakes as a man; so that as we, through his death, die in him, we might also be exalted in him, even as through him we arise from the dead, and enter into heaven, whither he has gone as our forerunner (Heb. vi. 20). When he says in John xvii. 19 that he sanctifies himself, the sense is, not that the Logos is to become holy, but that we also might be sanctified in him; so, too, the phrase: "God hath exalted him," does not imply that the Logos himself shall be exalted, but that we shall be exalted, and enter into the gates of heaven, which had been closed, not to him, but to us (c. Ar. 1. 40, 41). All that is said in vs. 9-11 respecting his name and worship, is to be taken in the same sense; it was not written for the sake of the Logos, who had been adored long before he became man. When he subsequently assumed our nature and received the name of Jesus, the whole creation still lay at his feet, and testified, in devout adoration, that the incarnation of the Logos and the death which he suffered in the flesh tended, not to the dishonor of his deity, but to the glory of God the Father. Hence the terms *ὑπερύψωσεν* and *ἐχαρίσατο* point to benefits which *we* receive. The former term may also be viewed as referring specially to his resurrection from the dead, in which case it would involve the following sense: He became man, and humbled himself even unto death; therefore God also exalted him through the resurrection. Even in this sense the word *διό* would not point to any reward of his virtue, but indicate the cause of his resurrection, namely the circumstance that he, although God, had become man. All other human beings die, because their descent is from Adam alone, and death rules over them; but he was "the second man, the Lord from heaven" (1 Cor. xv. 47), and he could not, in the words of Peter, "be holden of death" (Acts ii. 24

l. c. 44). If the Logos is represented as the subject of the exaltation, while in reality the latter concerned his human nature alone, the cause lies in the fact that his body, or human nature, which was immediately the subject of the exaltation, was not separate from his divine nature. While, however, in view of this fact, the Logos is said to have been exalted, it was the Logos himself who was the author of that exaltation, since all that the Father does and grants, he does and grants through the Son. Accordingly, the Son is both he who exalts, in respect to his divine nature, and also he who is exalted, in respect to his human nature (l. c. 45). "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever" (Ileb. xiii. 18), who is eternally unchangeable, is the same who gives as the Logos, and receives as a man (l. c. 48).

While the Arians adduced these passages for the purpose of showing that the origin of the Son was that of a creature, they resorted to another series in order to prove that the nature and character of the Son were confined within certain limits, and were capable of further development, thus implying that he was a creature. How can *he* be the Son of God by nature, they asked, and be like God in his essence or being, who declares himself that the "power" (Matt. xxviii. 18), "the judgment" (John v. 22), and, indeed, "all things" (John iii. 35; Matt. xi. 27), had been given to him by the Father? If he were the Son of God by nature, it could not have been necessary that he should first receive all things. How can he be the true power of God by nature, who, in the period of his sufferings, said: "My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death. If it be possible, let this cup pass from me"? If he were the power of God, he would not have feared, but rather have endowed others with strength. If, further, he were the true wisdom of the Father, how could it be said of him: "Jesus increased in wisdom" (Luke ii. 52)? When he came to Bethany, he inquired where Lazarus lay (John xi. 34), and, at another time, he asked his disciples how many loaves of bread they had. How can he

be wisdom itself, who increased in wisdom, and was unacquainted with so many facts? Or how can he be the Logos of the Father, who exclaimed on the cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and did not know the time of the judgment, whereas the Father is never without the Logos, and accomplishes nothing without his Logos? Because he was a creature he used such language and had various wants, such being the condition of creatures (c. Ar. 3. 26).

The Arians, Athanasius replies, in consequence of their unbelief and wickedness, are to be classed with the Jews. The latter ask: How can he who is a man be God? The former ask: How can he who was God become a man? The latter continue: If he were the Son of God he would not have suffered on the cross; while the former demand: How can ye call *him* the Son and Logos of God who suffered on the cross? The latter exclaim: Is he not Joseph's son? Do we not know his father and his mother? How can he, then, say: "Before Abraham was, I am." "I came down from heaven"? The former exclaim: How can he be the Logos and God, who sleeps as a man, weeps and laments as a man? Both the Jews and the Arians, in consequence of the sufferings which the Saviour endured in the flesh, deny the deity of the Logos (c. Ar. 3. 27). We, on the contrary, are Christians, and we understand the gospel narratives respecting the Lord in their proper sense. We do not stone him like the Jews, when we hear him speak of his eternal deity, neither are we offended, like the Arians, when he, as a man, employs for our sakes the language of human feebleness. It is, indeed, a peculiarity of the scriptures that they speak of the Saviour in a twofold manner, when they, on the one hand, set forth that he, as the Logos and brightness of the Father, always was God, and, on the other, explain that he afterwards became man for our sakes; this twofold view pervades the whole body of the sacred writings (l. c. 28, 29). He did not simply visit a man, as in the days of the prophets, for the purpose of sanctifying him,

and revealing himself, but he became also the Son of man. Hence all that is peculiar to human nature, such as hunger, thirst, and weariness, is ascribed to him, while at the same time he performs the works of the Logos, such as giving sight to the blind, or raising the dead. On the one hand, the Logos bore the infirmities of the flesh as his own, for it was his flesh; on the other, the flesh served the works of the deity, for it was the body of God. Hence the prophet truly says: "He bare (*βαστάζειν*, Matt. viii. 17) our sicknesses," and not merely, he *healed* them, so that it might not seem as if he had been out of the body and healed it only externally (c. Ar. 3. 30, 31).

While the Arians, like the Jews, proceeded on the principle that a fully divine nature was not capable of being united with a complete human nature, Athanasius firmly adhered, in accordance with the scriptures, to the doctrine of the union of the two natures. All the expressions occurring in the scriptures respecting the Lord, he referred to one of the two natures, without excluding the other from its due participation. He accordingly adopted this course also in reference to the most grave objection which the Arians advanced, namely, that there were many things which the Lord did not know. It was not, he says, as the Logos, but as a man, that he was unacquainted with some things, for instance, the day of judgment (Mark xiii. 32). How should the Lord of heaven and earth, who appointed days and hours, not know them? That he did know them he indicated when he foretold (Matt. xxiv.) all that should precede the day and hour of the judgment. The want of a knowledge of all things is a characteristic feature of human nature. As the Logos, the Lord knows; as a man, he does not know. As a man, he was not ashamed to confess the ignorance of the flesh (c. Ar. 3. 42, 43). As the Father does all things through the Son, and through him, too, appoints the day and hour of the judgment, the Son must necessarily have known the latter. The Son is in the Father, and the Father in him, so that he knows all that the Father knows

(l.c. 44). When he came to Cesarea, and asked his disciples: "Whom do men say that I, the Son of man, am?" he previously knew the reply which Peter then made. For if the Father revealed it to Peter, he revealed it through the Son, since "no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him" (l. c. 3, 46). Hence, as the Son of God, he well knew the time of the judgment; if he nevertheless said that he knew it not, he may have possibly been influenced by the consideration that if he revealed it, man would in the intermediate time become negligent, and forbear to watch, to pray, and to prepare for the hour (Matt. xxiv. 42). At the same time he by no means uttered that which was untrue, for, as a man, he could truly say, I know not. But after his resurrection, when his flesh was changed, glorified, and freed from death, he no longer said that he knew not, but only: "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons" (Acts i. 7); for at the period of his ascension it was no longer fitting (*οὐκ ἐτι ἔπρεπε*) that he should speak *σαρκικῶς*, but rather *θεϊκῶς* (l. c. 47-49). If the enemies of Christ are not satisfied with this explanation, we would be justified in addressing another interrogation to them: In Paradise God called unto Adam and said: Where art thou? And to Cain he said: Where is Abel thy brother? Did God, perhaps, not know, when he asked these questions? The answer must be: He well knew. Is it then unreasonable and inconsistent that the same Son, in whom God then asked those questions, should afterwards, as man, propose questions to his disciples?

§ 4. THE INFERENCES DEDUCED BY ARIUS FROM HIS FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINE, AND THEIR REFUTATION BY ATHANASIUS.

The foregoing statement describes the controversy as far as the fundamental principle of Arianism, that the Son of God is a creature, was concerned. Arius now proceeded to set forth a series of propositions containing inferences from

that principle, or presenting arguments in confirmation of it. These propositions, which assigned the attributes of a creature to the Son, and the mode in which they are assailed, present a striking analogy to the discussion of the main principle, as exhibited above. Arius derived his arguments in each case almost exclusively from reason, and in each, too, Athanasius repelled them by means of exegetical weapons.

1. "*The Son of God is not from eternity, but has a beginning of his existence* (ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν), even as everything except God has had a beginning." Such was the original and oft-repeated assertion of Arius. God was not always, he added, the Father, but ἦν ὅτε ὁ Θεὸς μόνος ἦν καὶ οὐπω πατήρ ἦν, ὕστερον δὲ ἐπιγέγονε πατήρ. For as all things were made of nothing, so, too, the Logos of God came into being out of non-existence, καὶ ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ κτίζεσθαι ἔσχε καὶ αὐτός (c. Ar. 1. 5; de Decr. 6). "It was," says Dorner (*Lehre von d. Person Christi* I. 814) "the main purpose of Arius to show that our conception of the Father and of his existence by no means necessarily implied the Son and his existence, but that his existence in his relation to the Father was contingent or incidental [and not an absolute necessity]." Hence Arius did not yet employ the formula ἦν ποτε κ. τ. λ. in his letter to Alexander, which is given at the commencement of this Article. As Arius, who asserted the *priority* of the Father, was anxious to avoid the appearance of connecting the conception of *time* with the existence of the Father, he carefully avoided the use of the word χρόνος in his favorite formula; this subterfuge, however, availed but little, for, as Athanasius correctly remarks, the conception of time unquestionably lies in the phrase ἦν ποτε. It may yet be added that the formula itself was not an original production of Arius, as both Origen and Dionysius of Rome had already assailed it (de Decr. 26, 27). The refutation of the Arian theory (represented by the rallying-cry of the party: ἦν ποτε, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν) is found chiefly in the first discourse of

Athanasius against the Arians. He proceeds thus: Let us subject this phrase to an equitable test. What is, strictly speaking, the subject [or nominative of the verb] in ἦν ποτε? Is it *God the Father*? But this would be unblushing blasphemy. For the term *once* (ποτέ) cannot be used predicatively of him who is absolutely the self-existent One, whose existence is an unchangeable and eternal *now* (ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν). Or is *the Son* the subject in the phrase ἦν ποτε? That would be a palpable contradiction in itself, since he cannot possibly both *be* and *not be* at the same time. We can then only assume that *time* (χρόνος) is the subject, and complete the sentence thus: ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ λόγος, as the word ποτέ authorizes us to do. The formula is then simply equivalent to another favorite Arian phrase: οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς πρὶν γεννηθῆναι, and both imply that time preceded the existence of the Logos. Now such language is diametrically opposed to that of the scriptures, which both maintain that the existence of the Son is eternal, without beginning as well as without end (ἀεὶ, ἀίδιον), and also represent the Son as eternally co-existing with the Father (John i. 1; Rev. i. 4; Rom. ix. 5) as his eternal power and Godhead (Rom. i. 20, comp. with 1 Cor. i. 24), c. Ar. 1. 11. We further find in the scriptures that when the Son speaks of his own nature, he always speaks in the present tense (εἰμὶ), and by it ascribes to himself an existence without beginning. He says: *I am* the truth (John xiv. 6), not *I became* the truth; *I am* your Master and Lord (John xiii. 13); *I am* the Shepherd (John x. 14); *I am* the Light (John viii. 12); Before Abraham was, *I am* (John viii. 58). Times and periods of time, like all things else, were first created through the Son, and when all things had not yet been created through him, time itself did not yet exist. How can we then conceive of time antecedently to the Logos? (c. Ar. 1. 12, 13). But the Arians allege: "If the Son is eternal as the Father, he is not his Son, but his Brother." How foolish and contentious they are! Their objection would be plausible if we simply held that Christ is eternal, and did not also teach that he is

likewise the *Son*; but how could we, in this case, conceive of him who is begotten as the *brother* of him who begets him? The Father and the Son are not begotten ἐκ τινος ἀρχῆς προϋπαρχούσης, so that they would be brothers, but the Father is the point of departure and the begetter (ἀρχὴ καὶ γεννήτωρ) of the Son: the former is Father only; the latter, Son only. When we now designate the generation by the Father as eternal, we do so with the strictest truth; for the essence or being of the Father was never incomplete, and the Son was not begotten as one human being is begotten by another, so that he would be posterior to the Father, but he is eternal as the eternal God, whose Son he is. Men beget in time, because their nature is not perfect, but God's nature is ἀεὶ τέλειος (c. Ar. 1. 14). If God had not always been the Father, and had only become so in time, he would be mutable, whereas we know that he is eternally the same (l. c. 22, 28). It is only folly to suppose that God is like a man. But as the foolish questions which the Arians ask may mislead the simple, we must offer a reply. They say to a woman: Hadst thou a son before thou broughtest forth? Then the Son of God did not exist before he was begotten (l. c. 22). So, too, they may ask a mechanic: Canst thou furnish an article without materials? Then neither can God do it. But they compare God to a man, only when we speak of his Son. When we assert that God creates, they refrain from such comparisons. Now even as God is not like man when he creates, so he is not like man when he begets (c. Ar. 1. 23).

2. "*The Son*," the Arians again held, "*was not begotten of the essence or being of the Father*, but proceeded from an external source, and was created out of nothing, for the essence or being of God is indivisible." Here, too, Athanasius shows that the premises are false, since the divine act of generation does not resemble that of a man, and the limitations of the human body do not occur in God. He does not consist of parts like a man. If the Son proceeds from an external source (ἐξωθεν), then this source or object,

whatever it may be, intervenes between him and God, and is nearer to God than he is; Christ is then the Son of this object, which is distinct from the nature of God. And yet, as God terms him *his* own son (comp. τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ, Rom. viii. 32, and πατέρα ἰδίου John v. 19), he cannot proceed from a foreign source, but necessarily derives his origin from the essence or being of God (c. Ar. 1. 28, 15).

3. The Arians further alleged: "*The Son came into being, like all things else, by the purpose and will of God*" (βουλήσει καὶ θελήσει γεγενῆσθαι τὸν υἱὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, c. Ar. 3. 59). Athanasius maintains that this proposition depends on the foregoing, when he says: τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα ποτὲ ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν ἐπιγιγνόμενα ὁ δημιουργὸς βουλεύεται ποιῆσαι (l. c. 61), and charges his opponents with the adoption of the heresy of the Gnostic Valentinus. His mode of argumentation here, however, as in some other cases, is comparatively undecided and feeble, as in his age theological science exhibited many defects, which have since been supplied.

4. In connection with these three propositions, the Arians also set forth the following: "*The Son does not possess an equality and a unity of essence or being with the Father.*" He is not like the Father in essence, they alleged, inasmuch as the Logos must, like other creatures, be unlike God (ἀλλότριος καὶ ἀνόμιος κατὰ πάντα τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας καὶ ιδιότητος, c. Ar. 1. 6). Athanasius replies by referring to passages like John xiv. 9 and Heb. i. 3, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father"; "who being the brightness of his glory," etc. The conditions and limitations of human nature should not be transferred to God. While human beings beget others in succession (κατὰ διαδοχὴν), and no human being is exclusively (κυρίως) a father or a son, the Father is Father only, the Son a son only. He who should ask why the Son did not, in his turn, beget a son, might with equal propriety ask why the Father had not himself a father before him (c. Ar. 1. 21, 22). The Arians also denied that the Son was *one* in essence or being with the Father (διηρημένον εἶναι κατ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀμέτοχον κατὰ πάντα τοῦ πα-

τὸς τὸν υἱόν, c. Ar. 1. 6). Athanasius replies: Who, that hears the words of the Lord and Saviour: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me," and "I and my Father are one" (John xiv. 11; x. 30), will dare to put asunder what the Lord and Saviour has joined together and declared to be indivisible (de Decr. 2)? The Arians had interpreted such passages as referring to oneness of the will, and adduced the circumstance that the Son was one with the Father in thought, judgment, and will. But Athanasius replied: Then all the angels in heaven, yea, the sun, moon, and stars may be said to be *one* with God, since God's will was always their own, and their judgment and purposes coincided with his own. And yet, what angel would presume to say: "I and the Father are one" (c. Ar. 3. 10)? Consequently, the equality and unity in question must be understood of the very nature and being of the Son, that is, substantially, and not merely ethically. As the essence of the Father and the Son is one and the same, the Father visits saints when the Son does, and hence the latter says: "We [I and the Father] will come unto him," etc. (John xiv. 23). When the Father confers grace and peace, the Son confers them too, as Paul always expresses himself: "Grace and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." If such divine gifts proceed in common from the Father and the Son, we have in this fact the evidence of the oneness of the Father and the Son (l. c. 11, 12).

5. The Arians also said: "*The Son of God, like all creatures, was subject to change, and really mutable, with respect to his nature; but with respect to his free will he remained good during his own pleasure.*" They added, that, as God had foreseen that he would remain good, he had, by way of anticipation, bestowed the glory on him which men receive only after they have demonstrated their virtuous tendencies (c. Ar. 1. 5). Athanasius refutes these views by referring to the Son's equality of nature or being with the Father. If the Father, he says, is unchangeable, and, accordingly, always remains the same, it necessarily follows that his

image (2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3) must also remain the same, and undergo no change; as he is begotten of the essence of the Father, he will always correspond in his whole nature and being to that divine essence. The Arians indeed make this assertion only for the purpose of severing the image from the Father, and reducing the Son to the rank of a creature (c. Ar. 1. 22). Now if the Son were mutable, how could we through him know the Father who is immutable? For he says: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father" (John xiv. 9), l. c. 35. The image of him who changes not (τοῦ ἀτρέπτου), must consequently also be unchangeable (ἀναλλοίωτος). To this the holy scriptures expressly give testimony, for we read in Heb. xiii. 8: "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever," and David thus gives praise to him: "Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth thou shalt endure thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end" (Ps. cii. 25-27). How could he be the Logos and the Truth of God, if he were subject to change? Or how could he be the Wisdom of God, if he did not always remain the same? For that which is true (ἀληθές) must continue to be the same (l. c. 36).

6. Lastly, the Arians held *that the Son does not possess a perfect knowledge of the Father*, inasmuch as he is himself of a different nature; they even maintained that the Son had not a perfect knowledge of himself. "The Father," said Arius in his *Thalia*, "is invisible to the Son; the Logos cannot fully and precisely behold and know his Father; the measure of his knowledge corresponds to his faculty of perception (ἀναλόγως τοῖς ἰδίους μέτροις οἶδε καὶ βλέπει), as our own knowledge corresponds in degree to our ability (δύναμις). Indeed, the Son does not only not know the Father precisely in consequence of the limits of his powers of comprehension (λείπει αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ καταλαβεῖν), but he has also no perfect knowledge of his own nature or essence" (c. Ar. 1. 6, 9; de Syn. 15). The Arians reached this conclusion by assuming that the Son, as a creature,

could not possibly fathom the infinite nature of the Creator of all. Athanasius arrived at opposite results in accordance with his system that no difference in essence or being existed between the Father and the Son. In opposition to the Arian statement which was subversive of all revelation, he appealed to the saying of Christ: "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father" (John x. 15), and reasoned thus: If the Son does not know the Father, then, neither does the Father know the Son; it must follow that none of the revelations which Jesus Christ has given us respecting the Father can be worthy of our confidence (ad Episc. Aeg. et Lib. 16).

Thus Arius developed his fundamental principle to its last results—the destruction of Christianity itself; but by this process he in reality pronounced judgment against himself in the eyes of all who had through Christ found peace in the knowledge of God. It may indeed be objected that Arius had simply denied that Christ knew God perfectly and precisely (*τελείως, ἀκριβῶς*), while the revelations which he did give, might nevertheless be true, and proceed from his own knowledge, and that all must concede that the revelations which Christ has given in the scriptures by no means furnish us with entire objective truth or an absolute knowledge of God. However, it may be replied, that we, as creatures of limited powers, are not, here below, competent to comprehend perfect and complete truth, and that the latter is, accordingly, not presented to us; but when Christ reveals such knowledge as we may comprehend, it must be assumed that he himself was competent to know God perfectly, as, otherwise, those portions of truth which he did disclose, would have, to his own mind, exhibited obscurity or uncertainty.

§ 5. THE APPEAL OF ATHANASIUS TO THE ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

Arius was compelled to appeal to the authority of earlier teachers in order to escape the odium of having introduced

new and heretical opinions. He attempts to sustain his theory by quoting various terms and phrases employed by Hermas, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Dionysius of Rome. Athanasius accepts the challenge, makes an appeal himself to the established church doctrine, introduces additional authors, such as Theognostus and Origen, and refutes Arius with triumphant success. While he vindicates the character of the early writers whom Arius attempts to associate with himself, he proves that the latter is the sole source whence all the heresies of his party proceeded. Voigt has given many details respecting this part of the controversy, which, as our Article has already reached an undue length, we omit.

If we, in conclusion, summarily view the contest between Athanasius and Arianism, and investigate its results, we reach the following conclusion: In this contest respecting the most important and precious truths of the gospel, Athanasius availed himself fully of all the resources which were furnished to him by the theological science of his age; the truth that had been set forth in the Nicene symbol gained an abiding victory. Arius may have been a man of ordinary abilities; he simply represented distinguished individuals of the oriental church whose doctrinal opinions he was the first to proclaim openly with boldness and consistency. In him, all who sustained his views were defeated by Athanasius. The latter proved conclusively, when the doctrine of the church was assailed by dialectic arguments, that it by no means involved the contradictions with which its opponents charged it; while he convicted the Arian system of numerous contradictions, he demonstrated that the unexplored depths and the mysteries which the church doctrine confessedly, like many other subjects of human knowledge, presented to man, were to be ascribed to his limited knowledge, or to the limited powers of his mind. He preferred, however, to explain and defend his doctrine, not so much by arguments derived from reason, as by those which

the scriptures or revelation afforded. Sustained by the latter, he deprived the Arians of every available weapon, and surrounded the church doctrine with fortifications which were impregnable ; this result is not enfeebled by the fact that his exegesis of various passages of scripture is obviously defective. The consciousness of the believer, too, whose hopes are founded on the redeeming work of the Son of God, supplied him with convincing arguments against the Arian scheme. And, finally, he proved that the faith of the church in Jesus Christ, as the Son of God, had uninterruptedly borne testimony against the fundamental error of Arianism.

Some weak points unquestionably appear in the apologetic and polemic statements of Athanasius, which may be ultimately traced to the imperfect development of theological science in his age. Nevertheless, the controversy in which he engaged, was, in view of its subject and its permanent results, a source of rich blessings to the Christian church. The reason of man, guided by its own dubious light, may still produce theories which exhibit in a greater or less degree an Arian taint ; the church can survey the rise of such errors without alarm, for her whole history, since the age of Athanasius, gives her the assurance that they will soon disappear. The Nicene faith, founded on the rock of the word of God, and endowed with imperishable vitality in the consciousness of the believer, has been assailed in every succeeding age, and has triumphed in every contest ; the attempts to overthrow it have invariably been ineffectual, and have simply resembled waves of the sea which the passing breeze temporarily calls into action, but which subside and disappear as rapidly as they arose.

ARTICLE II.

THE CARAITES.¹

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IN one of the narrow streets of the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem, in a house of moderate size, marked among the rest by its peculiar whiteness and neatness, a small community of some five-and-thirty souls dwell separate from the rest of their race. It is their boast and their consolation that they are the oldest inhabitants of the Holy City since the destruction of the second temple. They have suffered from plague, from famine, from persecution, from apostasy, until their numbers are reduced to this little band; but they still keep their union, their ritual, their purity of doctrine, and the precious volume of their ancient law. Under their house, in a subterranean chamber, lighted through a small square opening in the roof, and by a little glass chandelier with four oil lamps, strangely confusing the artificial with the natural gleam, is the synagogue, which, small as it is, has room for a larger company than the household dwelling above it. Upon the sacred ark is a silver plate inscribed in golden letters with the ancient creed of Israel: "The Lord our God is one Lord." Not from a roll, as in other synagogues, but from a *book* of parchments, the pages decorated with arabesques and illuminated initial letters, is the service chanted. This manuscript bears date of the sixth century, and carries back the possessors to an age earlier than the authentic beginning of the sect; for this little community, gathered in one house, is all that remains here of that important body of reformed Jews, that in the eighth and ninth ages were honored by the name of "Jerusalemites,"

¹ Geschichte des Karäerthums bis 900. Eine kurze Darstellung seiner Entwicklung Lehre und Literatur mit den dazugehörigen Quellennachweisen. Von Dr. Julius Fürst. Leipzig: 1862. 8vo. pp. vi & 186.

but are better known to us (though not much known to any Christians) by their name of *Caraites*.

The name Caraité, from the Hebrew *Kara*, to read or recite, describes the radical difference of this sect from the other Jewish sects. They are *textualists* in opposition to the traditionalists. They hold to the letter of scripture, in opposition to the forms of its various interpretation, and to the accretions by which the rabbins have overloaded and superseded it. This general difference has always been recognized, though beyond this, the information of scholars concerning the peculiarities of the sect has been sufficiently meagre. Very few eastern travellers have made any mention of their customs, and the studies of orientalists have but slightly noticed their literature and their dogmas. Benjamin of Tudela observes that in Damascus, in the twelfth century, there were about two hundred Caraites and four hundred Samaritans living on friendly terms together, but not intermarrying; yet he does not tell us the names of their rabbins, or the details of their life. The Christian writers rarely even mention the sect. But recent German investigations, particularly by the accomplished scholar Julius Fürst, have brought to light many interesting facts about the origin and early history of the Caraites, and have established its high importance in the development of Jewish thought. In this Article we propose to condense and exhibit some of these facts, and to speak of the Caraites as they were in the days of their influence and their leading teachers. This period of prosperity in the sect was short, lasting only a century and a half. For nearly a thousand years the sect has been in the position of a schism, too insignificant to be feared, living only in a lingering death, its largest communities numbered only by hundreds.

The origin of Caraism is to be found in a period long anterior to its actual beginning as a sectarian system of doctrine. Its source reaches back to that age when the contest of Pharisee and Sadducee first divided the Jewish church. The Sadducees were not in all respects as the

later Caraites. Some things which they denied, the Caraites believed; and some things which they upheld, the Caraites neglected. Yet the ground principle of both sects was the same — opposition to tradition and jealous attachment to the text of the law. Caraism was the resuscitation and regeneration of Sadducism, a thousand years after its first birth. In the fourth century before Christ, a party had arisen in the Jewish community which opposed to Pharisaic gloss and commentary a strict literalism, and denied equally the burdensome additions and the unwarranted mitigations which the rulers of the synagogue — the *soferim* or “scribes” — had brought to the Mosaic code. The Sadducees maintained that man’s will is free, that God is not the author of sin, and that no form of fatalism is taught in the scripture; that the happiness or misery of men is the result of their own choice and conduct, and is the sign, not of divine wrath or favor, but of individual sin or virtue. Finding no doctrine of a future life in the sacred history, they denied all separate existence to the soul, all retribution beyond the present life, and especially that notion of a resurrection which the wars of the Maccabees had confirmed as consolation for Israel in its faintness. They found in the words of Moses no warrant for the idea that the dead should come forth from their graves, or that there should be any renewal of the finished earthly life. To this rejection of all spiritual and future life for man, the Sadducees added a rejection of the Persian doctrine of angels and spirits, which, after the Babylonish exile, had been adopted into the Pharisaic system. The seven archangels of the Book of Tobit, and such visions as those related in the second book of Maccabees, were emphatically denounced as unreal and impious. In their interpretation of the law, while the Sadducees allowed free inquiry, in opposition to the authoritative decisions of the scribes, they were still strict constructionists upon particular statutes. They agreed with the Pharisees in not allowing a daughter to inherit from a father’s estate while sons were alive, but contended that this prohibition did not

apply when only the children of sons were living. They maintained literally the doctrine of retaliation, the eye for eye and tooth for tooth. In their view, the false witness might be put to death only when his lie had actually caused the death of his victim.

And in their religious customs and observances the Sadducees were in many things rigid iconoclasts. They absolved the people from the duty of daily sacrifice; rejected the libations of water from the feast of tabernacles; left the wearing of phylacteries free to individual taste and choice; forbade the lighting of lamps on the eve of the Sabbath, since the Mosaic law expressly forbids all kindling of fires on that day (in this respect directly contradicting the injunction of the Pharisees to light lamps in sign of joy on the day of joy and honor); ordered that no warm food should be eaten on the Sabbath day; and prohibited all connubial intercourse on the Sabbath. Many of these peculiarities of the Sadducaic system appeared in the Caraitic teaching; while some of them, especially those concerning the future state, were not adopted by the later heretics. The beginnings of Sadducism were earlier than the age of Alexander the Great, and in the year 333 B. C. the sect had its teachers. A hundred and twenty years before Christ it had reached its greatest influence and its highest point of development. In the apostolic age it had already begun to decline, and in the talmudic age its writings were only fragmentary comments upon the Mosaic law in the spirit of ancient Sadducism. Before the year 500 of our era, Sadducism had ceased to exist as a school of thought or as a separate sect. The Sadducees had long since been fused with the Pharisees, and in the common suffering from heathen oppressions, differences had been forgotten and a full affiliation realized. Nevertheless a foundation had been laid for future heresies; and along with the fuller rabbinical traditions in the Jewish church, there was now the tradition of literalism.

This ancient Sadducism was the earliest and the most important precursor of the Caraitic sect. Another and

nearer preparation for Christianity came in the awakened critical sense of the sixth century, and in the speculations and inventions of the Masorites. The examination of the language of the scripture, of the form and inflection and sound of the words and letters, which the *Nikkuds* of Acha of Irak (Babylon), and Mocha of Tiberias, systematized and made popular, opened the way for a new development of the textual spirit. The marks and accents of the Masora were indeed additions to the text, but they were not intended as additions, but only as signs. Accent and quantity, Keri and Kethib and Dagesh, only helped to fasten attention to the strict letter of the text. The Masora was but the improvement of the alphabet and grammar of the language. It was the formation of a new Hebrew, enlarged and improved. It is not a little remarkable, however, that Acha and Mocha both wrote their Masoras in the Aramaean dialects of their native provinces.

The labors of Acha and Mocha were continued in Babylon by Chabib, and in Tiberias by Pinchas, each of these teachers becoming the head of a school, and venturing beyond the accents and vowels in their dealing with the text of scripture. Pinchas was not merely the author of a complete Masoretic arrangement of the words of the scripture, but was also the first who had dared to arrange the Mosaic writings into rhythm and verse. In the treatise *Sofetim*—the last effusion of the ancient talmudic spirit, the last important work of the school of Tiberias—we have not only Masoretic speculations upon accents and letters, but freer description of the proper material for rolls of the law, alphabetical prayers for the synagogue, acrostic poems and forms of prayer in the new Hebrew style. In the seventh century the manuscripts of the Bible were greatly multiplied. It became a pious duty and delight of the scholars of the rabbins not only to study, but to *copy* the text of the sacred volume; and this habit of transcribing became a ground of more exclusive literalism. One of these manuscripts, if we may believe Abraham Sacculd, who found it in Africa

about the year 1590, was composed as early as the year 600 in the city of Hilla, near the ruins of ancient Babylon, and remained for ages a principal authority in questions of Masoretic dispute. Other manuscripts of great value came down from this century to the Middle Age, of which the most noted are those of Jericho, Jerusalem, and Sanbuk, the Damascene manuscript (*Sepher Damaski*), and the Great Cyclikon, or *Machasora*, arranged for the complete ritual of the year. Another preparation for Caraism is in the writings of the Jewish physicians, who made the sacred text the basis of their medical and hygienic inquiries. Asaph of Jericho wrote, about the year 630, a book on the healing art, which was widely copied and held in high authority. His direction was followed by numerous successors, some of whom even partially adopted the religion of Islam, and were received into the courts of the caliphs. Other secular studies, too, were joined to the rabbinical lore. Jews were found to write and translate in Arabic the sentences of the Lord's volume, and the songs of the synagogue. The second half of the seventh century is especially marked by these accommodations of Judaism to the newly arising Arabic literature. These defections from the sacred custom of the people prepared the way for Caraism by the shock which they gave, by the reaction which they aroused. The departure from the strict law of scripture seemed naturally to bring in this worldly alliance with a false religion and its unworthy dialect.

In the first half of the eighth century, the way for Caraism was still more directly prepared by the appearance of heretical teachers, claiming to be prophets and Messiahs. About the year 720 there appeared in Syria a reformer whose name, taken from his native town in Lower Galilee, has come down to us as Serini. He preached openly a return to the scriptures as authority, a rupture with all talmudic traditions and claims, and announced that he was sent to redeem and lead Israel back to its own land, and to drive out the intruding Arabs. Many thousands followed

his standard, flocking to it from all parts of the world. Even many of the Spanish Jews left their goods to be confiscated, in their blind devotion to this new Messiah. The end of his attempt, as might have been predicted, was only disaster and ruin to his followers. Yet the "Serinites," as these followers were called, were for the most part obstinate in their schism, and very few of them returned to talmudism after their leader's discomfiture.

Some twenty years later, another Messiah arose at Ispahan in Persia, whose Sadducism was still more pronounced than that of the Galilean Serini. His name was Abu Isa Ishak Ben Jakub Obeid-Alla. He organized an army of ten thousand adherents to overthrow the Islamite government; but his army was speedily defeated and dispersed at Rai in the province of Chorassan. His moral code had features of asceticism. He allowed no divorce for any cause, even for adultery, and taught that the marriage bond was eternal, — a sign of the connection of Israel with Jehovah, — and that the temporary permission of divorce in the former time was only a concession to human sin. He regulated the feast-days by the solar and not, as the rabbins reckoned, by the lunar year. Like the ancient Rechabites, he forbade the use of wine, and joined to this a prohibition of animal food. While he upheld the prayer of the rabbins, with its eighteen eulogies, and enjoined its strict use upon his followers, he increased the seasons of daily prayer from *three to seven*, after the manner of the Arabs. Most of his reforms were orally taught, but he left some writings of poetry and ritual, which Ben Hadassi stigmatizes as arbitrary and without the prophetic spirit. Scharastani says that Abu Isa wrote a book which rejected all religious offerings. His followers were called the Isawites or the Ispahanites; and the sect had a name to live for some time after the death of its leader.

About this time, too, there were living in the neighborhood of Rai, the Banu Musa, a tribe of Jews which had separated themselves from the talmudic Jews; they had neither

Mischna nor Gemara, knew nothing of the Tannaim, the Gaonim, the Amoraim, and the Saboraim, very rarely were visited by any rabbinical teacher, and used in their worship only the ancient Hebrew tongue. Abu Isa endeavored to interest them in his revolutionary movement, but with what success it is not related.

To all these immediate precursors of Caraimism, — such isolated tribes as the Banu Musa; the Jews dwelling among Arabs, and adopting their tongue; the sects, such as the Serinites and the Isawites, which openly rejected talmudism; the Grammarians and Masorites, the new Hebrew poets and physicians, whose secular studies seemed to cast contempt on the lore of the schools, — must be added also the protest which the bolder exilarchs had given for a century and a half against the arrogance and the exclusiveness of the heads of the schools. As early as A.D. 600 the exilarch Kafnai had claimed and exercised an independence of these spiritual dictators, and his example had been followed by Chaninai, Bostanai, Chasdai, Solomon and David, and Chananiah, a contemporary with the founder of Caraimism. Sche-riva, in his chronicle, complains that these rulers did not hesitate to speak their dislike of the teaching of the schools.

But closer still to the beginning of Caraimism were a class of teachers whose relation to Anan its founder was something like that of Erasmus to Luther. Among these "fathers of the Caraites," as they are called, are mentioned Genai ben Baruch, Anan's teacher, who wrote a ritual afterwards adopted by the heretical leader; Frajinus, Elisha, and Chanoba, interpreters of the Pentateuch, and honored in the memorial prayers of the Caraites; Obadiah of Bazra, surnamed *Ha-maschil*, the *sagacious* one, who wrote wisely upon the laws of the Pentateuch; Abu Nissi Noah, who wrote acrostics and alphabetic poems; and Judah the Persian, who wrote an astronomical calendar, in which he reckoned the years and the months according to the course of the sun.

From this survey of the antecedents of Caraimism we

discover the three radical negations which Sadducee doctrine suggested: the denial (1) of the traditional oral law, (2) of the interpretation of the written law by such tradition, and (3) of the development of the written law by the logic and the subtlety of authorized doctors. The three ground-principles of Caraitic doctrine answer to these three Sadducaic negations. The other preparations of Caraimism were only auxiliary to this Sadducaic chief direction. The rabbinical foes of Caraimism saw in it only Sadducism revived. The Caraites themselves rejected the name of "Sadducees," on account of its heretical sound, and from its connection with some opinions which they were far from maintaining; but their writers refer the origin of the sect to a time anterior to the appearance of their champion, and admit that the foes of the ancient Pharisees are naturally friends to those who forsook the later rabbins.

The founder of the Caraitic sect was Anan ben David, a grandson of the exilarch Chasdai, who held that office among the Jews in the caliphate from A. D. 700 to 730. He was born in Bet-zur (probably another name for Bazra), about the year 700, educated doubtless in all the learning and philosophy of the wisest of his time and race, in the Thora and Talmud, and prepared for his future dignity as successor in the line of exilarchs. His bitterest enemies allow his large scholarship and his eminent gifts. He understood and wrote, with equal facility, the Aramaic idiom as taught in the schools of Babylon, the Hebrew as the language of the scriptures and the Mishna, and the Arabic as the dialect of the land and of its learned men in Bazra and Kufa and Bagdad. With the Mutazila, the heterodox religious philosophy of Islam, which Mazil taught in Bazra in 740, he had acquainted himself; and he had personal intimacy with some noted reformers, particularly with Obadiah and Noah. He knew also of the fanatical movements of Serini and Abu Isa, though he was far from any sympathy with their Messianic pretensions. As the natural heir to his uncle Solomon in the position of exilarch, he thought it best

to remove nearer to the seat of power, and in 754 transferred his residence from Bazra to Bagdad, at this time the capital of the Abbasside caliphs. In the year 760 his uncle died; but the dignity which he expected of succession to the exilarchate was not conferred upon him. His heresies had become too open and noted and had drawn too many adherents not to excite serious opposition. The Gaon Jehudah at Sora and the Gaon Dudai at Pumbadita both protested against his election to so responsible a place, for which soundness in the faith was a prime and indispensable requisite. His younger brother Chananiah, though far his inferior in learning, had the merit of faith in the rabbins, and was named for the office. Anan was not disposed, however, to submit meekly to such a slight, and his partisans encouraged him to appeal to the caliph against the decision of the colleges. At first the caliph was disposed to favor his claim; but when it was urged that Anan was a follower of that Abu Isa who had stirred up sedition, and caused so much trouble in the realm, the favor was changed to persecution, and the defeated claimant was sent from Bagdad to seek, with his partisans, some more congenial home. The refuge which he chose was the old city of Jerusalem, that ancient centre of the tribes, — now almost a ruin and quite deserted by the race of Israel. In the year 760, when Anan built his synagogue on the side of Zion, no sound of Jewish worship was heard there, and all offerings of piety had long since ceased. The walls of that synagogue were standing in the time of the first crusade, and the Caraites to-day believe that they are worshipping on the spot where their founder blessed the stones which he laid. The Caraites held its first assembly nearly in the place where the Christian sect held its first assembly. With the establishment of the community the schism became formal and open; and the disappointed heir to the honor of David's throne inaugurated in the city of David's son a new reign and dynasty. No authority was asked from the schools or the doctors, but the head of the sect proceeded to make for it laws and to decide its place.

The writings of Anan are unfortunately lost, and we are mainly indebted to the statements and allusions in the works of the Arabic historians Makrisi, Masudi, Sharastani, and Abulfeda for our knowledge of his doctrinal system. The ground principles of this system are the unity of God and the justice of God. Under the principle of unity, Anan taught substantially the *spirituality* of God; or rather, he denied the literal exactness of those phrases which assimilate God to man. Every comparison, in the scripture, of the divine Being with created things, every word which describes the form and movement, the change or the passion, of the Infinite One is to be interpreted allegorically. Properly speaking God has no attributes, and his strict unity forbids any division or any analysis of his functions. Under the principle of God's *justice*, Anan taught the freedom of the human will, the right of the human understanding to test all forms of wisdom and all rules of life, and the distribution of reward and punishment according to human character and choice. The dogmatic scheme of Anan was in substance that of the Mutazilite sect of the Mohammedans, and that of the ancient Sadducees, with the exception of the limitation of life to the earth, on which Anan pronounced no opinion.

Consistent with these general views — the right of reason to interpret the scripture, the freedom of the human will, and the separation of God from all direct influence in human affairs — are the views of Anan concerning the founder of Christianity and the founder of Islam. He acknowledged Jesus as a true prophet for the heathen and an instructed scribe for the Jews, a teacher to the Gentiles of the word clearly revealed, and a restorer to Israel of the purity of that ancient word. The Jews in their blindness quite misunderstood this purpose. The legends of the evangelists about his miraculous birth and ascension are not to be credited, but his claim to be Paraclete may be allowed, since that is according to the letter of prophecy. Jesus, in Anan's judgment, was always a faithful Jew, careful to

observe the statutes of Moses, and had never the intention to establish any new religion. His object was only to regenerate Judaism, to enlarge its reach and sway, to call back its primitive simplicity, and to fulfil its original and providential design.

And with equal candor, Anan admitted the divine mission of the Arabian prophet. Mohammed was not a blasphemous impostor, but a genuine reformer, who came to break the idols of his tribes and to bring in the worship of the one true God. For the Arabs the Koran is a holy book, and may pass as the word of God. But for Israel, the Bible, the law, is better, because older, and because it is the source from which the doctrine of the Koran is drawn. These notions concerning the nature of the Deity and the mission of the prophets of Christianity and Islam were probably written in Arabic, in a book which the historian Jefet quotes under the title of "*Fadalkah*," or "Summary" of doctrine, a word corresponding to the Aramaic *Sechom* and the Masoretic *Jochen*, and to the Latin "*Summa Theologiae*."

More significant than these scanty remains of Anan's dogmatic teaching are the evidences of his method in the interpretation of scripture. He absolutely rejected the existing Mischna and Gemara, and advised his followers to a fresh and free study of the sacred word. Yet he accepted withal the thirteen rules of exegesis of Rabbi Ismael, and authorized them as the best and the necessary postulate of all useful study of the scriptures; and by the aid of these rules he composed a Commentary on the Pentateuch, and a collocation of the Mosaic statutes, for the right direction of his followers. Both these works are largely quoted in the writings of the Caraites and of the Jewish rabbins. From these frequent quotations, we are able to mark the character and extent of Anan's variation from the rabbinical teaching.

The first of the practical heresies of the Caraites was his alteration of the calendar, or rather his restoration

of the ancient calendar, which was in use when the temple was still standing. By his innovation the month began, or "was born," when the first line of its young crescent became visible, and not according to any fixed system of cycles and intercalary months. Each month had its own length, of twenty-nine or thirty days, as the case might be, to be decided by close watching for its new light. The effect of this change was to bring confusion into the celebration of the feasts, and to dislocate the adjustment of the sacred times with the natural seasons. Anan's year was made to begin, not with Tischri, according to the rabbinical reckoning, but with Nisan, the month of the passover. The Jewish *Rosh-Hashana* became in his system the *Yom Teruah*, the "day of trumpets." Ibn Ezra, in his Commentary on the Pentateuch, attacks and satirises these inconvenient changes; and the followers of Anan were not careful in this regard to keep the instruction of their teacher. If Ben Jerochim defends this from the letter of the law, it is from pride rather than from faith in the system.

In the arrangement of the feast-days of Israel, Anan reckoned eighteen days in the course of the year. The three principal feasts—the Passover, the Feast of Weeks, and the Feast of Booths—are enjoined in the scriptures as "*Nature-feasts*," rather than memorial seasons, in honor of national events. The passover is the feast of the first barley-harvest; the feast of weeks is the feast of the wheat-harvest; and the feast of booths is the feast of fruit, wine, and autumn grain harvest, closing properly the industrial year. Historical and national feast-days are set by Anan in the second rank. In regard to the proper time for killing the paschal lamb, he taught, in opposition to the rabbins and in conformity with the Samaritan custom, that it should be in the interval between sunset and darkness. In the same interval, too, must be baked the unleavened bread. The feast of weeks was appointed, not on the sixth day of Sivan, as the rabbins taught, but for the first Sunday after the seventh Sabbath after the passover. The directions of the rabbins about the

size and ornaments of the huts on the feast of tabernacles he rejects as wholly unwarranted by the Mosaic injunctions.

Anan's theory of the Sabbath was far more strict than that of the rabbins. Jews living in a heathen city were not permitted to go out of their houses at all on that day; and in a Jewish town they might only go from their houses a distance of two thousand ells, and that within the limits of the town. Circumcision was not allowed on the Sabbath, since the wound might require some aid of healing, which was on that day unlawful. Sexual connection on that day was strictly prohibited. The Talmudists, on the contrary, had made sexual intercourse a duty on the Sabbath day, supporting themselves on the word of Isaiah, which says that the Sabbath should be a *delight*. No fires were allowed by Anan to be kept on the Sabbath. The Talmudists had explained the verse in Exodus (xxxv. 3), to prohibit the *kindling* of fires on that day, but not their *preservation after they were kindled*. Lamps might be kept lighted, if they were only lighted before the set of the sun. Bread, too, might be baked on the Sabbath if only the process of baking were commenced early enough. Against these evasions Anan's voice was decided — they were simply profanations; and the Caraites not only sat in cold and in darkness on the eve of their day of rest, but avoided in their walks on that evening the sight of any lighted chamber. Nothing warm on that day, whether for food or for comfort, should be allowed to the faithful.

In other points of practical observance, the commentary of Anan departed widely from the rabbinical teaching. In the list of impure birds, he included common poultry, and would not suffer a cock or a hen to be brought to the altar as an offering. All fowls sipping water and sitting upon their broods are impure. The command to wear phylacteries he explained to mean that the sacred words should be fixed in the head and in the heart. His construction of the law of divorce and the law of inheritance was different from

that of the rabbins, though we are not enabled to know in exactly what particulars. Indeed, from the fragmentary character of the accounts of Anan's special interpretations upon the Pentateuch, it is difficult to draw out the Mosaic statutes as he arranged them, or to know how many of the Talmudic glosses he distinctly rejected.

Beside these separate hints of Anan's exegesis and ritual teaching, we may notice three positive positions and directions which his teaching gave in the formation of his sect :

1. He announced the right of all new religious teachers, of all religious reformers, to a respectful hearing : they were not to be dismissed as fanatics, or stigmatized as blasphemers, but to be judged according to their purpose and their claim. Caraim has never been intolerant of the prophets of other faiths, and has used no violence to suppress their extravagances. It has preferred to live in peace with the men of other creeds, and even with hostile Jews. To this day, the stranger, of whatever lineage, is welcomed and kindly treated in the Carait communities of Constantinople and Jerusalem, and is allowed to learn from them their own state and hope — a privilege which intercourse with orthodox Jews will not give him.

2. Anan announced the right and the duty of free inquiry, whether upon the extent of the clear Mosaic statutes, or upon the meaning of the dark passages of the scripture. In their free inquiry, there should be no respect of persons, no deference to authorities and no fear of men. Brother may differ from brother and father from son ; and the difference is good, if it is a proof of honesty and freedom. The teaching of Anan did not consolidate Caraim into an unchangeable doctrine, but allowed variations ; and later writings of the sect distinctly charge that its founder was not infallible and had taught some errors with his truths. Sahl, a Carait, writing in A. D. 950, says : " Say then not, how shall we come to the practice of the law, since the sons of the scriptures are so discordant with each other ? Whom of our leaders shall we follow ? Know rather that the sons of the

scripture do not say : ' We are your leaders.' They have not exhibited their views to force the people to go after their way ; they would only be known as investigators, seekers, interpreters, availing themselves of the labors of their faithful predecessors. They say to their brethren : Search, examine, press in, and decide, and then practise that which is established by your own knowledge and proof."

3. And with these principles of free speech and free inquiry, Anan proclaimed the duty of missionary labor and the dignity of the prophetic office. Himself an exile for the sake of the faith, he enjoined his followers to sacrifice comfort and earthly advantage in the propagation of their truth, not to fear abuse and persecution, but to strive unto the end. Family ties were not to hinder missionary zeal. Anan's counsel to his followers was substantially that of Jesus to his disciples. Unlike the rabbins, he encouraged the gathering in of proselytes from the heathen world, and would not allow that the promises of the Bible were confined to Israel after the flesh. His missionaries wandered not only in the lands where the Jews had their seats, but were found in lands where the Hebrew tongue and ritual had become obsolete. Jerusalem was only the head and centre of the sect. It was not a simple schism only, but the beginning of a new religious community. Makrisi derives the name *Caratism* from the missionary zeal of the sect. They were the criers, the preachers. The Caraites were not, however, willing to allow this theory of their name.

The separation between the party of the rabbins and the new Sadducee became soon complete. There were mutual criminations and anathemas, and Anan excepted from his charity the " Gaons " of the school and the rulers of the synagogue. He forbade his disciples from visiting their houses or their places of worship, from eating with them, marrying with them, or having any, except the most formal, intercourse with them. He chose Jerusalem and Mount Zion, not only as the sacred place which might bless his new sect by its

traditions, but as the site most removed from rabbinical intrigue. Yet from this "seat of the Caraites," he sent his disciples to the Talmudic seats, to disturb the ease and security of the teachers of tradition, and break the chains which rabbinism had bound around the Jewish church. In some instances these missionaries were drawn into the snares of the rabbins, and consented to compromise the new faith with the old, so that other messengers had to be sent to watch the first messengers and bring them back to the faith.

Anan died in Jerusalem in 765, five years after his schism was fairly decided. In this short time he had gathered around him a numerous community and had organized branches of his sect in Egypt, West Africa, Syria, Babylon, and Persia. The first name given to the sect was that of Ananites, as the disciples of Christ were called Christians. But as the sect increased, and as in the exercise of free inquiry its teachers came to differ, a distinction was made between the Caraites in general and the Ananites in special. The later writers mention four peculiarities of the Ananites: that they were willing to study the Mischna of the Talmud; that they reckoned the month from the sight of the moon's crescent, instead of from the conjunction of the moon and earth; that they had a different construction of some statutes; and that they denied the right of the elders and the exilarchs to any special authority. The same phenomenon appears in the Christian church, in which a sect are separated from the church and called "Christians," to signify, not their general belief, but their peculiar opinion and practice.

The son of Anan, Saul by name, assumed the title of exilarch and Nasi (or prince), at his father's death, but was insignificant both as a leader and as a writer. His literary labor, so far as we know, was confined to "Notes upon the Decalogue," in which he attempted to show that all the statutes of Moses were contained in the ten commandments. His son Josiah, a grandson of Anan, was still more insignificant. The teaching of the founder of Caraimism was not perpetuated in the line of his household, but by his more

eminent disciples, Malich ben Harmala and Nissi ben Noah. Of Malich we know comparatively little. He speculated upon the doctrine of the resurrection which Anan had quietly borrowed from the rabbins, and maintained that not all the dead would be raised at the last day, but only those who had been favored with the divine revelations. Of Nissi ben Noah we have a fuller account. He was a companion and friend of Anan, and shared his studies at Bazra. His early life was one of hardship, privation, and wandering, in which his resolute determination to master the learning of the schools prevailed over every hindrance. He became expert in the tongues, learned Hebrew and Aramaic from the rabbins, Greek and Latin from the priests; in Babylon studied the Masora; examined works of philosophy and logic; investigated religious systems; till in the end, by his own restless thirst for knowledge, he was brought to the Holy City, the head and mother of the Caraites household. When he came to Jerusalem, as he says, he found everything in confusion. There was no orderly system of doctrine, and the interpretations of scripture were as various as the interpreters. Anan had been dead only fifteen years, and already his work was threatened with ruin and seemed to be almost beyond recovery. Nissi resolved to write a commentary on the literal sense of scripture, and, unlike his predecessors in the sect, to write it in Hebrew and not in the Aramean, which had become the shame rather than the honor of the ancient people. The name of the great work of Nissi ben Noah was *Bitan ha-Maschilim*, the "Palace of the Teachers." It was a comprehensive explanation of the Mosaic laws and a complete institute of Caraites theology, showing its positive and its negative side alike. It denounces, without stint the rabbins and their teaching, calling them wranglers, brawlers, and blasphemers. The preface is curious, from its detailed statement of preliminaries to be settled in the profitable study of every book, whether of scripture or of secular wisdom. These preliminaries are *eight* in number: to know 1. the purpose and end of the

work, that the reader may judge impartially and not ascribe to the composer a plan which he did not have; 2. the profit of the work to the readers; 3. the name of the work and its *nickname*, and the reason for these; 4. the name of the composer, compiler, or editor, as the case may be; 5. the relation of the work to similar preceding works, whether it is a continuation or a development; 6. the prefatory advices which are essential to understand the work; 7. to what class of works it belongs and for what class of readers it is written; 8. the method and the divisions of the work.

This great work of Nissi ben Noah, invaluable as an exposition of Caraimism, is unfortunately lost and is known to us only in the accounts of other teachers. Next in the order of time among the Caraites was Benjamin ben Moses, called Nahawendi, from the name of his native city, in the mountain land of Media. His fame and influence were at their height about the year 800. He was not only an authority in Persia, where he was even able to convert the Moslems to the faith of the Bible, but his decisions were sought and respected in Babylon and Palestine. He professed to know and to reveal doctrines which were not disclosed to Anan, but which the Caraites believed had been taught to him by Anan's grandson Josiah, at this time exilarch at Jerusalem. Among his numerous works are mentioned a Commentary on the Pentateuch; an Explanation of Isaiah, in which he denies the supposed Messianic prophecies; a Commentary on the Book of Daniel, in which *days* are made to mean *years*; a Commentary on the Five Megilloth,—the Canticles, Ruth, Esther, Lamentations, and Ecclesiastes,—interpreting the first and last of these allegorically; a Book of Commands, based on the Caraites' customs; and a Catalogue of practical Mosaic statutes, prepared in Hebrew, which was called, in his honor, the Nassath-Benjamin. Besides these exegetical and practical works, Nahawendi seems also to have composed a dogmatic work, in which were speculations about God and creation and the soul. The soul, in his view, had no separate

existence, but is only part of the body, and can expect no life and no retribution apart from its bodily connection. God comes into no immediate relation with the world. His creation and providence are all through mediators, second causes, spiritual forces (*δυνάμεις*), words (*λόγοι*), angels of various ranks and degrees. Nahawendi denied that God spake directly to Moses, or that any word had come to patriarchs and prophets from one too exalted for all human intercourse, and would allow no anthropomorphic conceptions of the divine nature. In several minor points of practice he departed from the teaching of Anan, particularly as to the observance of the Sabbath, the killing of the paschal lamb, and the validity of the marriage bond. A lawful marriage, according to Nahawendi, requires more than purchase, contract, and cohabitation; it must have the preliminaries of betrothal, taking home, bridal presents, religious covenant, and the presence of witnesses, to be lawful.

After Nahawendi, the next conspicuous Caraitic doctor was Daniel ben Moses el-Kumassi, supposed to be a younger brother of the above mentioned Benjamin. He flourished from 820 to 860. Only a few specimens of his teaching are cited. Among these is a permission to kill on the Sabbath the paschal lamb, if the day of preparation comes on the Sabbath, but with the reservation that *only one lamb* is to be killed, and this to serve as the sacrifice for all Israel. Contemporary with Daniel was a certain Bochtan, who reckoned the pentecost feast as seven weeks from the barley harvest, without regard to the feast of the passover. More important than these was Judghan of Hamadan in Media, who taught that the law has both an outer and an inner sense, and must be at once literally and allegorically explained; that the soul of man passes from body to body, sometimes losing and sometimes gaining by the change. The Messianic claim which Judghan advanced discredited him with the great body of the sect, and he was regarded by the more sober as a schismatic and a visionary. A

considerable party, nevertheless, continued to observe his ascetic rules, to repeat his prayers, to neglect, according to his injunction, all celebration of the feasts, and to believe that his death was only apparent, and that he would come back to teach and judge the world.

The Messianic fanaticism was carried to still greater extremes by Schadgan, who abrogated not only all feasts, but all laws concerning food and purification, and by Muschka, who preached that war and the sword, as much as prayer and fasting, were needful to bring the deliverance of Israel. Abu Imnan el-Safarani also taught in Persia the doctrine of the separation of God from his creation, of the metempsychosis of the soul, and retribution in this transmigration, as the soul received a higher or lower form in its new body; and left behind him a sect of followers, who for many ages were called Tiflisites or Meswites. Another Caraites sect, about the middle of the ninth century, were the Ocarites, so called from two teachers of Ocar on the Tigris, Ismail and Abu Musa. More influential than these were the Baalbekites, a sect which followed the word of Mesui of Baalbec, a strict critic of all violations of the Sabbath. Other Caraites sects of this period were the Margharites, who insisted upon the mission of angels and the work of Jehovah only through agents and subordinates; the Galutites, who strangely likened God to men, and described the size and shape of his bodily organs; the Scharistanites, who maintained a spiritual sense in the scripture and that twenty-four verses of the law were lost; the Irakians, whose heresies were mainly in the construction of the calendar; the Palestinians, to whom the scribe Ezra was a true "son of God," and probably the restorer of the law; the "El Garija," who humanized God, and reckoned the months from the *full* moon; the "El Karija," a half-Samaritan sect, who kept in general assembly their Sabbaths and feasts, and drank out of dried gourds to avoid the risk of impurity; and the Mograbitites of Northern Africa, which seem to have been only a Caraites variation of a Moslem sect.

Two Moslem sects, in fact, had large influence upon the progress of Caraitic opinion, and may not be neglected in the notice of its history. These sects are the Mutazilites, who denied corporeal attributes to the Deity, separated him from direct connection with men, and asserted the freedom of human choice, and Ascharites, who asserted the constant action of Deity in human affairs and that all things, both good and evil, are from him.

In the second half of the ninth century the Caraitic doctors, if less influential than those who went before them, were much more numerous. We hear of David ben Boas, the fifth exilarch in Jerusalem since Anan, and of his commentary on the law; of Abu Ali Saadiah, and his son Ali-ha Levi, both exegetical writers; of Joseph ben Bachtani of Bagdad, a famous grammarian, some of whose readings of the law were quite peculiar, especially the explanation of the golden rule: not "thou shalt do the same good to thy neighbor as to thyself," but "thou shalt keep away from him the evil that thou keepest from thyself;" of Moses ben Adonim of Darah in North Africa, a poet as well as an interpreter; of Meborach ben Nathan, who composed laments and elegies for the days of fasting and atonement in Jerusalem; of Judah ben Alan, who wrote not only elegies, but also a grammar and a dictionary; of Abulfarag, whose Arabic commentary on the Pentateuch is celebrated by many writers; and, in Persia and Babylonia, of Ibn Sitha and Samuel Ibn Sakawiah, at once grammarians and philosophers.

The most remarkable Caraites of this period, however, were Eldad ha Dani, the traveller, and Chani-el Balchi, the rationalist. Eldad was a Median, and took his surname "ha Dani" from the tribe of Dan, to which he pretended to belong. His journeys were widely extended, through Arabia, Persia, Egypt, Africa even to Morocco, and everywhere he gathered a store of legends, and inquired into the faith of the people. The traces of him are finally lost in Spain, where his stories were heard and believed by his Jewish

brethren. His most interesting narratives are those which pretend to tell of the remnant of the ten tribes, their laws, their customs, and their condition. According to his statement, Hebrew was a living language in these communities, though they were able also to use the dialects of the many countries through which they were scattered. The scripture, and not the Talmud, was their authoritative book. They had indeed a Talmud of short sentences, in a Hebrew dialect, which had come down directly from Moses and Joshua, but this was without fulness or beauty of style. He identifies the ten tribes with the Banu Musa, that heretical sect mentioned earlier in this paper. Eldad's statements are not to be implicitly received; and it is quite certain that he did not travel as an authorized Caraité missionary. Yet he does not seem to be a deceiver, and the accounts which he gives of the condition of the Israelites in the countries which he visited are doubtless his real impressions. He was rather a sagacious and enterprising observer than a skilled man of letters.

Chawi-el-Balchi, the Caraité freethinker, is pronounced by Fürst to be "the first rationalistic critic of the Bible." In him were brought to their point and focus all the cavils and doubts of the preceding centuries upon the rabbinical teaching. His name El-Balchi is derived from his native city, Balch in Bactria. He flourished after the year 880. He wrote an Arabic translation of the Pentateuch with rationalistic notes, in which he denied that the world was created out of nothing; asserted that Moses availed himself of the ebb tide in crossing the Red sea; said that the miraculous manna was only the sweet exudation of a tree of the desert; that the glow on the face of Moses was only the repulsive sharpness from his emaciated features after forty days of fasting, which the people could not bear to look upon. Another important work of El-Balchi was the *Sepher ha Theanot*, the Book of Exceptions, which asks many strange questions concerning the sacred narratives: Why did God order sacrifices in the temple, when the Deity need not to be

fed? Why should lamps be on the altar, if God needs no light? Why should God have left his angels and come down to sinning men? Ten affirmations of El-Balchi concerning scripture singularly remind us of the controversies of our present time: that what the scripture is, cannot be exactly known; that it contains contradictions and discrepancies; that it has some statements which are irrational, and others clearly incredible; that the whole ritual system is incoherent and evidently not intended to be permanent; that any revelation is improbable, as an unnecessary condescension of Jehovah; that God needs none of those shows and offerings which the laws of worship prescribe; that circumcision is absurd, in seeking to improve man by mutilating him; that it is ridiculous to suppose the ashes of a red heifer to have cleansing power; that the ceremony of the scape goat is impious; and finally, that it is needless cruelty for the priest to wring the neck of an innocent beast because its owner has touched a dead body. The heresies and blasphemies of El-Balchi were severely denounced by the Caraitic writers of his own and succeeding ages; but he is not for this reason to be excluded from the sect, many of whose principles he carried out.

Yet the Caraimism of that early time is not to be regarded as a form of rationalism, or as mainly a criticism and negation of sacred truths. It was a genuine movement of faith, excited and sustained by a religious spirit. Its principles were religious as well as rational, and it sought to know and to show the true sense of the word of God. It respected the voice of the synagogue so far as this kept to the word of the scripture. It was not a protest against revelation, but against the things added to revelation. It sought only the more to justify and to fasten the written commands of God as binding in the practice of men.

In the year 900, the Caraitic sect had become everywhere recognized as the especially Biblical section of the Jewish church. It had communities, organized and flourishing, in all the lands from India and the Caucasus to the centre of

Africa and the Atlantic shore. It had a colony in the Crimea, which has kept its seat to our own day. On the last leaf of an old manuscript of the Bible in Odessa, it is noted that in Kertch, which an ancient tradition calls Sepharad, in Unchat and Sulchat at the foot of mount Agrimisch, and in Kafa, afterwards called Theodosia, in the year 900 communities were living, who had only the scripture, and had never seen the light of rabbinical doctrine. In the year 957, the note goes on to say, missionaries came from Jerusalem with the genuine rabbinite doctrine, which they preached with such effect that not less than two hundred families were converted from Caraimism.

Caraimism reached, in the year 900, its highest point of development. The opposition which it awakened was the means of restoring the rabbinical party and of bringing out champions for the faith of the schools, who were able to reinstate in the reverence of the Jewish people the traditions of the oral law. And Dr. Fürst closes his survey of the early history of Caraimism with a frank acknowledgment of its value as a reviving influence for effete Judaism. "The Caraitic rivalry," he says, "was necessary to arouse rabbinism from its lethargy, to turn it to the grammatical study of the Hebrew tongue and of the sciences of medicine, astronomy, and mathematics. The Caraites broke the torpidity of the scribe interpretations of the law, frightened off the traditionalists from their toying with numbers and letters, put a stop to the expositions of the Midrasch and Haggada, which had lost all creative power. The Midraschic interpretation, so monotonous and yet taken for genuine exegesis, was forced by the influence of Caraimism to become practical and real. Rabbinism was obliged to consent to unfold Judaism after a philosophical method, if it would set aside the reproaches of the Caraites. But for Caraimism also was this age (900) very critical. The endless variety of opinion upon dogmas, the most wayward, arbitrary, and contradictory views in interpretation, called out by the freedom of inquiry in the scripture, the manifold

divisions in the sect, and the tendency to freethinking, — all this must be fatal to the community as soon as any strong foe should rise against Caraism. The champion of rabbinism against Caraism, to whom more than to any other the defeat of the sect as a growing heresy is to be ascribed, was the Egyptian Saadia ben Joseph, who died in 942 as the head of the Jewish school at Sura. From his writings Dr. Fürst has drawn many of the details concerning the sect and the teachers, of whom he was the victorious foe.

The Caraites ceased after this time to have much literary significance. But the communities, which still remain, preserve in their customs, the lost record of Anan and his followers. When Dr. Frankl, in his Eastern journey some eight years since, visited the Caraites synagogue of the *Beni Hamikra* in Constantinople, he was surprised to notice that nearly all the congregation were gathered in the outer court, while the inner room of the synagogue was almost empty. He was told that the reason of this was that some of them had been in contact, on the day before, with a dead body, and that the majority probably had, on that day, “known” their wives, but on account of the Sabbath, had not been able to purify themselves by a bath.

ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINAL ATTITUDE OF OLD SCHOOL PRESBYTERIANS.

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INTRODUCTION.

IN responding to the call to contribute to the catena of expositions of the polemics of various evangelical churches and schools, now in course of publication in this Journal, the link which represents the attitude of the body of Presbyterians known as Old school, in the premises, the writer will not long detain his readers with preliminaries. He will, at this point, offer but one or two cautionary remarks. First, the author only is responsible for this Article and its statements, except so far as it quotes the testimony of others. No one else is committed by it. It, therefore, can carry no authority beyond the confidence reposed in his qualifications for the task, and the intrinsic, self-evidencing weight of its statements and reasonings. More than this he cannot claim. Thus much, doubtless, all parties in interest will cordially concede.

Secondly, the doctrinal principles which Old school Presbyterians have been called, in providence, to maintain against the assaults of parties within or without the pale of evangelical Christendom, they do not regard as peculiarities, either sectarian or provincial. They are often characterized as such by adversaries and outsiders, as if they constituted a special body of dogmas peculiar to Old school Presbyterians, or even to some one of their theological schools, as Princeton. So we often hear not only of Old school Presbyterian, but of "Princeton theology"; and this, as if they respectively were made up of a set of singular tenets un-

known, or little accepted, elsewhere in the Christian church. Old school Presbyterians regard this matter in a different light. Their own doctrines which have brought them into conflict with others, they regard as catholic in the sense immediately to be pointed out, and the counter doctrines, with which these have been impugned, as the peculiarities of parties or sects or individuals hurled against the common faith. In order to preserve this in its integrity and purity, it has been requisite to defend it against the intrusion of such singularities, novelties, and long-exploded but resurgent errors. In saying that their contested doctrines are catholic, we mean either, 1. that, with insignificant exceptions, they are part of the avowed faith of all the great branches of the Christian church, Latin, Greek, Lutheran, and Reformed ; or, 2. that, with like unimportant exceptions, they are professed by the evangelical churches of the Reformation, both Lutheran and Reformed ; or, 3. that, so far as disputes among those called Calvinists are concerned, the doctrines maintained by us are the doctrines of catholic Calvinism of the Reformed and Puritan churches, as shown by their symbols, the writings of their great theologians, and the vast preponderance in numbers among those reputed Calvinists, who hold with us on controverted points, over any of the parties who embrace either of the antagonistic schemes whereby they are assailed. Claiming thus to set up no peculiarities of our own, and to maintain only what is common to us, either with all, or with the evangelical, or with most of the Calvinistic portion of the Christian church, we come at once to our main work — the presentation of the views of Old school Presbyterians on points of difference between them and other evangelical Christians. Assuming, of course, that all agree in the sufficiency of the evidence for the being and more fundamental attributes of God, and that any controversies in regard to the nature or persons of the Godhead, are to be determined by the authority of the scriptures, the first questions to be disposed of, are those which pertain to :

THE RULE OF FAITH.

The holy scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are held to be the only and the sufficient rule of faith and practice, and the ultimate arbiter in all controversies. They are such because they are the word of God, and therefore infallible. This position, in general terms, probably will be scarcely questioned by any who call themselves evangelical. Yet we think it virtually assailed and endangered by the denial of verbal inspiration. We hold strenuously that inspiration extends not only to the thoughts but the words of scripture, else it is not the word of God, but man's word attempting to express the mind of God; hence it declares itself to be the word of God, spoken "not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth," "given by inspiration of God," who "spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets," the "holy men of God who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

By the "inspiration of God" we understand the infallible guidance of God so given to the writers of the sacred oracles as to lead them to write the precise words in which he would express his mind and will, and no other; to preserve them, in short, from all error, not only of thought, but of language. This is perfectly consistent with each writer preserving his own individuality of style, as is undeniably the case. To prove these things incompatible or contradictory is impossible. And unless for an author to preserve his own style, and yet use words which the Holy Ghost selects for the accurate expression of his mind, be proved impossible, all arguments against the verbal inspiration of the scriptures founded on this individuality of style are without foundation. This is wholly aside of all questions as to the manner of this guidance. It is enough that He who can so marvellously work upon the secret springs of the soul, unobserved, except by his marvellous effects in transforming that soul from unbelief to faith, from enmity to love, from despair to hope, can, in a manner no less secret

and wonderful, move it to write the words which he teacheth.

The questions pertaining to revelation, whether or how far it be by suggestion, dreams, afflatus, or articulate, vocal utterance, are irrelevant, and, in regard to the great question in issue — the nature and extent of inspiration — immaterial. Revelation is one thing; inspiration another. The former is the revealing to men of things before unknown; the latter is the securing of infallible accuracy in writing the truth, whether acquired through special supernatural revelation, or, in whole or in part, from natural human means of information. This, we say, extends both to the thoughts and words — the matter and manner of the subject of inspiration.

Not only does this appear from such scripture testimonies as those already cited, but from the impossibility of securing an infallible and authoritative communication of the mind of God to men by any other means. If the sacred penmen were left to the choice of their own words, without being divinely guided in all instances to the use of the right words, which truly express the thoughts of God, then there is no certainty that in any instance the words are employed which truly declare the mind and will of God. Nothing is more notorious than that the ablest and best men frequently fail adequately and rightly to express what they mean to express. If this be so in human things, must it not, much more, be so in divine things? How will it ever be possible thus to tell what is the real mind of God, from these attempts to speak it by the human authors of the words of scripture? The words may indeed assert something very different from what "man's wisdom teacheth." But how does this bind the conscience of any one offended by the doctrine thus declared? The words are the words of man, after all, and may very erroneously express the mind of God. Hence, if verbal inspiration be denied, then the whole authority of the scriptures, as an infallible rule of faith and arbiter of controversies, is subverted. No one is concluded

by any words of scripture, for the simple reason that they are not the words of God, and may not truly express his mind.

Moreover, so far as revelation is concerned, it is more than a question whether it can be made except in words, either to the writers or, through them, to the readers of scripture. Thought, and words — the articulate signs of thought — are so vitally intertwined, that to separate the former from the latter is like tearing the nerves from the flesh. It is true that the mind can and does take cognizance of single objects by intuition, without the intervention of language. But those discursive intellectual processes and products which constitute thought cannot go on, to any extent, without the aid of language. Those products of abstraction and generalization which involve the formation of conceptions represented by common terms, cannot be retained in the mind, or conveyed to other minds, without the aid of such terms. But without such conceptions, thus set in general words, there can be no judgments or propositions beyond empty tautology, much less reasonings or arguments. Let any one try to present to his own mind the propositions, thoughts, and arguments of one of Paul's Epistles without expression in language; or try to conceive how they could be revealed to any mind so as to be conveyed by that mind to another without the mediation of language, and he will, we think, see the impossibility of any real revelation of God to man, except through the vehicle of language. Such language then must be inspired, if there be a real revelation. A wordless thought is like a shapeless body; and a wordless revelation is, like a mute oracle, a dumb teacher. Presbyterians, therefore, as we suppose, in common with most evangelical Christians, hold that verbal inspiration is requisite to the authority and sufficiency of the scriptures as the only rule of faith and life, and the supreme arbiter of controversies. As to any real or supposed inaccuracies of fact, historic or scientific, they are capable of explanation, either by the unavoidable errors that

would creep into the successive manuscripts in the process of transcription, or by the solutions which will be furnished by a further advance in knowledge.

As to the principles which should control the interpretation of scripture, we hold that it should be interpreted by scripture: the obscurer parts by those more plain; exceptional passages by the general scope and harmony of the whole.

The province of human reason in interpretation is, to ascertain what the scriptures teach; to put its varied teachings in systematic form; to construe them so as to shun obvious contradictions with each other, with the indisputable testimony of sense, and of unperverted reason; and humbly to bow to them when so ascertained and determined, however incomprehensible, unwelcome, or irreconcilable with our feelings, judgments, or predilections.

This gives reason a very high office in ascertaining and accepting the teachings of revelation; a very humble office as an original authority touching any matters in regard to which God speaks in his word. The form in which human reason rebels against the authority of God's word, while professing to receive it, is, in claiming that the Bible cannot teach given doctrines, although its language seems plainly to teach them, because they are alleged to conflict with its own decisions or with right feeling. In this way nearly every distinctive Christian doctrine, whether of theology, anthropology, or soterology, has been in turn assailed, and widely rejected. And if reason may be exalted to this authority, it is supreme, and overbears the authority of the divine word. Reason soars beyond its true level when it assumes to judge what can or cannot be true or possible relative to the infinite God; what, therefore, he cannot mean to declare, although he seems to declare it, in his word. Human reason is competent to no such office. It cannot span infinity. A being, all whose nature, ways, and proceedings could be compassed by human reason, could not be God. That a revelation from God should contain much

which surpasses human comprehension, is only what reason should expect, *a priori*. In such cases it is our privilege as well as duty, not to doubt or reject, but to believe and adore. "Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen" (Rom. xi. 33-36).

While this disposes of a class of mysteries which are above the normal human intellect, such as the Trinity, Incarnation, Predestination, there are doctrines which the unregenerate soul cannot clearly see and appreciate, on account of the blindness induced upon it by sin. It is very certain that the Bible makes a broad distinction between the power to judge and appreciate scriptural truth in the regenerate and in the unregenerate soul. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned; but he that is spiritual judgeth all things" (1 Cor. ii. 14-15). Much more of the same purport might be cited from scripture. And it all shows, beyond all doubt, that the human intellect is disqualified for authoritative judgment, as to what it is compatible with the nature and character of God to reveal, not only by its finitude, but by its corruption. However it may retain its speculative insight comparatively unimpaired, its power in moral and spiritual aesthetics, i.e. to discern the beauty of holiness, the beauty of the Lord, the loveliness of Christ, the glory of his salvation in all its parts, is seriously impaired. Hence, with regard to the whole range of soterology, it is wholly disqualified and unwarranted to erect its judgment against the obvious meaning of the inspired record.

The only function that can be conceded to reason in constraining an interpretation into accord with its own

decisions, is what theologians have known as the *judicium contradictionis*. Truth cannot contradict truth. It is impossible that anything should be and not be at the same moment. Therefore the scripture must be so interpreted as not to contradict itself, or any other undeniable truth evidenced by sense or reason. To assert that Christ's body is ubiquitous is to assert a contradiction. For it is the very nature of body to be bounded. To assert that the bread and wine of the eucharist are literally, not emblematically, the body and blood of Christ, is to deny that they are bread and wine.

Yet this power of rejecting contradictions, must be duly guarded, lest it be strained to be a pretext for rejecting real and fundamental truths and high mysteries, to which a little perverse ingenuity may give the aspect of seeming contradiction, while, properly stated, they have not even the appearance of it. How many have rejected the Trinity, on account of the supposed contradiction of asserting the same being to be both one and three; whereas it asserts him to be three in one respect, one in another. The incarnation likewise, as asserting that two persons are one person; whereas it only asserts two natures in one person. So others have rejected the doctrine of vicarious atonement, because it contradicts their intuitive convictions of justice that the innocent should suffer for the guilty; others still, the sinners helplessness because it contradicts their ideas of responsibility and much more the like. All this only shows the great caution with which the *judicium contradictionis* should be exercised. We must be sure that the apparent sense of scripture does contradict some undeniable truth, before we, on this ground, strain it to a figurative, allegorical, or other non-natural interpretation. We must presume that the apparent meaning of scripture is its real meaning, and that any apparent contradiction in this meaning to known truths, must be owing to some flaw in our own conceptions, until the contrary is indubitably established. But when the contradiction is indisputably established, then scripture must be

interpreted consistently with known truth ; for truth cannot contradict truth. This cautious spirit, however, does not prevent our saying with all confidence, that " the seven good kine are seven years " (Gen. xli. 26), means they represent seven years ; or that " This is my body," in the words of our Lord instituting the eucharist, means this represents my body ; that, in the light of indubitable modern science, the " pillars of the earth " (2 Sam. xx. 8) have existence only in the forces that hold it in its orbit.

As to the authority of tradition and the church, while, with all evangelical Christians, we deny to either the power to make any additions to the teachings of the canonical scriptures ; and, while we further deny that any visible ecclesiastical organization is empowered to make any infallible or authoritative interpretation of scripture, which shall be *ipso facto* binding on the conscience, or binding at all, except as it is supported by the authority of scripture itself speaking to the conscience ; we nevertheless hold that what the true church — meaning thereby the true people of God — have ever held to be the meaning of scripture, on essential points, must be its true meaning. If in regard to fundamental doctrine, the saints in all generations have not found out what Christianity is, then it may safely be assumed to be past discovery. Revelation is a failure. Infidelity must triumph. This does not imply that there is not a vast field of revealed truth, beyond these " first principles of the doctrine of Christ," yet to be explored, or that these fundamental doctrines are not capable of fuller discovery, explication, definition, and defence. But it does imply that there are certain doctrines known which constitute the essence of Christianity, to profess which is to profess Christianity ; to deny which is to deny Christianity. Such, to go no further, are the Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption.

THE GODHEAD.

There is no material difference among evangelical Christians in regard to the attributes of God, unless on the

question whether all his moral perfections are resolvable into benevolence. We maintain, in common with nearly all Christendom, that holiness, and vindictory or distributive justice are distinguishable from, or rather involve more than, mere benevolence, while they are no less essential elements in the divine excellence. This has important bearings on the punishment and expiation of sin, the nature of the atonement, and the tone of Christian ethics. Other questions pertaining to the nature of the foreknowledge, purposes, and decrees of God will find their place appropriately hereafter.

THE TRINITY.

The language of our Confession is the brief but adequate expression of our faith in regard to the persons in the Godhead: "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons of one substance, power, and eternity: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceedeth from the Father and the Son" (Chap. II. 3).

This, of course, excludes all tritheistic and Sabellian theories, or formulas tending thereto. But here there is little dispute among those known as evangelical. In regard, however, to the sonship of Christ and procession of the Spirit, especially the former, vehement controversy has been waged against them by some prominent American theologians. It is hardly necessary to say, that though called to defend these doctrines, they are no peculiarities of ours. They are the common creed of the church. Simply remarking that the Holy Spirit is represented as proceeding from the Father, and being sent forth by the Son (John xv. 26), we pass on to consider the Sonship of Christ—a relation to the Father variously expressed otherwise, by the phrases "eternal generation," "eternally begotten of the Father."

THE SONSHIP OF CHRIST.

The main point which all these terms set forth is, that the title "Son of God," so abundantly bestowed in scripture on the Second Person of the Trinity, expresses a real relation to the First Person, which is the ground of their receiving the mutual appellations of Father and Son—a relation not primarily founded upon Christ's humanity, or any accidents thereof, but eternally subsisting in the divine nature.

This relation differs as much from any human or creaturely relation, as God differs from man—the Creator from the creature. Yet it more nearly resembles the filial relation than any other, and hence is most adequately shadowed forth to us in the words indicative of that relation. As understood by the church, it means nothing inconsistent with the immutability, eternity, and absolute Godhead of the Son. All ideas and definitions contradictory to this are to be rejected. The Son, though begotten of the Father, is so begotten, by a mysterious and eternal generation, as to be co-equal, co-eternal, and consubstantial with him. He is described as having "made the worlds," and "upholding all things by the word of his power," and yet as being, relatively to God the Father, "the brightness of his glory," and the "express image of his person" (Heb. i. 2, 3); "the image of the invisible God," by whom "all things were created" (Col. i. 15, 16). Thus this mysterious and adorable relation is shadowed forth to us by that of radiance or brightness to light, of an image to its original. But these, more fully than any other mode of representation, import, first, what is generated from another, and yet is co-etaneous and consubstantial with it. This is still further indicated in the title *λόγος* (word), used by the apostle John to denote Christ; and of which he declares that it "in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and was God." This points also to his being the eternal, outshining, or articulate expression of God, and yet no other than God. This adorable relation is still further indicated to us in the title "only begotten" (*μονογενής*), used

to denote this sonship (John i. 14, 18; iii. 16). This title shows that the sonship of Christ is forever distinguished from any relation which creatures, or the human nature of Christ, can sustain to God as their Father or Maker; and not only so, but that it refers to his divine nature. In the following passage (John i. 18) it is connected with his expressive or declarative function as the Word: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." All which adorable mysteries, and the faith of the church therein, is well summed up in the great Athanasian symbol to which Christendom reverently clings: "one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds; God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made."

Further proofs that the sonship of Christ refers to his divine nature are:

1. The Jews understood Christ to "make himself equal with God," by calling God his father (John v. 18). Christ did not dispute this interpretation of his meaning, but virtually assented to and confirmed it, by the divine prerogatives he asserted for himself, in his subsequent discourse. This could not be, if his sonship referred merely to his humanity.

2. In Rom. i. 4 it is said, in contrast to his being of the seed of David, according to the flesh, he was "declared [or evinced] to be the Son of God with power [or powerfully], according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead."

3. The greatness of God's love to us in the gift of Christ appears pre-eminently in that he gave his *only* begotten Son: "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." This can hardly consist with the idea that he became the Son of God in consequence of his mediatorship, his incarnation, or resurrection, or aught pertaining to his humanity. For then he would not be "the only

begotten son" until after God had sent him, and in consequence of his sending him, for our salvation. But the greatness of his love appears in that he sent for this purpose him who was his only begotten Son. Any other view greatly detracts from the force of this and all other passages which argue the exceeding greatness of his love in giving his Son to die for us. If he was not his Son as a person in the Godhead, and from eternity, how does this filial relation evince the incomparable love implied in the passages referred to? A love, too, which the church has ever felt to be peculiarly indicated by the gift and sacrifice of the only begotten Son?

4. The fact that, with insignificant exceptions, Christians, the world over, have ever taken the scriptures to mean, in the passages we have quoted and others, that Christ is the Son of God, as to his divine nature, is strong proof in point. Whatever the plain people of God quite unanimously take to be the meaning of his word, and the mind of the Spirit, on cardinal points of faith and practice, carries a very strong presumption in its favor, especially in a case like this, in which the endearment of the Son to the Father by virtue of his divine sonship, gives rise to no little of his endearment to themselves.

Finally, There is force in the opinion that the doctrine of the Trinity is more readily held in its integrity, if it have its roots, as the scriptures indicate, in the nature, or the eternal interior relations, of the Godhead. The balance is thus more readily held between extremes of tritheism and Sabelianism, and all tendencies thereto; which we think evinced not less by the history than the logic of the case.

DECREES, PROVIDENCE, AND PREDESTINATION.

The sum of our doctrine on this subject is well stated, in our Confession of Faith, Chap. III. 1, 2.

"1. God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to

the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

“2. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass, upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.”

This probably is a fair representation of the doctrine generally held by evangelical Christians. Still, portions of it have been impugned more or less widely and persistently : 1. By those who make God the author of sin. Presbyterians, in common with almost the whole church, earnestly deny, as their Confession does, that “God is the author of sin.” Herein they are adversaries of those who, limiting all moral quality to exercises, make God the author of sinful as truly and completely as of holy exercises ; an opinion which they have from time to time been called to confront and oppose. 2. They deny that sinful dispositions, whether native or acquired, are the positive creation of God. Such dispositions arise from the withdrawment of his presence and positive agency. God’s agency in the premises is wholly privative, like that of the sun to darkness. Darkness comes of the absence of the sun, not of his presence or agency. So when God withdraws from the soul, and the higher principles, which ought to regulate and balance its powers, are thus unsustained, the lower propensities fall into disorder and lawlessness. This withdrawment of God’s spirit and favor, we hold, as will yet more fully appear, to be only in judgment or punishment of sin. This is what is meant by God’s hardening the heart. It is a withdrawment of divine influences, which leaves it in more abject bondage to its own evil lusts. So the “want of original righteousness,” which is the fontal and originant source of native corruption, we hold is due to the withdrawment of the divine favor and communion vouchsafed to unfallen man, in punishment of that sin by which our first parents, and their posterity in them, fell. It is no positive creation of God. It is simply privative and punitive.

Although much misrepresented or misunderstood in re-

gard to our views of predestination and decrees, as if they interfered with the freedom of the will, or subjected it to compulsion or necessity incompatible with freedom, and equivalent to fate, we strenuously maintain the contrary: that "no violence is offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." What is established by the decrees of God is the certainty of future events, or their certain futurity, and this according to their several kinds. "Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently" (Confession of Faith. Chap. V. 2). Events in material objects are necessary relatively to those objects, though they may be free relatively to any free agents who voluntarily cause them. The voluntary acts of free agents are free in those agents. Events contingent on determining conditions known or unknown to us, though certain to God, come to pass "contingently," in this sense and to this extent. On these points there is really no ground for controversy. All are agreed that events come to pass in this way. The real question is, whether such a futurity of events by decree, as we maintain, can be accomplished, without destroying free-agency and contingency, as above described. This is vehemently denied by one class, who therefore deny that God purposes or decrees all events. We say, on the contrary, that there is nothing in free-agency which is inconsistent with its being previously made certain that the free agent will act in some given way rather than the opposite; nay, we say, that if he acts freely he will act in some certain way, rather than its opposite, and that this may be previously certain, and made certain. Is it not certain how a miser will act, if he acts freely, when a heap of gold is offered him? How the holy angels will receive all proposals of Satan? And, unless such certainty can be predetermined, how can events be

foreknown ? What becomes of foreknowledge, providence, and prophecy ?

The answer made to this is, in effect, that although the will is in such a sense a power of contrary choice or self-determination that God cannot foredetermine its action without restraint upon this power and destruction of its freedom, yet God foresees what such free agents so endowed will do, and foreseeing ordains it. This view we earnestly repudiate. In the language of our Confession already quoted : " Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass, upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass, upon such conditions.

So far as the present question is concerned, it is enough to say that, as the objects of knowledge are divisible into two great classes, to wit, the possible and the actual, without any intermediate *tertium quid*, so the knowledge of them is twofold, and only twofold, according to the nature of the things known. That is to say, there may be the knowledge of things considered simply as possible to the Divine Omnipotence, *scientia naturalis* ; and there may be the knowledge not only of things considered as possible, but the knowledge of whatever, out of the whole range of possibilities, actually has been, is, or shall be, *scientia libera, seu visionis*. Now in regard to things that have not yet occurred, they can be known only either as things possible to be, or as what, out of the infinite number of things possible to be, shall actually be. There is no foreknowledge, unless it be of events not merely possible but certain to come to pass. But God's absolute and universal foreknowledge of all events is undisputed. He knows them, not merely as what *may* be, but as what *will* be. How then do they pass from the category of simple possibility to that of futurity ? In regard to all but the acts of free-agents and their consequences, it will scarcely be denied that it is by virtue of the divine purpose that they shall come to pass. But in what other way, can the future acts of free-agents

be matters of certainty, ages before they exist, unless there be causes then in being to render them certain? And what antecedent eternal ground of such certainty can there be, except the divine decree? As to the knowledge of what is not in itself certain at the time of knowing it, it is simply absurd and self-contradictory. What is not in itself certain cannot be known as such. No *media scientia*, between the knowledge of things as possible and as actual, can be admitted, for the simple reason that there is no possible object of such knowledge, as the Reformed theologians demonstrated over and over again, "*contra Jesuitas, Socinios, et Remonstrantes.*"¹ The denial of eternal decrees which ensure the futurity of all events, therefore, subverts the foreknowledge of God. And it cannot be denied that it is out of harmony with the scriptural representations, which ever exhibit him as "working all things after the counsel of his own will" (Eph. i. 2). "He doeth according to his will, in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou (Dan. iv. 34, 35)?" The same thing is more distinctly and unquestionably implied in reference to the particular acts of free-agents that are pre-ordained, as the crucifixion of Christ (Acts iv. 27, 28).

The reason alleged, moreover, for founding fore-ordination on prescience, rather than prescience on fore-ordination, is suicidal. It is simply that the rendering of the actions of free-agents certain by an antecedent decree, is incompatible with free-agency; that, if actions are previously rendered certain, to the exclusion of the contrary actions, they are divested of the element of freedom. It is sufficient to say in reply, that the previous certainty or futurity of any event or action, according to its kind, does not alter its nature. Further, if such free acts cannot previously be made certain without losing their freedom they cannot be certain; and if they are not certain, they cannot be known as such. Thus foreknowledge is impossible. Not only so.

¹ Turretin, Loc. III. Quaest. 13.

Providence is impossible. If the actions of free agents may not be predetermined, it is impossible to govern and dispose the events of the universe in wisdom, or bring them to a happy issue; for by far the most frequent and momentous of these events are the acts of free agents, and their consequences. To be unable to control them is to be unable to control the universe. We do not, as we may yet have occasion more fully to show, admit free-agency to be such, or to involve any such, power of self-determination or contrary choice, as to be inconsistent with the previous certainty of actions. Whatever of these powers is not inconsistent with this, we do concede. It is hardly necessary to add, that in fore-ordaining acts, God, of course, foreordains all and singular the conditions and consequences thereof.

It results from the universality of God's decrees, as now set forth, that they who accept it must also accept the distinction between the decretive and preceptive will of God; i. e. inasmuch as many things occur contrary to his commands, while yet he fore-ordains all things, it must be that in these cases he purposes one thing and commands another. This cannot be evaded by any who admit the universality of his decrees or purposes. That it presents difficulties, and rises into the region of mystery, none can deny; but they are no more incumbent on us to solve, than on all others who do not reject the universality of God's decrees and providence. It is only necessary to say that the decretive will respects what, all things considered, God determines shall come to pass. But this does not imply that he produces it, if it be sin, by his own efficiency, or that in itself he is pleased with it, or does not abhor it; but that he permits the wickedness of men to execute it, "and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding and otherwise ordering and governing them in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends; yet so, that the sinfulness thereof proceedeth from the creature and not from God, who being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the approver of sin." "But

as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring to pass as it is this day, to save much people alive" (Gen. 1. 20).

His preceptive will simply respects what he approves and will reward in his creatures, the want or opposite of which he condemns and punishes. That in many instances he permits the opposite of what he commands, to occur, or does not prevent it, proves not insincerity.

All comparisons between the procedures proper to God and man, are of course inadequate. They can only be pressed a little way, and the parallelism must soon close, on account of the infinite distance between God and the creature. But still they may have a negative value in invalidating objections. Now, because the government of the United States takes measures to induce the rebels to give battle at a particular time and place, it does not follow that it is not sincere in forbidding all rebellion and insurrection. However, this difficulty is not of our making, and no special responsibility rests on us for its solution. All must admit that the conduct of Herod, and Pontius Pilate, and their confederates, was contrary to the command or preceptive will of God. Will any one, with whom we are here concerned, claim that it was contrary to God's decretive will? or that herein, "they did not do whatever God's hand and counsel determined before to be done?" Or that this deed, in itself most nefarious, as in its results it was the most resplendent manifestation of God's glory in the universe, was not a part of God's eternal plan, or that its execution was left to the mere caprice and contingency of the uncertain choice of human wills? Or, did this pre-ordination in the least impair the freedom, or lessen the guilt of these crucifiers of the Lord of glory?

Is it not declared in regard to them: "Him [Christ] being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and with *wicked* hands, have crucified and slain (Acts ii. 23)?"

After the foregoing statements and explanations, the

Reformed doctrines of personal and eternal election, and reprobation or preterition follow. It is only necessary to present the language of our Confession, and point to its scriptural proofs on these subjects. Chap. III. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

“ 3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death.

“ 4. These angels and men, thus predestinated and fore-ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

“ 5. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace.

“ 6. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, fore-ordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ; are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power, through faith, unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

“ 7. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.

“ 8. The doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending the will of God revealed in his word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election. So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God; and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the Gospel.”

PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL, AND METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES RELATED TO THEOLOGY.

Before proceeding to the contested points in anthropology and soterology, it will facilitate our progress to define certain

controverted terms, as also our attitude in regard to certain psychological and metaphysical principles inseparable from such discussions. We begin with the latter:

1. As to the will. All are agreed that it is free, and that its acts or choices involve moral quality or accountability. The only question agitated is : What does this freedom imply or involve? It involves the power of self-determination, in the sense of choosing any object or its opposite, in accordance with our preponderating desires. But we deny any power of self-determination or contrary choice beyond this, i. e. any power of determining or choosing at any given moment of choice, not only as we do choose, or as we please, but the contrary of what we desire or are pleased to choose. So far from being requisite to freedom, moral agency, and responsibility, such a power would subvert them. It would destroy the very nature of freedom, which has its being in acting as we please, or not at all. It would make it a thing of indifference, of blind hazard, irresponsible contingency. It would leave the universe under the dominion of almighty chance, and subvert the sovereignty and universality of divine Providence. Our most intimate consciousness denies any other liberty than that already set forth, or that we can be accountable for any fortuitous acts that spring up in defiance of our own pleasure or inclination.

The other chief psychological and metaphysical questions respect the morality of desires, feelings, and dispositions. Many contend that these are all void of moral quality in their own nature, or, at all events, beyond the point at which the will has had part in producing them. In regard to this, we hold : 1. That the acts and traits of the human soul having moral quality, have it in virtue of their own nature ; not in virtue of any originating cause back of themselves. Love to God and man is right, malice and envy are wrong, in themselves, irrespective of their origin. 2. The moral character of volitions depends on the feelings, desires, or intentions which prompt them, but not *vice versa*. If a man

determines to pull the trigger of a gun, the moral character of the volition depends entirely on the feeling and purpose with which it is done. Desires, then, do not receive from, they give to, volitions their moral character. 3. The ancient scholastic division of the mental faculties, which appears in such authors as Reid and Edwards, was into understanding and will, including under will all the non-cognitive powers. In this sense of the word "will," it is of course true that no desires or feelings which are not the effect of will, have moral character. But this is by no means admitting that no desires or feelings are moral which are not the fruits of will as a mere faculty of choice. It rather implies the opposite doctrine, maintained by us, denied by our opponents.

The question whether the spontaneous feelings and desires have moral quality is to be determined, not by any *a priori* judgments or theories, but by the simple testimony of the unperverted consciousness of mankind, and of the sacred oracles. Now the feelings, and the desires, which are all dependent and consequent on the feelings, since we desire what, and only what, awakens agreeable or complacent feelings, are divisible into two great classes — the animal and rational. The animal are those which arise blindly, without any intervention of reason or intelligence, as hunger and thirst. These have no moral character in themselves. The undue inflammation or indulgence of them, voluntarily and knowingly, is culpable. In contrast to the animal are the rational feelings and desires, which are those evoked by objects apprehended by the intelligence — as pleasure in and desire for knowledge, heaven, righteousness, the service and glory of God. Now these are divisible into three classes, according as they respect objects morally good, bad, or indifferent. Feelings and desires relative to things indifferent are themselves indifferent, as in regard to colors and shapes. Feelings and desires in regard to things morally good or evil are themselves morally good or evil. This is clearly settled: 1. By the consciences of men, which condemn feelings of envy, malice, of delight in wickedness, and

of pain in view of whatsoever is pure and lovely and of good report. It condemns not only such feelings, but the corresponding desires and affections. When the chief priests and captains were "glad" at Judas's purposed betrayal of Christ, were they not so far forth culpable? And is not the testimony of the Bible explicit as to the moral quality of feelings and desires regarding moral objects? Do they not signify, not only that they who do things worthy of death are wicked, but also those who "have pleasure in them that do them" (Rom. i. 32)? And where do they rank the "desires of the flesh and the mind" (Eph. ii. 3)? "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life" (1 John ii. 16)? But the explicit command of God is conclusive on this point: "Thou shalt not covet." That this is decisive of the present question clearly appears from the experimental exegesis of the apostle (Rom. vii. 7): "I had not known sin but by the law, for I had not known lust, except the law had said, thou shalt not covet."

This incidentally *settles* the question so much controverted, whether concupiscence is of the nature of sin. So far as mere blind animal cravings, or cravings for things indifferent are concerned, it is doubtless void of moral quality. But so far as it consists in lawless cravings for what is morally wrong, it is in every degree of it sinful.

A deeper question still, respects the morality of dispositions, or permanent habits of the soul which involve a tendency and facility to any given class of exercises. The only dispositions here in question are moral dispositions; that is, to good or bad moral exercises. On this point we have no doubt what is the judgment of the unperverted human conscience. Holy, benevolent, magnanimous dispositions men judge morally excellent and praiseworthy. And they no less certainly judge wicked, perverse, and malevolent dispositions criminal. They attach blame and ill-desert to a disposition to lie, steal, slander, blaspheme, and this whether such disposition be natural or acquired. No ingenuity of metaphysics or metaphysical torture can en-

tirely wrench such convictions out of the human soul. The collective dispositions of a man constitute his character. If they have no moral quality, his character has no moral quality. The scriptures clearly indicate the reality, and the good or ill desert of moral dispositions, when they tell us of the "good treasure of the heart" and "the evil treasure of the heart;" of the "good tree" and the "bad tree;" of the "old man" and the "new man;" the *σάρξ*, the *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς*, and the *φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος* (Rom. viii. 6, 7). However any may criticise one or more of these instances as inconclusive to our purpose, it cannot be questioned that, as a whole, they, with other like phrases, import an inward state which disposes to act, and is, in its own nature, either morally good or evil, praise or blame worthy. Nor does this, as some contend, imply that the substance or essence of the soul is polluted. The substance or essence of anything does not consist of changing or separable states, which may be present or absent, that substance still remaining in its entirety. Such are all habits, all moral dispositions, all treasures of education and culture, all continued yet changeable states of the soul, whether innate, acquired, or infused. Take the soul of the habitual drunkard or libertine, as it is between his acts of debasing indulgence. Is its state precisely as pure as it would be without such polluting practices? But does the very essence and substance of his soul therefore consist of corruption? Take that "governing purpose" into which some resolve the predominant character of man, be it holy or sinful. Whatever be its origin, it is none the less a state involving tendency or facility for a given kind of acts. It has moral character. But it is not the substance of the soul.

Nor does our psychology put the intellect, in some of its operations, wholly without the sphere of moral responsibility. It is so implicated in the moral states and exercises of the soul, that its judgments connected with them cannot be wholly void of moral quality. To this the unperverted human conscience and scripture alike testify. If we find

men justifying iniquity and approving the wicked, or condemning righteousness, we condemn them. The conscience and the Bible are alike severe in their condemnation of false moral judgments. The woe is upon those who "call good evil, and evil good; who put light for darkness, and darkness for light." If a man is blind to moral excellence, so that he does not appreciate and love it, we condemn him. In this region of what we may, so to speak, call moral aesthetics, such want of discernment of the beauty of moral excellence is the very core of depravity and guilt; and, so far as the soul is blinded, the necessity of spiritual illumination in regeneration becomes indispensable. This, whatever theories we may have, accords with the uniform representations of scripture. The language of the apostle (Eph. iv. 18), describing the blindness induced by sin, cannot readily be misunderstood: "Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their hearts." All familiar with these subjects know that abundant citations, no less significant and unequivocal can be made; to some of which we may yet refer, as we come to speak of sin and grace.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

Our theology rejects all utilitarian theories of the nature of virtue, or moral goodness; that is to say, theories which deny that it is a good intrinsically, and make it a mere means to some extraneous good beyond itself, such as happiness. We deny that it can be analyzed into a mere means of anything other, simpler, better, than itself. We not only deny the Epicurean form of this theory, that it is a mere means of the happiness of the agent; but its broader and more generous form, which asserts virtue to be merely the means of happiness to the sentient universe. We hold that right is an intrinsic quality of actions, involving obligation to do them; that what is right is what ought to be done, and is meritorious; that what is wrong is what ought to be

shunned, and, if done, deserves punishment. We hold it right indeed, within due limits, to pursue our own happiness and the happiness of the universe. We hold that it is evermore right and obligatory to obey the will of God, because the will of God is evermore conformed to the perfect goodness and absolute rectitude of his own nature, wherein is found the first original standard, the norm of all righteousness. But much as might be said on this point we must hasten forward, to the

DEFINITION OF CERTAIN THEOLOGICAL TERMS.

"*Sin* is any want of conformity to, or transgression of, the law of God" (*ἀνομία*). Shorter Catechism, 9. 1 John iii. 4.

Righteousness is perfect obedience or conformity to the law of God. "For whosoever shall keep the whole law and offend in one point shall be guilty of all" (James ii. 10).

To justify is to declare or adjudge righteous, not to make inherently righteous. It is the opposite of condemning. "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord" (Prov. xvii. 15).

To impute means, not the transfer of inherent qualities, but to reckon or put to the account of any one, as a ground of judicial treatment. This is the uniform scriptural meaning of the word, and also that which it bears in our standards. That this is the scriptural meaning can hardly be the subject of rational dispute to those who candidly examine the passages in which it is found, especially Rom. iv. 5. and the Greek words translated "impute," viz. λογίζομαι and ἐλλογέω. What else, indeed, can it mean when the apostle speaks of "not imputing iniquity," of "imputing righteousness without works," or, as the same original Greek word is employed in the phrase "counted for righteousness." That this is the meaning of the word in our symbols and standard theological writers is no less evident.

Guilt is equivalent to the Latin *reatus*, and means obligation to, or the being obnoxious to, the punishment of sin. Says Turretin (Loc. IX. Quaest. 3): “Duo vulgo peccati effecta dicuntur, *Macula Reatus*. *Macula* est pollutio spiritualis et ethica, quo hominis anima inficitur. *Reatus* est obligatio ad poenam ex praevio delicto.” Two effects of sin are commonly noted, its *stain* and *guilt*. Its *stain* is the moral and spiritual pollution with which the soul of man is infected. *Guilt* is obligation to punishment arising from previous fault.” This is beyond doubt the usage of scripture. Thus one word translated guilty is *ἐνοχος*, (ἐνέχω) held or bound to. When Christ’s accusers charged him with blasphemy, they said, “he is guilty (*ἐνοχος*) of death;” i.e. held obnoxious to the punishment of death (Matt. xxvi. 66; Mark. xvi. 64). The same word is translated “in danger of,” in the phrase “in danger of eternal damnation,” for the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost (Mark iii. 29). The word translated guilty (Rom. iii. 19), in “all the world shall become guilty before God,” is *ὑπόδικος*, under condemnation, or obnoxious to punishment. In Matt. xxiii. 16, *ὀφείλει* is rendered “he is a debtor,” in vs. 18, “he is guilty,” showing very clearly that it means the debt of, or obligation to, punishment. When David prays (Psalm li.): “Deliver me from blood-guiltiness,” what else does or can he mean, than from my exposure to punishment for blood-shedding? Even the lexicographer Webster tells us that, according to one probable derivation of the word, “it denotes a debt contracted by an offence, a fine, and hence came its present signification.” He also quotes Chancellor Kent as saying: “A ship incurs guilt by the violation of a blockade,” in illustration of the definition “exposure to forfeiture or other penalty.” We have dwelt thus on the theological definition of this word as used in the Reformed theology and confessions, because it appears so unwarrantable to many, who have been accustomed only to its present popular meaning of personal criminality in the subject of it. Such criminality is the normal ground

of guilt, and criminality in some person is the only ground of guilt or obnoxiousness to punishment. But the latter may be transferred from those who are to those who are not personally subjects of the former, as in all cases, under the providence of God, of bearing the iniquities of others; which means simply to bear their punishment.

Punishment is evil judicially inflicted for sin. It is correlative to guilt. It may be inflicted on the offender personally, or on those who, through a representative or other relation, have such a community with him, that the punishment of his sins may be justly laid upon them.

ANTHROPOLOGY. — THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

As the doctrine of sin logically precedes and underlies that of grace and redemption, so it may be considered in three aspects — with regard to the subjects, the degree, and the origin of it. Although the question of its origin may be logically first, yet it is so related to the degree and subjects of it, that it will be most readily solved, in the present state of controversy among evangelical schools, by some preliminary consideration of the subjects and degree of it. With regard to these, to the best of our knowledge, all parties recognized, or claiming to be recognized, as evangelical, agree that the present condition of human nature is such, or that all men are found in such a state, that they are subject to suffering and liable to death from the first; and that they sin, and sin only, from the beginning of moral agency in the knowledge of the moral law, except so far as any may have been the subjects of a saving change of character. Indeed, these are undeniable facts of divine providence, which exist with or without a divine revelation. The Bible does not make them. Nor are believers in the Bible, which in some degree explains them, and provides the only adequate remedy for them, nor is any school of theologians, specially bound to account for them. Whatever burdens or perplexities these facts may involve, they equally burden all schools, not only of Christians, but of theists, who are

concerned to justify the ways of God to man. But, with this amount of agreement, there is still a wide margin for disagreement, in regard to this antecedent connatural state which brings with it suffering, liability to death, and a dread certainty of sinning on the opening of moral agency. Some regard it as a weakness, wholly devoid of moral character. Others as more than a weakness, as a debasement, but still indifferent as to moral quality. Another class regard it as indeed moral depravity, or a corruption of the moral nature, and some of them are willing to call it sinful, but still insist that it is innocent and not justly obnoxious to punishment. All these go upon the ground that nothing can be morally corrupt or, if so, punishable which is not produced by the will of the subject of it. They include some parties in both the Protestant and Romish churches. But a much larger class, including many Romish divines, all the Reformed and Lutheran, as shown by their confessions, the adherents of the Westminster and Savoy confessions, the Edwardeans and Hopkinsians in this country (many of the latter, however, believing in moral agency from birth) hold that this native moral depravation is truly and properly sin, and constitutes the essence of original sin, in whole or in part. It is hardly necessary to say that the Articles of the Episcopal church pronounce this to be "original or birth-sin," and also that "in every person that cometh into the world it deserveth God's wrath and damnation." It is hardly necessary to show that the Presbyterian symbols, in common with those of the Reformation, aver the same thing, viz. that "original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it,"¹ is "conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so as that all who proceed from them in that way are conceived and born in sin,"² and that "every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the

¹ Shorter Catechism, 2, 18.² Larger Catechism, 2, 26.

law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries — spiritual, temporal, and eternal.”¹

The reasons why Presbyterians, in common with so large a portion of Christendom, certainly of Protestant Christendom, take this view of the original native corruption of man, whence proceed all actual transgressions, are : 1. It corresponds with the scriptural representations of our being conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity ; that that which is born of the flesh is flesh ; that we are by nature children of wrath. These, and like passages, answer to nothing short of native pollution and guilt. 2. Infants experience pain and are liable to death. But in mankind death is the penalty of sin. It was the penalty originally threatened agaist and executed upon the first sin of our race. It is that which is declared to be the “wages,” i. e. the penalty or retribution of sin. “The soul that sinneth it shall die.” In like manner, the scriptures universally connect tribulation and anguish with sin as its righteous ground. And herein they do but echo the dictates of the universal conscience of men, which refers suffering to sin as its meritorious ground. The barbarians on the island of Melita, seeing the viper fasten on Paul’s hand, said : “Surely this man is a murderer, whom vengeance [or retributive justice] suffereth not to live.” But that death is a penal visitation on all our race for sin, is explicitly asserted by the apostle, in a way which Presbyterians can neither get over nor around. “By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned” (Rom. v. 12). Whether this refers to sinning in Adam or not, it none the less certainly asserts that death comes by sin, and upon all men for their sin, in person or in their representative. And if it refers to sinning in Adam as federal head, this brings upon all the subjects of it, as an immediate penal consequence, the loss of righteousness, and resulting inherent corruption, which being transgressions of, incur the penalty of, the law. It is not only far more scriptural, but far more consonant with our ideas of justice,

¹ Confession of Faith, VI. 6.

that suffering and death should be the penalty of sin, than that they should be the effect of any mere arbitrary appointment of God. 3. Another reason why this natural pravity of disposition is judged sinful and ill-deserving, is its fruits. This is a scriptural test: "For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit, neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. For every tree is known by its fruit." The root which bears only sin, is itself sinful. "The works of the flesh are manifest" (Gal. xix. 20, 21). It is equally manifest that what produces them cannot be innocent. And here the principle applies, that the moral quality of dispositions is determined by their nature and fruits, not by their origin. Their origin may have to do with the vindication of God's relation to it, but not with their moral quality or ill desert. 4. A final reason why so large a part of the Christian world attribute a sinful moral quality to native human corruption is, that infants are capable subjects of the salvation of Christ, which has reference only to the sinful and the lost. "Neither is there salvation in any other, for there is none other name given under heaven whereby we must be saved." "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." Therefore "except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." It will, indeed, be scarcely maintained, that any are saved, out of Christ. But his salvation is from sin only, first its guilt and punishment, then its bondage and pollution. Infants dying in infancy are, as we believe, saved from both, through Christ.

THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY.

It being conceded, then, that all men are born with their moral nature so depraved as either to be itself sinful, or to insure the certainty of sinning in and from the first moral action, the question arises: How is this degraded and ruined condition of our whole race to be accounted for? The light of nature which reveals the fact, reveals no explanation of it. The instincts and traditions of the race, however, point more or less distinctly to a state of purity and felicity, from

which it has fallen. It is conceded, moreover, by all with whom we are now concerned, that the word of God connects the fall of the race with the fall of its first progenitor, as the primal cause thereof. It is perhaps proper to note as exceptions to this remark, the small class who, like Coleridge, Dr. Julius Müller, and others, hold to a sort of transcendental probation and "timeless" fall of all and singular the members of our race, before birth and entrance into the body in time. This is virtually the doctrine of a probation and fall of all men in a pre-existent state, of which the degradation and misery of their native state is the punishment. In this more common-sense or non-transcendental form, the theory finds an occasional advocate. This scheme, of course, denies any causative connection of Adam's first sin with the fall of the race, and accounts for the scriptural eminence assigned him in the matter, by his case being the first in order, and so an eminent type or example of the lapse of all his descendants. This theory has significance, as conceding, or rather as constrained by, the overbearing evidence of two points: 1. That the natural state of our race is such as to admit of no explanation, unless it be a punishment for sin; 2. that this is inexplicable without a previous state of probation in which the sin and fall so punished occurred. This being so, no alternative remains but either that all men personally lived, and each for himself was on trial, and fell, in a pre-existent state, or that, in some way, they had their trial in Adam, and fell in his fall, of which their present degraded natural condition is the penal consequence. The objections to the former view are: 1. There is no evidence of any such pre-existent state, trial, and fall. 2. This hypothesis does not adequately explain the phenomena which it is desired to account for. What it seeks to provide is a fair trial for each one of our race, whereby he had a fair opportunity to escape a fall, and consequent ruin and misery. This could not be, unless they were created with a bias toward holiness as strong as their propensity to sin, so that there was at least an even chance in their favor. But

if this were so, how are we to account for the fact that all fell, went in one way, with no universal preponderating bias in that direction? This explanation, therefore, itself needs explaining in the same way as that which is explained by it. But, 3. The conclusive reason is, that this view is contrary to scripture, which, in the judgment of nearly all Christendom, attributes to Adam's sin, not a mere typical or exemplary, but a causative, relation to the sin and death of his posterity; an interpretation which candid readers of Rom. v. 12 et seq. cannot easily avoid.

If then we, with the scriptures, give to Adam's sin this causative relation to the fall of our race, it must, in some way, have possessed the nature of a probation, not only for himself, but his posterity, in order to warrant the infliction of so dire a punishment upon them. We will not overlook, however, a large, and respectable, and in some parts of this country predominant, class of theologians, who, while admitting that the fallen condition of our race is the effect, deny that it is the penal effect, of Adam's sin. They say that it is not a punishment or judicial infliction for Adam's sin, but that it arises solely from a sovereign constitution, whereby, upon his sinning, his posterity were to be brought into a state of sin and misery. This dread calamity is a mere sovereign allotment, without any trial or sin, either in themselves or an appropriate representative. To this we object, in common with the Reformed, not to speak of other branches of the church: 1. It is in direct conflict with the scriptural representation, which affirms not only a sovereign causation, but a judicial relation between Adam's sin and the ruin of the race. "The judgment was by one to condemnation." "By the offence of one (judgment came) upon all men to condemnation" (*κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα*), Rom. v. 16, 18. These, supported as they are by the whole context, are plain words, and mean something more than mere sovereign infliction, not in punishment of sin. 2. We object further that it rejects the only solution of our deplorable estate, as related to the administration of

a righteous and benevolent God, afforded by his word. Nature confessedly sheds no light here. The Bible affords us this clew, that "in Adam all die," because all are under "condemnation" for his "one offence" in paradise, which implies that they had a probation in him, so that his sin is justly reckoned to their account, and they are dealt with as if it were their own personally. But to reject this solution is to leave the infliction of the most tremendous evils on a race of moral beings wholly unaccounted for, and to sever the nexus in such beings between sin and suffering, which is a first law of natural conscience and the word of God, and an essential bond of the moral universe. 3. We reject it because of the parallelism exhibited between the relation of Adam's sin to the condemnation of his posterity, and the righteousness of Christ to the justification of his people (Rom. v. 12 et seq.). If the way in which Adam's sin inures to our ruin is by mere sovereign allotment, and not by being its meritorious ground, then the righteousness of Christ works our salvation by mere arbitrary allotment, and not as its meritorious ground. This invalidates justification through the alone merits and righteousness of Christ. For "as by the offence of one (judgment) came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by the disobedience of one many were made sinners, even so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous" (Rom. v. 18, 19).¹ In view of these and

¹ Says Chalmers, "On the authority of revelation, and in obedience to the analogy of the faith, we feel inclined to the highest view that has been given of the subject of imputation. . . . We confess that we hailed it as a great acquisition when we first became acquainted with Edwards's view of the mediate imputation, and rejoiced in it as another instance of the accordance which obtains between the evangelism of the Bible and those discoveries which are gained by a deeper insight into the constitution of human nature, or into the secrets of mental and metaphysical science. It is the parallelism which the scripture affirms between the imputation of Adam's guilt and the imputation of Christ's righteousness which has broken up this illusion, as I now regard it to be, because consistent neither with the statements of the Bible nor the findings of experimental Christianity." — Chalmers's *Posthumous Works* (Harper's ed.), Vol. VII. pp. 482, 483.

other considerations, a much larger number have embraced the doctrine that Adam's first sin is not only the cause, but, by virtue of a just imputation to his posterity, the meritorious cause, of their depravation and ruin, these being the penal effects of it. But here the problem has been, so to connect Adam and his sin with his descendants, as to furnish a reasonable ground of its imputation to them. The prevailing doctrine of the Reformed, not to speak of other churches, as shown by their symbols and standard theologians, is that he, by covenant, was constituted their representative, so that his act was in this sense and in legal effect accounted and treated as their act, and, on this ground, imputed to them. It is not denied that this view has its difficulties, but, as we think, incomparably less than other schemes which have all its difficulties with many others peculiar to themselves. It is not denied that it at length roots itself in mystery. But bereft of this solution, we sink from mystery to rayless depths of "darkness visible," "inso-much that man is more incomprehensible without this mystery, than this mystery is incomprehensible to him." Some, however, have endeavored to escape these difficulties, by resorting to the scheme which accounts for the transmission of hereditary depravity by the natural laws of propagation, according to which, like begets like. So Adam "begat a son in his own likeness, after his image" (Gen. v. 3). It is obvious, however, that this law of propagation, whatever it may be, is God's sovereign creation, unless it be constituted, as it is, for the purpose of carrying into execution the penalty inflicted on the race for the sin of Adam. In this latter alternative, it is a part of the means of a judicial infliction, which is our view. In the former, it is a means of a mere sovereign infliction, and exposed to all the objections just brought against that view. Moreover, the law of descent, throughout animated nature, only insures the transmission of the essential qualities of the kind or species propagated. It does not, of itself, insure the transmission of separable accidents. It insures the transmission in men

of an animal and rational nature—the essence of manhood; but not of those separable accidents which distinguish the individuals, races, and varieties of mankind from each other. Now sin and holiness are, as we have before seen, separable accidents, in the presence or absence of either of which, manhood remains. The necessary laws of propagation, therefore, do not account for the universal degradation, corruption, and misery of the descendants of Adam. It can only be accounted for, in our judgment, as a judicial infliction for the sin of their first parent, on some fit ground, reckoned to their account.

Some other methods of accounting for the charging of Adam's sin to the account of his posterity, must not be overlooked.

One of these is the realistic theory of our race, according to which manhood is one substance, and whatever Adam did, all men did; therefore, his first sin was their sin. But the obvious difficulty here is, that on this scheme, not only the first sin, but all the sins, of Adam were those of his posterity; their acts too are his acts, all personal identity and accountability are confounded and vacated. Moreover, realism, by necessary consequence, has its logical terminus in pantheism. It comes to one substance of the universe, or of that *summum genus*, called being, which includes all things. This scheme, therefore, generates a hundred difficulties for one it removes. Withal, it invalidates the doctrine of justification by Christ's righteousness. As before shown, the scriptures draw a parallel between the mode of condemnation by Adam's sin and of justification by Christ's righteousness. If, then, Adam's sin condemns us because it is ours inherently, Christ's righteousness justifies us because it is ours inherently. We are thus justified by our own inherent virtues. This subverts the whole Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone. Others maintain a sort of literal sinning in Adam by his descendants, because they were potentially in his loins, as the branches in the root. This implies that we were literally present, and participating in

Adam's first sin. This is obviously impossible, and exposed to some of the most serious and fatal objections lying against the realistic scheme. Many, however, have used such language as sinning in the loins, or because we were in the loins, of Adam, to denote either sinning in him interpretatively, as our federal head and representative, or to indicate the reason of his being constituted such. With such we have no controversy, further than that some of them have used language so loosely as to invite or cause serious misinterpretation of their meaning.

Another scheme is that of mediate imputation. By this is meant, that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity not immediately, but mediately, through their own innate depravity, whereby they are supposed to consent to it; that in virtue of such supposed or implied consent to his sin, it may be reckoned, or they be treated, as if it were their own. This, however, is no real imputation of Adam's sin, but simply of their implied consent to it. Moreover, this does not account for the universal degradation and misery of our race. It presupposes them, either as a sovereign infliction or hereditary transmission, without any previous trial of any sort. It therefore stands on the same footing as those schemes already considered. Especially if Adam's sin is imputed to us on account of our previous sin, then, from the apostle's parallel between the two (Rom. v.), Christ's righteousness must be imputed to us mediately, through or on account of our previous righteousness. This grounds our justification on works of righteousness that we have done, and thus logically subverts the evangelical system.

In stating our objections to other theories, thus successively eliminated, we have virtually stated our own—that to which we, and, as we understand it, an immense majority of Old school, to say nothing of other Presbyterians, feel shut up. This is affirmed, while it is freely admitted that some, we know not how many, hold to some of the explanations of the imputation of Adam's sin already referred and excepted to by us. Our position, as shown by our

standards and standard writers, may be briefly summed up in the following points:

1. That God not only laid Adam under the simple obligation of a reasonable being to obey his law, but entered into a covenant with him, promising life upon "condition of perfect and personal obedience," and death upon the first act of disobedience (Con. of Faith, vii. 2.; Larger Cat. 20). This is hardly to be questioned. According to the account in Genesis ii. iii., certainly death is expressly stipulated upon the first disobedience; and, by inevitable implication, life was promised upon continued perfect obedience. But if this implication were doubtful, it is made certain by the express condition everywhere ascribed to the fulfilment of the law: "the man that doeth these things shall live by them" (Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12).

2. Our first parents forfeited the blessings and incurred the penalties of this covenant, in that they, "being left to the freedom of their own will, through the temptation of Satan, transgressed the commandment of God in eating the forbidden fruit, and thereby fell from the estate of innocency in which they were created" (Larger Cat. 21). This needs no comment.

3. "The covenant being made with Adam, as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity; all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in that first transgression" (Larger Cat. 22). This explains beyond peradventure in what sense our standards affirm that "we sinned in Adam," viz. as he acted not only for himself, but as our representative. Hence the imputation of that sin and its guilt to his descendants. Hence both catechisms put the first element of man's fallen state in "the guilt of Adam's first sin," while the Confession (vi. 3) declares "they [our first parents] being the root of all mankind, the guilt [obligation to punishment] of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation." The proofs that this

stipulation included their posterity with our first parents, are: 1. That the penalty denounced against our first parents (Gen. iii. 15 – 17), has been undeniably executed upon their descendants, showing that they were included in the covenant of which this is a part. 2. As has before been shown, it is affirmed, Rom. v. 12 et seq., that while “by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,” while it “reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression” (probably infants), yet this was in such wise, that the “judgment was by one to condemnation”; yea, “by one offence upon all men to condemnation”; moreover, that they are made sinners by the disobedience of Adam as they are made righteous by the obedience of Christ. This proves that Adam’s posterity were so included with him in the covenant broken by him in eating the forbidden fruit, that his sin was imputed to them, reckoned to their account, as a basis of judicial treatment, and that sentence of condemnation issued against them for it.

3. The same thing appears from the parallel between Adam and Christ, of whom Adam is declared the figure (Rom. v. 14), who is the “last Adam” (1 Cor. xv. 45), and (vs. 47) the “last man,” in contrast with the “first man.” This parallel must refer to the single point of headship, and the manner in which these two great heads of our race respectively bring condemnation and justification upon the parties represented by them. As it is undeniably by the merits of Christ’s righteousness reckoned to our account that we are justified, so it is by the charging to our account of Adam’s sin that we are condemned. As has been before shown, it is this view alone that preserves, to our apprehension at least, the gratuitous justification of the sinner, through Christ’s merits exclusively, intact, or protects it logically from subversion.

4. As before shown, it is the only way of reconciling the deplorable, lapsed condition of our race with the justice of

God. According to other theories, this terrible visitation has come upon us without any previous probation, either in ourselves or a fair representative. It seems to us, therefore, that by the rejection of this view much is lost, and nothing gained towards a sound theodicy.

5. The concessions of opposers. Dr. Hopkins opposed this doctrine, yet over and over again admits its main elements in such language as the following: "Adam was considered and treated as comprehending all mankind. The covenant made with him was made with all mankind, and constituted him the public and confederating head of the whole race of men, and he acted in this capacity as being the whole; and his obedience was considered as the obedience of mankind; and as by this Adam was to obtain eternal life had he performed it, this comprehended and insured the eternal life of all his posterity. And, on the contrary, his disobedience was the disobedience of the whole, of all mankind; and the threatened penalty did not respect Adam personally, or as a single individual; but his whole posterity, included in him and represented by him" (Hopkins's *System of Divinity*, Vol. I. pp. 192, 193). We could hardly wish for a more explicit statement of what we have set forth. It is not our province to reconcile it with much of a contrary sort. It is quite common for the extreme and strenuous opponents of the doctrine to fall into such phrase as that "Adam was not on trial for himself alone, but for his posterity," which, developed in all its implications, involves all that we have maintained. The great objection to this doctrine has been, that according to it, Adam was constituted representative of his posterity without their consent. But if this objection is valid, it impeaches many of the natural and providential arrangements of God. Are not parents and magistrates representatives of those who never could consent to their assumption of this position, so that the children of a family, or a nation, are often dealt with as if the acts of those set over them in the Lord were their own? Cannot a ruler plunge into the horrors of war those of his

subjects who were opposed to him and the war? Are not children, in spite of themselves, born to the poverty and degradation of poor or worthless parents? The objection, therefore, proves itself groundless by proving too much, and assailing the undeniable proceedings of the Almighty.

But it is objected again, that according to this scheme God inflicts sin as the punishment of sin; and this is incongruous with his nature, making him the author of sin. To this we reply, that this language of "punishing sin with sin," is chiefly, if not wholly, that of opponents. We hold to what the scripture undoubtedly teaches, when it represents God as giving men up to their own hearts' lusts, or to a strong delusion, or of hardening their hearts, for their sin and obduracy; not that God thus positively creates sin; but that, in punishment of it, he withdraws the gifts, endowments, and restraining grace of his Spirit, without which the mere natural principles of action become inordinate, unbalanced, and at once sink into *ἀτάξια* and *ἀνόμια*. Such withdrawal of God's favor and Spirit is undeniably set forth in scripture as a penalty of sin often inflicted. So in the present case; original sin is exhibited in all our standards as taking rise in the "guilt of Adam's first sin"; then the "want [absence or loss] of that righteousness wherein he was created," as the immediate consequence of incurring this guilt; then, next in order, and as the instantaneous effect of this loss, is the "corruption of his whole nature," the disorder and abnormality arising from the loss of the regulative, harmonizing, and purifying power of original righteousness. The Confession of Faith (VI. 2) puts the same truth in another aspect: "By this sin they fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in the faculties and parts of soul and body." Here their sin and the loss of original righteousness are spoken of as if they implied each other,¹ while it is by

¹ The standard view on the two preceding heads is well put in the following language of Turretin: "*Pœna quam peccatum Adami in nos accersit, vel est privativa vel positiva. Prior est carentia et privatio justitiæ originalis, Posterior*

virtue of this that they became "dead in sin," etc. The next article proceeds to say that "the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity," etc. That this is the present condition of our race, who are both "by nature children of wrath" and "dead in trespasses and sins," is the undeniable representation of scripture (Eph. ii. 1-3). That this view of the genesis of the successive stages of original sin, given in our standards, accords with scripture, and sufficiently disposes of the objection that thus God "punishes sin with sin," we think needs not to be further argued.

A single observation further. While, on this scheme, the withdrawal of divine favor and communion from our race,—of which corruption is an instantaneous consequent,—is due to Adam's sin, yet the further punishment of subsequent misery and death is inflicted with primary reference to this inherent personal pollution and attendant guilt, originating as aforesaid, and the actual transgressions proceeding from it.

The question whether we are called on to repent of Adam's sin as if we committed it personally, is sufficiently answered by what has been already presented. As it was not a sin committed by us personally, we are not to repent of it as such. We are to feel humbled as members of a race fallen from its integrity and purity, on a most favorable trial, in short, as "degenerate plants of a strange vine."

We will now inquire a moment as to the extent of this fall. This will help to estimate how far there is any ability on the part of man to recover himself from it. Presbyterians find no language more clear and exact than their own

est mors tum temporalis, tum aeterna, et in genere mala omnia, quae peccatoribus immittuntur. Etsi secunda necessario sequitur primam ex natura rei, nisi intercedat Dei misericordia, non debet tamen cum ea confundi. Quoad primam dicimus Adami peccatum nobis imputari immediate ad poenam privativam, quia est causa privationis justitiae originalis, et sic corruptionem antecedere debet, saltem ordine naturae; Sed quoad posteriorem potest dici imputari mediate quoad poenam positivam, quia isti poenae obnoxii non sumus, nisi postquam nati et corrupti sumus." — Loc. IX. Quaest. ix. 14.

standards, to express their views. "From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions" (Con. of Faith, VI. 4). A previous article declares them "wholly defiled in all the parts and faculties of soul and body." All evangelical Christians agree that the will is indisposed to good, and perverse in all its actions. That the desires, feelings, and dispositions partake of this depravity and consequent culpability has been sufficiently evinced already. That the intellect, as it is implicated in the moral and spiritual actings of the soul, is also defiled and blinded, has been shown heretofore. It is a necessary inference from the necessity of spiritual illumination so constantly asserted in the scriptures. How could this be more strongly asserted, even past all power of self-recovery, than in the following words, so familiar to all conversant with these subjects? "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned" (1 Cor. ii. 14). The body not only has in it the seeds of disease and death, but, in so far as it is mysteriously united to the soul and is manifoldly its organ and instrument, as libidinous and intemperate appetites have their seat in the body as animated by the conscious soul, so the body partakes of the defilement of our sin. Hence the exhortation: "Let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal bodies, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof, neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin" (Rom. vi. 12, 13). "If ye through the spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."

INABILITY.

All this involves inability for self-restoration. They are "indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good." These terms are expository and complementary of each other. The indisposition is inability. The inability consists in such indisposition as involves a disordered state

of the faculties, cognitive, sensitive, and volitional. It is needless to rehearse the direct assertions of the sinner's inability; the arguments from his being dead in sin, having a heart of stone; from the new creation by the Holy Ghost, and the exceeding greatness of his power to us ward who believe. All this has satisfied all parties that the sinner labors under some sort of inability. But precisely what it is, and how far it is a real inability, is in question. We hold it to be a moral inability, a sinful inability, and a real inability. With respect to the distinction between natural and moral inability so much insisted on by some, we hold to whatever of truth it contains, although most of us are not fond of the phrase, on account of its liability to be misunderstood or perverted. We hold that our inability is moral, and is our sin; and that it is natural in one sense, and not so in another sense, of the word "nature." It is natural in the sense that it is native to fallen man, and not acquired, so being like the depravity in which it consists. It is not natural in the sense of belonging to human nature in its original, normal, unfallen state. It is a depravation of this nature induced by the fall. Further, it is irremovable by the sinners own power, else it would be no real inability. We thus stand opposed to those who affirm a natural ability, meaning thereby a real, present ability, to perform works spiritually good, without divine grace. If by natural ability they mean, as some do, only the possession of natural faculties which constitute a moral agent, or which are essential to mankind, we maintain it. But these faculties are in a distempered state, governed by an evil bias, which needs to be purged away, by the Holy Spirit "creating us anew in Christ Jesus unto good works," before we can truly serve God in the spirit. This meaning of our Confession is put beyond all doubt, in the following language:

"Man by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so, as a natural man, being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or prepare himself thereto." — Chap. IX. 3.

As to the objection, that we are not accountable for not doing what we are unable to do, it applies to outward acts, but not to sinful dispositions. The more inveterate and invincible they are, by so much are they the more culpable. If the disposition to slander and backbite is so powerful that one cannot repress its actings, does this excuse it? Or does it not rather evince its aggravated criminality?

SOTEROLOGY.

In regard to the way of salvation from this deplorable state, we are concerned first with the persons who accomplish it, and next with the means they employ for this purpose. And in regard to the persons there is little dispute among the evangelical, all finding the germs of their creed here in the apostolic benediction: the love of God, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the communion of the Holy Ghost. To effect this salvation, belongs to the Son and the Holy Ghost. The only question mooted by parties here recognized, is in regard to the constitution of Christ's person. Our doctrine, and certainly the catholic doctrine, is, that "the eternal Son of God became man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and man, in two distinct natures and one person forever." This stands opposed to those who in any manner confound or identify the human and divine natures in Christ; to all who, in any degree, merge the divine in the human, or the human in the divine, or both in a *tertium quid* neither human nor divine, an undefinable, intermediate, theanthropic being. We maintain that he is "very God and very man." Thus, being of the rank and nature of each of the alienated parties, he is fitted to be the "one Mediator between God and man."

The offices to be performed for our recovery correspond to the various aspects of the evil from which we are to be saved. Now sin involves, 1. Misery and guilt, or exposure to punishment; 2. Pollution and blindness; 3. Dominion over us, and our consequent bondage to it. Now Christ delivers us from the guilt of sin by bearing our punishment for us; he procures for us a title to the rewards of righteousness

through the imputation of his righteousness to us. He cleanses us from the pollution and liberates us from the dominion of sin through the Holy Spirit dwelling in us. In regard of the various offices of Christ for our salvation, in virtue to which he is called our prophet, priest, and king, all which need attention in relation to our present object, have been or will be sufficiently treated under other heads in this Article, except what relates to his priestly office.

It is proper, however, to remark that the Old school Presbyterians cleave to that view of redemption which represents it as a covenant transaction, first between the Father and the Son, according to which the Father stipulated to the Son the chosen seed as the reward of his sufferings, and the Son stipulated to suffer and do whatever was requisite to ransom them from the curse and bondage of sin. This is clearly set forth in John vi. 37: "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." Secondly, there is a further stipulation indicated in the last clause, and manifoldly reiterated, that whoso cometh to or believeth on Christ shall be saved. Thirdly, there is the further covenant wherein God stipulates to give the grace of his Spirit to those whom he hath promised to Christ, to "persuade and enable them to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to them in the gospel." "This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will put my laws into their mind, and will write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people" (Heb. viii. 10). So it is promised that they shall come to Christ, and declared that none can come except the Father draw them (John vi. 37-44).

The topics connected with Christ's priestly office requiring notice are:

REDEMPTION AND JUSTIFICATION.

1. As to the manner in which Christ's sufferings and death become efficacious for our redemption. We maintain

that they are efficient for this purpose by being a true and proper satisfaction to divine justice for all penal obligations of sinners saved through him. By justice we understand distributive justice,—that perfection of God which is immutably determined to render to all their deserts, either in their own persons, or by an accepted substitute. As to what some call “general justice,” as distinguished from distributive, we understand them to define it substantially as benevolence in the government of the universe. When we speak of satisfying divine justice, we do not mean justice in this sense, which, in our view, is no proper meaning of the word “justice.” We mean justice proper, or distributive justice, whereby God “will render to every man according to his deeds” (Rom. ii. 6), and “every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward” (Heb. ii. 2), and “it is a righteous thing in God to recompense tribulation” to evil doers (1 Thess. i. 6). Now when we say that Christ satisfied divine justice, we do not mean, as some appear to imagine, that God has pleasure in his sufferings *per se*, but that the claims of his justice for the punishment of the sinner are satisfied or discharged by the sufferings and death of Christ substituted and accepted in lieu thereof. That, on some ground, they are so accepted and substituted, is conceded by every scheme recognized as evangelical. How then do the sufferings of Christ discharge the penal claims of the law, in lieu of the believing sinner’s punishment? We say, because we think the scripture says, by being themselves truly penal, and accepted as such, in lieu of the sinner’s punishment. That Christ was thus our substitute and surety, bearing the punishment of our sins, is manifoldly taught by the sacred writers: “God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons” (Gal. iv. 4, 5). Christ then was made under the law. In whose behalf, unless for his people, whom he undertook to redeem? How did he redeem them? “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being

made a curse for us ; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. iii. 13). Does this mean less than that Christ delivers us from the condemning sentence of the law by assuming and bearing it in our stead ? Again, he is often represented as "bearing our sins," or having them "laid upon him." There can be no doubt that the universal scriptural sense of the phrase to "bear sin," is to bear the punishment of it, as a due collation of the passages containing it will show. Indeed, in what other way could our sinless Saviour bear sin ? He could not surely be contaminated with its pollution. It is directly affirmed that the "chastisement [or punishment] of our peace," or required for our peace, "was upon him, and by his stripes are we healed" (Isa. liii. 5). He was "stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted" (vs. 4); and for whom ? "For the transgression of my people was he stricken" (vs. 8). "Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures." To die for sin, to be smitten of God, stricken for transgression, is not this punishment ? Is it not evil judicially inflicted for sin, and in support of law ?

If this be so, then it follows that those transgressions of his people for which he was stricken, must have been reckoned to his account, i. e. imputed to him ; and that thus he assumed their guilt, i. e. their obligation to punishment, not their pollution, in accordance with our previous definitions of terms. God "hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin" (2 Cor. v. 21). How could he, thus personally sinless, be "made sin for us," in any other possible way, than by the imputation of our sins to him ? Whether these reasonings be accepted as conclusive or not, it will at least show what Old school Presbyterians mean in saying that Christ's sufferings were penal, that our sins were imputed to him, and he assumed our guilt, and why they say so.

As to the objection that Christ could not have endured the penalty of the law in the sinner's stead, because his sufferings could not have been equal in amount, or similar in kind, with those of the sinners whose substitute he was, we

meet it with the obvious answer, that his sufferings had a boundless worth on account of the infinite dignity of his person. True, he did not undergo remorse of conscience, as sinners do for their personal sins; still he became a *curse* for us, and "poured out his soul unto death." What mean the terrible anguish of soul, and the bloody sweat of Gethsemane, and those dreadful hidings of the Father's face on the cross, which called forth the fearful exclamation: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me"? Doubtless there is an awful mystery here. But are these heavy shadows of God's wrath explicable except as a visitation upon sin? And what sin, unless those of his people imputed, and for whom he was made sin and a curse, and smitten of God, and afflicted?

Thus far of the nature and efficacy of Christ's sufferings, which, substituted for ours, serve to deliver us from merited wrath and woe. More than this they cannot accomplish. They leave us in a neutral position, without any title to the rewards of righteousness. In order to this we need interest in the merits of a perfect righteousness. Such a righteousness Christ, who for our sakes was "made under the law," wrought out for us. It is imputed to us, or reckoned to our account, as the ground of our justification, so that we are treated and judicially dealt with as if it were ours. The evidence of this is manifold and cumulative. "By the righteousness of one (the free gift) came upon all men unto justification of life." What this righteousness is is indubitably shown in the verse following. "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous" (Rom. v. 18, 19). It is the righteousness or obedience of Christ, then, that makes us righteous. How, unless it be so imputed to us, that in the eye of the judge we are regarded and treated as righteous on account of it? We are dealt with forensically, as if we were inherently righteous, solely for the sake of "the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone." Even so David describeth "the blessedness of

the man to whom the Lord imputeth righteousness without works" (Rom. iv. 6). So Christ is "the Lord our righteousness," is "made unto us righteousness" (1 Cor. i. 30), and "we are made the righteousness of God in him" (2 Cor. v. 21), i. e. made righteous with the righteousness which God provides and accepts in Christ. As being such, it is often called "the righteousness of God," in contrast to our own, and as being received by faith, the "righteousness of faith," in opposition to that by works, and for both reasons "the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto and upon all them that believe" (Rom. iv. 22). So the apostle charges against the Jews, that "they being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves, unto the righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness, to every one that believeth" (Rom. x. 3, 4) Paul sought to "win Christ, and be found in him, not having on mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." In view of all this, and much more the like, Presbyterians see no reason for discarding or modifying the doctrine of our catechism. "Justification is an act of God's free grace unto sinners, in which he pardoneth all their sins; accepteth and accounteth their persons righteous in his sight; not for anything wrought in them or done by them, but only for the perfect obedience and full satisfaction of Christ, by God imputed to them, and received by faith alone" (Larger Cat. 70).

Thus the atonement is no mere governmental expedient; no merely didactic, or symbolical, or influential exhibition. It is a true and proper satisfaction of divine justice by Christ's endurance of the penalty due the sinner, and his perfect obedience imputed to him for his full justification. It is often said, that in this scheme salvation comes, through the merits of Christ imputed, to be a matter of justice, and not of grace. It is indeed a matter of justice, in one view, that salvation be given to those whose debt of punishment

their surety has discharged, and for whom he hath purchased the gift of eternal life. "We are bought with a price," for God hath purchased the church with his own blood. God is "just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." It is the grand peculiarity of this method of reconciliation to God, that it displays his mercy in accordance with, not in derogation of, his justice; that he is a just God and our Saviour. But it is none the less, it is all the more, of grace for being conformed to justice. It is still of God's free grace that he provided and accepts this satisfaction and obedience of Christ for their justification. So "grace reigns through righteousness," not in subversion of it. We are "justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace." The objections just considered are of older date than our standards, which dispose of them thus: "Christ by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all them that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to the Father's justice in their behalf. Yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace; that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners" (Confession of Faith, xi. 3).

This view of the atonement seems to us to accord with the manifold scriptural representations of it, and alone to meet adequately the real need of the sinner's soul. The convinced sinner knows "the judgment of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death," that his sin deserves God's wrath and curse, that God's justice requires him to punish sin, and that He "cannot deny himself," and, therefore, that he (the sinner) cannot be safe unless this curse and penalty are borne by a sufficient and accepted substitute. Until he sees that debt discharged, he cannot but fear that it will be exacted of him by the eternal and

immutable justice of God. On no other ground can his soul stay itself except on this, that Christ bore our sins, and became a curse for us. Otherwise it is still "a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

THE SUBJECTS AND EXTENT OF REDEMPTION.

All who know anything of the Westminster standards, know that they represent Christ as the "Redeemer of God's elect," and that they limit the redemptive efficacy of his death to his people: "For the transgression of my people was he stricken" (Isa. liii. 8). "He laid down his life for the sheep" (John x. 15). "He purchased the church with his own blood" (Acts xx. 28). "He gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works" (Tit. ii. 14). The end for which Christ gave himself is thus, and in manifold other passages, unmistakably indicated. It is to "redeem them for whom he gave himself from all iniquity, to purify unto himself a peculiar people." This is not merely to render salvation possible, but actually to impart and complete it in those for whose salvation he gave himself. These are those whom the Father stipulated to give him as the reward of his sufferings: "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out" (John vi. 37). These beyond all question, constitute the special objects of his redemptive work, his sufferings, and death. While this view accords with the manifold and unambiguous representations of the scriptures, yet it is perfectly consistent with another set of scriptural representations, which, whatever may be said to the contrary, we heartily accept, in common with all evangelical Christians. We adopt the old formula that the atonement is "sufficient for all men; efficient only for the elect." The sacrifice that is adequate to atone for the sins of one man, would be adequate to atone for the sins of all, if it were applied to them. Hence it is ample foundation for the gospel offer of Christ to all men, which we all agree is made in

scripture, and is to be made, without hesitation or reserve, by the ministers of the gospel. It is in the embrace of this universal and unconditional offer to all, and as made to all, that the elect become partakers of its benefits. Hence the just condemnation of all rejecters of the gospel. They reject the salvation freely offered to them, which would be theirs for the taking of it, and "this is their condemnation."

The question then is not concerning the sufficiency of Christ's redemption for all, or the universality of its offer — the certain justification of all who accept it, and condemnation of all who reject it; but it is, what was the purpose of God in giving his Son, and of the Son in offering himself for the sins of men? Was he given, did he give himself, to redeem all, or to redeem his people? We think the answer of the scriptures is plain: "Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it" (Eph. v. 25). To the same effect are several passages already quoted, and that might be quoted. The passages also which attribute the saving work of the Spirit to Christ, clearly limit the efficacy of his redemption to the subjects of that work — Christians are "quickened together with Christ" (Eph. ii. 5). "Who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ" (Eph. i. 3). "According to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour" (Tit. iii. 5, 6). Moreover, it is the uniform testimony of scripture that we receive from Christ, not a mere possibility of reconciliation, forgiveness, justification, salvation, but these very gifts themselves. But those who receive these blessings are the people of God, the elect only. In short, both in the light of reason and scripture, the following statement of President Edwards appears unanswerable:

"From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense may be said to *die for all*, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea the whole world by his death, yet there must be something *particular* in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should be

actually saved thereby. As appears by what has been here shown, God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in his proper absolute design, and of a certain number only; and therefore such a design can only be prosecuted, in anything God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other, most strictly speaking; for it is impossible that God should prosecute any other design, only such as he has. He certainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he has not. And indeed, such a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge as from that of his decree." — *Treatise on the Will*, Sec. XIV.

A single remark is due before leaving this subject: Whatever opinions any may entertain of the doctrines of our church on this subject, it is believed that no body of Christians more exalt Christ in their public teachings and worship, or in their inward spiritual experience. This is freely admitted by all parties in any degree familiar with the tone of our thinking, feeling, and preaching. Whatever may be true of other bodies, among us Christ is everywhere lifted up as the substance and essence of our religion, the central object of faith, the spring of all that is sweet, holy, and heavenly in religious affections, "the power of God unto salvation." Nowhere is Christ more constantly and demonstratively set forth as having provided a full and free and finished salvation for all who will accept it, as the author and finisher of faith, the beginning and end of all piety. Explain all this as we may, it is not to be overlooked in estimating the tendency and effect of the doctrines they hold in the premises. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

It is also to be remembered that many of the objections urged against Particular Redemption presuppose that the gift and sacrifice of Christ, in order to put lost men in a salvable state, is a matter of justice, not of grace. They are groundless on any other hypothesis. But this hypothesis subverts the gospel, and destroys the very foundations of Christianity.

THE OFFICE OF THE SPIRIT.

In regard to that branch of soterology which respects the work of the Spirit in regeneration and sanctification, it is, of course, held to be co-extensive with the depravity of the soul and its enslavement to sin. The Spirit removes the perverseness, pollution, and impotence for acts spiritually good in the soul, which, as we have already seen, possess the natural man, darkening the intellect, corrupting the affections, infusing into the will an invincible bias to evil; altogether constituting a bondage to sin from which the mighty power of God's Spirit alone can deliver it. The sum of our faith on this point is stated, to our full satisfaction, in the following language of our Confession :

"1. All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as that they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

"2. This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, and being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it" (Confession of Faith, Chap. X).

According to this, man is passive in regeneration, which is the work of God upon and in him, and active in conversion, which is his own act of turning to God and embracing Jesus Christ. But, in what is properly the act of God upon him he cannot be active. He is the object on whom the work is wrought, and so necessarily passive. But the simul-

taneous effect of this work is his own active turning to God.

It is to be observed withal, that the work of grace in the human soul, though supernatural, is not miraculous. Though above nature, it is not contrary to nature, nor in contravention nor suspension of its laws. The Spirit operates upon the soul with a secret and resistless efficacy, and yet without violence to, yea, in perfect harmony with, the laws of all its faculties, cognitive, sensitive, and voluntary. But while thus in sweet accord with the laws of our rational and accountable nature, it is "even according to the working of the mighty power which God wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead" (Eph. i. 19, 20).¹

It is in place to say a word as to the relative priority of faith and repentance in the soul, not in the order of time, but of nature. They are co-instantaneous beyond dispute. But it is disputed which is the logical antecedent or condition of the other. The definition of repentance in the Shorter Catechism happily expresses our view of this question. "Repentance unto life is a saving grace, whereby a sinner, out of a true sense of his sin, and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ, doth, with grief and hatred of his sin, turn unto God, with full purpose of, and endeavor

¹ It has been quite a fashion with some parties to charge Old school Presbyterians with holding that depravity is a "physical" state, and therefore that regeneration is a "physical" change, meaning by the word "physical" something like material or corporeal. What we and the great body of Christians hold is, that the work of the Spirit on the soul in regeneration is *immediate*, producing an immediate change in its moral state or dispositions, so that it freely and sweetly is persuaded and attracted by the objective evangelical truth and motives which it previously rejected. This is in opposition to the doctrine of regeneration by the mere suasive influence of such external truth and motives, without any antecedent interior change in the soul itself. But this change is moral, i.e. in the moral nature and state; not physical in any sense inconsistent with this. It is true that some old standard writers used the term "physical" to denote the immediate character of the work of the Spirit on the soul, and in contrast to moral; this word being used by them in the sense of a mere external suasive influence. In this sense they pronounced the work of the Spirit physical, not moral. But this only means that it must be wrought upon and change that *φύσις*, or native moral state, whereby we are "children of wrath" (Eph. ii. 3).

after new obedience." The point to be noted in this definition is, that repentance flows out of, and therefore presupposes our "apprehension of, the mercy of God in Christ." Of course, such "apprehension," in order to be effective, must be a believing, confiding apprehension. So while faith and repentance are inseparable, like the fire and its heat, yet faith is the logical antecedent or condition of repentance. We think the whole scope of the scriptural exhortations to repentance, carries an express or implied reference to the "mercy of God in Christ," as the constraining motive thereto. "Repent and be converted that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord, and he shall send Jesus Christ which before was preached unto you" (Acts iii. 19, 20). "Let the wicked forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return ^{unto} the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon" (Isa. lv. 7). In the nature of the case it must be so. For nothing is genuine in religion which is not inspired by love to God. And can genuine love exist towards a being to whom we dare not trust ourselves, or whose honor and glory we know demand our destruction and misery? So there can be no real, cordial trust in God on the part of sinners which has not its root in faith in Christ as the expiation for our sins. "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him" (Heb. xi, 6). How can the convinced sinner believe that God is the rewarder of those who seek him, otherwise than as he beholds him in Christ "reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses?" There may be legal and slavish repentance without faith in Christ, inducing a hard, reluctant service of God in "dead works." Evangelical and saving repentance can only be the daughter of faith in Christ; a faith, however, which instantaneously begets it, which works by love, and purifies the heart:

This subject has vital connection with the whole tone and spirit of preaching and religious experience. On the one system, the poor soul must become penitent and holy, consciously endowed with spiritual life, in order to feel warranted to come to Christ. On the other, it is invited to come to Christ "that it may have life;" in all its unworthiness, helplessness, and misery, to come at once to him for "all things pertaining to life and godliness," for "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption." It is easy to see which system entangles the soul, in its access to Christ and peace and holiness, in inextricable toils, and which system clears the way to him in free and buoyant faith, hope, and love.

ECCLESIOLOGY.

It is unnecessary to go at any considerable length into our principles of church organization. The cardinal features of our ecclesiastical system are: 1. Representative government by officers chosen by the people, in contrast alike with government by the people in person, or pure democracy, which is congregationalism, and with government by officers not chosen by the people, i. e. by a prelatical and hierarchical government. Both extremes are avoided, not only the despotic, but what is elsewhere found impracticable, that of the people attempting to exercise legislative and judicial functions immediately themselves, instead of through the medium of their representatives. 2. The parity of the ministry as shepherds of Christ's flock, neither as lording it over God's heritage, nor over one another. Herein, again, Presbyterianism contrasts with all prelatical and hierarchical systems. 3. Unity. This binds all particular churches in one organization, composed of representatives of the lower courts. It is opposed to Independency, which, to the eye of a Presbyterian, runs towards disintegration and dissolution. It represents organically the unity of the Church. All its members become subject to their brethren in the Lord. The soundness of the whole body can be brought

to bear effectually to heal or expel distempers in particular parts. 4. Closely connected with this is catholicity. Her communion is open to all Christians of all nations. But this is not at the expense of purity. Our ministers and teachers are required to subscribe and conform to her Confession of Faith. This provides for the purity of their teachings, while at the same time, our church debars no credible Christian professor, competent to discern the Lord's body, from communion at the table of the Lord.

In regard to the reasons of the secession of a portion of our ministers and churches a quarter of a century ago, it is only necessary to observe that the main cause was doctrinal. Other influences, however, gave tone and intensity to this. Among them ecclesiastical differences were undoubtedly prominent. Of these, foremost in time, if not in influence, was the position of Old school* Presbyterians, that church-work, such as educating ministers, regulating missions etc, should be done by agencies appointed and controlled by the church. On this point, as those who seceded from them are coming rapidly, avowedly, and exultingly to the same ground, there is no need of further remark. Another, and perhaps the most immediately impulsive, reason was the summary elimination of the congregational element from their system, which, with the best of motives, had been unconstitutionally introduced by the celebrated "Plan of Union" with Congregationalists in 1801. This alien and incongruous element had become a source of great discord and trouble. In the language of Chief Justice Gibson, in the celebrated opinion given in rendering the decision of the Supreme Court, which ended the legal contest, "the two systems [Congregational and Presbyterian] are as immiscible as water and oil." As the same conclusion, theoretically and practically, has been reached by the New school Presbyterians and Congregationalists themselves, no more is necessary to be said on the subject.

A few words on two other points, out of the many that suggest themselves, must close this Article, already too

protracted. First, as to the church-membership of the children of Christians. On this subject Old school Presbyterians are coming more and more into the fullest sympathy with their standards, however they may have, owing to various causes in the present century, lost sight of their precious significance, in placing children on the same footing in the visible church with their parents. The mind of our church is deeply moved on this subject, and is unrelenting in its efforts to bring her children to the closest intimacy and oneness with herself. She resists with a holy jealousy every effort to loosen this bond, in the utmost stringency of it, as set forth in our Book of Discipline. A striking evidence of this has appeared in connection with the attempt to revise and amend this book, which has for some years been in progress in our body. The committee appointed by the General Assembly to prepare the needed amendments, recommended that a clause be inserted in the article which declares baptized children subject to the "government and discipline" of the church, asserting that, before making a profession of religion, they were "not subject to judicial prosecution." This amendment chiefly prevented the acceptance of the amended Book of Discipline by the assembly of 1860. It has been expurgated from the subsequent revisions of the book, in obedience to the almost unanimous voice of the church, because it was feared that it would weaken the bond of union between the church and its baptized members. This growing recognition of the church-membership of the children of Christians, and the consequent treatment of them as persons who are recreant to their position, if they do not think and feel and live and act as becomes the children of God, is producing the happiest results. Much lost ground yet remains to be recovered in this regard. But enough has already been regained to give the highest promise for the future.

Next in regard to the sacraments, we will barely add, that Old school Presbyterians, repudiate the opposite extremes of attributing to them, on the one hand, an intrinsic

opus operatum efficacy, and, on the other, a mere emblematic and didactic character. We hold that they are not mere "signs," intended to illustrate the nature of Christ's salvation, but that they are "seals" also, designed to ratify the promises and covenants which, through faith, convey that salvation to the soul (Rom. iv. 11). This stipulatory character of the sacraments we deem of great moment. They are like the seal on a deed, designed to be solemn attestations of the sincerity of the promiser, and of the reality of the benefits stipulated by him. In regard to the efficacy of this, it is to be observed: 1. That, according to the constitution of our nature, such a visible and conspicuous attestation of solemn earnestness in making a promise has a power, beyond the mere word, to assure our faith, so apt to stagger, our hope, so apt to droop. It is analogous to the "oath for confirmation wherein God, willing more abundantly to show unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath" (Heb. vi. 16, 17). The word of promise is indeed sure in itself. But the seal of the promise makes it "more abundantly" sure to us. 2. Not only in their own nature, but as divine ordinances, the sacraments are channels of a peculiar grace to all who receive them aright. If we cannot tell why he has done it, it is enough that God has instituted them, and has been pleased to connect special gracious benefits with their appropriate use. 3. They are not efficacious of themselves, but only as they are received by faith. As Calvin says, we get only so much from them as we take by faith. 4. We admit and insist on the real presence of Christ in the sacraments, as we do in his word and ordinances generally, by his Spirit operating in and through them as the instruments or media of his agency. Any other real presence of Christ's person or body in the bread and wine, whether by transubstantiation, consubstantiation, or otherwise, we deny. 5. We reject that theory of the person of Christ now advanced in some Protestant communions, according to which Christ is denied to be truly God and truly man, and is

asserted to have a theanthropic nature, produced by confounding and identifying the two natures in a *tertium quid*, which is neither God nor man, nor God and man, but a divine-human intermediate between the two, whose divine-human life is deposited in the church, and dispensed, through the sacraments, to men for their salvation. This scheme really gives the sacraments an *opus operatum* efficacy, and is a kind of modern transcendental sacramentarianism and ritualism which we discard.

CONCLUSION.

Here we pause. Our exposition of the polemical attitude of our church has been prepared under the pressure of extraneous labors and hinderances, brought upon us in divine providence, and wholly unlooked for, when we engaged to furnish it. Such as it is, however, it must speak for itself. While it has been our endeavor to set forth the controverted doctrines of Old school Presbyterians, as we understand them, it has been no less our endeavor to avoid charging the doctrines we oppose upon any specified communion or school of Christians. Thus we have hoped to consult the interests of truth and charity ; with what success our readers must judge. What we insist on for ourselves and others is simply the grand old maxim : *In necessariis unitas ; in non necessariis libertas ; in omnibus caritas.*

ARTICLE IV.

CHARLES WESLEY AND METHODIST HYMNS.¹

BY REV. FREDERIC M. BIRD, PHILADELPHIA.

It is a singular circumstance that the most prolific and powerful of Christian lyric poets should be comparatively unknown. *Positively* unknown he is not; his praise is in all the churches; no Christian denomination has entirely refused to accept his valuable help in the common work of worship; in every modern English and American hymn book he is represented by some of the noblest of spiritual songs. But relatively to his genius and his works, the world knows little of him. Perhaps one tenth of his poetry is yet in print. The Methodists cherish his memory, and their various collections contain some eight hundred hymns bearing his honored name. Other hymnals have a sprinkling of the Wesleyan style and spirit, more or less, according to the views, the prejudices, the knowledge of their editors: if

¹ The Life of the Rev. Charles Wesley, M.A. By Thomas Jackson. 2 vols. 8vo. London. 1841.

Hymns and Sacred Poems. By John and Charles Wesley. 2 vols. 1749.

Hymns and Sacred Poems. By Charles Wesley. 3 vols. 1739, 1740, 1742.

Short Hymns on Select Passages of the Holy Scriptures. By Charles Wesley. 2 vols. 1762, 1794.

Hymns on the Lord's Supper. 1745, 1825.

Hymns on God's Everlasting Love. 1756.

Funeral Hymns. 2 vols. 1753, 1759.

Hymns for Children and others of Riper Years. 1766, 1842.

Hymns for the Use of Families and on Various Occasions. 1767, 1825.

Hymns on the Trinity. 1767.

The Wesleyan Psalter. Nashville, Tenn. 1855.

And divers others.

Methodist Hymnology. By David Creamer. 12mo. New York. 1848.

Wesleyan Hymnology. By the Rev. W. P. Burgess. London. 1846.

A Collection of Hymns for the Use of the People called Methodists. By the Rev. John Wesley, A.M. London.

Hymns for the Use of the Methodist Episcopal Church. New York.

Hymns of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. Nashville, Tenn.

the compiler have an unusually liberal spirit, and a rare acquaintance with his subject, the number of Wesleyan hymns may approach one hundred. But we have yet to see an American non-Methodist selection which does fair justice to the greatest of hymn writers.

Beyond what is contained in the standard denominational hymn books, the Wesleyan poetry is inaccessible to ordinary readers, and can be reached by the most zealous book-worm (in America at least) only at some expense of time, trouble, and labor. It is scattered through over thirty separate publications, the dates of which range from 1738 to 1785. Most of these were never reprinted; and all, except three which have been republished by the British Methodists within the century, have been out of print for many years. So much for the *published* poems (between four and five thousand) of Charles Wesley; but there are nearly as many, says his biographer, which he left in manuscript at his death, and which have never seen the light. Such is the enterprise and spirit of the English Wesleyan Conference, to which they belong.

It is difficult properly to handle a subject of such magnitude, and one which has been so little studied and appreciated. "The glorious reproach of Methodism" is scarcely yet extinct; the name of Wesley still arouses many old-time prejudices: Calvinists have not quite lost their suspicion of the Arminian teacher, nor churchmen forgotten to look coldly upon the great schismatic. Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? Charles Wesley was the "bard of Methodism"; and most people, without knowing very thoroughly what Methodism is, judge it to be something quite different from other forms of Christianity, and therefore conclude that its poet can hardly be the poet of the church at large. Mr. Creamer, in his "Methodist Hymnology," hazards the opinion, that the man is not born who should fully appreciate the genius of the Methodist poet. Certainly the day will come when the grateful praises of his own people shall be echoed by the thanks of the whole

Christian world ; when posterity shall remedy the tardy justice of time, and Charles Wesley be acknowledged as a name great among British poets, and *facile princeps* of modern sacred song. It is because the Methodist poet is *not known*, that he is not appreciated. The more extensively and closely his writings are examined, the more will be found in them worthy to be admired and used. Other hymn writers have had some measure of justice done them. Of Dr. Watts especially, the name and writings are household words : his Psalms and Hymns may be found at every bookstall, and very copious extracts from them in every hymn book. But only a few venturesome persons have explored the vast mine of Wesleyan poetry ; and its treasures are as yet unclaimed and unused by the church at large. Dr. Watts has been commonly considered the most voluminous and powerful of hymnists. Many of our readers will be surprised to hear that the published Wesleyan hymns are five times as numerous as his, and that of this immense mass the literary standard is far higher than that of the lesser bulk of the more celebrated writer. Set aside one hundred of Watts's and five hundred of Wesley's best hymns ; there will be no comparison between the remainder, in style and poetic merit. Dr. Watts was a poet at certain times, and under special inspiration ; Charles Wesley was a poet by nature and habit, and almost always wrote as such. Of course his effusions are not equal among themselves ; but he established and observed, through all his multiplicity of verses, a standard which no other hymn writer up to his time was able to approach, and which none has since surpassed.

The above remarks have an air of special pleading. It may relieve our readers to know, that the present writer is not a Methodist, and simply wishes to see justice rendered. He has had inclination and opportunity to study the Wesleyan poetry as few persons have done, and the conclusions resulting from that study are here expressed. The object of the present Article is to communicate as thorough and

extensive a knowledge of the subject as our limits will permit, by allowing our author to speak for himself as naturally as may be, and illustrating the various phases of his genius and character by extracts from his works. If any attention is thereby drawn to a realm of literary wealth which lies a little off the high road, and has been neglected by most travellers, but offers to the enterprising visitor unequalled attractions and rewards; if, in any quarter, an enlarged interest be awakened in the most fertile and important, yet least explored, region of English hymnology, the labor will not be lost.

The interest which attaches to the Wesleyan poetry is not due merely to its intrinsic excellence. It is the product, not only of a great mind, but of a rare day, and wonderful doings. No hymns were ever so autobiographic and historical. They groan under the mortal anguish of repentance; they throb and quiver with the throes of the new birth; they swell with the triumphs of faith, the full glories of a present salvation. The whole vitality, not only of the poet, but of his people and the Lord's, is in them. The life-blood of the time flows through them; they are big with the great awakening, which turned the world upside down. The controversy of the Lord with the nations has come; his servants are at war with the world; the "spark of grace" has fallen, the fire is beginning to burn. The fearless preacher has gathered his thousands in the open air; you hear the clamor of persecution, the shouts of the godless mob; you see the eager faces of the listening multitude, as the words of life drop into their hearts. The work goes on: the contempt of the high, the hatred of the low, opposition, slander, brute force, are wasted on it in vain.

How happy are the little flock
Who, safe beneath their Guardian rock,
In all commotions rest!
When war's and tumult's waves run high,
Unmoved above the storm they lie,—
They lodge in Jesus' breast.

This is the peculiarity of the Wesleyan hymns. They are not versified moralities, not didactic disquisitions, nor languidly virtuous sentimentalisms; but they are most intensely alive and thoroughly practical. Dr. Watts and his followers wrote their hymns in their closets, and if there were a circumstance or story of personal interest in connection with any of them, it is told as something remarkable. Charles Wesley composed on horseback, on a journey, in all times, places, and surroundings; and the verses were generally called forth by the special fortunes and emotions of the hour. When "going to Wakefield to answer a charge of treason," he sings:

Thou who at thy creature's bar
Didst thy Deity declare,
Now my mouth and wisdom be;
Witness for thyself in me.

And "afterwards":

Who that trusted in the Lord
Was ever put to shame?
Live, by earth and heaven adored,
Thou all-victorious Lamb!

For every occasion of human life he (as his biographer observes) "had a hymn, had a psalm." His soul was melody, and its most natural language praise or prayer. "His thoughts flowed most readily in sacred verse." His songs and his life illustrate and reproduce each other. In his poems we may trace all the more important events, experiences, changes of his history, whether as a man or as a minister. The death or loss of his friends; the progress of the "new religion"; his personal blessings and trials; the varied circumstances and wants of the people whom he was over in the Lord, are all immortalized in his glowing strains. "His heart overflowed with sacred verse till it ceased to beat; and his tuneful voice was never silent till it was silenced in death." In his last illness, when his failing hand had ceased to hold the pen, he dictated to his wife these dying lines:

In age and feebleness extreme
Who shall a sinful worm redeem?
Jesus, my only hope thou art;
Strength of my failing flesh and heart:
Oh could I catch a smile from thee,
And drop into eternity!

We shall see more of the fluency and versatility of his genius as we go on. It will also appear how much more truth there is than most non-Methodists would be apt to suppose in Mr. Jackson's strong assertion: "In the composition of hymns adapted to Christian worship, he certainly has no equal in the English language, and is perhaps superior to every other uninspired man that ever lived. It does not appear that any person besides himself, in any section of the universal church, has either written so many hymns, or hymns of such surpassing excellence."

Charles Wesley was born at Epworth in Lincolnshire, Dec. 18, 1708; being five years younger than his brother John. But little has been told concerning his early days. His father was an excellent clergyman, of some name in literature, author of a versified scripture history, and of the hymn, "Behold the Saviour of mankind." Talent, and a certain energy and weight of moral character, seem to have been hereditary among the Wesleys. In 1716, Charles was put at Westminster school, under the care of his brother Samuel, another poet, some of whose verses are still in the hymn books. In 1726 the embryo psalmist entered Christ Church, Oxford, where he remained nine years. At the age of twenty he "became serious," and with a few others of like mind formed the famous "Holy Club." Here they were soon honored with the name of "Methodist," when John Wesley was not as yet with them. Their doings might seem to be harmless enough: they simply wished to lead more studious, regular, and Christian lives than was common among the collegians. But the surprising fact that half a dozen young men met statedly to explore the pages of inspired as well as of classic writers; that they mingled devotion with their readings; that they attended the sacra-

ment weekly, and visited the poor, the sick, and the prisoners,—this overturned the grave university, and was noised abroad through all England. The event justified this widespread interest; for, within that little circle were the men commissioned to kindle God's fire upon earth, and execute a work, the like of which had not been seen since the Lutheran Reformation. The days of field-preaching and startling doctrines were not yet; but in the quiet routine of their daily prayers and labors, Whitefield and the Wesleys were unconsciously fitting themselves for the evangelization of Great Britain and America. It is not easy to estimate the vast results that spring from specific and humble causes; but the little glimmering ray that rose in that seat of learning a hundred and thirty years ago, has since shed its generous light over half the world. That something of vital Christianity exists among professed believers of every name; that the doctrine of justification by faith is generally understood and preached; that we are not blind Pharisees, or dead formalists, or practical Socinians and deists,—we may trace the cause in great part (we cannot tell how largely) to the Holy Club of Oxford Methodists.

Yet at this time these chosen vessels, or at least the Wesley brothers, were themselves not under grace, but under the law. Ignorant of the righteousness of Christ, they went about to establish a righteousness of their own. In outward life and to all appearance the holiest of men, they had not yet discovered that true Foundation, other than which can no man lay. Honest, zealous, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, making it their meat and drink to do their Master's will; consecrated, with seeming unreserve, to his service; self-denying to asceticism; separated utterly from worldly ties and passions—we wonder how they could have groped so many years in unregenerate darkness, and missed the simple wisdom that cometh down from above. But so it was. The way of salvation was not made so universally plain in that day as in this: it was harder to find Christ; there was less of his presence in the earth; his wit-

nesses were few; churchmen and dissenters were asleep together; spiritual wickedness was in high places; there were not many professed teachers of righteousness who had not bowed the knee to Baal. Then the individuality of the Wesleys was strong; their minds (or rather mind, for they were as one man) were *sui generis*: they could not take an idea at second-hand, or fall in easily with another's mode of thought; originality was strongly stamped on all they said and did; any new experience must come to them agreeably to the wants and capacities of their peculiar character; they must learn the lessons of life in their own way. And so, we may suppose, redemption could only reach them as it reached the world, "when the fulness of time was come."

Meantime they followed blind guides, and greatly revered certain "mystic divines," particularly one William Law, whose works, celebrated at that time, extol inward godliness while obscuring saving faith, and propose to make men Christians without much help from Christ. "He set his pupils," says Mr. Jackson, "on the hopeless task of attaining to holiness while they remained in a state of guilt." A visit paid by Charles Wesley to this apostle of Judaism, called forth a conversation which is worth recording:

"*Wesley*. What of one who dies unrenewed, while endeavoring after it? *Law*. It concerns neither you to ask, nor me to answer. *W*. Shall I write once more to such a person? *L*. No. *W*. But I am persuaded it will do him good. *L*. Sir, I have told you my opinion. *W*. Shall I write to you? *L*. Nothing I can either speak or write will do you any good." Such was the dreary and profitless gospel which served many spiritually-minded people in that age, for want of a better. Let us be thankful that we have more cheery and condescending expounders of the law.

It does not appear that in these days Charles had as yet applied himself to poetry. If his genius was precocious, his biographer does not mention the fact; and his earliest known effusions seem to have come forth within the year,

or less, preceding his conversion. It was fitting that the harp of this new David should be strung, and the trumpet of Methodism first sounded, in close connection with the commencement of his knowledge, privileges, and labors as a genuine Christian.

In 1735, the brothers undertook a missionary enterprise in Georgia, and were away from England somewhat above a year. The experience therein gained was doubtless a part of the providential plan concerning them; but it does not appear that they did any particular good in their wanderings. Charles endured various hardships, and was near death several times, by land and water. After his return, he was depressed by sorrows real and imaginary. His temperament was gloomy, his health feeble; he felt the insufficiency of his spiritual state, and his woes began to flow in melancholy verse. His "defective creed and gloomy feelings" are set forth in the famous Hymn for Midnight, where he describes himself as

Doubtful and insecure of bliss,
Since *death* alone confirms me His.

With "faith" instead of "death," part of this poem still stands in the English Wesleyan collection. It is one of the most imaginative and elegant that ever came from his pen, or any other. Witness the last two verses:

Absent from thee, my exiled soul
Deep in a fleshly dungeon groans;
Around me clouds of darkness roll,
And laboring silence speaks my moans.
Come quickly, Lord! thy face display,
And look my darkness into day!

Sorrow, and sin, and death are o'er,
If thou reverse the creature's doom;
Sad Rachel weeps her loss no more,
If thou, the God, the Saviour come;
Of thee possest, in thee we prove
The light, the life, the heaven of love.

These were earnest but as yet unfulfilled aspirations. At this time he hoped to be saved because he had used his best

endeavors to serve God; he had nothing else to trust to. After a severe sickness, he says :

Of hope I felt no joyful ground,
The fruit of righteousness alone :
Naked of Christ my soul I found,
And started from a God unknown.

By "righteousness" here, he must be supposed to mean "the righteousness which is of God by faith"; of this he was not yet possessed. But God had better things in store for him. Early in 1738, he and his brother met Peter Bohler, a Moravian preacher, and from him obtained such an insight into the simple but essential truths of scripture, as all their learning and zeal had never stumbled upon. May 4th, John Wesley writes, in the spirit of prophecy : "Peter Bohler left England. What a work hath God begun since his coming into it! Such a one as shall never come to an end till heaven and earth pass away."

Yet the "work" in their own minds was not accomplished at once. On the 25th of April, Charles was seriously offended with John for upholding instantaneous conversion; but four weeks later he became the subject of it himself. After various struggles and inward agonies the brothers both passed from death unto life on the 21st of May, 1738. And now "the harp was tuned to gladness," and the full tide of the poet's heart burst forth in triumphant strains of sacred joy :

Where shall my wondering soul begin?
How shall I all to heaven aspire?
A slave redeemed from death and sin;
A brand plucked from eternal fire!

He addressed a poem to his brother, "Congratulation to a Friend, upon believing in Christ:"

What morn on thee with sweeter ray,
Or brighter lustre, e'er hath shined?

And a year later he wrote, for "the Anniversary of One's Conversion," the noble hymn :

O for a thousand tongues to sing
My great Redeemer's praise!

We are now fairly launched upon the mighty stream of Wesleyan poetry. Before we pursue our course, it becomes us to sum up, in a brief table, the various publications in which that poetry is contained; put forth by Charles alone, or conjointly with his brother, during the fifty years of his Christian life and ministry.

In 1738, the Wesleys first published a small book containing "twenty-three psalms and forty-six hymns; price, 8d." Of these a few only are original, and they were afterwards included in other of their books. This volume is not known to exist in this country; Mr. Creamer of Baltimore, the best American authority on these points, has never seen it. In the invaluable collection of that gentleman, the present writer has had the privilege of examining *all* the publications mentioned below, except the small tract of 1782, "Hymns for the Nation." The list represents, as accurately as may be, the number of hymns published by Charles Wesley. It is impossible, amid so great a quantity, to do this precisely, for some—a very few indeed—occur more than once; many are in two or more parts; and in the first three volumes the poems are not numbered. The earliest, that of 1739, contains one hundred and thirty-eight poems; but many of them are adapted and modernized from Herbert and other English authors; twenty-three are translated from the German, etc., by John Wesley; six were written by Gambold; and a few of Charles's own cannot be regarded as hymns. It is altogether a more miscellaneous volume than any which they published afterwards.

		pp. Hy. by C.W.	
1739	Hymns and Sacred Poems,	223	50
1740.	Hymns and Sacred Poems,	162	76
1742.	Hymns and Sacred Poems,	311	165
1745.	Hymns on the Lord's Supper,	170	166
	Hymns for Times of Trouble and Persecution,	83	64
	Hymns for the Watchnight [reprinted in H. & S. P., 1749],	12	—
1745.	Hymns for the Nativity of our Lord,	18	21
1746.	Hymns for Public Thanksgiving Day, Oct. 9, .	12	7
	Graces before and after Meat,	12	26

	pp. Hy. by C.W.	
1746. Hymns for those that seek, and those that have, Redemption in the Blood of Jesus Christ, . . .	68	52
1747. Hymns of Petition and Thanksgiving for the Promise of the Father (Whitsunday), . . .	36	32
Hymns for Ascension Day, . . .	11	7
Hymns for our Lord's Resurrection, . . .	23	16
1749. Hymns and Sacred Poems, 2 vols. . . .	690	455
1750. Hymns occasioned by the Earthquake, . . .	—	19
Gloria Patri, or Hymns to the Trinity, . . .	12	24
Hymns for the year 1756, particularly for the Fast Day,	24	17
1755. Hymns for New Year's Day,	6	7
1756. Hymns on God's Everlasting Love, . . .	84	40
1758. Hymns of Intercession for all Mankind, . . .	34	40
Hymns for the Use of the Methodist Preachers, . .	10	7
Funeral Hymns,	24	16
1759. Funeral Hymns (larger tract),	70	43
Hymns on the Expected Invasion,	12	8
1762. Short Hymns on Select Passages of Scripture, 2 vols.	824	2348
1766. Hymns for Children and others of riper years, .	84	105
1767. Hymns for the Use of Families,	180	168
Hymns on the Trinity,	132	188
1772. Preparation for Death, in several Hymns, . .	46	40
1780. Hymns written in the Time of the Tumults, .	19	13
1782. Hymns for the Nation,	47	40
Prayers for Condemned Malefactors,	12	10
		4260

We shall notice the more important of these publications separately. Many of the "scripture hymns" can scarcely be regarded as independent lyrics, being but four, six, or eight lines long; but, on the other hand, the earlier volumes contain numerous poems of twelve or twenty eight-line verses, which are counted but as single hymns, when out of them two, three, or even more, in the present collections have been or might be extracted. So, taken all in all, the above is a fair approximation to the number of Charles Wesley's published hymns. Those which have never appeared are said by his biographer to be equally numerous. So much for Mr. Jackson's first claim, that "no other person has written so many hymns." The other point, as to their

“surpassing excellence,” is not so easily settled, being a matter of taste and judgment. It is not pretended that all, or the chief part, of the compositions are “adapted to Christian worship.” How could so vast a quantity be compressed within the range of what is precisely fitted for congregational singing? Of hymns that *are* thus fitted, he has produced more than any other known author. But it is the deliberate conviction of the present writer that the Wesleyan poetry will sustain an honorable comparison, taking it in any way,—the best with the best, the whole with the whole, or the inferior mass against its like,—with the works of any British lyricist; and that it will disdain such comparison, if made extensively and thoroughly, with the effusions of any other *hymn-writer* in the language. “Next to Dr. Watts, as a writer of hymns,” says Montgomery, “undoubtedly stands the Rev. Charles Wesley.” Next to Watts he undoubtedly is; but it may be next before, as easily as next behind. “It is sufficient for him,” said Dr. Johnson, with true dogmatic stupidity, of the venerated father of English hymnology, “to have done better than others what no man has done well.” It is sufficient for the Methodist poet, we may say with greater justice, to have done better than all others what many have done well.

It is a very common and very gross error to suppose that Wesley’s genius had no variety; that his style is a monotone; that his harp, powerfully touched perhaps, possessed but a single string. “The paucity of his topics,” says Milner, the biographer of Watts, “produces frequent repetition. He has little variety of manner, and less variety of matter.” This is mere foolishness; or, it might be more charitable to say, ignorance. Let any one look at the list of his published poetry above: is there little variety of matter there? Hymns for every possible occasion of human life, for the individual, the family, the church, the nation; for the reigning sovereign, and the dying malefactor; hymns on doctrines and on festivals; hymns expository, narrative, hortatory, peti-

tionary, laudatory, rhapsodic. No other sacred poet has attempted such a "variety of matter;" and his versatile muse handles all these multifarious topics with unequalled, almost with unvarying, ease and grace. We are not advancing unsupported assertions; abundant illustrations will presently be given of the fecundity of genius, the rare adaptive power, the "variety of matter *and* manner" which are peculiar to Charles Wesley. But let us hear Mr. Milner further. "The amount of genius requisite for the composition of such hymns was far less than that which Watts brought and employed in his task." That is purely a matter of opinion: the facts above presented seem to justify the opposite conclusion. Nor does it appear why Wesley "must yield the palm for originality, catholicity, and versatility of genius." "There is far less appearance of effort in his (Watts') hymns than in Wesley's; they are less strained and artificial, and bear in a higher degree the stamp of being the spontaneous effusions of devotional feeling." It happens that Wesley was the most fluent and natural of versifiers; song was the natural language of his heart; much of his poetry came out of him, as it were, without his help. It will be news to Methodists that their hymns are "artificial;" and Mr. Milner, if he had not been pressed to make, by any means, the best of a bad case, must have seen that there are no hymns in the world of such "spontaneous devotion;" none so loftily spiritual; none so unmistakably genuine and intensely earnest, as the best known and most largely used of Wesley's. It is the highest praise of the few noblest hymns of Watts and Cowper, that they reach an elevation on which the Methodist poet generally sat, and express a mental state which was habitual with him.

But a graver charge has been brought against our author, and is commonly credited. "Many of his pieces," says the same critic, "wear the exclusive aspect of the sectarian: he casts his mite into the treasury of a party; he writes as the 'poet of Methodism,' not as the servant of the universal church." It ought to be known, that when John and Charles

Wesley commenced writing hymns and preaching in houses, streets, and fields, they had no other object than to revive true religion, save perishing souls, and glorify God. It was years before Methodism grew into an outwardly definite system, or threatened to form an independent ecclesiastical body; and with this last prospect, Charles, as a strict and zealous churchman, had no sympathy. It is true the brothers had mental peculiarities, and held views of their own. As before stated, their character was strongly individualized, and they impressed that individuality deeply and permanently upon their disciples: the Methodist church of this day is the product and resultant of two mighty and intensely earnest minds. But that which is personal is not necessarily sectarian; and the peculiarities of Wesleyan doctrine and life are not so far distant from positive scripture and catholic Christianity as we are apt to imagine. The brothers were not bigots, but men of a liberal, loving spirit. They held their own views, indeed, strongly, as it was in their nature to do; but when other Christians have, by any accident, come to understand those views better and approach them more nearly, it does not appear that any serious injury has resulted. This is certain, that if we — compilers of hymn books, students of sacred literature, ministers, and Christians in general — would lay aside our prejudices and give the Wesleyan productions a fair trial, we should find more to sympathize with than to object against, and the poetry and piety of our hymn books would greatly gain thereby.

It is time to resume our theme, suspended for these discussions. When Charles Wesley had experienced the power of the atoning blood, his zealous soul yearned to extend the knowledge and benefits of that redemption, and he gave himself with renewed consecration to the work:

Oh that the world might taste and see
 The riches of His grace:
 The arms of love that compass me,
 Would all mankind embrace.

His only righteousness I know ;
His saving truth proclaim :
'Tis all my business here below,
To cry, " Behold the Lamb ! "
Happy, if with my latest breath
I may but gasp his name :
Preach him to all, and cry in death,
Behold, behold the Lamb !

His inward comforts at this season of his first love he described, years afterwards, in the celebrated hymn :

How happy are they who their Saviour obey,
And have laid up their treasure above.

In this are some of those characteristic, extravagant expressions, which were perfectly natural to his excitable, imaginative, ardent nature :

On the wings of His love I was carried above
All sin and temptation and pain ;
I could not believe that I ever should grieve,
That I ever should suffer again.
I rode on the sky (Freely justified I !)
Nor envied Elijah his seat ;
My soul mounted higher, in a chariot of fire,
And the moon it was under my feet.

It is the reviewer's business to show the faults as well as beauties of his author. But the poet was perfectly honest in these things ; they were not mere prettinesses of language, or flights of fancy to him, but spiritual realities. In his diary he says of one of his early converts : " She rides on the high places of the earth ; she speaks in the plerophory of faith ; she lives in the spirit of triumph. One of her expressions was, ' I do not walk, but fly ; and seem as if I could leap over the moon.' " It has always been considered the most obnoxious feature of Methodism, that it allows too much to vain emotion, and encourages its votaries to lay a stress on sensations and fancies, which may be merely those of the natural man. Evil or good, or mixture of both, as it may be, this is an essential point in the system, for it was a vital element in the character of the founders of that system

Charles in particular was "the creature of feeling"; and we must not be surprised if his lively emotions sometimes ran away with his sober judgment. At least he never transgressed without a cause and an excuse; and his wildest pieces have more sense and taste than Watts's hymns on the Song of Solomon.

The grossest violation of correct judgment which our poet ever committed was in that remarkable hymn, which his brother strangely introduced, unaltered, to his great collection:

Ah, lovely appearance of death!
What sight upon earth is so fair?
Not all the gay pageants that breathe
Can with a dead body compare.

With solemn delight I survey
The corpse when the spirit is fled;
In love with the beautiful clay,
And longing to lie in its stead.

We know that the poet's views regarding death were eminently spiritual. As a sample of his personal feelings this singular "Funeral Hymn" is valuable, and the lines are invested with all his own grace and tenderness; but, tried by the standard of a severely correct taste, the language is unpardonable. He had no right to say:

Of evil incapable thou,
Whose relics *with envy* I see.

Nor,

What now with my tears I bedew,
Oh might I this moment become!
My spirit created anew;
My flesh be consigned to the tomb.

The occasion and first idea of this very curious poem may be found in the author's diary. One of the good Methodists died at Cardiff, Wales, August 13, 1744. "We were all in tears. Mine I fear flowed from envy and impatience of life. I felt throughout my soul that I would rather be in his condition than enjoy the whole of created good. The spirit at its departure had left marks of happiness upon the clay. No sight upon earth, in my eyes, is half so lovely."

For many years the poet pursued his itinerancy with unselfish and unfaltering zeal; and, though weak in body and often oppressed by sickness, endured labors, hardships, and perils scarcely less than those of his brother and George Whitefield. Many passages from his diary, preserved by his biographer, exhibit the native magnanimity of his character, as well as his earnest devotion to his Master's business. After preaching an hour and a half, under physical pain and infirmity, at Gloucester, he says: "My voice and strength failed together; neither do I want them when my work is done." The first public opposition he met was in March, 1740. After being insulted and interrupted in his services, his simple comment is: "These slighter conflicts must fit me for greater." The greater conflicts soon came. The incompetence, bigotry, and spiritual blindness of the clergy in general were such as we, in this favored day, can hardly conceive. They refused to lend their churches to the Methodist, and often drove his converts from the altar at communion. "All who are healed by our ministry," said the devout churchman, "go and show themselves to the priest, and enter the temples with us." Yet he was forced to complain: "We send them to church to hear ourselves railed at, and, what is worse, the truth of God." In one place where his brethren were unusually civil, he says, "I am invited by them, but decline visiting, as I can neither smoke, drink, nor talk their language." One pious shepherd "wished the Bible were in Latin only, that none of the vulgar might be able to read it."

Meanwhile, in spite of opposition, persecution, and mobs often raised and sometimes headed by the clergy, the work went on. Charles Wesley, whose views were ascetic, who had a poor opinion of unregenerate human nature, and who regarded this world as Satan's seat, expected and desired little earthly comfort or encouragement in the discharge of his duty. His motto was: "Error of every kind may meet with favor; but the world never did, nor ever will, tolerate real Christianity." His first volume of poetry contains a curious "Hymn to Contempt:"

Welcome contempt! stern, faithful guide,
Unpleasing, healthful food!
Hail, pride-sprung antidote of pride;
Hail, evil turned to good!

On this principle the poet seems to have faithfully acted for many years. Count Zinzendorf, the head of the Moravians, had told him in 1737, that "he and a lady were in love, till, finding something of nature, he resolved to renounce her, which he did, and persuaded her to accept his friend. 'From that moment I was freed from all self-seeking, so that for ten years past, I have not done my own will in anything, great or small. My own will is hell to me.'" With this singular disinterestedness Charles must have been greatly edified, though he did not attempt to imitate it when the tender passion afterwards found place in his own breast. But in other things he mortified nature sufficiently. "I had much discourse with Mr. C——, a sensible, pious clergyman. He gave me a delightful account of the bishop; yet I do not find it good for me to be countenanced by my superiors. It is a snare and burden to my soul." He rather preferred persecution and opprobrium: "I could not help smiling at (a clergyman), who had come, as he said, on purpose to judge me; and his judgment was, Sir, you have got very good lungs, but you will make the people melancholy." "I dreaded their [the ministers'] favor more than all the stones in Sheffield." There is a moral sublimity in such passages as this: "We went through honor and dishonor; but neither of them hurt us." He had a philosophic contempt for the transient favors of public opinion. While his labors were unusually successful and popular in Cork, he writes: "As yet there is no open opposition, though the people have had the word two months. Nay, it is not impossible but their love may last two months longer, before any number of them rise to tear us in pieces. At present we pass through honor and good report. The chief persons of the town favor us. No wonder then that the common people are quiet. We pass and repass the streets, pursued

by their blessings only. 'The same favorable inclination is all round the country. Wherever we go, we are received as angels of God. *Were this to last, I would escape for my life to America.*'

Such was the character of the man whom God had raised up to lead the devotions of his people in strains of sweetness and strength unknown before. The true Reformer's fire, the fearless zeal, the utter self-renunciation, the contempt for what other men prize, the unworldly aspirations, the miracle-working faith. As we see thus his daily sentiments and daily life, we can perceive the sincerity of such hymns as

Come on, my partners in distress,
My comrades through this wilderness,
Who still your bodies feel :

and understand what he means when he claims to

sing triumphantly distressed
'Till I to God return.

Whatever he called on the people to join with him in singing was *real*; it had been a part of his experience and theirs. There was nothing in their favorite range of subjects that he was not qualified to describe; from the groans of anguished penitence to the ecstasies of sublimated faith, he had *been there*. His converts knew it, and his songs had power accordingly. We languid Christians of the present day smile as we look over the quaint divisions of good John Wesley's great Hymn Book: "For Believers Rejoicing, Fighting, Praying, Watching, Working, Suffering; for Mourners Convinced of Sin, Brought to the Birth, Convinced of Backsliding, Groaning for full Redemption; for Believers Saved." But there was nothing strange to the simple Methodists about this; it all seemed to them vital realities, essential spiritual truths. They lived in that way; and their hymns were a part of their life.

Meantime the poet was "working, fighting, praying, suffering" on. Hardships and comforts were lost on him alike; no weather stopped his laborious course, no peril checked his

venturesome spirit ; and his frail life, always hanging by a thread, was wonderfully preserved through what would have killed twenty common men. " At five I came to —, sated with travelling, but had not time to rest, the people demanding me. My knees and eyes failed me, so that I could neither stand nor see. I leaned on a door, and called : ' Is it nothing to you, all ye that pass by ? ' The word was not weak, like me."

Such labors were not lost. By these and like means the Lord everywhere purified unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works. The poet and his brother had faith as a grain of mustard-seed, and many a mountain of iniquity was through them removed and cast into the sea. Not many mighty, not many rich, not many wise after the flesh, were called ; but among the neglected, ignorant, and depraved masses the preached word was the power of God unto salvation. Districts notorious for wickedness became a garden of the Lord : the benighted colliers of Kingswood exchanged the tavern for the chapel, and turned their weekly revel into a solemn watch-night ; godless reprobates, the scorn or terror of their neighborhood, were changed to meek and consistent believers, sometimes to zealous and successful preachers of the truth. The contrast between these humble and persecuted disciples and the surrounding crowd of formalists and worldings was eminent enough. " The minister of Darlestone said, the meek behavior of our people, and their constancy in suffering, convinced him the counsel was of God ; and he wished all his parish were Methodists." Such was the example of their outward walk ; their spirit and inner life may be gathered from the following words of a young woman to Charles Wesley : " From twelve years old I have walked with God, and found him in all my ways, in every place, and business, and company. In all my words I find him prompting me. From my infancy he has been my guide and instructor. Many things he has taught me to pray for, which I did not myself understand at the time of my asking, nor fully till the answer came.

This thought pursues me still, that I am to suffer for my Saviour ; and I should *grudge* the dying in my bed."

Such sublime results could only spring from the use of very unusual means ; and very unusual means were employed. No man ever surpassed the Methodist poet in describing the power of faith ; because no man ever felt that power more strongly :

Faith, mighty faith, the promise sees ;
Relies on that alone ;
Laughs at impossibilities,
And cries, it shall be done !

And it was done. He expected much, and much was given. He made the gospel offers apply to all, unrestrained by modern proprieties or refinements of reason, with a directness and definiteness which could not fail to take its hold and do its work :

Lovers of pleasure more than God,
For you he suffered pain :
Swearers, for you he spilt his blood ;
And shall he die in vain ?
Misers, for you his life he paid ;
Your basest crimes he bore :
Drunkards, your sins on him were laid,
That you might sin no more.

Preaching in Wales, he says : " Many tears were shed at the singing of that verse :

Outcasts of men, to you I call,
Harlots and publicans and thieves !
He spreads his arms to embrace you all :
Sinners alone his grace receives !

He teaches his converts to seek a redemption *from sin*, rather than from death and hell :

What is our calling's glorious hope,
But inward holiness ?
For this to Jesus I look up ;
I calmly wait for this. .

And he teaches them to expect this complete salvation with a faith that knows no fear, uncertainty, or doubt :

Saviour, to thee my soul looks up,
My present Saviour thou !
In all the confidence of hope,
I claim the blessing now !

And he found apt scholars. Perhaps no other hymns, in the universal church's history, have been so popular and powerful. The author of "*The Voice of Christian Life in Song*" allows to the Wesleys the credit of making the first "people's hymn book." And Mr. Jackson says: "It is doubtful whether any human agency has contributed more directly to form the character of the Methodist societies than the hymns. The sermons of the preachers, the instructions of the class-leaders, the prayers of the people, both in their families and social meetings, are all tinged with the sentiments and phraseology of the hymns."

The Wesleys were zealous in the promotion of psalmody. A year before his conversion, Charles says, "I was present at [Count Zinzendorf's] public services, and thought myself in a choir of angels." But the Methodist singing soon equalled its Moravian prototype. One Williams, a pious Calvinistic dissenter, who visited the society at Bristol not long after its establishment, gives an interesting account of their doings: "Never did I hear such praying or such singing; never did I see such evident marks of fervency of spirit in God's service. Their singing was the most harmonious and delightful I ever heard. They 'sang lustily and with a good courage.' Indeed, they seemed to sing with melody in their hearts. If there be such a thing as heavenly music upon earth, I heard it there." To this day, the genuine Methodist singing is unequalled for hearty simplicity and earnestness, except by German Protestants and at Mr. Beecher's Plymouth church in Brooklyn.

It has been already intimated that the ardent and impetuous character of our author sometimes led him into incorrectness of idea and language. His was rather the theology of the emotions than of the intellect. "Full as he was of poetic fire, being the creature of feeling, it was not his

practice to analyze doctrinal principles with logical exactness." Hence some objectionable expressions in his finest hymns, as when his words at least encourage the error of Patripassianism: "The *immortal God hath died* for me;" or as that remarkable couplet, against which Adam Clark, in his Commentary, objects so strongly:

Give me to feel thy agonies;
One drop of thy sad cup afford.

Hence, more frequently, those singularities of fanciful emotion, or that unrestrained gush of mere excited feeling, which are hardly profitable:

'Tis done! My Lord hath died;
My love is crucified!
Break, this stony heart of mine;
Pour, mine eyes, a ceaseless flood;
Feel, my soul, the pangs divine;
Catch, my heart, the issuing blood!

And again,

Oh what a heaven of heavens is this, —
This *swoon of silent love*!

Or,

Rapturous anticipation!
Who believe, We receive Sensible salvation;
Silent bliss, and full of glory,
In thine eye, While we lie Prostrated before Thee.

The indulgence of this style scarcely agrees with another of his sentiments:

Slighting nature's every feeling,
We on grace alone rely.

But this was a part of the man. We find the same thing frequently in his diary, especially in the earlier years. Praying for dying criminals, he says: "The great comfort we found therein made us confidently hope, some of them were received as the penitent thief at the last hour." On another occasion, "We had great power in prayer, and joy in thanksgiving. William Delamotte often shouted for joy." (Here is high authority for a poor practice.) While preaching near Kingswood, "I was pierced through with desires of

complete redemption, which broke out in tears and words that affected them in like manner. I began the sacrament with fervent prayer, and many tears, which almost hindered my reading the service. I broke out into prayer again and again. Our hearts were all as melting wax." He quotes with approbation a woman's experience; the description is a type of that sudden and violent manner of conversion which many good people consider it necessary to expect and endure: "She saw herself as it were dropping into hell; when, suddenly, a ray of light was darted into her soul, and filled her with all joy and peace in believing." Yet he had strong and solid sense, and used it on most occasions: "We have certainly been too rash and easy in allowing persons for believers on their own testimony; nay, and even persuading them into a false opinion of themselves." "Some stumbling-blocks I have removed, particularly the fits. Many more of the gentry come now that this is taken out of the way; and I am more and more convinced it was a device of Satan to stop the course of the gospel." He possessed a sharp and ready wit, with abundant self-command and self-respect. His services having been once interrupted and broken up by a magistrate, "I told him I had nothing now to do but to pray for him. He answered, 'I have nothing to do with prayer.' 'So I suppose, sir,' said I, 'but we have.'" In conversation with the Primate of Ireland, the latter said: "I never could account for your employing laymen. *W.* My lord, it is your fault. *P.* My fault, Mr. Wesley? *W.* Yes, my lord, yours and your brethren's. *P.* How so, sir? *W.* Why, you hold your peace, and the stones cry out. *P.* Well, but I am told they are unlearned men. *W.* Some of them are in many respects unlearned men; so the dumb ass rebukes the prophet."

The most remarkable feature of the poet's mind was its subjectiveness. His vision was perpetually introverted; he had no eyes for external objects, no interest in the things that other men care most for; he was all soul; spiritual ideas and facts were the world to him. His most natural and

fervent prayer is, not for protection, help, blessing, on the outward and visible life — he cares nothing about this ; but

Give me the enlarged desire, And open, Lord, my soul
Thy own fulness to require, And comprehend the whole :
Stretch my faith's capacity Wider, and yet wider still ;
Then with all that is in Thee My soul forever fill !

He loses providence in grace ; he thinks not of times and seasons ; and when he condescends to notice carnal things at all, it is only as the types of things spiritual. He writes a hymn for New year ; but only to reflect,

Our life is a dream ; Our time, as a stream, Glides swiftly away,
And the fugitive moment refuses to stay :
The arrow is flown ; The moment is gone ; The millennial year
Rushes on to our view, and eternity's here.

At the Land's End, " on the extremest point of the rocks," he sings :

Carry on thy victory ;
Spread thy rule from sea to sea ;
Reconvert the ransomed race ;
Save us, save us, Lord, by grace.

Oh that every soul might be
Suddenly subdued to thee !
Oh that all in thee might know
Everlasting life below !

Now thy mercy's wings expand ;
Stretch throughout the happy land :
Take possession of thy home ;
Come, divine Immanuel, come !

and at his marriage :

Stop the hurrying spirit's haste ;
Change the soul's ignoble taste ;
Nature into grace improve,
Earthly into heavenly love.

Raise our hearts to things on high,
To our Bridegroom in the sky ;
Heaven our hope and highest aim ;
Mystic marriage of the Lamb.

If he could not spiritualize a thing, he let it alone. Visiting his native place after an absence of years, there must have

been many old associations and tender memories awaiting him at every turn; but "he was too intent on saving the souls of the people to indulge in mere sentimentality." His itinerant duties took him among the wild scenery of Wales; but he had no leisure to look at mountains. His only verses on external nature occur in two hymns "For one retired into the Country":

Come then, thou Universal Good, And bid my heart be still,
And let me meet thee in the wood, Or find thee on the hill:
My soul to nobler prospects raise; My largest views extend
Beyond the bounds of time and space, Where pain and death shall end.
Lead to the streams of paradise, My raptured spirit lead,
And bid the tree of life arise, And flourish o'er my head.

This last line, it is due to the poet to say, is one of the lamest he ever wrote. In most hymn writers it would be respectable; but his muse seldom moved so haltingly. Now for the other:

Along the hill or dewy mead
In sweet forgetfulness I tread,
Or wander through the grove;
As Adam in his native seat,
In all his works my God I meet, —
The object of my love.
I see his beauty in the flower;
To shade my walks and deck my bower
His love and wisdom join:
Him in the feathered choir I hear,
And own, while all my soul is ear,
The music is divine.
In yon unbounded plain I see
A sketch of his immensity
Who spans these ample skies;
Whose presence makes the happy place,
And opens in the wilderness
A blooming paradise.

These verses show that the poet was not insensible to the beauties of creation, and could, had he chosen, have rhymed of purling streams and gentle breezes as well as his neighbors. He did better, in applying himself to higher themes.

Perhaps the finest example of his spiritualizing power is

found in his Hymn on the Curse pronounced, Gen. iii. 17-19. The use made herein of the thorns and sweat is nobly poetical :

Most righteous God, my doom I bear,
My load of guilt and pain and care, Enslaved to base desires ;
Hard toiling for embittered bread,
I mourn my barren *soul* o'erspread With cursed thorns and briars.

Death's sentence in myself receive,
And, dust, to dust already cleave; Exiled from Paradise,
Hasting to hellish misery,
Jesus, if unredeemed by thee, My soul forever dies.

But Jesus hath our sentence borne ;
He did in our affliction mourn, A man of sorrows made ;
A servant and a curse for me,
He bears the utmost penalty, He suffers in my stead.

I see Him sweat great drops of blood ;
I see him faint beneath my load ! The *thorns* his temples tear !
He bows his bleeding head, and dies !
He lives ! He mounts above the skies, He claims my Eden there !

But it was ordained that this unworldly mortifier of the flesh should experience some of the natural emotions, and form the strongest of the ties, which bind men to the present life. It is difficult to see why, with his views (which, be it remembered, were vastly different from the views of people in general), he should have wished to marry. For earthly happiness he had no desire, and natural appetites he regarded as profitless, if not sinful ; given to man to be restrained, not gratified. Whatever might be the effect on other men, marriage could hardly promote the piety of the devoted Christian who, wrapped up in his Master's business, had no ties, no interests, no desires of his own ; and it must of necessity curtail the usefulness of the itinerant preacher, whose spiritual children deserved and claimed all his sympathies, whose parish was the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. He might have foreseen, too, that the cares of an increasing family and the almost certain sorrows of a conscientious parent would add to the already sufficient burdens of a too sensitive heart, and

darken the evening of a life for which there was not much of earthly joy. The result would have justified such anticipations. Doubtless the *poet* was taught a larger sympathy with the common comforts and distresses of humanity, and enabled to tune his harp to themes which might else have remained unhonored and unsung; and doubtless the *man* attained, in the relations of husband and father, a completer experience of life below, a more rounded symmetry of character, than could have been vouchsafed to the unsettled, roving bachelor; but beyond these indirect and general benefits, it is hard to see what good came of the poet's matrimonial investment. He was as happy as men can expect to be in that relation; but petty troubles and great anxieties were born to him in numbers. His itinerant labors slackened, then ceased; his busy mind, accustomed to the turmoil and variety of incessant travelling and daily straining of body and soul, pined in the quietness of home; and the last thirty years of his life were spent in comparative inaction, obscurity, and idleness. He was still an eminently holy, industrious, and useful minister; but for the might of his strength, for the fiery ardor of his intensest zeal, for the glory of his greatest works, we must look back to the days of his youth, and stop with a period of some ten years after marriage.

But neither Charles, nor the others most concerned, thought of these things at the time, or saw the matter in this light. He was forty when he became engaged to Sarah Gwynne, the daughter of a family respectable for wealth, standing, and piety, in Wales. He was tenderly attached to the young lady; but that seems to have been the point of least consequence in the matter. He managed all in the most business-like style: concluded first that he had better marry then than later, if at all; then consulted his brother and other friends about it, and agreed that if any opposition were met, the plan should be forever abandoned. It all went smoothly enough, however. For the few months preceding the ceremony, he conducted with Miss G. a corre-

spondence "remarkable for its piety. Considerable part of his letters to her were written in verse; a vehicle in which his thoughts flowed in the most natural manner, especially when his feelings were excited. These epistles express many fears lest the love of the creature should at all interfere with that supreme love to God which is the soul of religion. Never was wedded love more strong and decided than that which he cherished; and never was it more thoroughly sanctified by a perfect and constant reference to God." On the day before the wedding, "we crowded as much prayer as we could into the day." April 8th, 1749. "I rose at four, spent three and a half hours in prayer or singing, with my brother, with Sally, and with Beck [his bride and her sister]. It [the wedding] was a most solemn season of love. I never had more of the divine presence at the sacrament. Prayer and thanksgiving were our whole employment. A stranger that intermeddled not with our joy said, 'it looked more like a funeral than a wedding.'" Three weeks afterwards he wrote: "Hitherto marriage has been no hinderance. You will hardly believe it sits so light upon me. I forgot my wife (can you think it?) as soon as I left her. Neither did death appear less desirable than formerly. I almost believe nothing shall hurt me."

A number of the poetic epistles above referred to were published in the second volume of his *Hymns and Sacred Poems*, 1749, under the common title "Christian Friendship." He is soberly anxious to keep his passion within proper limits; in one poem only does nature obtain fair vent, and then he is careful to justify it by the example of our Lord:

O Thou whose special grace Did kindly condescend
Of all the chosen race To single out a friend,
To shower on him, above the rest, Thy richest favors down,
And press him closest to thy breast, — Thy best beloved John!

I lit my heart to thee, — To thee, who know'st the whole,
Its dearest amity For one distinguished soul;
The soft unutterable love Wherewith I one embrace,
With gracious smiles behold, approve, And turn it to thy praise.

At the same time he is particular to guard and pray against any perversion or exaggeration of this permitted human love :

While with just, peculiar kindness We each other's soul embrace,
Save us from that doting blindness Fatal to our fallen race ;
From the mean, contracting passion Keep us free and unconfined ;
Raise our generous inclination, Fix our love on all mankind.

Several hymns still used by the Methodists, and made to bear upon the church and Christian fellowship, were written at various times by the poet with direct reference to his wedded state.

Come away to the skies, My beloved, arise,
And rejoice in the day thou wast born,

was addressed to his wife upon her birth-day. Its companion-piece,

Come let us ascend, My companion and friend,
To a taste of the banquet above,

had a similar origin. So had the fine hymn, "Centre of our hopes thou art : " which in the original commences :

Author of the peace unknown, Lover of my friend and me,
Who of twain hast made us one, One preserve us still in thee :
All our heightened blessings bless ; Crown our hopes with full success.

His object in composition, says Mr. Jackson, was first his own edification, then the edification of the church. Hence it was natural for him to use language which, while referring directly to his personal affairs, could be easily turned to all believers and the church at large :

Why hast thou cast our lot In the same age and place,
And why together brought, To see each other's face ?
To join with softest sympathy, And mix our friendly souls in thee.

The poet's wife was an intelligent, aimiable, and pious woman, who did her whole duty by her husband. Her character, as slightly recorded in his Biography, by Mr. Jackson, makes no profound or startling impression ; but they seem to have lived in uninterrupted peace. He was not so happy in his children. Five died in infancy, and the remaining three caused him much anxiety and sorrow by

their lack of early piety. The younger son, Samuel, a perverse and undutiful child, embittered his father's dying years by going over to Popery. The poet's fortune in this respect gave melancholy confirmation to that stoical preference of his brother's:

I have no babes to hold me here ; But children more securely dear
For mine I humbly claim ;
Better than daughters or than sons, — Temples divine of living stone,
Inscribed with Jesus' name.

We cannot forbear pursuing the comparison, in Charles's own touching verse. In the first poem, headed "Naomi and Ruth. Adapted to the Minister and People," he addresses his loved and loving spiritual children, who often, on foot, followed his horse for miles:

Turn again, my children, turn ; Wherefore would ye go with me ?
Oh forbear, forbear to mourn ; Jesus wills it so to be.
Why, when God would have us part, Weep ye thus, and break my heart ?
Go in peace, my children, go ; Only Jesus' steps pursue :
He shall pay the debt I owe ; He shall kindly deal with you ;
He your sure reward shall be, Bless you for your love to me.

Compare with this the earth-renouncing hopelessness, the mournful resignation of the following, when his aged heart was wrung by the ungrateful folly of his son in the flesh :

Farewell, my all of earthly hope,
My nature's stay, my age's prop, Irrevocably gone !
Submissive to the will divine,
I acquiesce and make it mine, — I offer up my son !

.
The blessed day of my release
(Should sorrow's pangs no sooner cease) Will swallow up my woe ;
Make darkness light, and crooked straight,
Unwind the labyrinths of fate, And all the secret show.

But while thy way is in the deep,
Thou dost not chide, if still I weep, If still mine eyes run o'er :
The bitterness of death is past ;
The bitterness of life may last A few sad moments more.

Patient till death, I feel my pain,
But neither murmur nor complain, While humbled in the dust :

My sins the cause of my distress
I feel, and mournfully confess The punishment is just.

Wherefore with soft and silent pace
I measure out my suffering days, In view of joys to come, —
In hope his plan to comprehend,
When Jesus shall with clouds descend, And call me from the tomb.

The life of Charles Wesley was a varied, and in the main, a sad one. He thoroughly understood the great lesson of the book of Ecclesiastes, and of all earthly life :

Taught by long experience, Lord, By thy Spirit taught, I see,
True is thy severest word, All on earth is vanity :
Empty all our bliss below, Seeming bliss, but real woe.

He never forgot that this is not our rest. He expected persecution and opprobrium as the natural and necessary favors of the world towards living Christians :

Since first we heavenward turned our face,
Exposed and outraged all day long,
A helpless, poor, afflicted race,
For doing good, we suffer wrong :
We suffer shame, distress, and loss,
And wait for all thy glorious cross.

But the prospect did not frighten him. When he first undertook to follow Christ, he began to deny himself and take up his cross :

And did my Lord on earth endure
Sorrow and hardship and distress,
That I might sit me down secure,
And rest in self-indulgent ease ?
His delicate disciple, I,
Like him might neither live, nor die ?
Thy holy will be done, not mine ;
Be suffered all thy holy will :
I dare not, Lord, the cross decline ;
I will not *lose* the slightest ill,
Or lay the heaviest burden down, —
The richest *jewel* of my crown.
Sorrow is solid joy, and pain
Is pure delight, endured for thee ;
Reproach and loss are glorious gain,
And death is immortality ;
And who for thee their all have given,
Have nobly bartered earth for heaven.

Some eminent pleasures, indeed, he enjoyed, in the consciousness of his Maker's favor, in communion with God's people, and in the exercise of his gifts for his Redeemer's glory:

How happy, gracious Lord, are we,
Divinely drawn to follow thee, Whose hours divided are
Betwixt the mount and multitude ;
Our day is spent in doing good, Our night in praise and prayer.

With us, as melancholy void,
No moment lingers unemployed, Or unimproved below ;
Our weariness of life is gone,
Who live to serve our God alone, And only thee to know.

And his impressible nature, susceptible of all extremes of emotion, sometimes rose to ecstasy in view of his spiritual privileges :

What a mercy is this, What a heaven of bliss,
How unspeakably happy am I !
Gathered into the fold, With thy people enrolled,
With thy people to live and to die !

In a rapture of joy My life I employ,
The God of my life to proclaim :
'Tis worth living for this, To administer bliss
And salvation in Jesus's name.

As often was he in the depths of despondency and gloom ; but his depression, like his excitement, is always that of a Christian. His most mournful pieces are full of submission, humility, and faith ; and thus, often his " sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought : "

A child of sorrow from the womb, By sad variety of pain
Weighed down, I sink into the tomb, Yet only of myself complain :
My sins the root of bitterness I must in life and death confess.

Always profoundly sensible that he was a pilgrim and stranger upon earth, worldly things seemed to him as a dream, and nothing real but the realities of eternity :

The angels are at home in heaven ; The saints unsettled pilgrims here :
Our days are as a shadow, driven From earth ; so soon we disappear.
We no abiding city have, No place of resting but the grave.

"On going to a new habitation," moving from Bristol to London, he sings:

What then is change of place to me?
The end of sin and misery In every place is nigh:
No spot of earth but yields a grave;
Where'er He wills, if Jesus save, I lay me down and die.

And again:

No matter where or how I in this desert live,
If, when my dying head I bow, Jesus my soul receive:
Blest with thy precious love, Saviour, 'tis all my care
To reach the purchased house above, And find a mansion there.

His tender sympathies were often tried by the personal unkindness or spiritual faithlessness of his friends. Divisions were introduced into the Methodist societies; some of his followers became Calvinists or Moravians, and were taught to turn from their spiritual father as a false prophet; others embraced fatal errors, and abandoned the profession and practice of the common faith. On such occasions, the poet's wounded spirit soared to the healing fountain. In the volumes of 1739 are a number of hymns on the "Loss of his Friends:"

Take these broken reeds away! On the Rock of Ages I
Calmly now my spirit stay, Now on Christ alone rely;
Every other prop resign, Sure the sinner's Friend is mine.

Fly, my friends, with treacherous speed; Melt as snow before the sun;
Leave me at my greatest need, — Leave me to my God alone,
To my Help which cannot fail, To my Friend unchangeable.

While I thus my soul recline On my dear Redeemer's breast,
Need I for the creature pine, Fondly seek a farther rest,
Still for human friendship sue, Stoop, ye worms of earth, to you?

With such sublime consolations did the Christian soothe his own afflicted spirit and the spirits of as many as could rise with him to that altitude of faith. But for the enduring comfort, the perfect rest of life, he looked beyond the present state:

Come, Finisher of sin and woe, And let me die my God to see;
My God, as I am known, to know, Fathom the depths of Deity,
And spend, contemplating thy face, A blest eternity in praise.

The last poem ever written by his own hand, "a little before his death," possesses a peculiar interest. The fire of his youth is gone, but the grace and sweetness are still present; it is now the subdued language of one full of years and earthly experience, who only desires to fulfil his Maker's will and depart in peace:

How long, how often, shall I pray, Take all iniquity away;
And give the plenitude of good, — The blessing bought by Jesus' blood;
Concupiscence and pride remove, And fill me, Lord, with humble love.

Again I take the words to me Prescribed, and offer them to thee:
Thy kingdom come, to root out sin, And perfect holiness bring in;
And swallow up my will in thine, And human change into divine.

So shall I render thee thine own, And tell the wonders thou hast done;
The power and faithfulness declare Of God, who hears and answers prayer;
Extol the riches of thy grace, And spend my latest breath in praise.

O that the joyful hour were come, Which calls thy ready servant home,
Unites me to the church above, Where angels chant the song of love,
And saints eternally proclaim The glories of the heavenly Lamb!

He died March 29th, 1788, in his eightieth year. The epitaph placed over his remains had been written by himself for another:

With poverty of spirit blest,
Rest, happy saint, in Jesus rest;
A sinner saved, through grace forgiven,
Redeemed from earth to reign in heaven!
Thy labors of unwearied love,
By thee forgot, are crowned above; —
Crowned, through the mercy of thy Lord,
With a free, full, immense reward!

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE V.

THE SERPENT OF EDEN, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW
OF ADVANCED SCIENCE.

BY THE REV. JOHN DUNS, D.D., FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND,
TORPHICHEN.

“And the Serpent has been more subtle than any beast of the field which the Lord God hath made. and he saith unto the woman, ‘Is it true that God hath said, “Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?”’ And the woman saith to the serpent, ‘Of the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat, but of the fruit of the tree which in midst of the garden God hath said, “Ye shall not eat of it, nor touch it, lest ye die?”’ And the serpent saith unto the woman, ‘Ye do not surely die, for God doth know that, in the day of your eating thereof, your eyes have been opened, and ye have been as god, knowing good and evil. . . . And the Lord God saith to the woman, ‘What this thou hast done?’ And the woman saith, ‘The serpent hath caused me to forget, and I do eat.’ And the Lord God saith unto the serpent, ‘Because thou hast done this, cursed thou above all the cattle, and above every beast of the field; on thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat, all the days of thy life. And I put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: He shall bruise thee the head, and thou shalt bruise him the heel.’—Gen. iii. 1–4, 13, 14 (Literal Translation).

RECENT interpreters have approached this passage with considerable hesitancy. They are not sure of their ground. Their remarks indicate a strong latent suspicion that, though it would not do to disturb popular impressions, the view of the serpent given here will not stand the test of modern science. We hope to show that they are mistaken. The subject is one of much importance. It has not, however, so far as we are aware, been hitherto set in lights which harmonize with other passages of scripture, or even with the demands of the popular Christianized intelligence. Critics and commentators satisfy themselves by repeating what those who have gone before them have said, and adding a few common-place remarks about alleged changes of structure in this “wisest of the beasts of the field.” The truth

seems to be, that the explanation of this transaction given by Josephus, and the pictures of the poets, have influenced many most learned students of the Bible, when they were little aware of it. "God," says the Jewish historian (*Antiq.* I. i. 4), "commanded that Adam and his wife should eat of all the rest of the plants, but to abstain from the tree of knowledge; and foretold to them that, if they touched it, it would prove their destruction. But while all the living creatures had one language, at that time the serpent, which then lived together with Adam and his wife, showed an envious disposition at his supposal of their living happily, and in obedience to the command of God; and imagining that, when they disobeyed him they would fall into calamities, he persuaded the woman, out of a malicious intention, to take of the tree of knowledge. . . . He also deprived the serpent of speech, out of indignation at his malicious disposition towards Adam. Besides this, he inserted poison under his tongue, and made him an enemy of men; and suggested to them that they should direct their stroke against his head, that being the place wherein lay his mischievous designs towards man, and it being easiest to take vengeance on him in that way; and when he had deprived him of the use of his feet, he made him to go rolling all along, and dragging himself upon the ground." "Hence it appears," gravely adds Whiston, the learned translator, "that Josephus thought several, at least, of the brute animals, particularly the serpent, could speak before the Fall. And I think few of the more perfect kinds of those animals want the organs of speech at this day. Many inducements there are also to a notion that the present state they are in is not their original state; and that their capacities were once much greater than we now see them, and are capable of being restored to their former condition." The place of the serpent in the temptation has influenced all men's thoughts in regard to it; and, instead of studying it as they would do other animals, many theologians have *imagined* a natural history for it. Thus Cruden, from the heading of whose

valuable Concordance so many are willing to take their knowledge of scripture, has, under the word "Serpent," recorded such notes from its nature as the following: "When he is old he has the secret of growing young again, and of stripping off his old skin, by squeezing himself between two rocks. He assaults a man if he has his clothes on, but flees if he finds him naked. When he is assaulted, his chief care is to secure his head, because his heart being under his throat, and very near his head, the readiest way to kill him is to squeeze or cut off his head. And many suppose that his chief subtlety, or wisdom, as the gospel calls it, consists in this, that he chooses to expose his whole body to danger, that he may save his head. When he goes to drink at a fountain, he first vomits up all his poison, for fear of poisoning himself as he is drinking. Though this observation be not assented to by everybody, it has nevertheless a great many defenders." And referring to the words: "They are like the deaf adder that stoppeth his ear," the illustration is at hand: "It is said," continues Cruden, "it applies one of its ears hard to the ground, and stops up the other with the end of its tail." Then as to the words: "Dust shall be the serpent's meat," he says: "It is true, however, that they eat flesh, birds, frogs, fish, fruits, grass, etc.; but as they continually creep upon the earth, it is impossible but that their food must be often defiled with dust and dirt. Some of them may really eat earth out of necessity, or at least earth-worms, which they cannot swallow without a good deal of dirt with them!" Many more like remarks might be quoted from commentaries on the holy scriptures.

Poetry has also helped to convey erroneous impressions as to this passage. An old poet (1580) introduces Satan as assuming many forms ere he took to that of the serpent:

"The fountain of our sorrow,
Thinks, now the beauty of a horse to borrow;
Anon to creep into a haifer's side;
Then in a cock, or in a dog to hide,

Then in a nimble hart himself to shroud ;
 Then in the starr'd plumes of a peacock proud ;
 And least he miss a mischief to effect,
 Oft changeth minde, and varies oft aspect.
 At last remembering that of all the broods,
 In mountains, plains, airs, waters, wildes, and woods,
 The knotty serpent's spotty generation
 Are filled with infectious inflammation ;
 And though they want dog's teeth, bore's tusks, bear's paws,
 The vulture's bill, bull's horns, and griffin's claws ;
 Yea, seem so weak, as if they had not might,
 To hurt us once, much less to kill us quite ;
 Yet, many times they treacherously betray vs,
 And with their breath, look, tongue, or train, they slay vs."

Milton, in "*Paradise Lost*," follows the older poet, as regards the changes of Satan, and with even less regard to natural history. Thus, after describing the prowling wolf's method of getting at the shepherd's folded flock, when he

" Leaps o'er the fence with ease into the fold,"

he continues the description of Satan's entrance :

" So clomb this first grand thief into God's fold.
 Thence up he flew, and on the tree of life, —
 The middle tree, and highest there that grew, —
 Sat like a cormorant." — Book IV.

Afterwards the guardian angels, Ithuriel and Zephon, are represented hastening

" To the bower direct
 In search of whom they sought ; him there they found
 Squat like a toad, close at the ear of Eve,
 Assaying by his devilish art to reach
 The organs of her fancy, and with them forge
 Illusions as he list, phantasms and dreams ;
 Or if, inspiring venom, he might taint
 The animal spirits." — Book IV.

Taking to himself in the long run the distinctive form, he is described, in lines of unmatched beauty, " addressing his way toward Eve " :

" Not with indented wave,
 Prone on the ground, as since ; but on his rear,
 Circular base of rising folds, that tower'd
 Fold above fold, a surging maze ; his head

Crested aloft, and carbuncle his eyes;
 With burnished neck of verdant gold, erect
 Amidst the circling spires, that on the grass
 Floated redundant; pleasing was his shape
 And lovely; never since of serpent kind
 Lovelier.

“Of his tortuous train
 Curl'd many a wanton wreath in sight of Eve,
 To lure her eye;
 He bolder now, uncalled before her stood
 But as in gaze admiring: oft he bow'd
 His turret crest, and sleek enamelled neck,
 Fawning; and licked the ground whereon she trod.”—Book IX.

This picture has shed its influence into some of the most homely and precious comments on the word of God. “The devil,” says Matthew Henry, “chose to act his part in a serpent, because it is a *specious* creature, has a spotted, dappled skin, and *then* went erect.” He piously and very truly adds; “Many a dangerous temptation comes to us in gay, fine colors, but they are but skin deep.”

There are, no doubt, many difficulties in this narrative, which it would be impossible to get any light on, were we to limit our attention to the words of Genesis. They must, however, be looked at in the light of other portions of the word of God. To this we now turn, and in doing so, would plead for the true historical character of the third chapter of Genesis. It is not a symbolic representation; it is not a poem; but a true history of some of the most momentous facts that the world has ever seen. The references to this chapter both by our Lord and his apostles show this. If there be matters in it which suggest relations between mind and matter, between the spiritual world and the material, which we cannot fully explain, let us not hide our ignorance behind fanciful attempts to solve all difficulties, because it is not in the word only but even in connection with some most familiar natural objects, that we find much which forces us to say, “We do not know.”

The first question is: Was the serpent a true serpent? The answer to this is given in the narrative. It is men-

tioned as one of the "beasts of the field which the Lord God had made;" and when the curse was uttered against it, it was in the words: "Thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field." It is impossible to explain away the natural meaning of these words by alleging that "this serpent was no common beast, no ordinary serpent." Neither does it strengthen our trust in the narrative to be assured that the whole transaction is designed to bring before us Satan only. There are expressions here which forbid such a construction. It has been urged that the presence of the Hebrew article before the original word points to a difference between this and all other serpents. But a little familiarity with the scripture use of the term would have shown how groundless this allegation is. In Numbers xxi. 9, Ecclesiastes x. 11, and Amos v. 19, the same form is used; and in these passages there can be no doubt a common serpent is referred to. In the last it is associated with the lion and the bear: "If a man did flee from a lion and a bear met him; or went into the house, and leaned his head on the wall, and a serpent bit him." The passage in Genesis introduces us both to the true reptile, and to Satan, the head of sin. This combination has been too much overlooked. Yet it is in it alone we can find the key to two classes of scripture texts. The language of the Bible is peculiarly exact in all references to the creature so intimately associated with the temptation. Others of the same family are referred to, but under different names. This should lead us to look for several species. The word in this passage is *nāhāsh*, and corresponds to the Greek term *ophis*, from which, in natural science, the great order of true serpents is named *Ophidia*. Following the scriptural use of the word, we next find it in Gen. xlix. 17, "Dan shall be a serpent (*nāhāsh*). by the way," he shall be subtle, cunning, crafty; "an adder (*shēphīphōn*) in the path" — the *cerastes*, noted for its venom — he shall be hurtful to others. "And the Lord said unto him, what is that in thy hand? And he said a rod. And he said cast it on the

ground ; and it became a serpent (*nāhāsh*),” an object of terror, for “Moses fled from before it” (Exod. iv. 2, 3). “And the Lord sent fiery serpents among the people, and they bit the people ; and much people of Israel died. Therefore the people came to Moses, and said, We have sinned, for we have spoken against the Lord, and against thee : pray unto the Lord, that he take away the serpents from us. And Moses prayed for the people. And the Lord said unto Moses, Make thee a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole ; and it shall come to pass that every one that is bitten, when he looketh upon it shall live. And Moses made a serpent of brass, and put it upon a pole ; and it came to pass, that if a serpent had bitten any man, when he beheld the serpent of brass, he lived ” (Numb. xxi. 6–9). Here the same word is used throughout, except in vs. 8, where we have one introduced to express the bright or fiery appearance (*sārāph*). “Who led thee through that great and terrible wilderness, wherein were fiery serpents and scorpions, and drought ; where there was no water ” (Deut. viii. 15). “Their poison is like the poison of a serpent (*nāhāsh*), they are like the deaf adder (*yethon*), that stoppeth her ear ” (Ps. lviii. 4). “Look not on the wine when it is red, when it giveth his color in the cup, when it moveth itself aright. At the last it biteth like a serpent (*nāhāsh*), and stingeth like an adder (*tziphōnē*) ” (Prov. xxiii. 32). It is suggestive that this same term is used for the constellation to which Job refers, when he says : “By his spirit he hath garnished the heavens ; his hand hath formed Nahash, the crooked serpent ” (Job xxvi. 13), an expression to be kept in mind in connection with the worship of the serpent, to which reference will be made. The use of the New Testament equivalents for these words shows the same exactness and discrimination. “Ye serpents (*ophis*) ; ye generation of vipers (*echidna*) ” (Matt. xxiii. 33). “As Moses lifted up the serpent (*ophis*) in the wilderness ” (John iii. 14). “For their power is in their mouth and in their tails ; for their tails were like unto serpents (*ophis*) ” (Rev. ix. 19). “And he

laid hold on the dragon (*drakon*), that old serpent (*ophis*) which is the devil and satan" (Rev. xx. 2). Other expressions are used in the Old Testament for serpents as *zohel*: "I will also send teeth of beasts upon them, with the poison of serpents of the dust" (Deut. xxxii. 24); *acksāb* (adder or asp): "They have sharpened their tongues like a serpent; adder's poison is under their lips" (Ps. cxl. 3); *epheh* (viper): "He shall suck the poison of asps; the viper's tongue shall slay him" (Job xx. 16).

All this shows that the writers of scripture had well-defined views of the nature of the reptiles, on the one hand, and of their fitness to shadow forth certain moral qualities, on the other.

But the serpent associated with the Fall is represented as speaking to the woman. This is the difficulty. Yet here the thoughtful reader may meet with the solution: Thought is above matter, and can act upon it; the spiritual world is above the world of mere animal nature. There is not, however, the slightest intimation in the whole word of God that the one is isolated from the other; that there is no interaction between the two, that the spiritual may not act upon and through the brute nature, for purposes of good or evil. If this is countenanced by the word of God, then much of the mystery which has hung around the mention of the serpent in this passage is cleared up. What is claimed, is not care over or the use of the lower animals in connection with moral ends, but a nearer approach to it than this—the approach to it in absolute sovereignty on the part of the Creator, in order to display or bring into power that which is in the highest sense spiritual; and the approach to it permissively, of him who was "a liar and murderer from the beginning," in order to the accomplishment of his own designs. Leaving the temptation out of view for a little, let us look at God's use of the beasts. The whole subject is deeply interesting. "And Balaam rose up in the morning, and saddled his ass, and went with the princes of Moab. And God's anger was kindled because he went: and the angel of the Lord stood in the way

for an adversary against him. (Now he was riding upon his ass, and his two servants were with him.) And the ass saw the angel of the Lord standing in the way, and his sword drawn in his hand: and the ass turned aside out of the way, and went into the field; and Balaam smote the ass to turn her into the way. But the angel of the Lord stood in a path of the vineyards, a wall being on this side, and a wall on that side. And when the ass saw the angel of the Lord, she thrust herself unto the wall, and crushed Balaam's foot against the wall; and he smote her again. And the angel of the Lord went further, and stood in a narrow place, where was no way to turn either to the right hand or to the left. And when the ass saw the angel of the Lord, she fell down under Balaam: and Balaam's anger was kindled, and he smote the ass with a staff. And the Lord opened the mouth of the ass; and she said unto Balaam, What have I done unto thee, that thou hast smitten me these three times? And Balaam said unto the ass, Because thou hast mocked me: I would there were a sword in mine hand, for now would I kill thee. And the ass said unto Balaam, Am not I thine ass, upon which thou hast ridden ever since I was thine unto this day? Was I ever wont to do so unto thee? And he said, Nay" (Num. xxii. 21 – 30). The ready answer to all this, on the part of those who wish to banish everything like miracle from the scriptures, and who are ever anxious to make, as it were, an apology for the "seemingly miraculous," would no doubt be, "the false prophet's mind was so much excited that he *imagined* all this." But we are not allowed to entertain such a thought. The direct reference to the transaction, in the New Testament, is decisive as to its being real: "Which have forsaken the right way, and are gone astray, following the way of Balaam the son of Bosor, who loved the wages of unrighteousness; but was rebuked for his iniquity, the dumb ass speaking, forbad the madness of the prophet" (2 Pet. ii. 15, 16). The influence of the same power is seen in the case of Jonah: "Now the Lord had prepared a great fish to

swallow up Jonah. And Jonah was in the belly of the fish three days and three nights. Then Jonah prayed unto the Lord his God out of the fish's belly. And the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited out Jonah upon the dry land" (Jonah i. 17; ii. 1, 10). Our Lord himself acknowledged the historical character of this, when he said: "As Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." (Matt. xii. 40). Jesus, as the Lord of nature, once and again showed how all things obeyed him. One example will occur to most, viz. that of the stater in the fish's mouth: "lest we should offend them, go thou to the sea and cast an hook and take up the fish that first cometh up; and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a piece of money; that take, and give unto them for me and thee" (Matt. xvii. 27). From these passages it is plain that God could and did use the lower animals in as wonderful a way in order to good, as Satan here used the serpent in order to evil. Besides, we have proof that such influence has been permitted him. It has not been appointed to him, but in virtue of his spiritual power he has not been hindered from taking it. The whole miracle of the cure of the Gadarene demoniac testifies to this. The devils truly entered into the swine, and so influenced them, that they hastened over the cliffs into the sea, and were killed. Jesus did not send them into the swine, but he did not hinder them from taking their own way. It is thus clear from scripture, that such a power of that which is spiritual over brute nature as was seen in the temptation, is more than once recognized in the word of God. This of itself strips the narrative of much of its strangeness. It indeed removes its chief difficulty. Even in man's relations with the lower animals we see something of the same kind: we see him leaving the impress of his mind and affections on the beasts put under him so strongly that they show the power of both in their actions. "In our common life, the horse, and the dog no less, are eminently receptive

of the spiritual conditions of their appointed lord and master, man. With what electric swiftness does the courage or fear of the rider pass into the horse ; and so too the gladness or depression of its master is almost instantaneously reflected and reproduced in the faithful dog" (Trench). The poet carries these thoughts into these relations, and addressing Satan as "ruthless murderer of immortal souls," he pictures him as bringing down man, "whose spirit goeth upwards," to the level of the beasts, "whose spirit goeth downwards."

"Thou play'st the lion when thou doost ingage
 Blood-thirsty Nero's barbarous heart with rage,
 While flesht in murthers (butcher-like) he paints
 The saint-poor world with the deer blood of saints.
 Thou play'st the dog, when by the mouth profane
 Of some false prophet thou doost belch thy lane.
 Thou play'st the swine, when plunged in pleasures vile,
 Some epicure doth sober minds defile.
 Thou play'st the nightingale or else the swan
 When any famous rhetorician
 With captious wit, and curious language, draws
 Seduced hearers ; and subverts the laws.
 Thou play'st the fox, when thou doost fain aright
 The face and phrase of some deep hypocrite." (1580.)

Such figures are no doubt fanciful ; but may not our Lord have had in view the same aspects of truth when he characterized the crafty king as "that fox Herod," and the bitter-hearted pretenders of his day as "a generation of vipers?"

There are, however, many other difficulties connected with this transaction. Does what we know of the habits of serpents warrant us to speak decidedly as to its cunning being greater than the other "beasts of the field which the Lord God has made?" There may be much in the noiseless way in which it winds its deadly coils around its victim, and much in the fascinating glance of its bright eye, to suggest something like this ; but there can be no doubt that it is far less subtle in its mode of taking its prey than many other creatures are. There is no necessity here to make out a disposition of superior subtilty in order to corroborate

the words in Genesis iii. 1. Its craft is directly associated with the evil will which was now acting on it and through it, in the manner indicated above — the will of him who was a “liar from the beginning.” The first words spoken declare by their abruptness, point, and power to arrest the attention of the good, were it for no other purpose than to put the speaker right, that the evil mind now acting on it was full of “all subtlety and all mischief.” As thus used by Satan, the serpent was more subtle than any “beast of the field.” There is literally nothing in this passage to indicate that superior craft and cunning are affirmed of the serpent, apart from its presence as completely under the control of spiritual wickedness. The complete identification of the beast with the bad angel is all that is referred to. Thus there is no break in the narrative, no filling in of an explanatory sentence between the former and latter parts of the verse, such as “when the devil had entered into it he said unto the woman.” The act of possession — of entering in and complete subjugation of the brute to the evil spiritual nature — is not described. In some other cases the link missing here is supplied. Thus, in the account given by Mark (v.) of the demoniac at Gadara it is distinctly said: “The unclean spirits went out, and entered into the swine, and the herd ran violently down a steep place into the sea.” So too, when he took complete control both of the mind and body of Judas, it is said “and after the sop Satan entered into him.” “He then, having received the sop, went immediately out, and it was night” (John xiii). The direct address of the Creator to the serpent has been surrounded with unnecessary mystery. “And the Lord God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field: upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life. And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel” (vs. 14, 15). The reptile and its indwelling evil spirit are now regarded as

one. The address proceeds on the recognition of this relation. It consists of two parts, answering to the two natures — the body of the reptile and the mind of the evil spirit. This direct mode of address to the lower animals has its illustration in the narrative of creation. Thus, to the fish of the sea and the fowl of the air God said: "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth." The expression of the will of the Creator became thus a law of their being. There is, moreover, the well-known revelation of a yet higher influence of God over his creature in 1 Kings xvii. 34. "Get thee hence, and turn thee eastward, and hide thyself by the brook Cherith, that is before Jordan. And it shall be that thou shalt drink of the brook; and *I have commanded the ravens to feed thee there.*" In 2 Chron. vii. 13, he speaks of himself as one that can "*command the locusts to devour the land.*" And in Amos ix. 3, we have the striking words: "Though they hide themselves in the top of Carmel, I will search and take them out thence; and though they be hid from my sight in the bottom of the sea, *thence will I command the serpent, and he shall bite them.*" Many other passages will readily occur to the reader, and though, as the last quoted, the words may be highly figurative in some cases, they yet illustrate the sovereignty met with in the curse pronounced upon the serpent.

The chief difficulty remains. The general and popular impression of the fourteenth verse has been, that there were no serpents before the time of our first parents, and that at the Fall some change was made in the structure of this creature. Is there anything in this verse which, of necessity, shuts us up to this impression? We think not. There were serpents on the pre-Adamic earth, whose structure was analogous to the true serpents (*Ophidia*) of our day. Geological discoveries have put this as completely beyond doubt as that there were *mollusca* in those primeval times.

The *Ophidia* range from the top of the chalk, up through the tertiary group of rocks, and culminate at the top of the

highest member of that series — the Pleiocene. "The earliest evidence," says Professor Owen, "of an ophidian reptile has been obtained from the Eocene clay of Sheppey; it consists of the vertebrae indicating a serpent of twelve feet in length, the *Palaeophis toliapicus*. Still larger, more numerous, and better preserved vertebrae have been obtained from the Eocene beds of Bracklesham, on which the species *Palaeophis typhaeus* and the *Palaeophis porcatus* have been founded. These remains indicate a boa-constrictor-like snake, about twenty feet in length. Ophidian vertebrae of much smaller size from the newer Eocene at Hordwell, support the species *Paleryx rhombifer* and *Paleryx depressus*. Fossil vertebrae from a tertiary formation near Salonica have been referred to a serpent, probably poisonous, under the name of *Laophis*. A species of true viper has been discovered in the Miocene deposits at Sansans, South of France." In Professor Owen's description, many years ago, of the species first named, one of those inductions in regard to associated forms of life occurred which are so often to be met with in natural science. We are well acquainted with the favorite food of living *Pythons* and *Boas*; and proceeding on this knowledge, he added: "If, therefore, there had not been obtained direct evidence of both birds and mammals, in the London clay, I should have felt persuaded that they must have co-existed with serpents of such dimensions as the species of which the dorsal vertebrae are here described." There can, then, be no manner of doubt that serpents existed in pre-Adamic times, and that their structure and, by fair inference, their habits corresponded with those which now inhabit various parts of the world. This fact is, of course, fatal to all attempts to make out a case of direct interference with the structure of the serpent because of the transaction in Eden. Neither does it favor any speculations, professedly based upon the inductions of "philosophic naturalists" as to the serpent being the "extreme of animal degradation," even its very type and exemplar. "How remarkable the fact," says Hugh Miller, "that the reptile selected as typical

here of the great fallen spirit that kept not his first estate, should be at once the reptile of latest appearance in creation, and the one selected by the philosophic naturalist as representative of a reversed process in the course of being, — of a downward sinking career, from the vertebrate antetype towards greatly lower types in the invertebrate divisions." The remark, however, is more striking than true. It might be shown, that the structural peculiarities of the Ophidians have much about them to indicate a connection between them and the fishes below them, on the one hand, and the birds and mammals above them, rather than, on the other hand, with the invertebrate types of life. For example, in breathing by lungs, in their digestive organs, in the organs which serve in the highest vertebrate animals to give forth sounds, in the bones of the head, in the brain, in the structure of the vertebral column, and in the organs of reproduction.

The sentence pronounced on the serpent assumes two aspects. Its body was cursed, and permanent antagonism between "its seed and the seed of the woman was declared. But here again it is impossible to separate between the beast and the personal evil — the bad angel — who had thus used it in order to his own purpose. The first expressions plainly refer to something in regard to the body of the reptile which in all times was to characterize it as accursed. It has, however, been remarked already, that now, as ever, it follows its own nature. Where then is the curse? Let us bear in mind what is said of the man, whose whole nature yielded without resistance to the same evil powers. "Thou art cursed from the earth," was the sentence uttered against Cain; though as to mental and physical constitution all his faculties retained their identity. So here: the instrument and the agent both are set apart as cursed. The former carries the curse about with it, as it trails on its belly among the dust of the world, loathed, hated, turned away from by man, Cain's curse was not only realized in his own consciousness, but it came home to him as pecu-

liarily poignant when he thought, that not only was he avoided, but that, as the race increased, he might count on something more. "My punishment," he said, "is greater than I can bear." "It shall come to pass that every one that findeth me shall slay me." And thus is the serpent cursed in the very attitude of man to it. The strong expressions as to creeping on "its belly, and eating the dust all the days of its life," have much light shed on them indirectly in other portions of scripture. That the original structure of the serpent was good after its kind cannot be doubted; but here that form replete, as all others, with evidences of creative skill, and containing much in it prophetic, as it were, of some of the most important parts of the human skeleton, has a far different thought now suggested with it. But the truly good may come to be associated with a curse. "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, I will even send a curse upon you, and I will curse your blessings." Even vegetation may be made to bear direct testimony to the same truth: "Master, behold the fig-tree which thou cursedst is withered away" (Mark xi. 21). In Leviticus xi. 42 "whatsoever goeth upon its belly" is characterized as "an abomination," and in Psalm xlv. 25, those cast down, and feeling as if under a curse speak of themselves as those whose "belly cleaveth unto the earth." Again, such references as the following are suggestive, in connection with this curse: "I will send the teeth of beasts upon them, with the poison of serpents of the dust" (Deut. xxxii. 24). Man is abased, and he joins the mention of himself with the dust: "My flesh is clothed with worms and with clods of dust" (Job vii. 5); "Thou hast brought me into the dust of death" (Ps. xxii. 15). The extreme degradation of all opposed to the truth is thus stated: "His enemies shall lick the dust" (Ps. lxxii. 9); "They shall lick the dust like a serpent" (Mi. vii. 17).

In the other part of the curse the agent of evil is especially addressed: he was to have a seed, a people, in the world, who should serve him, and over whom he should

reign as the "prince of this world." The woman who was in the transgression, was to have a seed likewise, specially distinguished by this, that it should ultimately destroy, cast down, overcome, the seed of the serpent, now to be known as "that old serpent called the devil." The history which traces and which unfolds the fruits of this antagonism, has very many points in it suggestive of the relation between man and the beasts formed in Eden.

To conclude: how remarkable the influence which this association of man with the serpent has had upon the world! Traditionally it seems to have gone with the human race wherever they wandered, and into what circumstances soever their lot was cast. All the great branches of the human family appear to have come more or less under its influence. In China and India, in Egypt and Persia, in Greece and in Rome, it has been the object of the worship of fear. By a natural law, that which is dreaded comes to be propitiated, and, according to well-known principles, objects long propitiated come to be regarded with something like esteem. Thus the twofold worship of the serpent. Thus, too, the explanation of its place as a type of blessing, of healing, of health.

ARTICLE VI.

CONFIDENCE, THE YOUNGEST DAUGHTER OF CAUTION.

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Evitando vivit anima, quae adpetendo moritur.

AUGUS. CONF. LIB. XIII. § 21.

ONE of the proofs of the Bible's being the word of God is, that it everywhere gives tokens of its coming from an omniscient mind. The test of omniscience is foresight. None can see into the future but God. The prophecies, therefore, as they roll on to their accomplishment, speak the wisdom of him who gave them. But it is not in the direct prophecies alone that the foresight of God is seen. We often find in human writings, and sometimes in authors of eminence, remarks that are sparkling and ingenious, but their truth can by no means endure the test of time. The ink is hardly dry on the paper before the teaching has lost its application and the author's reputation has gone to ruin. As the hill that arises highest into the air is apt to stand upon the strongest granite foundation, so the permanency of a doctrine is the signal of the strength of its origination. The editorials of a partisan newspaper, the speech of a pleader in a private trial, a funeral sermon, and often a political oration, are calculated only for the hour. Their best beauties are like the hues on a cloud after a vernal sunset, dependent not only on a fading ray, but the direction of that fading ray, and soon to be followed by a darkness which obliterates their form and memorial, until they return, on another day, to an existence as transient and as soon to be forgotten.

It is one of the proofs of the divinity of the Bible, that all its principles rest on a permanent foundation. Even when the transient appears, it is only a vesture to wrap up an immortal form. Generally speaking, we everywhere find the

vestiges of far-reaching foresight. It is the professed object of the prophecies to foresee and foretell ; and every coming age, until the coming of the millennial kingdom, is to magnify the wisdom which prepared its foundation and predicted its accomplishment. But it is not in professed prophecy alone that this permanent wisdom is seen : The Bible never outlives its principles. The oldest book in the world is never out of date. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets : I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." How many instances of this divine permanency may be brought from the sacred record ! It seems to us that most of the popular objections to the high truths of revelation have been anticipated, showing the foresight that secures their future existence. When Paul says "I speak as a man," he projects himself into the popular sentiment, and takes away the sword of the adversary before he has drawn it from its sheath. In Rom. ix. 19 we have a remarkable passage : "Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault ? For who hath resisted his will ?" How natural is this question on the preaching of the doctrines of Paul, and how many millions of times has this objection been made ! So the saying of Peter (2d Ep. iii. 4) : "Where is the promise of his coming ? For since the fathers fell asleep all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." These simple words contain the first postulate of all the objections of Hume and others to the miracles ; the doctrine of La Place and most of the French infidels, the German objections, and the whole tendency of infidel geology and what the pious geologists are attempting to meet. All is anticipated in its simplest form, and traced to its origin through all its Protean variations. Perhaps there is not a single heresy that has ever infested the church, that has not been "prevented," in the double sense of that old, pregnant word. I can imagine the shades of the old heresiarchs rising from their sepulchres

and saying, each one, to Paul, *Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις, λέγων, εἰ τι ἤσθησαί με φίλτρον ἐπιστάμενον, ὃ ἐγὼ εἶδος λέληθα ἐμαντόν;* “If you knew me to possess some filtre which I was unconscious of, would you not tell me of its power before I asked you?” An historical commentary might be written on the New Testament, illustrating those wonderful provisions against heretical error, such as the Gnostic, the Manichean, the Arian, the Pelagian, the Universalist, which the light of truth was sure to generate in that mingled darkness which it modified, but did not remove.

The Bible has vast foresight in another direction. We would not refine; nor would we for a moment pretend that it assumes any other province than to afford men religious instruction. It leaves the bowels of the earth and the stars of heaven to offer their own evidence to the interrogation of mankind. But religion is involved in many other modes of improvement. Now one of the evils of a growing civilization is the vast inequality it introduces in property, multiplying riches while it diminishes the numbers that hold them, and increasing poverty while it multiplies the number of the poor. This inequality alone is the prime cause of many a revolution. Now the laws of Moses provided for this evil the year of jubilee,—the returning of the possessions to the original holders; and moreover, the assuming their conquered lands on this condition, enacted an agrarian law with justice, and made the whole thing popular and feasible. Rome perished for the want of something similar, and the opposite evil produced the French Revolution. Here then is wisdom, incidental wisdom, which marks the foresight of a divine provision. So polygamy was indirectly prevented by the division of the territory of the promised land into small tenements; probably a more practical provision than a prohibitory law would have been. And what a beautiful provision is that recorded in Deut. xx. 8: “And the officers shall speak further unto the people, and they shall say, What man is there that is fearful and faint-hearted? let him go and return unto his house, lest his brethren’s heart faint as

well as his heart." This is said of their soldiers going to war: what a deep knowledge of human nature and political wisdom does it imply! We are acting on this system in the present war. We are calling for volunteers. Courage generally is conscious power founded on activity and strength; and there will always be men enough in every great nation of such a temperament to excuse their weaker brethren, who may still serve their country in a laborious and retired life. Let the brave defend the timid, and let the timid support the brave. Each man finds his place, reaps his reward, and the harmony of the social system is supported by its diversity.

Many other proofs of the telegrams which revelation has sent into futurity might be adduced. But there is one line of invention on which the human researches have moved, in which we feel great solicitude to ask: What foresight has revelation shown? What provision was made for those objections and difficulties which were sure to arise? We allude to those discoveries of science which seem most to conflict with the facts and principles of revelation, particularly in the departments of astronomy and geology. Has the same permanent wisdom been shown in respect to these sciences as has anticipated all other improvements? Do we see here *the unambiguous footsteps of a God?*

The views which the Bible takes of the material creation are the most infantine possible. The material creation is assumed to be *κατ' ὄψιν*, according to the first impressions on primitive observers: The sun rises and sets; the earth is a plain extended over the waters; there is a solid expanse which supports the upper flood; the windows of heaven are opened when it rains copiously; there are an upper and under and a middle world; there is an absolute *up* and *down*; heaven is always above us and the nether floods beneath; and the plurality of worlds in the stars is utterly ignored. Even the slender attainments of the Greek and Latin poets and philosophers in natural science are not reached. The sublimity of the Bible does not lie in the line of discovery of the secrets of creation.

These views are not formally presented, but incidentally involved in its other teaching. The formation of the whole host of stars, the gaze and the admiration of modern astronomy, is put into a short parenthesis in the first chapter of Genesis. Now it is obvious that a book of these assumptions sent into a world where science was to be progressive for untold centuries, was likely to meet new objections with every new discovery.

The question then is, whether the Bible has made any provision for these future objections, and what the special provision is.

It would be contrary to its usual scope of foresight to say that it has made no provision. For if without parade, and in an informal way, it has armed itself against every heresy and objection that has ever appeared, it would be very strange if it had left itself unguarded in this most important department. We see at once the very partial and limited philosophy of Socrates, when, not contented with the negative ground, he ventures to say that natural philosophy was a hopeless pursuit: Ἐθαύμαζε δέ, εἰ μὴ φανερόν αὐτοῖς ἔστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὐρεῖν,¹ "He was astonished that it was not manifest at once, that such discoveries are impossible to men." This remark was exceedingly natural in his day, before the telescope was invented, before a careful induction had paved the way to the true knowledge of nature. But certainly it is a decisive proof that Socrates had no anticipation of the circle of knowledge which human investigation would fill. The remark does not stand the test of time. If the modern philosophers had believed his doctrine, philosophy would still have been an idle repetition of moral precepts. Now the Bible has no doctrines which thus outlive their own date; and, though we do not contend that it anticipates, or even limits, any *possible* discovery out of its own department, yet it never, on the negative side, makes an assertion like that of Socrates, inconsistent with the knowledge of future times. We say,

¹ Xenophon Mem., Lib. I. c. 13.

then, that revelation occupies permanent ground. Its truths are now as harmonious and credible as they were in the infancy of its dawn.

But what special provision has revelation made for the difficulties supposed to be engendered by the discoveries of modern science?

We can imagine two methods: one would be to foretell them all, and to make it a part of divine prophecy to foresee the Copernican system, the laws of Kepler, the gravitation of Newton, the formation of the hypogene rocks, as taught in geology, and all the wonders of the nebular theory. But what an endless task! And where shall the record stop? We are yet but very imperfectly instructed into the mysteries of nature, and other ages must be provided for as well as our own. It would have changed the whole character of the book; it would have diverted attention, and frustrated the whole design of revelation. Besides, God completed his revelation, in this line of knowledge, when "he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made." He set his vast creation before the observing eye, and when he made the light of the distant stars to reach our earth, he gave a signal which at once excited curiosity and ensured, to a surprising degree, its gratification. All the improvement, all the sharpening of the intellect in these noble sciences, is owing to the speaking of the book of signs and the silence of the book of words.

The other method of proceeding is the one which *has been* taken; and it seems to *us* to be remarkably suitable to the design of a religious revelation, and worthy of the wisdom of God. Let us contemplate it with some care.

It seems to *us* that the provision of the Bible is peculiar, and is the very best we could conceive to have been adopted. It teaches the general ignorance of man, and his ignorance *after* discovery: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations

fastened? or who hath laid the corner-stone thereof? When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? Or who shut up the sea with doors, when it brake forth, as if it issued out of the womb" (Job xxxviii. 4-7)? So verse 12: "Hast thou commanded the morning since thy days; and caused the day-spring to know his place? and, verse 16: "Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea? or hast thou walked in the search of the depth? So the apostle tells us: "Now we see through a glass darkly" (1 Cor. xiii. 12). And again (Eccl. viii. 16, 17): "When I applied my heart to know wisdom, and to see the business that is done upon the earth; then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun: because though a man labor to seek it out, yet he shall not find it." Now we conceive these declarations differ from the explicit declaration of Socrates, who puts his finger down on an especial department of knowledge and says or rather insinuates that man can never make discoveries in that line; but the Bible foretells the *general* ignorance of man; an ignorance not total, susceptible of being diminished by degrees, but an ignorance, after all his progression in knowledge, so great as to preclude the possibility of a valid objection to the revealed wisdom of God. The system of nature, the laws of nature, never can be grasped by us as a totality: we never can compare two totalities together, that of nature and that of revelation; and hence when they seem to jar, we should be cautious; the two notes have never been fully sounded together. Besides, the very knowledge of nature is but a spreading ignorance; the Newtons, the Pascals, the Butlers of the intellectual world, have felt it most, and been the first to acknowledge it. Never was there a discovery in nature which, while it answered one question, did not start a hundred more. Our natural researches are like lighting a lantern in a dark forest at midnight; it gleams on a little circle round your feet only to show you the thickened, the boundless gloom that limits your observation and darkens

your horizon. Hence the *specific* ignorance taught by Socrates has been confuted by a train of discoveries, whereas modern science has only sealed and confirmed the general ignorance asserted in scripture.

It is one of the perpetual delusions of the scientific world (not so much perhaps of the real leaders), to impute a fulness and a completion to certain new sciences which subsequent discovery modifies or overthrows. We are fond of arranging our knowledge and completing our arrangement. We cannot help imputing a totality to the works of nature, as we do to the existence of space. Now place a human mind before this totality. How vast the book! How mean the reader! Can we imagine a greater contrast? And the progress of knowledge hardly approaches to a comprehension of this totality. Then science always leads you to some power that is incomprehensible and out of her province. For instance, the laws of motion from compound forces producing a new direction. How beautifully it explained the motion of the planets in their orbits. One might be tempted to hope that the discovery had exhausted the problem. But oh, whence comes the main force, the impulse? We only confess our ignorance when we say it is the finger of God.

It is not only true that the investigations of science have hitherto not diminished the force of the application of our ignorance to the revelations of God, but it always must be of equal force; we see no tendency to such a completion of science as ever to lay a valid foundation for a valid objection. Thus, in the motion of the planets one of the powers is unaccounted for, and every astronomer, we believe, has as deep a conviction that it never will be accounted for. If we understand it, the philosophy of Newton as clearly demands special divine interposition as modern geology. The natural law leads to a supernatural origin. It always begins in miracle:

He, by the blended power
Of gravitation and projection, saw
The whole in silent harmony revolve.

"He" is Newton; and we can conceive of no natural power as producing projection. The clearer we see, the more we know we see in part. You always meet some buttress that stops your journey. All your researches but serve to give you a vaster idea of the infinite that is before you.

This assertion of human ignorance in the Bible — not that which denies the possibility of knowledge in a specified department, but the general assertion that our ignorance must be more clearly felt by our increasing knowledge — may be regarded as one of the provisions against the infidelity of scientific objections.

But, secondly, that the Bible so clearly insulates its own province, and ignores all that is beyond it, may be regarded as the provision of this foresight. The lamps of a light-house shine over the sea, but the kerosene lamp which you put on your centre-table when you draw your evening curtains, is intended to illuminate only the walls of your parlor. Perhaps there was a significance in the construction of the old tabernacle. The shew-bread, the golden candlestick with its seven branches, the ark, and the table were all enclosed from the open air, and the light of the sun was excluded from them. Moses was careful not to sanction the creed of those, who,

With gentle heart
Had worshipped nature in the hill and valley,
Not knowing what they loved, but loved it all.

He had very little sympathy with Byron :

Not vainly did the early Persian make
His altar the high places and the peak
Of earth — o'er-gazing mountains, and thus take
A fit and unvalled temple, there to seek
The Spirit, in whose honor shrines are weak,
Uppear'd by human hands. Come and compare
Columns and idol-dwellings, Goth and Greek,
With nature's realms of worship, earth and air,
Nor fix on fond abodes to circumscribe thy prayer !

Childe Harold, Canto III. 91.

This tabernacle seems to be a significant emblem, that the light of nature and the light of revelation, for certain purposes and to a certain extent, must be kept separate, and that we are never more deceived than when we attempt dogmatically to mix them, in order to walk in a twilight of our own blending¹ —

Darkness is better.

But there is, thirdly, another provision — the frequent cautions we have to beware of philosophy. “Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.” Philosophy is a general term; but what peculiar specification had the apostle in view? I have no doubt he had in his mind those peculiar speculations begun by the Ionic school, and which Socrates, or rather his accusers, called, *τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια* and sometimes *μετέωρα* and *δαιμόνια*, that is, investigating the secret laws of the material creation. A shade of impiety in the early ages was cast over such pursuits. Now it is remarkable that the caution is not addressed to the philosophers but to Christians. They must not take the initiative; and when it is said “beware of philosophy,” it cannot be meant philosophy standing on its own independent basis; but the *application* of philosophy either to the support or the overthrow of religion. The warning seems to be: Take care how you bring the subjects together, take care how you blend them; take care that you do not magnify a conjecture into a certainty, or a seeming difficulty into a positive opposition. Here is the danger. Men are tempted to harmonize too soon; and dogmatism here is peculiarly pernicious. The whole history of the church verifies this remark. The evidences of Christianity have suffered as much by the hasty efforts of its defenders to press natural philosophy into its

¹ Far be it from us to exclude the light of nature from the general evidences of revealed religion. Here, too, the emblem holds: the light of the sun helped you to walk to the entrance of the tabernacle; but after you were within, your only light streamed from the seven lamps in the golden candlestick.

defence as it ever did from the assaults of the philosophers themselves; nay, the very difficulty has often arisen from the previous dogmatism which created it. Thus, when we assume that the popular language of the Old Testament concerning the earth's being founded on the waters, the sun's rising, etc., is strictly literal and philosophic (an assumption which originally no one thought of), we lay a foundation for all the objections which investigation generates. The objections are wholly relative; and how many of these assumptions are there in the ancient writers! Who does not wish the phoenix away from the pious epistle of Clemens Romanus? Who can be edified by the long disproof of the antipodes in Lactantius, Lib. III. 24. Inst. De Falsa Sapientia? Who does not lament that Augustine did not always follow his own rule? Non legitur in Evangelio Dominum dixisse, Mitto vobis Paracletum, qui vos doceat de cursu solis et lunae. Christianos enim facere volebat, non mathematicos (Augustine to the Manicheans).

Even later writers have forgotten the apostle's "beware;" the learned Grotius, in his *De Veritate*, makes evaporation a miracle (Lib. I. sect. 7); and how unfortunate was the suggestion, not long since, that the shells on the mountains were triumphant proofs of the Noachean deluge. What a splendid book of splendid blunders is Dr. Thomas Burnet's "Sacred Theory of the Earth!" and its long reputation how astonishing! Never did fancy win such a triumph over reason. And even more sober men in a later age have wronged the cause they attempted to aid. Take such a book as Gisborne's *Testimony of Natural Theology to Christianity*, and see how little the witness can bear cross-examination, and how he is confuted almost before he leaves the stand. These instances, and a thousand more, illustrate the simple principle, that a bad argument injures the best cause.

Now all this is a contrast with the *silence* of scripture. None of these courses of reasoning have a scriptural tone to them. Conceive for a moment how it would sound to read

a chapter in Matthew like the following: ‘ Now Jesus and his disciples passed through Magdala, and it being the heat of the day, the Master, being weary, sat down on a rock — it was a conglomerate — and his disciples stood round him; and the Master said to Thomas, run and get me a hammer, and let us break in pieces some portion of this rock. Here, my children, you may see the wonderful power of God; here you may trace the footprints of the Creator. This rock has passed through fire and water ’ — but we must stop; we dare not write any more; we feel as if we were bordering on profanity; but ancient profanity is modern wisdom; at any rate, let us beware of philosophy when it dogmatically aims either to help or hinder religion. It is like mixing those chemical compounds where you are in danger of an explosion.

But perhaps the man of science may say he wants exemplifications; these remarks are general. We would meet this demand by saying, in the first place, that we have no doubt as to some of the prime discoveries of geology. There can be no doubt, under the attainments of modern investigation that the prime matter of our globe is far more ancient than the six-days theory of creation about six thousand years ago would allow us to suppose. We allow that the famous quotation from Cowper, in the present state of science, would be out of place.

“ Some drill and bore
The solid earth, and from the strata there
Extract a register, by which we learn
That he who made it, and revealed its date
To Moses, was mistaken in its age.”

and even the remark of Alexander Brozniart:¹ “ If any suppose themselves of sufficient knowledge of geological phenomena, and are endued with so bold and penetrating a spirit as to be able, with the few materials we possess, to set forth the manner in which our earth was created, we leave them their splendid undertaking; as for ourselves, we feel

¹ See Leonard Woods’s *Theological Review*, Jan. 1834, p. 126.

that we are in possession neither of sufficient means nor strength to erect so bold, and probably so perishable, a structure." If this be truth, it is precisely the truth which one would not wish now to utter. It might be wisdom fifty years ago. Yet we must confess we are not satisfied with some of the popular *reconciliations* now afloat. Both the scriptural and the scientific class is too little solid. The harmony is remote; the discrepancy is glaring; the method is dogmatical; and the imperfect solution of one doubt leads to twenty more.

But let us exemplify; let us ask what are the imperfections of the modes of reconciling brought forward by our Christian geologists, and what is the better way?

The fault is (as it seems to us), they are too specific, and of course too dogmatic. A dogmatic solution of a dogmatic difficulty is bad — especially if the solution be more dogmatic than the dogmatism from which the difficulty arose. When an apparent discrepancy meets us between scripture and science, in the vast abyss of powers and probabilities presented by both, we can seldom fasten on *one* as the only certain solution. We must be careful, therefore, to keep on the negative side — not to glide over to the positive. Our formula should be: it may be this, it may be that; it may be many laws, many causes; but we should be very cautious of selecting one of the possibilities, and turning it into an iron fixture. We certainly lay a trap for confutation. Progressive science may confound us. The standing prejudice of scientific men, especially men scientific in particular departments, is to presume a point of view which does not exist. This presumption leads often to an unconscious dogmatism. Many definite schemes, being based on the present state of science, run great hazard from future discoveries; besides, they are not proved; they secretly turn a possibility into an imaginary certainty.

It *may be so* does not prove it *is so*. Because an hypothesis seems to reconcile a discrepancy, it does not prove it is true, though the converse would prove it false. Let us ex-

emplify. The sun and the moon stood still at the word of Joshua. Some say a halo was substituted, and the miracle consists in a visible light imparted to a narrow region. "Sun stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou moon in the valley of Ajalon" (Josh. x. 12). Well, this saves all the improbability of disturbing the solar system; what would you say better? First, we have no doubt of the miracle, and no doubt of the power of God to work a miracle, great or small. Secondly, we are not called upon to *deny* that the miracle was as great as the most literal sense would imply. But, thirdly we are not called upon to *affirm* this. If the whole solar system was disturbed, it might be by some unusual law of nature; it might be by supernatural interposition; it might be by some secondary purpose, which God had to accomplish in other worlds; for a very philosophic poet has told us:

In human works, though labored on with pain;¹
A thousand movements scarce one purpose gain;
In God's, one single does its end produce;
Yet serves to second too, some other use,

It may have been a halo, or it may have been a miraculous impression on the contending hosts, without anything in the objective. All we are concerned to show is, that amid the mighty powers and possibilities of nature, we have no reason to doubt the narrative or diminish the wonder. In our ignorance of causes we have a vast storehouse of materials to answer objections; and ignorance is here wiser than knowledge.¹

¹ I must confess for one, that Dr. Chalmers's famous Discourses on the Christian Revelation, viewed in connection with the modern astronomy, with all their blaze of eloquence and power of illustration, are far from being satisfactory. He solemnly assumes a positiveness on both sides — on the side of science and on the side of revelation — which is not proved and does not exist. For he assumes the peopling of the planets (very cautiously at first, but it grows into a certainty), which we know nothing about; indeed geology teaches that for ages and ages our globe had no rational inhabitants. Why may not the stars be still in that state? And then, if they are inhabited, who knows who or what their inhabitants are — sinners or holy beings? What he says about the importance of a transaction not being indicated by the narrowness of the field on which it takes place

The same remark may be made concerning the expert geologists in their attempts to reconcile the first chapter of Genesis with the last discoveries of their science. They insensibly glide into the specific; they attempt to extract from this science a positive testimony to revelation which is not so satisfactory to the common reader as to themselves. Where is the necessity of saying whether the long period they demand for the testimony of their science is found in the interval supposed between the second and third verse of the first chapter of Genesis, or in the long days they give to the week of the world's creation? Why not simply say: The narrative of Moses is perfect for his purpose; he neither aimed at chronological or scientific exactness; he merely meant to teach us that this world belonged to God, for he made it, and he made it for a benevolent purpose. "The sea is his, and he made it; and his hands formed the dry land." One cannot help distrusting τὸ πῶς through the whole domain of theology. Already we have been told by Hugh Miller, that the systems¹ of Dr. Chalmers, Dr. J. Pye Smith, Dr. Buckland, Dr. Harris, Dr. King, Professor Sedwick have been antiquated. What was satisfactory in 1814 is no longer so in 1839. Then, on the other hand, the interpretations of the Bible which they adopt to meet these specifics are often exceedingly forced; such as no mere philologist would have discovered in his own line. We must confess that the best observations we have ever found on this subject are made by old Calvin, long before geology

is altogether inapplicable until we know more about the subject. The fact is, that splendid work in answering one difficulty raises twenty more in every reflecting mind. How much better, then, to stop a little sooner, and to say at once that we know too little about the stars; too little about the design of God in making them; too little about the extra-mundane connections of the gospel — either to start an objection, or to be satisfied with an ingenious solution of an *objection, which never ought to be started.* Besides, all that Chalmers has said in seven splendid discourses, had been before suggested by Andrew Fuller (in his Gospel its own Witness) in a few paragraphs. Chalmers's force lay in glittering expansion.

¹ i. e. systems of reconciliation.

had appeared to enlighten or to distress mankind. Standing on a sort of Pisgah, as if he had foreseen the promised land, and the flood we were to cross, he says in his Commentary on the Pentateuch (Gen. i. 16): “Dixi Moſen non hic ſubtiliter diſſerere de naturæ arcanis, ut philoſophum; quod in his verbis videre eſt. Primum planetis et ſtellis in expaſione cœlorum ſedem aſſignat: aſtologi¹ vero ſphaerarum diſtinctionem tradunt et ſimul docent ſtellas fixas² proprium habere locum in firmamento. Moſes duo facit magna luminaria: at qui Aſtologi firmis rationibus probant, Saturni ſyduſ, quod omnium minimum propter longinquitatem apparet, lunari eſſe maius. Hoc intereſt, quod Moſes populariter ſcripſit quæ ſine doctrina et literis omnes idiotæ communi ſenſu percipiunt: illi autem magno labore investigant quicquid humani ingenii acumen aſſequi poteſt. Nec vero aut ſtudio illud improbandum eſt, aut damnanda ſcientia, ut phrenetici quidam ſolent audacter rejicere quicquid eſt illis incognitum. Nam aſtologia non modo iucunda eſt cognitu, ſed apprime quoque utilis: negare non poteſt quin admirabilem Dei ſapientiam explicet ars illa. Quæ ut laudandi ſunt ingenioli homines qui utilem operam hac in parte ſumpſerunt: ita quibus ſuppetit otium et facultas, hoc exercitationis genus negligere non debent. Nec Moſes ſane ab eo ſtudio retrahere nos voluit, quum omiſſit quæ ſunt artis propria: ſed quia non minus in doctis et rudibus quam doctis ordinatus erat magiſter, non aliter potuit ſuas partes implere quam ſi ſe demitteret ad craſſam iſtam rationem. Si de rebus vulgo ignotis loquutus foret, cauſari poterant idiotæ altiora hæc eſſe captu ſuo. Denique quum hic Spiritus Dei promiſcuam omnibus ſcholam aperiât, non mirum eſt ſi ea maxime deligat quæ paſſim ab omnibus intelligi. Si Aſtologus veras ſyderum diſtentiones quaerat, lunam reperiet Saturno minorem, verum id eſt reconditum: oculis enim aliud apparet. Ergo Moſes ad uſum potius ſe convertet. Nam quum Dominus

¹ By aſtologers Calvin means aſtronomers.

² Calvin received the old Ptolemaic theory.

mauim quodammodo ad nos usque porrigat, dum facit ut solis et lunae splendore fruamur: quantae ingratitude foret ad ipsam experientiam ultro connivere? Non est igitur quod Moses imperitiam videant arguti homines, quia lunam facit secundum luminare: neque enim nos in coelum evocat, sed tantum proponit quae ante oculos patent. Habeant sibi Astrologi alio rem notiam: interea qui a luna percipiunt nocturnum splendorem, coarguuntur ipso usu, perversae ingratitude, nisi Dei beneficentiam agnoscant.”¹ These remarks of Calvin have reference to the

¹ “I have said that Moses does not discourse here concerning the secret powers of nature, like a philosopher, which is clear from his words. First, he assigns the seat of the planets and stars in the expanse of heaven. Astronomers indeed define to us a distinction of spheres, and teach us the stars being fixed has each its proper place in the firmament. Moses makes two great lights, though astronomers show, by immovable reasons, that the planet Saturn, which seems so small, on account of its distance, is larger than the moon. The difference is, that Moses writes, in a popular way, what all the common people may understand by common sense, without learning or letters, while the others investigate with great labor whatever the sharpened genius of man can pursue; and this learned study is by no means to be blamed, or to be cursed, as it is by some fanatics, who vilify what they do not know. Astronomy is not only a pleasant science, but it is very useful. It cannot be denied that it is an art that shows the wonderful wisdom of God; and those ingenious men are to be praised who applied their useful toil in this department, which ought not to be neglected by those to whom ability and leisure is given. But as Moses was ordained a teacher, both to the rude and ignorant as well as to the learned, he did not execute his office but by stooping to the simplest apprehension. If he had spoken of things commonly unknown, the common people (*idiotae*) could have complained that his subjects were beyond their abilities, nor could he discharge his office without condescending to their crude conceptions. Finally, since the Holy Spirit opens in the Bible a school for all, it is no wonder that he selects such knowledge as all can understand. If an astronomer inquires into the true dimensions of the stars, he will find the moon to be less than Saturn. But that is a recondite fact; it appears otherwise to the eyes. Therefore Moses turns from science to practice; for when God, as it were, reaches out his hand to us, in giving us to enjoy the splendor of the sun and the moon, what ingratitude it would be to wink out of sight our own experience. There is no reason, therefore, why hair-splitting men should laugh at the artlessness of Moses, because he makes the moon the second luminary; for he does not call us up to heaven, but only spreads what is obvious before our eyes. Let the astronomers have their profounder knowledge to themselves; in the meantime, let those who perceive the nocturnal splendor of the moon be convinced by its very light of perverse ingratitude, unless they acknowledge the beneficence of God.” — *Translation.*

science of astronomy, but they equally apply to all the present and all the future discoveries of geology. They are pregnant with anticipation and foresight. They foreclose all possible difficulty from any amount of future discoveries. It seems to us that one may venture to say that no future discovery in astronomy, unless it should prove a flat contradiction to some essential postulate in revelation, can ever meet an objection which is not obviated in these remarks. The great force of Calvin consists in his knowing when to stop. He is not too articulate for his future strength. He takes eternal ground, never to be abandoned until the word of God perishes.

Now let us copy him in meeting the objection of another science. It is equally wise to say that Moses did not intend to teach geology any more than astronomy. There is as little positive in the Bible of one of these sciences as of the other; and we may say in both cases: "*Si de rebus vulgo ignotis loquutus foret, causari poterant idiotae altiora haec esse captu suo.*"

Now it seems to me that most of our pious geologists transcend this safe line. They are not governed by Calvin's caution. They attempt to extort from science a positive testimony to revelation, which science by no means *fairly* gives; and, secondly, they attempt to extort from revelation an accommodation to science which a philologist never would have found. There is a double violence done in each department, and the two rows of trees, forced by violence over our path, form only an ominous and transient shade. When you have once said that Moses ignores every particle of the scientific, you ought not to turn round and magnify every accidental resemblance into a scientific indication.

Let us verify these general remarks. Thus, when it is said that the Bible represents the creation as the special result of Jehovah's efficiency, to the exclusion of every other cause, and yet that God employs instrumentalities in the work of creation; that the creation was a gradual work; the emergency of the land from the water before the crea-

tion of animals and plants; that the earth had an early revolution on its axis in twenty-four hours, — all this may seem obvious to the sharpened eye of the learned reconciler, but we fear a plain reader (Calvin's idiotae) would complain, that these things were *altiora esse captu suo*; that they had never found them either in science or the Bible. They present to the common mind too forced a conformity, and are far from being necessary to the satisfaction of our science or our faith. We had better stop sooner.

Some of the interpretations of the Bible are equally defective: "Ever since I began to read the Mosaic account," says Dr. Hitchcock, "with reference to geology more than forty years ago, two facts have been more and more strongly impressed on my mind in respect to the days. One is, that Moses understood them, and meant his hearers to understand them, as literal days. The other is, that they are in reality, or stand for the representatives of, something quite different. The earth's submergency during the first day and emergence on the third, if we can judge from geological changes of analogous character, could have been no twenty-four or even seventy-two hours process, but rather requiring untold ages. So geology teaches us that all the great classes of plants were introduced only after immense intervals, whereas Moses brings them all in upon a single day."¹ Again, "I cannot believe that any man of unbiased judgment can read the account, and not feel that Moses is writing a literal history. The objects about which he writes are all of them real existences, which were before him and he seems to be giving an account of their creation in the simplest possible language. Now to be told, that he understood the word *day* to be a period of indefinite length, and meant his readers so to understand it, seems so discrepant to the whole character of the record, that it greatly troubles an honest inquirer. But the symbolic theory allows us to understand the account literally; at least as much so as many prophecies. That is, we may take the terms in a lit-

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct. 1860, p. 688.

eral sense until science shows us that they are insufficient, and then we may be allowed to expand them as far as is necessary. It may be doubtful whether Moses had any idea beyond the literal sense, just as was probably sometimes the case with the prophets. Yet subsequent discoveries make a wide expansion of the term *day*. Moreover by regarding the account as a literal one, and the days natural ones, the sanction of the Sabbath is preserved in all its force to those unacquainted with geology, and retained symbolically to those acquainted with it.”¹ Now we yield to no man in veneration for the world-wide reputation of this writer; we have the highest conviction of his piety and good intentions towards revelation; and we have no thought of writing him a letter, exhorting him to save his ruined and ruining soul by a retraction of his impious mistakes. But we cannot refrain from asking, how much he gains in his harmonizing scheme by substituting an emblematic in the place of a literal meaning? Has he considered? Has he looked ahead? Does he not know, that by adopting such an expedient he sanctions a general principle. Suppose I march out among my people and meet a universalist, and I press him with the passage in Matthew xxv. 46. “These shall go away into eternal punishment.” “Why yes,” he says “I have no doubt the word *eternal* means never-ending; and that it is as strong when applied to the pains of hell as the joys of heaven; I have no doubt our Saviour meant so, and meant that we should understand it so; but then I have got an emblem here, which comes in to alter the whole signification. The words *eternal punishment* present a most expressive emblem of the sorrows of life, which certainly never end till life ends; and, as it is utterly impossible that a benevolent Deity should ever make any of his creatures forever miserable (geology can present no exigency greater than this), I must conclude that eternal punishment is only a sad emblem of the protracted suffering of our

¹ Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1860, p. 694.

present life; and in this interpretation I am sanctioned by the example of some of our most pious and learned men.

It is well remarked by Colridge, that "in arguing with infidels or the weak in faith, it is the part of religious prudence, no less than of religious morality to avoid whatever looks like an evasion. To retain the literal sense, wherever the harmony of scripture permits and reason does not forbid, is ever the honestest, and, nine times in ten, the more rational and pregnant interpretation. The contrary plan is an easy and approved way of getting rid of a difficulty; but nine times in ten a bad way of solving it."¹ Now let this writer imagine himself in the presence of three classes of people; infidel geologists, mere biblical philologers, and plain Christians (Calvin's idiotae), will not his canon of interpretation (though not so to him) to them — to all of them, appear like an evasion? Would they not say, he would not have thought of it if not pressed with a difficulty; and still worse, if they should become his converts and adopt his rule, will they not thrust in his emblems in some literal spot where he would be horrified to find them. The wise builders in the temple of orthodoxy should remember, they seldom lay a stone but another builder must lay another stone over it. Let us remember the old proverb, ἰδεῖν τὸ τέλος.

One is surprised often at the great rapture which the *experti* in a science feel at some alleged similitude, seeming very remote to every other man. The idea that pre-Adamite perished races of animals, fishes, etc., that this has anything to do with the gospel, as is alleged by the eloquent author of the "Cross in Nature," is surely a conviction which will not strike every mind as forcibly and beautifully as it does his own; for only think what it demands of us: First, that the signification came ages and ages before the thing signified; the symbol is not the shadow of the idea, but the idea is the shadow of the symbol. Secondly, the suffering of these primitive creatures, though it prefigures

¹ Aids to Reflection, Intro. Aph. XIV.

sin, is not properly a punishment of sin. Thirdly, sufferings not penal in beings not sinful, are an appropriate emblem of beings that will have penal sufferings because they are sinful. Fourthly, this strange signal stood for ages for nobody that could possibly understand it. Fifthly, when God made the world and gave man a revelation he preserved a mysterious silence as to this symbol. Sixthly, six thousand years roll away, and all the evidences of this signification lie buried up in the depths of the earth; and, lastly, in modern times, when by our learned excavations we have brought the proofs to light, the resemblances are so remote that not one man in ten can trace them, even when they are elaborately pointed out by the most scientific finger; for we most solemnly declare, we cannot see how an effect should go before its cause; how sin should blast creation millions of years before it existed; how a signal should be held out so long before any could understand it; and finally, when men do come on the earth to admire this harmony, how they can see any harmony between the natural sufferings of creatures not sinful and the lost condition of mankind to be released by Jesus Christ; the sufferings are different, the beings are different, and the one happens millions of years before the other is known; and what analogy can bind them together?

It is my turn: if I see a spider dart on a fly, and—

“ The fluttering wing
And shriller sound declare extreme distress,
And ask the helping, hospitable hand;

I may think of Satan seizing a miserable soul, and I may use it as a striking comparison; but it is quite another thing to say such was the intention of nature when flies and spiders were made; and still more remote is it to imagine that a groaning creation gives forth didactic sounds when there is no being to hear them. Besides, what do the other things in the primitive world signify: the granite rocks, the slates, the ferns, the coals, the molluscs, the trilobites? How

amidst such a bundle of figures, flying at the mast-head of creation, are we to select the one that has a meaning? Reason gives the matter over to imagination, and imagination herself, as she stretches her wings over the dreadful chaos, is confounded in the mighty void.

But we are all bound to reconcile science with scripture. What would you substitute as safer ground? We would simply say, be less articulate. We cannot do better than to take Calvin's remarks, applied to astronomy, and apply them to geology, or any other science, which may now or hereafter *appear* to conflict with the Bible.

To make my meaning clear, let me suppose myself a trembling candidate for a settlement before a council of venerable Doctors of Divinity, and some of them consummate geologists. They examine me as to my ability to defend the Bible against the scientific infidelity of the day. A venerable man arises and asks. Do you consider yourself as set to defend the gospel? *Trembling Candidate.* Yes sir, as far as I know how. *Learned Doctor.* Have you studied geology thoroughly, in its connection with revelation? *Trembling Candidate.* No sir, I have not. My knowledge, to you, I have no doubt, would appear very superficial. *Learned Doctor.* How can you expect then to defend the gospel? *Trembling Candidate.* I may be a very imperfect champion. *Learned Doctor.* Have you given any attention to the subject? Are you aware of any difficulties in bringing the two sciences to an agreement. *Trembling Candidate.* Yes sir, I have. I believe I have read all your books on the subject. *Learned Doctor.* Well, have they done you any good? Have they enlightened you on the subject? *Trembling Candidate.* Certainly, sir, they have. I acknowledge the general truth of the science, and I respect you as one of its most able benefactors. *Learned Doctor.* Well, do you intend to follow my example in answering objections? *Trembling Candidate.* As far as I can, sir. I have read your books with the greatest interest, and received from them much instruction. But I certainly follow you more heartily

when you keep on the negative side than when you pass over to the positive, and attempt to extort from revelation or nature a specific testimony that they agree. I then start back, and prefer *my* ignorance to *your* knowledge. *Learned Doctor.* Do you mean to throw contempt on my speculations? *Trembling Candidate.* No, by no means; I have read your works with a double instruction; often as an example, and now and then as a warning. I cannot involve myself in some consequences which I see sanctioned by very high authority. *Learned Doctor.* How will you then defend the Bible? *Trembling Candidate.* Simply by saying that an inspired writer and a philosopher fill two departments, each of them perfect in his line. I suppose the narrative of Moses conveyed *all that he wished it to convey*. It was perfect for his purpose. It presented God as the rightful sovereign, because he is the literal creator of this universe. He meant also to sanction a Sabbath. But he designed to teach little or nothing of science. I shall stop where he stops. I shall stop on obvious declarations. I see, on my ground, no positive contradictions, nor, when the subject is fairly considered, much difficulty. I shall deem it safe to be as ignorant as Moses or Paul was, and as silent, on the dogmatic side, as was Jesus Christ. *Learned Doctor.* Well, I don't know but I must let you pass until you get the egg-shell off your head. *Trembling Candidate* (whispers to himself). It is not yet knocked off by you.

Many other instances might be given than those noticed above. We present only specimens.

The opinion that it is geology solely that proves a supernatural interposition among the operations of nature, i. e. that it lays a foundation for believing the miracles of the gospel, is surely unsupported. Most of the old philosophers (except the Epicureans) bear one testimony on this point. Anaxagoras is said to have introduced mind to account for the motion and arrangement of matter.¹ Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ· εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. "All the wise

¹ Diogenes Laertius, Lib. II., Anaxagoras.

agree," says Plato, "that the ruling principle in heaven and earth is *νοῦς*" (mind).¹ It was a general principle that the beginning of motion was mind. Modern philosophy echoes the sentiment. MacLaurin, in his account of Newton's discoveries, says: "We are always meeting powers which surpass mere mechanism." Newton himself says: "The main business of natural philosophy is to argue from phenomena without framing hypotheses, and to deduce causes from effects, till we come to the very first cause, which certainly is not mechanical;" and the following maxim is found in Cote's preface to Newton's *Principia*: "*Causae simplicissimae nulla dari potest mechanica explicatio; si daretur enim, causa nondum esset simplicissima.*" It is a fixed maxim, in all comprehensive philosophy, that the laws of nature lead to something above nature; but what is above nature is the *miraculous power*. The first decree that creation offers to our adoration is, that she is not sufficient to her own operation; and geology only adds a weak—"weak" because the vote was taken in the subterranean chambers of the earth and kept there for ages—suffrage to Nature's ancient and stronger declaration.

One evil must always attend these recondite resemblances between science and revelation. They never can recur spontaneously to the plain Christian. They never strike him, because they are found beyond the sphere of common observation, and they are totally unlike any proof adduced by the sacred writers.

¹ *Philebus*, p. 28, C. D.

ARTICLE VII.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CITY OF VAN, by Rev. Justin Perkins,
Missionary at Oroomiah, Persia.

ON my recent return to Persia, I spent a Sabbath at the renowned ancient Armenian city of *Van*. It is situated about seventy miles southwest of Ararat. Its location is one of the finest in the world. The charming lake of Van stretches away to the westward like a vast placid mirror, being nearly a hundred miles in length, and at least half that in breadth. The lofty pyramid peaks of Mt. Stephen and Mt. Nimrod, loom up beyond as mighty pillars, to mark its northwestern and southwestern limits. To the north, east, and south is spread out a broad, fertile plain, to the distance of ten to fifteen miles, bounded all around by rugged mountain-ranges; those on the south forming a most magnificent chain, whose higher portions are capped with perpetual snow. This chain runs parallel with the lake and plain of Van, and rears a seemingly impassable barrier between Old Assyria and Armenia. Its streams flowing south from the head-waters of the river Tigris, the miscreant sons of Sennacherib, the Assyrian king — Adrammelech and Sharezer — might well have felt themselves secure from pursuit, on crossing such a mountain-barrier and fleeing into Armenia.

The town of Van is near the lake, hardly a mile from its eastern shore. It reposes compactly under a bold cliff of flint rock, which rises abruptly from the plain, about a mile in length, from two to five hundred feet in height, and not much broader than it is high. The southern face of this cliff, under which the town is built, is perpendicular. Its crest is surmounted by strong fortifications, which, with the natural advantages of the place, render it well-nigh impregnable. Beautiful gardens, orchards, and vineyards environ the city in all directions.

On the perpendicular face of the cliff that overhangs Van are interesting relics of antiquity. Near the top is a royal palace, cut out in the solid rock, consisting of an audience hall, and two smaller rooms which open from it. There is, also, a few hundred feet westward from the palace, a large, smoothed tablet, on the surface of the rock, covered with arrow-head inscriptions. And there are similar inscriptions on the opposite side of the cliff. These inscriptions were copied by Mr. Layard, about twelve years ago.

No wonder that the Assyrian queen Semiramis should choose Van as a favorite summer retreat, though obliged to make her way to it by a journey of a month, winding along the shore of the Tigris and its branches, rising gradually with the advance of the season, and regulating her return, in the autumn in the same way, but in the reverse direction. The contrast

of climates could hardly be greater than that of the burning plains of Old Nineveh and the genial atmosphere of this lofty region, nearly six thousand feet above the ocean, and further modified by the lake and the snow-capped mountains. Her route must doubtless have been the same as that now travelled, which has, from time immemorial, been a great route of commerce. I passed over several stages of that route on my way from the city of Bitlis, which is on the head-waters of the Tigris, nestled among the mountains, near the southwest corner of the lake.

Van is a venerable town in Armenian history, having been one of the capitals of that ancient kingdom. It now contains from twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants, the majority of whom are still Armenians; and the whole region is studded with Armenian churches and monasteries. Two rocky islands of the lake are seats of renowned monasteries, still swarming with monks like bees, though unfortunately the "bees" are all "drones."

A more interesting and inviting missionary field than Van can hardly be conceived. Added to its local attractions are the great numbers of Armenians accessible, who, if more superstitious than those of western Turkey, are in a far more normal and hopeful state. Those of the west, by coming in contact with European civilization in its least desirable forms, are much more inclined to copy its faults and vices than its virtues. The wonder is, that Van has remained so long unoccupied by American missionaries; and it is not strange that the late Dr. Dwight, who visited this city a few months before his death, had entertained the purpose of making it his future residence. Within the last two months, I have passed across Turkey from the borders of Servia—Wallachia and Bulgaria, on the northwest, to the eastern confines of the empire; and were I to-day to select a location for its attractions of climate and actual scenery (all enhanced under the clear sky of this lofty region), of antiquarian associations, and last, though not least, for missionary promise, that place, of all others that I have seen within the dominions of the Porte, would be *Van*. Is there no young pastor, among the subdivided parishes of New England, who can be spared to occupy such a field?

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN HUSS.¹

WE are glad to see these handsomely printed volumes. They fill a space in our Ecclesiastical History which had been less thoroughly explored than, perhaps, any other portion of it. With the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries we have been better acquainted; but the fifteenth has been passed over as a period of comparatively little interest. And yet, in this century, lived some of the most remarkable men of any age, and in it occurred some of the most stirring events in the whole history of the church.

The power of the popes, which had been gradually accumulating for almost a thousand years, culminated near the close of the thirteenth century. It was then that the bishop of Rome "exalted himself above all that was called God, or was worshipped; sitting in the temple of God, and showing himself that he was God." But several events took place in the next century (the fourteenth) tending to shake his dominion, and show the vaunting creature that he was but a man. There was his quarrel with Philip of France, in consequence of which the seat of the popedom was removed from Italy to Avignon in France, where it remained seventy years. Then there was what is called "the great Schism of the West," a period of some forty years, during which the church had two or three heads at once, and the rival popes were assailing each other with excommunications, maledictions, and all sorts of hostile measures; above all, there was the rising of John Wiclif, "the morning star of the Reformation," whose light was not extinguished till the Reformation came.

The light of Wiclif's teaching and example shone far beyond the boundaries of the English nation, and flashed (among other places) upon Bohemia. In the year 1394, Anne of Luxembourg, wife of Richard II. of England, and daughter of the Emperor Charles IV., died. She was a native of Bohemia; and many of her attendants, who, like their mistress, had imbibed the religion of Wiclif, returned thither after her death, carrying the books of the Reformation with them. These were eagerly sought by students in the newly founded university of Prague; and ere long the seed thus scattered among them began to bring forth fruit.

Meanwhile other influences had been at work in Bohemia, preparing

¹ The Life and Times of John Huss; or, the Bohemian Reformation of the Fifteenth Century. By E. H. Gillette. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xx and 632, and xii and 651. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1863.

the way for the changes which were to follow. The Waldenses had been there for many years. Indeed, it is said that Peter Waldo himself, being driven by persecution from one country to another, at last found a refuge and a grave in Bohemia. Here also we find a faithful few, — as Waldhauser, Miliez, Janow, and Peter of Dresden, — whose labors are detailed in the volumes before us, and whose names (almost unknown) should never be forgotten.

Among the students at Prague who profited by the labors of these men, and by the books of Wiclif, was John of Hussinitz, commonly called John Huss. He was born in the year 1373; entered the university in 1389; and though, like Luther, oppressed with poverty, received in succession its highest honors. He was made dean of the theological faculty in 1401, and rector of the university in the following year. He was also the chosen confessor of Queen Sophia of Bavaria, and was appointed preacher in the new Bethlehem chapel, — a position of commanding influence. Among the friendships which Huss contracted at this time was that of Jerome of Prague, who was ever after his companion and counselor, and shared with him the honors of martyrdom.

From his earliest years, Huss had manifested a deep interest in the lives of holy men who had distinguished themselves in the history of the church. Blameless in morals, and devoted to religious duties, his zeal for an acquaintance with the characters of those to whom he might look as models amounted almost to a passion. His manner of life was plain and simple; his tastes were pure and innocent; while his pale and somewhat attenuated features showed the earnestness of his spirit. His ambition, if he had any, aimed only at distinction in the paths of devotion and of Christian effort. He scorned wealth, he cared little for the honors of the world; but he wished to write his name by the side of those who, by a holy self-denial and virtuous deeds, had adorned the history of the church. It was his special delight, while a student, to pore over the history of the martyrs, to trace the progress of their devotion, and contemplate their sacrifices and sufferings. He became early acquainted with the manifold corruptions of the Romish church, and joined his voice and his efforts with those who desired and demanded a reformation.

We have spoken already of “the great Schism of the West,” and of the scandals and abominations growing out of it. Various plans had been proposed for putting an end to this state of things, but all in vain. One partisan council after another had been convened, and yet nothing effectual was accomplished. Each of the pontiffs insisted that he was the true bishop of Rome, and neither would consent to yield his claims to any other. Meanwhile Huss had been growing in knowledge and in grace. He had been getting his eyes open to the terrible state of things in the Romish church. He had been studying Wiclif, and, instead of slunning him as a detested heretic, had come to love him as a brother in the Lord. By his preaching, his lectures, and more especially by translating and circulating

the works of Wiclif, he had himself incurred the suspicion of heresy and the censures of the church.

To bring to an end the lamentable and long protracted schism in the popedom, to meet the incessant calls for a reformation in the church, and to decide upon the case of Huss and others who were suspected of heresy, it was at length determined to call a general council. This council was convened at Constance, a city of Baden, situated on the lake of Constance, on the third day of October, 1414, and was the largest council ever brought together in Christendom. Of the ecclesiastics assembled, there was one pope, thirty cardinals, twenty archbishops, one hundred and fifty bishops, a multitude of abbots and doctors, and eighteen hundred priests. Among the sovereigns who attended, besides the Emperor Sigismund, there were the Elector Palatine, the Electors of Metz and Saxony, and the Dukes of Austria, Bavaria, and Silesia. There were also a vast number of margraves, counts, and barons, and a great crowd of noblemen and knights. Each prince and nobleman was attended by his train, so that the number of persons from abroad was estimated at 50,000. Among these were found persons of almost every trade and profession, and many whose profession was their shame, but whose tastes and interests led them to seek a welcome in the miscellaneous crowd.

Before this great council Huss was summoned to appear; and, fortified by a "safe conduct," i.e. a written and solemn promise of protection and a safe return, from the Emperor Sigismund, he went. But before the emperor arrived, he was seized and cast into prison; nor could the emperor be persuaded to release him, or to regard at all the promise of protection which he had given. He was made to believe that he was under no obligation to keep his word to a heretic; and Huss was left to languish in his dungeon as before. The work before us details his several interviews before the council; his unwavering constancy under every trial; his farewell speeches and letters to his friends; and his triumphant martyrdom. Having been degraded from his priestly office, and delivered over to the secular arm, he was burned at the stake on the sixth of July, 1415. The closing scene was exceedingly touching and sublime. His last words, like those of his divine Lord, were a prayer for his murderers: "O Lord Jesus, for thy gospel I would endure with humility this cruel death; and I beseech thee pardon all my enemies."

Following the death of Huss, we have a full account of the trial and execution of his friend Jerome; of the indignation awakened by these proceedings among the Bohemians; of the terrible war which followed, in which the armies of the emperor were defeated; of the disastrous division which was at length excited among the Bohemians, and of the perseverance of the better portion of them, under every form of persecution, until the Protestant Reformation, and the close of the succeeding thirty years' war. From the remains of this noble band of Taborites, sprang the Moravians, or the United Brethren, of our own times, — worthy successors of a most

worthy Christian ancestry ! A nobility of descent more to be valued than any which the world could bestow !

The account here furnished of the proceedings of the council of Constance is full of interest. In the deposing of three popes, and the election of another to take their place, the holy fathers established, on the highest Roman Catholic authority, that the decisions of a general council are superior to those of the pontifical court, — a point which the Popes of Rome, even at this day, are scarcely willing to admit. They also established, on the same authority, the most detestable of all the principles of the Jesuits, viz. : that public faith is not to be kept with heretics.

The volumes before us contain, not only a Memoir of Huss, but a detailed history of the Romish Church for more than a hundred years ; a period, too, which, as we have said, is comparatively little known. It is a valuable acquisition therefore to our church literature ; a gift, which the religious public will receive with gratitude, and which we hope they will repay by a liberal patronage.

BIBLICAL NATURAL SCIENCE.¹

We are glad to see this great and promising work fairly begun. It will extend to 24 numbers and 1152 pages of the largest octavo, if it be not rather quarto. We have received only two numbers, and these afford very creditable specimens of the typography and the numerous maps and woodcuts the work is to contain. The work is to have alternately two and three plates in each number, besides numerous woodcuts ; the first number containing over fifty. The price of each number is two shillings.

A few sentences from the author's preliminary address will give an idea of some of the most important points he means to discuss :

"A full exposition will be given of the first eight chapters of Genesis ; and, in connection with the exposition, recent 'Geological Theories of Creation,' the 'Theory of Development by Natural Laws,' and that proposed by Mr. Darwin, on 'The Origin of Species,' will be carefully reviewed and set in popular aspects. Questions touching the 'Presence of Death in the World before the Fall of Man,' the hypothesis of a 'Race of pre-Adamite Men,' 'The Unity of the Human Race,' and the 'Extent of the Deluge,' will all be considered in the introductory pages of the work.

"Again, those only who have studied the scriptures from the points of view of advanced science can be fully aware of the great light which can be shed on their meaning by Geology, Botany, Zoölogy, and Physical Geography. Nor is this to be reckoned of little moment," etc.

¹ Biblical Natural Science ; being the Explanation of all References in Holy Scripture to Geology, Botany, Zoölogy, and Physical Geography. By the Rev. John Duns, F.R.S.E. Super-royal 8vo. London, Glasgow, and Edinburgh : William Mackenzie.

This is a wide and noble field, and one at present unoccupied by any competent explorers. It needs eminent qualifications. He who enters it should, in the first place, possess an extensive and accurate acquaintance with all the branches of natural history and physical science; secondly, with the principles of the exegesis of scripture; thirdly, with the principles of natural and revealed religion; and finally, he should be a man of consistent and humble piety. Rare as it is to meet all these qualifications in one man, we are satisfied that Mr. Duns possesses them in a higher degree than any writer in Europe with whose works we are acquainted. He is, we understand, the faithful pastor in the Free Church of Scotland, of a parish near Edinburgh at Torphichen, and lectures on the natural sciences in connection with religion, in the new college of that city, as the successor of the late eminent Dr. Fleming. His appreciation by scientific men may be seen in his membership in the Royal Society of Edinburgh; but his attainments in science may be learned still more satisfactorily, in numerous articles on science and religion in the *North British Review*, of which he was editor for several years, but left that chair in order to prepare the present work. Some of the articles to which we refer, are "Genesis and Science," "Scottish Natural Science," "Comparative Anatomy—Professor Owen," "Aquatic Zoölogy," "Birds," "Origin of Species," etc. One cannot read these without being amazed at the extent and accuracy of the author's scientific knowledge. His attainments are obviously directed into the right channel, and we cannot but anticipate a standard work on this all-important subject.

We are happy to welcome the author of this work among the contributors to the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. An Article from his pen appears in the present number of our *Review*.

LYELL'S ANTIQUITY OF MAN.¹

It is no new thing for the claims of geological discoveries to disturb for a season Christian faith. From the time when the apparent disagreement between the Mosaic account of the Deluge and that given by geology was first promulgated, this science has made its attack, at intervals, upon the earlier Biblical record. In the work before us, there is no such formal attack, for neither the Bible, nor any of its writers, are named, or alluded to; but the whole drift of the book is designed to show that man has existed on the earth many thousands of years longer than the Biblical account warrants us to believe; how many thousands of years we are not informed, for the author gives us no clue to his own belief on this point.

¹ The Geological Evidence of the Antiquity of Man, with Remarks on the Theories of the Origin of Species by Variation. By Sir Charles Lyell, F. R. S. Illustrated by Woodcuts. Second American from the latest London edition. 8vo. pp. 526. Philadelphia: George W. Childs. 1863.

The general line of argument is this: Peat-beds have been found consisting of several generations of decayed trees superimposed one upon another; long periods have been required for the growth and decay of these, and for their conversion into peat-beds. Moreover, in the lowest strata of these decayed trees, human implements have been found; hence man was contemporary with the trees composing this strata. The time estimated for the growth of the peat is, in some instances, from four thousand to sixteen thousand years. In some cases, too, peat-beds twenty or thirty feet deep are underlaid by gravel containing flint tools.

In several of the Swiss lakes, where the water is only from five to fifteen feet deep, ancient wooden piles are observed at the bottom. These evidently once supported villages of great antiquity; for among the piles large numbers of human implements, such as are found in the lowest peat and gravel beds, have been dredged up.

A large number of shafts or borings have been made in the Nile mud, to the depth of sixty feet or more; and at this depth, pieces of burnt brick and pottery have been found; and, it being assumed that six inches of this mud accumulates in a century, the makers of the brick and pottery must have lived twelve thousand years ago. There are other similar trains of reasoning in the book, such as finding human bones and other relics, in caves and other places, in juxtaposition with the bones of animals long since extinct, and the discovery of a human skeleton in the delta of the Mississippi, to which Dr. Dowler ascribes an antiquity of fifty thousand years, though our author makes no estimate of its age.

Now it will be seen at once, that it is not possible to draw any definite conclusion from such data. They indicate the great antiquity of man; but how great? How long was each strata of the peat-bed, each with its particular species of tree, in forming? Or how long the gravel-bed beneath? What is the interval covered by the different kinds of implements, as stone, bronze, and iron, found in these different strata? It has been assumed that the stone implements cover a period of from three to four thousand years, and the bronze from five to seven thousand; but this is only conjecture.

So too in regard to the Nile mud, — it is not proved that the accumulation is at the rate of six inches in a century for twelve thousand years back; it is merely an assumption, a supposition, and is rejected by some persons most competent to judge in the case. And the juxtaposition of human bones and other relics, in caves and elsewhere, with the bones of animals long since extinct, does not prove that man was contemporaneous with such animals. These relics may have drifted into the place where they have been found, or been conveyed there by some other means.

In this volume we meet quite too frequently with arguments based on assumptions: "A strong *presumption* in favor of the opinion is;" "Now, if we *suppose*;" "if we could *assume*." It is assumed uniformly in the volume that the rate of geological change in the earlier periods was as slow as at

present, or, in other words, that the rate of change has been *uniform* from the beginning; while many eminent geologists maintain that the present slow changes cannot be applied to the earlier periods. There is, therefore, no agreement among geologists themselves as to the rate of change at different times; nor is there always an agreement in the interpretation of particular phenomena. Our author regards the famous flint drift in the valley of the Somme, which contains human implements, and is thought to furnish very strong evidence of the early appearance of man on the earth, as being of very great antiquity, while another eminent geologist, M. Elie de Beaumont, considers it as belonging to the, recent period.

Our faith then in the Biblical account of the antiquity of man need not be disturbed, till the eminent interpreters of the geological phenomena involved in this subject can agree among themselves, and adduce more convincing arguments in support of the theory here maintained.

It is not intended by these remarks to undervalue the services of Sir Charles Lyell in the preparation of this volume. He has brought together from various sources a vast amount of geological information bearing on the subject discussed; indeed, he has done all that the materials yet gathered would enable him to do. Nowhere else has so much matter illustrative of the subject been collected. The high reputation of the author and the nature of the subject will deserve and give the work a special interest and a wide circulation. The publishers, too, have presented it in a very attractive form.

BENGEL'S GNOMON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.¹

BENGEL'S Gnomon is a commentary on the New Testament. "It is an index or pointer to indicate what lies within the compass of the sacred text; less for the purpose of exhausting the text for the reader, than to give suggestive hints." It was written a hundred and twenty years ago, in the Latin language, and has always been considered a valuable expositor of the New Testament. It differs from ordinary commentaries by avoiding long discussions, and confining attention to the meaning of the text directly. The thought is given in the shortest and most compact form.

The work was first translated into English, and published by the Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh, in 1854, in five volumes. The present edition is translated directly from the Latin; the translators, as they say, using the language of the Edinburgh edition only where it could not be improved.

As great progress has been made in sacred philology and in the principles of interpretation since the Gnomon was published, it would be reasonable to

¹ John Albert Bengel's Gnomon of the New Testament; pointing out from the Natural Force of the Words the Simplicity, Depth, Harmony, and Saving Power of its Divine Thoughts. A new translation, by Carleton T. Lewis, M.A., and Marvin R. Vincent, M.A., Professors in Troy University. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 925 and 980. Philadelphia: Perkinpine and Higgins. 1862.

expect that such progress would reveal both errors and defects. To give, therefore, increased value to the work, the translators have incorporated the expositions of the best modern commentators wherever there seemed to be either errors or deficiencies in the original. The additions have been made from such works as Meyer, De Wette, Lücke, Tholuck, Winer, Neander, Stier, Calvin, Olshausen, Gesenius, Alford, etc. The critical part of the Gnomon, too, has been greatly improved. Bengel's discussions relating to the text are of little value in comparison with the investigations of later critics. The New Testament text has, accordingly, been revised and conformed to the latest critical researches. Notwithstanding these modifications, Bengel's views, except in the discussions relating to the text, have been faithfully retained; the additions, whether pertaining to the exposition or the text, being indicated by brackets. Thus, this edition gives us Bengel and the expositions of the best modern commentators.

We have compared the translation, in several passages, with the original. It faithfully represents the meaning of the author, while it has one of the best criterions of a good translation in rarely ever suggesting that it is a translation. It is in pure idiomatic English, giving the meaning with point and directness. A comparison of this version, at almost any point, with that of the Edinburgh edition will show that, in all the essentials of a good translation, it is decidedly superior. We regret that the want of space does not allow us to illustrate this by parallel passages.

MUSIC OF THE BIBLE.¹

The book which bears this title is a thick octavo volume of more than five hundred pages, neatly printed and prepossessing in its external appearance. In taking up a work of such a size, one naturally expects to find the subject of Hebrew, as well as Grecian and Roman music, discussed in a thorough and discriminating, if not exhaustive, manner. But whoever takes up the volume in question with such an expectation will be disappointed. A very large part of it is occupied with matter either not at all connected with the music of the Bible, or not connected in such a way as to shed light on the subject. Here may be mentioned the ethnological and historical discussions which occupy almost the entire preface of fifty-eight pages, and a multitude of scriptural passages, quoted merely because they contain references to singing, dancing, or shouting. For example, the whole of 2 Sam. xxii, containing fifty-one verses, is quoted because it is introduced with the words: "and David spake unto the Lord the words of this song." One might, indeed, suppose that the author's design was to present a sample of Hebrew poetry, with discussions on its

¹ Music of the Bible; or, Explanatory Notes upon those Passages in the Sacred Scriptures which relate to Music, including a Brief View of Hebrew Poetry. By Enoch Hutchinson. 8vo. pp. 513. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Co.; Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1864.

peculiar structure and rhythm ; but he finds at the end only the following general remarks, which throw no light on either Hebrew music or Hebrew poetry :

"The above is a psalm of praise, containing a general review of God's mercies to the king of Israel through life, and the many wonderful deliverances which he had experienced. This ode, with a few variations, is found in the book of Psalms (Ps. xviii.). We have it here as originally composed by David for his own private devotions. In Psalms we have it as amended and delivered to the chief musician for the services of the temple. The hymn extends through the chapter, and contains some of the finest specimens of oriental imagery extant."

The above is a fair sample of numerous quotations with their comments ; the writer's plan being to take the books of the Bible in order, and quote every passage in which there is a reference to singing, shouting, dancing, or musical instruments. As these quotations are very many, and often very extended, they occupy no small part of the work.

The writer does, however, discuss, at considerable length, the subject of ancient musical instruments, and gives some good engravings, taken from Villoteau and others, which shed much light on their form and the manner of using them. We could wish that, in the remarks appended to them, he had given us, in well-digested form, the result of his own investigations, rather than a congeries of opinions that are often conflicting. It would be unreasonable, however, to require, on a subject so obscure and difficult, that a writer should always have a clearly defined judgment.

What has just been said of his remarks on ancient musical instruments applies, in general, to his "General View of Hebrew poetry," pp. 232, seq.

CHRISTIANITY THE RELIGION OF NATURE.¹

The fundamental idea on which the discussion in this treatise is based is, that Christianity is identical with natural religion. In its essence, natural religion is not different from revealed religion. There is really but one religion. The distinction between natural and revealed religion relates only to "the different methods in which religious truth becomes known to mankind. What is ascertained by the unaided exercise of man's own powers is called natural religion ; what is received on testimony is called revealed religion. But the latter is no less natural than the former" (p. 19). But man's unaided powers are insufficient, either by consciousness, intuition, or reasoning, to attain to a knowledge of religious truth. A revelation is therefore needed to give men a knowledge of what is beyond their own consciousness ; and revelation must be authenticated by miracles, else it is

¹ Christianity the Religion of Nature. Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute. By A. P. Peabody, D.D., LL.D., Preacher to the University, and Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard College. 12mo. pp. viii and 250. Boston : Gould and Lincoln ; New York : Sheldon and Co. ; Cincinnati : George S. Blanchard. 1864.

no revelation. Now it is "maintained that not only the contents of revelation, but the fact of revelation, belongs to natural religion; that is, that revelation is not only an historical fact, but a fact that was to have been anticipated on *a priori* grounds, — on grounds connected with the nature of man and of God" (p. 34). The yearnings of man's nature would lead him to look for a revelation. There is "a universal appetency" for it; and "there is an antecedent reason in the nature of things to suppose," that this appetency will be satisfied (pp. 34, 36). Moreover "there is in the nature of God antecedent reason to suppose that he would have made a revelation" (p. 38); and such antecedent reason rests on the basis of natural religion.

A reason for the Sabbath, too, exists in natural religion. It is "revealed because it is natural; written on the tablet of stone because it had been first written on human, animal, and inanimate nature" (p. 240). "Christianity is," therefore, "as old as creation," a provision and a probability of a revelation being implanted in our nature. On the grounds of this *a priori* probability, an authoritative revelation through Jesus Christ is to be defended against scepticism. It is, therefore, "incumbent on Christians to demonstrate that the religion of the gospel is, in all its parts, in all its apparatus, in all its history, natural religion, — that it is not a provisional scheme, not a supplementary dispensation, but co-eternal with the mind of God, and coeval with the souls of men, — that its doctrines and precepts are not true and right because they were revealed, but that they were revealed because they are essentially true and immutably right. It is only when this conviction is produced in the mind of the objector, that he is prepared to listen to argument and to weigh evidence as to the historical aspects of the question" (p. vii).

The argument throughout is clear and forcible, presented in a style of great neatness and purity. The line of discussion will be found a rich subject for study in these days of scepticism, when the canons of historical criticism applied to the Bible by some of the rationalistic schools would destroy our faith in the genuineness of every other ancient book, and in every "fact a few centuries old."

While we feel objections to some of the statements, and miss others that we would have gladly seen, the general argument will strengthen the defences of Christianity against the assaults of its enemies.

TERCENTENARY MONUMENT OF THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.¹

The Essays which compose most of this volume were read before the General Convention held in Philadelphia, from the 17th to the 23d of Janu-

¹ Tercentenary Monument. In Commemoration of the Three Hundredth Anniversary of the Heidelberg Catechism. 8vo. pp. lxxiii and 574. Chambersburg, Pa.: Published by M. Kieffer and Co.; Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blackiston; New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1863.

ary last, to celebrate the three hundredth anniversary of the Heidelberg Catechism. Besides the Essays, the volume contains an Historical Introduction and two Sermons. The subjects are discussed with marked ability, and are of great interest to the student of history and theology. A full view of the objects of the anniversary and of the subjects presented, may be found in the July number of this Journal for 1863, p. 670, et seq.

"THE WITNESS PAPERS" is a collection of Essays, historical and descriptive sketches, and personal portraitures by Hugh Miller, edited by Peter Bayne. The volume consists chiefly of his Articles in the *Witness* newspaper, while edited by him, on the church question. It also contains his celebrated Letter to Lord Brougham, which is one of his most successful performances. It was this that first directed public attention to him as a writer, and turned all eyes to him as the editor of the then contemplated *Witness*. These papers present the author "in a new character, as the champion of his church; and show how rich he was in resources for the part he was to act. They make us familiar also with the nature of the conflict between the Established and Free church of Scotland, which was terminated by the Disruption." There seems to be no propriety in calling this volume "The Headship of Christ." Such a title resembles too much the fanciful names now so frequently met with in popular literature.

"GEOGRAPHICAL STUDIES," by the late Professor Carl Ritter, is a volume of 356 pages, translated from the German by William L. Gage. It contains a Biographical Sketch of the author, an account of his geographical labors, his Introductory Essay to General Comparative Geography, and several other papers relating to geographical science. The whole is prepared with good judgment and taste; and it will give a new interest and a new breadth to geographical studies. The work will illustrate also what the eminent Ritter did for the department of geography, elevating it from a mere summary of isolated facts about countries, cities, rivers, etc., to the dignity of a science. It places him in advance of all others in this department, in giving a right direction to geographical inquiries, and in extending the field of investigation. Few will have the leisure to study his *Erdkunde* (Physical Geography), embraced in nineteen volumes, in all, twenty thousand pages; but the principles which underlie that great work are presented in some of the papers of this volume.

"THE MERCY-SEAT; or, Thoughts on Prayer." By Augustus C. Thompson, D.D. 12mo. pp. 345. — Those who are acquainted with the author of this volume, will expect much from him on such a subject, and their expectations will not be disappointed. The subject is treated in its broadest relations, and in a style and spirit which cannot fail to interest and profit.

The three preceding works are from the press of Gould and Lincoln, which has of late been prolific in good books.

"THE MIRACLES OF CHRIST as attested by the Evangelists." By Alvah Hovey, D.D., Professor in the Newton Theological Seminary. 12mo. pp. 319. Boston: Graves and Young. — This is a timely volume, and discusses the subject with ability and candor. It sets forth lucidly the fallacy of scientific and philosophical objections to miracles, which have been raised by such works as "Essays and Reviews," etc. The study of it cannot fail to have a healthful influence among laymen or clergymen. The mechanical execution, at the Riverside Press, will satisfy the most fastidious eyes.

"LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN WINTHROP," Governor of the Massachusetts-Bay Company at their Emigration to New England, 1630. By Robert C. Winthrop. 8vo. pp. 452. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864. — Some recently discovered papers of the Winthrop family have brought to light important facts in regard to the early condition and fortunes of the first Governor of Massachusetts. Many of the letters have never been made public before. The volume covers the period of Governor Winthrop's life up to the time of his embarkation for America, "and exhibits the whole preparation and discipline through which he passed before entering upon his memorable New England enterprise." It consists largely of the letters of Governor Winthrop. These are charming specimens of the epistolary style of the times. Those to his wife breathe a tenderness, a warmth of affection, and a spirit of piety which it is refreshing to read.

Mr. Winthrop has done a valuable service in the preparation of this beautiful volume; and he will place the public under new obligations, if in another volume he will give the history of his eminent ancestor as the first governor of Massachusetts.

"THE LAST DAY OF OUR LORD'S PASSION." By the Rev. William Hanna, LL.D., author of the Life of Dr. Chalmers. 12mo. pp. 379. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1863. — Dr. Hanna here presents the scenes in the last day of the Saviour's suffering life in a clear and graphic style, the whole being a continuous and expanded narrative not only of the incidents themselves, but of "the characters, motives, and feelings of the different actors and spectators in the events described." One cannot rise from the reading of this volume without a most vivid and impressive view of the scenes it portrays. The author is soon to publish "The Forty Days after our Lord's Resurrection."

"A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE." By William G. T. Shedd, D.D. In two volumes. 8vo. pp. 408 and 508. 1864. — These elaborate and beautiful volumes are the result of Dr. Shedd's investigations in the department to which they relate, while he was Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Theological Seminary at Andover. The breadth and thoroughness of the discussions, the philosophical treatment, and the forcible style cannot fail to awaken a new interest in this much neglected department of theological study.

A COMPENDIOUS HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LITERATURE, and of the English Language, from the Norman Conquest. With numerous specimens. By George L. Craik, LL. D., Professor of History and of English Literature in Queen's College, Belfast. In two volumes. 8vo. pp. 620 and 581. 1863. — We have here the best means yet furnished for studying the history of English literature with the history of the language. The growth and changes of the language are clearly presented, and fully illustrated by specimens of the literature of the different periods.

"THE FOEDERALIST"; reprinted from the original text. With an historical Introduction and Notes, by Henry B. Dawson. In two volumes. 8vo. Vol. I. pp. cxlii and 615. 1863. The first volume contains an historical and bibliographical Introduction of eighty-nine pages by the editor, and the whole of the text of the Foederalist. The second volume, not yet published, is to consist of Notes by the editor. Our times will give special interest to the study of these volumes.

The three preceding works are published by Charles Scribner of New York, and deserve a fuller notice than we have space to give them. The mechanical execution fully sustains Mr. Scribner's well-deserved reputation for sumptuous books.

"THE BOOK OF PRAISE," from the best English Hymn-writers, selected and arranged by Roundell Palmer, is a choice collection of devotional poetry, happily arranged. It contains four hundred and twelve hymns, and in its whole execution forms one of the neatest and most tasteful volumes of the year. It is published by Sever and Francis, Cambridge, and printed by Welch, Bigelow, and Co. A more beautiful specimen of typography is rarely to be found.

The three following books are from the Massachusetts Sunday-school Society, Boston, published by William S. and Henry Martien, Philadelphia: Frank and Rufus; or, Obedience and Disobedience. By Catharine M. Trowbridge. 18mo. pp. 280. George Morton and his Sister, same author. 12mo. pp. 258. Little by Little. 18mo. pp. 224. — These are attractive and instructive books for the young, — the two last just published.

ARTICLE IX.

RECENT GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

BY PROF. W. F. WARREN OF BREMEN.

Among the recent publications of the theological press in Germany, we select the following as most likely to interest American students:

1. *Studien zur Kritik und Erkl  rung der biblischen Urgeschichte, Gen. Cap. 1. — XI.* Von Dr. Eberhard Schrader. 8vo, pp. viii and 200. Zurich. (Con-

tributions to the Criticism and Explanation of Primeval History — Genesis, chap. I.—XI.) Dr. Schrader, a few months ago elected Professor Ordinary in the University of Zurich, brings us, in the above work, his first considerable contribution to theological literature. It consists of three Essays or Disquisitions entitled respectively: I. The Composition of the Biblical Record of Creation; II. Meaning and Connection of the Passage on "the Sons of God"; and, III. The so-called Jahvistic sections of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, a new investigation of their relation to each other. The discussions are fresh and clear, and evince a good acquaintance with the modern literature of the subject. Perhaps the most notable thing about his results is, that while De Wette, Tuch, Ewald, Stähelin, and other champions of the "Document Hypothesis" held that the Elohim document is a connected and complete whole, to which the Jehovah document is merely complementary, our author makes the latter quite as connected and complete as the former, while it is at the same time far more picturesque, lively, and readable. The author of the Elohim document he designates the "Annalist," the author of the other, the "Prophetic narrator." The object of the former is to narrate the earliest history of the world in chronological form, according to great epoch-making divisions; the aim of the latter is more the progress of the inward and outward development of man. The following passages he refers to a later hand, probably the compiler, or rather editor (*Redaktor*) of our present book of Genesis: iv. 25, 26; vi. 1-4; ix. 18 b, 19; ix. 20-27; x. 8-12, 18 b, 21; xi. 1-9. Under the expression "Sons of God," ch. vi. 1, he, like Kurz and other recent writers, understand angels. The question whether the passage was original with the *Redaktor* or borrowed from some existing document, our author leaves unsettled: he thinks, however, that verse 3 was thus borrowed, while verses 1, 2, and 4 were original with the editor. In an appendix Dr. Schrader has arranged, upon confronting pages, the whole of the eleven chapters according to his view. On the left-hand page we have the history as given by the "annalistic narrator," on the right-hand page, as given by the "prophetic narrator," while at the foot stand the interpolations of the *Redaktor*. The first verse of Genesis he translates, with Bunsen and others, "When, in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth," etc. The other modes of rendering it are fully discussed, pp. 40-57. To students of biblical history and criticism the work will prove interesting and suggestive.

2. The late Dr. H. A. C. Hävernicks Lectures on the *Theologie des Alten Testaments* has just appeared in a second edition, edited, with additions by Dr. Hermann Schultz. 8vo. pp. xiv and 284. Frankfort and Erlangen. The Preface of the former editor, the late Dr. H. A. Hahn, is retained, together with the laudatory Introduction from the pen of Dr. Dörner. The text of the work has been faithfully reproduced in the present edition, and the notes, literary references, etc., by the new editor, seem judicious and valuable. The excursuses, however, appended to the former edition, having

served their purpose in showing the personal opinions of Dr. Hahn upon various difficult points, have, in the present, been omitted, with the exception of the two entitled *Die heiligen Verhältnisse der Israeliten*, and *Der Knecht Gottes*, Jes. 40–66." To these Dr. Schultz has added one of his own on "Old Testament Prophecy." Although the work has many of the defects inherent in posthumous publications, we have little hesitation in pronouncing it one of the very best we yet have in this interesting field. It is free from the milk-and-water philosophy and persistent scepticism of De Wette, the heathenish indifference of Kaiser, the superficiality of Gramberg, the rationalism of Von Coelln, the Hegelianism of Vatke, the unpragmatical, mechanical method of Lutz, the dogmatism of Von Hofmann, the theosophy of Beck, and the blasphemous sophistries of Bruno Baur. Hävernick's views of revelation, of the Bible as its codex, of the development of the kingdom of God, of prophecy, and related subjects, undoubtedly underwent a process of liberalization in the course of his academic activity; but it was under the influence of a liberating, spiritualizing piety, not under that of a licentious, carnalizing scepticism. We only wish the honored man might have been spared for a final ripening of his views, for ten years more study of his subject, and the production of a work on Old Testament theology, worthy at once of the culture of our age and the high importance of the theme.

3. *Die Messianischen Prophezien des Jesaias*. Von Dr. G. K. Mayer, Domkapitular und Professor der Dogmatic in Bamberg. 8vo. pp. 505. Vienna: 1863. The author of this work on the Messianic Prophecies of Isaiah is one of the most prolific of the Roman Catholic professors in Germany. His first work of note was a treatise on the "Essence and Propagation of Original Sin" (1838). Since that he has written "the Genuineness of John's Gospel" (1854); "Man, according to the Creed of the Universal Church and in the speculative System of Günther" (1854–56); "The Belief in God" (1857); "The Belief in Jesus, the Anointed" (1858); "The Patriarchal Promises and Messianic Psalms" (1859). Of the last named, the work before us may be regarded as a continuation. It is an attempt to establish the belief in Jesus the Anointed, by a consideration of the various prophecies in Isaiah concerning him, *seriatim*. The author expressly declines all critical investigations, taking the text as it stands, and seeking to interpret it without any of the showy apparatus of modern learning. The result is, a work perfectly popular in its style, remarkably free from the mannerism and trite phraseology of Catholic writers, and actually refreshing in many of its pages to every true believer.

4. *Enchiridion Theologiae Moralis; Auctore Dr. Carolo Werner*. 8vo. pp. 352: Vindobonae. 1863. A very neatly-printed new Manual of Moral Theology, containing little that is new, but presenting the standard views of the old Catholic authors in a remarkably clear, lucid, and systematic form. It

would be difficult to find the same materials in any other work of the same size. The grand revolutions which have taken place in the Protestant literature of this science within the past century, the various developments and misdevelopments which lie between Buddeus and Wuttke, have left scarce a trace in the work before us. Professor Werner, in the cloisterly stillness of his episcopal seminary; suffers no sound of the contending schools and philosophies of North Germany to reach the ears of his students. Suarez, Escobar, and Busenbaum are to him as oracular as two centuries ago. Very different was it with the Catholic moralists early in the present century — a Mutschelle, a Riegler, a Vogelsang. Catholic science has grown reactionary.

5. *Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche von der Entstehung des Christenthums bis auf die neuste Zeit. Von Professor Dr. F. Chr. Baur.* 5 Vols. Tübingen: Fues. 1863. Price, 13 thaler, 4 neugroschen. Of this work, the first and second volumes have been for a considerable time before the public, and now appear, the first in a third, and the second in a second edition. Vol. III., "The Christian Church in the Middle Ages" was noticed in these pages last year (p. 870), and Vol. V., "Church History of the Nineteenth Century," announced still more recently. The fourth volume now makes its appearance, under the editorial care of Dr. F. F. Baur (son of the late Professor), and completes the entire work. The merits of the history seem to increase in direct ratio to the author's distance from the apostolic and post-apostolic period of the church. His astonishing theory of the origin of Catholic doctrine, the Canon, and the Church, he seems to have retained to his death; and the first volumes of this history will ever remain the most important of the series, containing, as they do, one of the most curious specimens of historiographical aberration to be found in the world's literature. The volume before us covers the period extending from the Reformation to the end of the last century. It exhibits all that profound mastery of the material, historic insight, and skill in treatment for which Dr. Baur was distinguished. No room is taken up with literary references, quotations of sources, etc.; the seven hundred pages are all a clear, flowing narrative from the author's own pen. An excellent Index of twenty-seven pages adds much to the value of the volume.

6. *Die Weissagungen des Alten Testaments in den Schriften des Flavius Josephus und das angebliche Zeugniß von Christo. Von Dr. Ernst Gerlach.* 8vo. pp. vi and 120. Berlin: 1863. The Berlin theological faculty having propounded as a theme for prize competition in the year 1859-60 the investigation of the genuineness or non-genuineness of the noted "testimony to Christ" in the writings of Josephus, this little treatise was presented, and honored with the prize. After carefully rewriting and somewhat enlarging it, the author presented it to the public some two months ago. Its greatest value consists in its having shown, for the first time, the true method of arriving at a solution of the question, to wit, by way of a more thorough

and exhaustive study of Josephus's own Christological views and expressions, as found elsewhere in his writings. Our author's personal conclusion is that Josephus *cannot* have written the passage, whatever the critical grounds from MSS., etc., may say for or against its genuineness. Others must try the same method and see if it invariably lead to the same result before we can call the question finally settled. The table of contents will show the plan of the discussion in a brief and perspicuous form. *Introduction*: 1. Survey of the History and Literature of the Problem; 2. Was Josephus a Pharisee or Essene? I. *Josephus's Estimate of Old Testament Prophecy*: 1. Of the Old Testament Canon in general; 2. Of the Prophets in particular: (1) Their Inspiration and Credibility; (2) Fulfilment and aim of the Prophecies. II. *Josephus's Idea of the Messiah, and its Justification in the Prophecies of the Old Testament*: 1. the Prophecies of Daniel: (1) the Four Universal Monarchies; (2) the Interpretation of the Stone in Dan. ii. and the oracle respecting the World-ruler from Judah; 2. the Messianic Hopes of Josephus based upon the Prophecies of Daniel; 3. Traces of the Messianic Interpretation of other Prophecies. III. *Criticism of the so-called Testimony to Christ*: 1. On the Manuscripts and Variations; 2. Criticism of individual Sentences of the Passage; 3. On other Arguments against the genuineness of the passage; 4. The Passages on John the Baptist and James the brother of the Lord.

7. *Die Bildung der evangelischen Theologen für den praktischen Gottesdienst.* Von Dr. Daniel Schenkel. 8vo. pp. 208. Heidelberg: 1863. This is a memorial, prepared on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Evangelical Protestant Seminary for Preachers in Heidelberg, of which Dr. Schenkel is director. It contains: I. An Essay on the General Principles of Ministerial Education. II. A Sketch of the evangelical *Predigerseminarien* of Germany previous to the founding of the Heidelberg one. III. The Institution in Heidelberg. IV. Concluding Remarks, and Appendices containing the Statutes of the different *Predigerseminarien*, Lists of the alumni of the Heidelberg school, etc. Some six years ago when the writer was engaged in preparing a series of papers on "Ministerial Education in Germany," this work would have spared him a great amount of trouble, correspondence, and expence. As all his readers, however, may not yet have made their studies in this field, he will cordially commend to them the information contained in Dr. Schenkel's Memorial volume. The author's views of ministerial culture and training, we scarcely need add, are very liberal. As to the policy of separate clerical schools he thinks it absolutely necessary, (1) that they be incorporated into the university as a university-institution; (2) That they be inseparably united with the theological faculty of the university; (3) That they be secured from the possibility of immediate ecclesiastical influence infringing upon their liberty; (4) That the pupils enjoy the fullest freedom of conscience, etc.; (5) That the free Protestant spirit prevail throughout the whole (p. 144).

8. *Johann Gottlieb Fichte im Verhältniss zu Kirche und Staat.* Von Ado'f Lassel. 8vo. pp. 244. Berlin: Herz; London: Williams and Norgate. 1863. Among the numerous recent publications on Fichte and his philosophy, we deem the above worthy of especial notice and commendation. The discussion of the relation of Fichte to the church (to Christianity would have been a better and truer expression) fills over 130 pages of the work, and is exceedingly interesting to every one who knows anything of the intimate relation of German philosophy to the latest developments of German theology. The author has made most thorough preliminary studies; he seems as familiar with every sentence of Fichte's writings as with the alphabet, and yet knows how to discriminate in his judgment of a master whom he evidently reveres. The production is of more than ephemeral value.

9. *Die Geschichte des Pietismus von Heinrich Schmid, Dr. and Professor der Theologie in Erlangen.* 8vo. pp. vi and 507. Nördlingen: 1863. Hossbach's "Life and Times of Spenser," having portrayed the history of "Pietism," in too favorable a light to suit the strict Lutherans, and the work proving so able and popular as to attain to its third edition in 1861, it became necessary to set a more ecclesiastical pen in motion, and to attempt a history of this remarkable and salutary movement from the point of view of high Lutheranism. The result is before us. The author has had but few new materials, and does not display any great skill in historical composition. The work has a certain interest arising from its polemic aim, and from the reflex light which it throws upon the party to which its author belongs. It will be valued more as a criticism of Pietism than as its history. He substantially agrees with two of the latest Lutheran writers upon the subject, Max Goebel and Kliefoth, in the assertion, that the real origin of the pietistic controversies was the attempt to transplant essentially *Reformed* ideas and appliances into the *Lutheran* church. He affects great candor in his treatment of Spenser and the other distinguished leaders of the movement, but is often not even just, where he claims to be generous. He denies, with Rudelbach, that Pietism was a re-action against evils which *originated* in the Lutheran church in the course of the seventeenth century; affirming, on the other hand, that the evils of which it complained were long standing, dating, in fact, from the Reformation, and attributable to the imperfection of the *constitution* of the Lutheran church. The Introduction, filling forty-two pages, gives a very interesting picture of the deplorable state of the church in the century mentioned, partly from clergymen of the time, and partly from the more varied testimony which Tholuck has recently collected and brought to light in his *Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus*.

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ARTICLE I.

THE GENUINENESS OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.¹

BY PROF. GEORGE P. FISHER, YALE COLLEGE.

THE Gospel that bears the name of John is one of the main pillars of historical Christianity. Christianity would indeed remain were the apostolic authorship and the credibility of this Gospel disproved; for before it was written, Jesus and the resurrection had been preached by faithful witnesses over a large part of the Roman world. Christianity would remain; but our conception of Christianity and of Christ would be materially altered. The profoundest minds in the church, from Clement of Alexandria to Luther, and from Luther to Niebuhr, have expressed their sense of the singular charm and surpassing value of this Gospel. In recent times, however, the genuineness of the fourth Gospel has been impugned. It was denied to be the work of John by individual sceptics at the close of the last century; but their attack was not of a nature either to excite or to merit much attention. Not until Bretschneider published (in 1820) his *Probabilia* did the question become the subject of seri-

¹ Bleek's *Einleitung in das N. T.*, 1862. Meyer's *Com. über das Evang. des Johannes*, 3 A., 1856. Schneider's *Aechtheit des Johann. Evang.*, 1854. Mayer's *Aechtheit des Evang. nach Johann.*, 1854. Ewald's *Jahrb.* III. s. 146 seq., v. s. 178 seq., x. s. 83 seq.

ous discussion. But the assault, which has been renewed by the critics of the Tübingen school, with Baur at their head, has more lately given rise to a most earnest and important controversy. The rejection of John's Gospel by these critics is a part of their attempted reconstruction of early Christian history. Starting with the assertion of a radical difference and hostility between the Jewish and the Gentile types of Christianity,—between the party of the church that adhered to Peter and the original disciples, and the party that adhered to Paul and his doctrine,—they ascribe several books of the New Testament to the effort, made at a later day, to bridge over this gulf. The Acts of the Apostles proceeds from this motive, and is a designed distortion and misrepresentation of events connected with the conflict about the rights of the Gentile converts. And the fourth Gospel is a product of the same pacifying tendency. It was written, they say, about the middle of the second century by a Christian of Gentile birth, who assumed the name of John in order to give an apostolic sanction to his higher theological platform, in which love takes the place of faith, and the Jewish system is shown to be fulfilled, and so abolished, by the offering of Christ, the true paschal Lamb. We hold that the fundamental proposition, which affirms a radical hostility between Pauline and Petrine Christianity, can be proved to be false, even by the documents which are acknowledged by the Tübingen school to be genuine and trustworthy; and that the superstructure which is reared upon this foundation, can be proved, in all its main timbers, to be equally unsubstantial. In the present Article, however, we shall take up the single subject of the authorship of the fourth Gospel, and shall make it a part of our plan to refute the arguments which are brought forward by the sceptical critics on this question—the most important critical question connected with the New Testament canon. But while we propose fairly to consider these arguments, we have no doubt that the attack upon the genuineness of John, has its root in a determined unwillingness to admit the

historical reality of the miracles which that Gospel records. This feeling, which sways the mind of the critics of whom we speak, is the ultimate and real ground of their refusal to believe that this narrative proceeds from an eyewitness of the life of Jesus. And were there nothing in Christianity to remove this natural incredulity, and to overturn the presumption against the occurrence of miracles, the ground taken by the Tübingen critics in reference to this question might be reasonable. It is right to observe that behind all their reasoning there lies this deep-seated, and, in our opinion, unwarrantable prejudice.

We have recorded the titles of some of the more recent defences of the Johannean authorship: Bleek's Introduction, in which the author discusses the question at length, with his wonted clearness and golden candor; Meyer's Introduction to his Commentary on John, which contains a brief, condensed exhibition of the principal points of argument; Schneider's little tract, which handles with ability certain parts of the external evidence, but falls far short of being a complete view; Ewald's Essays, which contribute fresh and original thoughts upon the subject, but are not without faults in opinion as well as temper; Mayer's copious treatise, in which the external testimonies are ably considered, though too much in the temper of a controversialist, and with occasional passages not adapted to convince any save members of the Roman Catholic church, of which the author is one. We intend to present our readers with a summary of the arguments, most of which are touched upon in one or another of these writers; although we lay claim at least to independence in weighing, verifying, and combining the various considerations which we have to bring forward.

That the apostle John spent the latter part of his life in Proconsular Asia, in particular at Ephesus, is attested by all the ecclesiastical writers after the middle of the second century. At the conference of Paul with the other apostles in Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 1 seq.; Acts xv.), which occurred

about twenty years after the death of Christ, John is mentioned, in connection with Peter and James, as one of the pillars of the Jerusalem church. Whether he was in Jerusalem on the occasion of Paul's last visit, we are not informed. It is in the highest degree probable that John's residence at Ephesus began after the period of Paul's activity there, and either after or not long before the destruction of Jerusalem. Among the witnesses to the fact of his living at Ephesus in the latter part of the second century, Polycrates and Irenaeus are of especial importance. Polycrates was himself a bishop of Ephesus near the end of the third century, and of a family seven of whose members had previously been bishops or presbyters in the same church. In his letter to Victor, he expressly says that John died and was buried at Ephesus.¹ Irenaeus, who was born in Asia, says of the old presbyters, immediate disciples of the apostles, whom he had known, that they had been personally conversant with John, and that he had remained among them up to the times of Trajan (whose reign was from the year 98 to 117). Some of them, he says, had not only seen John, but other apostles also. Whether the ancient stories be true or not, of his fleeing from the bath on seeing there the heretic Cerinthus, of his recovering the young man who joined a company of robbers, or the more probable story found in Jerome, of his being carried in his old age into the Christian assemblies, to which he addressed the simple exhortation: "Love one another," they show a general knowledge of the fact of his residing at Ephesus, and of his living to an extreme old age. His Gospel, also, according to the testimony of Irenaeus, Clement, and others, and the general belief, was the last written of the four, and the tradition places its composition near the close of his life.

THE EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

Mayer begins his argument by an appeal to Jerome and Eusebius; the one writing in the latter, and the other

¹ Euseb., Lib. III. 31.

in the early, part of the fourth century; both having in their hands the literature of the church before them; both diligent in their researches and inquiries; both knowing how to discriminate between books which had been received without contradiction, and those whose authority had either been disputed or might fairly be questioned; and yet neither having any knowledge or suspicion that the fourth Gospel was not known to the writers of the first half of the second century, with whom they were familiar. This appeal is not without force; but instead of dwelling on the inference which it appears to warrant, we choose to begin with the unquestioned fact of the universal reception of the fourth Gospel as genuine in the last quarter of the second century. At that time we find that it is held in every part of Christendom to be the work of the apostle John. The prominent witnesses are Tertullian in North Africa, Clement in Alexandria, and Irenaeus in Gaul. Though the date of Tertullian's birth is uncertain, a considerable portion of his life fell within the second century, and his book against Marcion, from which his fullest testimony is drawn, was composed in 207 or 208. His language proves the universal reception of our four Gospels, and of John among them. These together, and these exclusively, were considered the authentic histories of the life of Christ, being composed either by apostles themselves or by their companions.¹ The testimony of Clement is the more important from his scholarly character and his wide acquaintance with the church. He became the head of the Catechetical school at Alexandria about the year 190. Having been previously a pupil of various philosophers, he had in his mature years

¹ Adv. Marcion, Lib. IV. c. 2; also c. 5. He says in this last place: "In summa, si constat id verius quod prius, id prius quod et ab initio, id ab initio quod ab apostolis; pariter utique constabit, id esse ab apostolis traditum, quod apud ecclesias apostolorum fuerit sacrosanctum." Then shortly after: "eadem auctoritas ecclesiarum apostolicarum caeteris quoque patrocinabitur evangeliiis, quae proinde per illas, et secundum illas habemus": here follows the enumeration of the four. It is historical evidence — the knowledge possessed by the churches founded by the apostles — on which Tertullian builds.

sought instruction from Christian teachers in Greece, in Lower Italy, in Syria, in Palestine, as well as in Egypt; and his works which remain prove his extensive learning. Not only is the genuineness of the fourth Gospel an undisputed fact with Clement, but, not to speak of other testimony from him, he gave in his lost work, the *Institutions*, quoted by Eusebius, "a tradition concerning the order of the gospels which he had received from presbyters of more ancient times;" that is, concerning the chronological order of their composition.¹ But of these three witnesses, Irenaeus, from the circumstances of his life as well as the peculiar character of his testimony, is the most important. A Greek, born in Asia Minor about the year 140, coming to Lyons and holding there first the office of presbyter, and then, in 178, that of bishop, he was familiar with the church in both the East and the West. Moreover, he had in his youth known and conversed with the aged Polycarp of Smyrna, the immediate disciple of John, and retained a vivid recollection of the person and the words of this remarkable man. Now Irenaeus not only testifies to the universal acceptance in the church of the fourth Gospel, but also argues fancifully that there *must* be four and only four gospels to stand as pillars of the truth; thus showing how firmly settled was his faith, and that of others, in the exclusive authority of the canonical gospels.² To the value of his testimony we shall have occasion again to refer. We simply ask here if it was possible for Irenaeus to express himself in

¹ Euseb., Lib. VI. c. 14. That the four Gospels alone were regarded as possessed of canonical authority is evident from other places in Clement. In reference to an alleged conversation between Salome and Jesus, Clement says: "We have not this passage in the four Gospels delivered to us, but in that according to the Egyptians." Strom., Lib. III. (See Lardner, Vol. II. pp. 236 and 251).

² Adv. Haer., Lib. III. 1. 1. This noted passage on the four Gospels thus begins: "Non enim per alios dispositionem salutis nostrae cognovimus, quam per eos, per quos evangelium pervenit ad nos; quod quidem tunc praeconaverunt, postea vero per Dei voluntatem in scripturis nobis tradiderunt, fundamentum et columnam fidei nostrae futurum." Like Tertullian, he makes his appeal to sure historical evidence. In speaking of Polycarp and the men who followed him,

this way—to affirm not merely the genuineness of the four gospels, but the metaphysical necessity that there should be four—if John's Gospel had been made known for the first time during his lifetime, or shortly before. With these noteworthy witnesses, we associate the great name of Origen, the successor of Clement at Alexandria, although Origen's theological career is later, terminating near the middle of the third century, he having been born but fifteen years before the end of the second; for his extensive journeys through the Eastern church, and as far as Rome, and especially his critical curiosity and erudition, together with the fact that he was born of Christian parents, give extraordinary weight to the evidence he affords of the universal reception of John's Gospel. In the same category with Irenaeus, Clement, and Tertullian, belong the Canon of Muratori, or the list of canonical books which Muratori found in an old manuscript in the Milan library, and which is certainly not later than the end of the second century; and the ancient Syriac version of the New Testament, the Peschito, having a like antiquity. In both these monuments the Gospel of John is found in its proper place. Nor should we omit to mention here Polycrates, the bishop of Ephesus, who, as we have said, represented the Asia Minor churches in the controversy concerning the celebration of Easter in the year 196, and in his letter to Victor the Roman bishop, alludes to John, who, he says, "leaned upon the Lord's breast," ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ στήθος τοῦ κυρίου ἀναπεσών.¹ Even Hilgenfeld, one of the most forward of the Tübingen critics, does not longer deny that the expression is drawn by Polycrates from John xiii. 25 (xxi. 20). It proves the acceptance of John's Gospel by the Christians of Asia Minor.

he says of the former (III. 3. 4): "qui vir multo majoris auctoritatis et fidelior veritatis est testis, quam Valentinus et Marcion et reliqui, qui sunt perversae sententiae." The curious attempt to show that there could not be more or fewer than four authoritative Gospels is in Lib. III. 11. 8.

¹ Euseb., Lib. V. c. 24.

Looking about among the fragments of Christian literature that have come down to us from the second half of the second century, we meet with Tatian, supposed to have been a pupil of Justin Martyr, though after the master's death the disciple swerved from his teaching. It is now conceded by Baur and Zeller that in his apologetic treatise, the *Oratio ad Graecos*, composed not far from the year 170, he quotes repeatedly from the Gospel of John.¹ There is also no reason to doubt that his work entitled *Diatesseron* — a sort of exegetical Harmony — was composed upon the basis of our four Gospels. Eusebius says that Tatian “having formed a certain body and collection of Gospels, I know not how, has given this the title *Diatesseron*, that is, the Gospel by the four, or the Gospel formed of the four, which is in the possession of some even now.” Precisely how the work was constructed from the four Gospels, Eusebius appears not to have known. He testifies, however, to the fact of its being in the hands of catholic Christians. At the beginning of the fifth century Theodoret tells us that he had found two hundred copies of Tatian's work in circulation, and had taken them away, substituting for them the four Gospels.³ A Syriac translation of this work began, according to a later Syrian writer, Bar Salibi, with the opening words of the Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the word.” To this Syriac edition, Ephraem Syrus, who died in 378, wrote a commentary, as Syriac writers inform us; and this translation must therefore have been early made. The attempt of Credner to invalidate this evidence on the ground that the Syrians confounded Tatian with Ammonius, the author of a Harmony in the early part of the third century, is overthrown by the fact that Bar Salibi distinguishes the two authors and their works.⁴ Considering all the evidence in the case,

¹ The following are examples,—*Oratio*, c. 13: *καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄρα τὸ εἰσημένον· ἡ σκοτία τὸ φῶς οὐ καταλαμβάνει.* c. 19: *πάντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐδε ἓν.* c. 5: *ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχῇ γεννηθεῖς.* See Bleek, s. 229.

² *Lib. IV.* c. 29.

³ Theodoret *Haeret.*, fab. 1. 20, as cited by Bleek, s. 230.

⁴ See Meyer's *Einl.* s. 9. Lardner, Vol. II. p. 445. Bleek, s. 230.

together with the fact that Tatian is known to have quoted the Gospel of John in his *Oratio*, there is no room for doubting that this Gospel was one of the four at the foundation of the *Diatesseron*. Contemporary with Tatian was Theophilus, who became bishop of Antioch in 169. In his work *Ad Autolyicum*, he describes John's Gospel as a part of the Holy scriptures, and John himself as a writer guided by the Holy Spirit.¹ This explicit statement is a most weighty item of evidence. In addition to this, Jerome states that Theophilus composed a commentary upon the Gospels, in which he handled their contents synoptically: "*quatuor evangelistarum in unum opus dicta compingens.*"² There is no good reason for questioning the statement of Jerome respecting a work with which he appears to have been himself acquainted. A contemporary of Theophilus is Athenagoras. His acquaintance with the Prologue of John's Gospel may be inferred with a high degree of probability from his frequent designation of Christ as the Word. Besides this, he has the following passage, which is obviously founded on John x. 30: "The Father and Son being one; and the Son being in the Father, and the Father in the Son." Another contemporary of Theophilus, Apollinaris, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, in the fragments found in the *Paschal Chronicle*, makes a reference to the pouring out of water and blood from the side of Jesus (John xix. 34), and in another passage clearly implies the existence and authority of the fourth Gospel.³ The Epistle of the churches of Vienne and Lyons, written in 177, and presenting an account of the sufferings of their martyrs in their great persecution under Marcus Aurelius, an epistle from which Eusebius gives copious extracts, contains a clear reference to John xvi. 2, in the passage where they say: "Then was

¹ Ὅθεν διδάσκουσιν ἡμῶς αἱ ἅγαι γραφαὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ πνευματοφόροι, ἐξ ὧν Ἰωάννης λέγει· ἐν ἀρχῇ, κ. τ. λ. See Bleek, s. 231.

² Hieron. de viris ill. 25 and Ep. 151. Bleek, s. 230.

³ See Meyer's *Einl.*, s. 9. There appears to be no sufficient reason for questioning the genuineness of these fragments, as is done by Lardner (*Vol. II. p. 315*), and Neander (*Church Hist.*, *Vol. I. p. 298, N. 2*). See Schneider, s. 52.

fulfilled that which was spoken by the Lord, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service." The same epistle, applying the thought of 1 John iii. 16, praises the love of one of their martyrs who "was willing in defense of the brethren to lay down his own life."¹ But every testimony to the first epistle is, for reasons to which we shall advert hereafter, virtually a testimony for the Gospel.

We go back now to the first half of the second century, and among the remnants of early Christian literature which remain, where so much has irrecoverably perished, the writer who is most entitled to consideration is Justin Martyr. He was born about the year 89, and his life extended at least ten years beyond the middle of the next century. A native of Flavia Neapolis, near the ancient Sichem, he had visited various countries, having been at Alexandria and Ephesus before he came to Rome. He had, therefore, an extensive acquaintance with the church. It is well known that Justin in different places refers to works which are styled by him the Records or Memoirs by the Apostles and their Followers or Companions.² He quotes from these as the authentic and recognized sources of knowledge respecting the Saviour's life and teaching. He further states that they are read on Sundays in the Christian assemblies, where "all who live in cities or in country districts" meet together for worship. They are read, he says, in connection with the writings of the Old Testament prophets; and when the reader concludes, the people are instructed and exhorted "to the imitation of these excellent things."³ The evangelical histories which he has in mind, then, were used in the public worship of Christians everywhere. What were these Records or Memoirs? This title, we may observe, was probably given to the gospel histories, partly for the reason

¹ Euseb., Lib. V. c. 1.

² τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων. Apol. I. 67. ἀπομνημονεύμασι, ἃ φημι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις παρακολουθησάντων συντεταχθῆναι. C. Tryph., c. 103.

³ Apol. I. 67.

that in Justin's view they bore a character analogous to Xenophon's *Memorabilia* of Socrates, and also because it was a designation intelligible to those for whose benefit he was writing. Of the direct citations from these gospel Memoirs in Justin, and of the numerous allusions to sayings of Christ and events in his life, nearly all plainly correspond to passages in our canonical Gospels. That the quotations are inexact as to phraseology, is not a peculiarity of Justin. He probably quotes from memory; and for his purpose it was not requisite that he should be verbally accurate.

Before we proceed to speak of his use of John in particular, we will advert to the question which has been warmly discussed, whether he quotes from *other* gospel histories than those in our canon. Considering that the cases of an allusion to sayings or transactions not recorded in the canonical gospels, are so very few, and that of these only one is explicitly referred by Justin to the Memoirs — a reference which may easily have sprung from a lapse of memory — it is not impossible that the source of his knowledge in these exceptional cases was oral tradition. Living so near the time of the apostles, when, as we know, some unrecorded sayings of Christ and circumstances in his life were orally reported from one to another, this supposition is by no means unnatural. Yet as written narratives, besides the four of our canon, were extant, and had a local circulation — especially the Gospel of the Hebrews among the Ebionite Christians — Justin may very likely have been acquainted with one or more of these, and thence derived the exceptional passages which we are considering. That either of these, however, was generally read in the churches (as were the Memoirs of which Justin speaks) is extremely improbable; for how could any Gospel which had been thus made familiar and dear to a multitude of Christians by being read in their assemblies, be suddenly thrown out and discarded without an audible word of opposition? How can such an hypothesis stand in view of the fact that by the time Justin died Irenaeus had already reached his manhood? It is

clearly established that Justin had mainly, if not exclusively, in view the same Gospels which we read in our Bibles, although, as we have said, he may have been acquainted with other less trustworthy narratives of the life of Christ.¹

The evidence that the fourth Gospel formed one of Justin's authoritative Records or Memoirs cannot be gainsaid. In a long list of passages collected from Justin by Semisch and other writers, there is a marked resemblance in language and thought to places in the fourth Gospel.² In regard to many of these, to be sure, we are not absolutely obliged to trace them to this source. They may have been derived from unwritten tradition. But we are authorized to find the origin of this class of expressions in John, when we have assured ourselves, from other passages which admit of no doubt, that Justin made use of the fourth Gospel. And from this conviction there is no escape. We mention here only one, but perhaps the most obvious and striking, of the special quotations which Justin has drawn from this Gospel. Having described with some detail the method of Christian baptism, Justin adds: "For indeed Christ also said: 'except ye be born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.' And that it is impossible for those who are once born to enter into their mother's womb, is plain to all." Here is a passage so peculiar, so characteristic of John's Gospel, that we are precluded from attributing it to any other source. Is it credible that Justin drew this passage from some other gospel, which suddenly perished and was supplanted by that bearing the name

¹ That by the ἀπομνημονεύματα Justin had in mind solely the four Gospels is earnestly maintained by Semisch, and by Professor Norton in his very able work on the Genuineness of the Gospels. Bleek holds that he had these mainly, if not exclusively, in view. Ewald, without any just reason, thinks that because the records are said to emanate from the apostles and their followers, he had reference to many such writings, which were in his hands. *Yahrh. d. Bibl. Wiss.*, VI. 60.

² The work of Semisch to which we refer — *Die Denkwürdigkeiten des Märtyrers Justinus* — is a thorough examination of the question: What Gospels were made use of by Justin?

of John? Writers of the Tübingen school have suggested that this, as well as other passages seeming to be from John, were taken by Justin from the Gospel of the Hebrews. Aside from the entire absence of proof in support of this assertion, all the information we have concerning the Gospel of the Hebrews warrants the declaration that it contained no such passages.

The Gospel of the Hebrews bore a great resemblance in its contents to our Gospel of Matthew. It was the product of a translation and mutilation of our Greek Matthew. There is much to be said in favor of the opinion, for which Bleek cogently argues, that the known fact of its resemblance to Matthew first gave rise to the impression that Matthew originally wrote his Gospel in the Hebrew tongue.¹

The fact of Justin's acquaintance with John's Gospel, however, does not rest solely upon the evidence afforded by the citation of isolated passages. In his doctrine of the Logos and of the Incarnation, and in the terms under which the person of the Saviour is characterized, are indubitable marks of a familiarity with John. This peculiar type of thought and expression pervades the whole theology of Justin. And what makes the argument fully convincing is

¹ The occurrence of this passage relative to regeneration, in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies, with the same deviations from John that are found in Justin's quotation, was made an argument to prove that both writers must have taken it from some other Gospel — the Gospel of the Hebrews. But the *additions* to the passage in the Homilies, and the omission of the part concerning the impossibility of a second physical birth, — points of difference between Justin and the Homilies, — are quite as marked as the points of resemblance, which may be an accidental coincidence. There are two or three other citations, however, in the Homilies which present the same deviations as are found in the corresponding citations in Justin. But Dressel's edition of the Homilies which gives the concluding portion, not found in Cotelierius, furnishes an undeniable quotation of John ix. 2, 3 (Hom. 19, 22). This makes it evident that Hom. 3, 52 is a citation of John x. 9, 27, and also removes all doubt as to the source whence the quotation of John iii. 3 was derived. If the similarity of the Homilies to Justin, in the few quotations referred to above, is not accidental, it simply proves that Justin was in the hands of their author. This may easily be supposed. The date of the Homilies is in the neighborhood of 170. See on these points, Meyer's *Einl.* s. 10. Bleek, s. 228. Semisch, s. 193 seq.

the circumstance that Justin expressly attributes this doctrine to the Records or Memoirs as the source whence he had derived it.¹ "For I have proved," he writes, "that he [Christ] was the only-begotten of the Father of all things, being properly begotten by him as his Word and Power, and was afterwards made man of the virgin, *as we have learnt from the Records.*" Are we to believe that this whole Johannean type of doctrine was found in some unknown Gospel, which in Justin's day was read in the Christian congregations in city and country, but was suddenly displaced by *another* Gospel having just the same doctrinal peculiarity; a change which if it took place at all, must have occurred in the later years of Justin's life, and in the youth of Irenaeus? And yet Irenaeus knew nothing of it, had no suspicion that the fourth Gospel had any author but John, or that the fixed and sacred number four was made up by so recent an intruder!

But we have testimonies to the genuineness of the fourth Gospel prior even to Justin. The first of these we have to mention is Papias, who flourished in the first quarter of the second century. He wrote a work in five books entitled "An Explication of the Oracles of the Lord," in the composition of which he depended mainly on unwritten traditions which he gathered up in conversation with those who had heard the apostles. Eusebius states that "he made use of testimonies from the First Epistle of John."² That this epistle and the fourth Gospel are from the same author, has been, it is true, called in question by the Tübingen critics. But if internal evidence *has any weight*, is ever entitled to any regard, it settles this question in agreement with the established, universal opinion. In style, in language, in tone and spirit, the two writings have the closest resemblance, and to ascribe this resemblance in either case to the imitation of a counterfeiter, is to give him credit for an incredible

¹ Semisch, s. 188. Justin, c. Trypho. 105.

² Euseb., III. 39.

refinement of cunning¹. So that the testimony of Papias to the First Epistle is likewise testimony to the genuineness of the Gospel. Turning to the Apostolic Fathers, we find not a few expressions, especially in the Ignatian Epistles, which remind us of passages peculiar to John; but in general we cannot be certain that these expressions were not drawn from oral tradition. Yet in some cases they are much more naturally attributed to the fourth Gospel, and in one instance this can hardly be avoided. Polycarp, in his epistle to the Philippians (7), says: "for every one who does not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is antichrist."² The resemblance of language to 1 John iv. 3 is striking; but a thought which in that form is so peculiar to this canonical epistle, being, as it were, the core of the type of doctrine which it presents, can hardly, when found in Polycarp, an immediate pupil of John, be referred to any other author.³ Another and still earlier testimony is attached to the fourth Gospel itself (John xxi. 24). This testimony which purports to come from another hand than that of the author, has been attached to the Gospel, as far as we are able to determine, from the time when it was first put in circulation. If it be not part and parcel of a flagrant imposition, it proves the work to have been written by the beloved disciple.

An important part of the external evidence for the genuineness of the fourth Gospel, is the tacit or express acknowledgment of the fact by the various heretical parties of the second century. Significant, in connection with this point, is the circumstance that the Artemonites, the party of Unitarians who came forward in Rome near the end of the second century, did not think of disputing the apostolical origin of that Gospel to which their opponents were indebted for their strongest weapons. Had the fourth Gospel

¹ On the certainty that the first Epistle was written by the author of the Gospel, see De Wette's *Einl. in das N. Testament*, § 177 a.

² πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα ἀντιχριστός ἐστι. *Ad. Phil.* 7.

³ Meyer's *Einl.* s. 5.

first been heard of within the lifetime of the old men then living in the Roman church, we should look for an attack from this Unitarian party, who did not lack ability, upon its authority. But no doubt of this kind was expressed. From the disputes which agitated the middle part of the century, however, the argument we have to present is mainly derived. If the fourth Gospel was acknowledged to be the work of John by Marcion, the Valentinian Gnostics as well as their opponents, and at the epoch of the Montanistic controversy, the most sceptical must give up the attempt to bring down into the second or third quarter of the second century the date of its authorship.

We begin with Marcion. Marcion was a native of Pontus, and came to Rome about the year 130. In his enthusiastic and one-sided attachment to Paul's doctrine, he exaggerated the contrast of law and gospel into an absolute repugnance and contrariety, rejected the Old Testament, regarding the God of the Old Testament as an inferior Divinity, hostile to the Supreme Being, and consequently was led to make up a canon of New Testament writings to suit himself. His Gospel, as the church Fathers testify, was a mutilated copy of Luke, so altered as to answer to his peculiar tenets. The priority of our Luke to Marcion's Gospel is now generally allowed, even by the Tübingen critics who had previously taken the opposite ground. There is, indeed, no room for doubt in reference to this fact. Not only is Marcion known to have altered the Pauline Epistles to conform them to his opinions, but the fragments of his Gospel which have been preserved, are plainly the product of an alteration of corresponding passages in our third Gospel. But our present inquiry relates to John. Was Marcion acquainted with the fourth Gospel? The negative has been stoutly maintained by the school of Baur, in opposition, however, to decided proof. We learn from Tertullian that Marcion rejected John's Gospel — a fact which implies its existence and general reception; and Tertullian explains his motive in this procedure. Tertullian says:

"But Marcion having got the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians, who blames the apostles themselves, as not walking uprightly, according to the truth of the gospel, and also charges some false apostles with perverting the gospel of Christ, *sets himself to weaken the credit of those Gospels which are theirs*, and are published under the name of apostles, or likewise of apostolical men."¹ That is to say, conceiving, like the modern school of Baur, that there was a hostility between Peter, James, and John on the one hand, and Paul on the other, and making himself a partisan of Paul, he rejected everything that came from them. Tertullian makes it clear that by "the Gospels published under the name of apostles or likewise of apostolical men," he intends the four of our canon.² Hence the Gospels which he says were rejected by Marcion must be Matthew, Mark, and John. Again, Tertullian, speaking of the adoption by Marcion of Luke's Gospel alone, says: "Now, since it is known that these (Matthew, Mark, and John) have also (as well as Luke) been in the churches, why has Marcion not laid hands on these also, to be corrected if they were corrupt, or received if incorrupt."³ Tertullian would convict Marcion of an inconsistency in laying aside the other Gospels,⁴ not pretending to purge them of fancied corruptions, and yet not receiving them. Once more, in regard to a certain opinion of Marcion, Tertullian says, addressing Marcion, that if he did not *reject some* and *corrupt* others of the scriptures which contradict his opinion, the Gospel of John would convict

¹ Sed enim Marcion nactus epistolam Pauli ad Galatas, etiam ipsos apostolos suggillantibus ut non recto pede incedentes ad veritatem evangelii, simul et accusantibus pseudapostolos quosdam pervertentes evangelium Christi, connititur ad destruendum statum eorum evangeliorum quæ propria et sub apostolorum nomine eduntur, vel etiam apostolicorum, ut scilicet fidem, quam illis adimit, suo conferat. Adv. Marcion, Lib. IV. c. iii.

² Adv. Marcion, Lib. IV. c. ii. "Denique nobis fidem ex apostolis Ioannes et Matthæus insinuant, ex apostolicis Lucas et Marcus instaurant," etc.

³ Adv. Marcion, Lib. IV. c. v. Igitur dum constet hæc quoque apud ecclesias fuisse, cur non hæc quoque Marcion attigit aut emendanda, si adulterata, aut agnoscenda, si integra?" etc.

⁴ "Quod omissis eis Lucae potius institerit." *Ibid.*

him of error.¹ The correctness of Tertullian in these statements has been impeached, but he had taken pains to inform himself concerning the life and opinions of Marcion, and there is no good ground for charging him here with error. His accuracy is confirmed by the explanation he gives of the origin of Marcion's hostility to the apostles, as proceeding from his wrong view of the passage in Galatians. We must conclude, therefore, that when Marcion brought forward his doctrine, the fourth Gospel was extant, the acknowledged work of John.

The general reception of John as an apostolic work preceded the Valentinian Gnosticism. Valentinus, the author of the most vast and complete of all the fabrics of Gnostic speculation, came to Rome about the year 140. That the Gospel of John was admitted to be genuine, and used as such, by his party, is well known. Irenaeus speaks of the Valentinians as making the most abundant use of John's Gospel: *eo quod est secundum Johannem plenissime utentes*.² Heracleon, one of the followers of Valentinus, wrote a commentary upon John's Gospel, from which Origen in his work upon John frequently quotes.³ Ptolemaeus, another follower, expressly designates the Prologue of John as the work of the apostle, and puts his own forced explanation upon its contents. The precise date of Heracleon and Ptolemaeus we cannot determine, but they must have written not far from the middle of the century. But did Valentinus himself know and acknowledge the fourth Gospel as the work of John? This we might infer with great probability from its acceptance by Heracleon and his other followers. We should draw the same conclusion from the silence of Irenaeus as to any rejection of John's Gospel by Valentinus, and from his statement as to the use of it by the school in

¹ "Si scripturas opinioni tuae resistentes non de industria alias reiecisses, alias corrupisses, confudisset te in hac specie evangelium Ioannis," etc. *De Carne Christi*, III.

² *Adv. Haer.*, III. 11. 7.

³ The passages in Heracleon referred to by Origen are collected in Grabe's, *Spicilegium*.

general. Moreover Tertullian contrasts Valentinus and Marcion in this very particular, that whereas the latter rejected the scriptures, the former built up his system upon perverse interpretation. Valentinus, he says, did not adjust the scriptures to his material — his doctrine — but his material to the scriptures.¹ Marcion made havoc of the scriptures; Valentinus *autem pepercit*. And Tertullian says, directly that, Valentinus appears to make use of the whole instrument," i.e. canonical Gospels. Here the word "appears," does not indicate any doubt in Tertullian's mind upon the point in question. This will be evident when we quote his entire sentence: "for if Valentinus appears to make use of the entire instrument (i.e. our scriptures), he put his hands upon the truth with a not less artful spirit than Marcion."² The *videtur* is either the concession of an adversary, Tertullian not being able to charge him with an actual rejection of any of the Gospels, however tempted to bring such a charge by polemical feeling; or it signifies a pretence on the part of Valentinus, — an ostensible use, while in fact he explained away their real contents. But aside from this evidence, we are furnished with direct proof of the fact that Valentinus used and acknowledged the Gospel of John, through the lately found work of Hippolytus. Hippolytus wrote the "Refutation of all Heresies" in the earlier part of the third century. He devotes considerable space to the systems of Valentinus and the Valentinians, which he traces to the mathematical speculations of Pythagoras and Plato. In the course of his discussion, referring to Valentinus, he writes as follows: "All the prophets and the law spoke from the demiurg, a foolish god, he says — fools, knowing nothing. On this account it is, he (Valentinus) says, that the Saviour says: 'all that came before me

¹ "Valentinus autem pepercit, quoniam non ad materiam scripturas excogitavit auferens proprietates singulorum quoque verborum." De Praescript. Haeret., c. xxxviii.

² "Neque enim si Valentinus integro instrumento uti videtur, non callidior ingenio quam Marcion manus intulit veritati. De Praescript., c. xxxviii.

are thieves and robbers.' " ¹ The passage is obviously taken from John x. 8. The pretension of the Tübingen critics that the author here ascribes to the master what belongs to his pupils, is improbable; since Hippolytus, while coupling Valentinus and his followers together in cases where their tenets agree, knows how carefully to distinguish the different phases of belief in the schools. The peculiarities of the Italian Valentinians, Heracleon and Ptolemaeus, of the oriental Valentinians, Axionikus and Ardesianes, and the special opinions of other individuals of the party, are definitely characterized. We have in their disposition of this case a specimen of the method of reasoning adopted by Baur and his followers. Hippolytus, we are told, may have attributed to Valentinus what belongs only to his pupils. Granted, he may have done so. The supposition is possible. But what is the evidence that in this instance he did so? We are to assume that he is right until he is proved to be wrong. We are not arguing about what is possible or impossible; but we are discussing points where probable reasoning alone is applicable. So, these critics tell us it is *possible* that Polycarp quoted an anonymous sentence current at the time, which is also taken up into the first epistle bearing the name of John. It is *possible* that this or that writer drew his passage from some lost apochryphal work. The possibility we grant, for in these matters demonstration is of course precluded. But the suggestion of a mere possibility on the opposite side against a presumptive, natural, and probable inference, deserves no better name than a subterfuge.

When we look at the interior structure of the system of Valentinus, we find that the characteristic terms employed by John are wrought into it, some of them being attached as names to the aeons which, in a long series of pairs, constitute the celestial hierarchy. Among these pairs are such as *μονογενής* and *ἀλήθεια*, *λόγος* and *ζωή*. The artificial and fantastic scheme of Valentinus, so in contrast with the

¹ Hippolytus (Dunker and Schneidewin's ed.), Lib. VI. 35.

simplicity of John, wears the character of a copy and caricature of the latter. That it has this relation to John we cannot, to be sure, demonstrate; for it may be contended that both the Gnostic and the author of the fourth Gospel took up current terms and conceptions, each writer applying them to suit his own purpose. But the freshness and apparent originality of John's use of this language, not to speak of the other proofs in the case, are decidedly against this theory of Baur. When we bring together all the items of evidence which bear on the point, we feel warranted to conclude with confidence that not only Ptolemaeus and the other disciples of Valentinus, but also their master, alike with his opponents, acknowledge the apostolic authorship of the fourth Gospel.¹ Through Hippolytus, we are provided with another most important witness in the person of Basilides, the other prominent Gnostic leader, who taught at Alexandria in the second quarter of the second century. Among the proof-texts which Hippolytus states that Basilides employed, are John i. 9: "This was the true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world;" and John ii. 4: "My hour is not yet come."² In the passage in Hippolytus containing these quotations ascribed to Basilides, and in the closest connection with them, stand his essential principles and characteristic expressions; so that the suggestion of a confounding of master and pupils on the part of Hippolytus has not the shadow of a support.

We have to touch upon one other movement in the second century, the controversies connected with Montanism. The main features of Montanism were the Chiliasm, or expectation of the Saviour's millennial reign and speedy advent, and the prophecy or ecstatic inspiration. In the millennial doctrine, as well as in the belief in the continued miraculous gifts of the Spirit, there is a striking resemblance between the Montanists and the followers of Edward Irving. We cannot say how far Montanism professed to found itself on John's Gospel, because we know not pre-

¹ See Schneider, S. 35.

² Hippol., Lib. VII. 22, 27.

cisely when in the development of the sect the claim to the presence of the Paraclete, in this form, was set up. We allude to Montanism, therefore, to speak of a certain party that opposed it. Irenaeus speaks of some who, in their opposition to the recent effusions of the Divine Spirit upon men, do not accept of the Gospel of John, "in which the Lord promised that he would send the Paraclete, but at the same time reject both the Gospel and the prophetic Spirit."¹ Shortly before he had spoken of some who would fain exhibit themselves in the character of searchers for truth, possibly referring to this same class. Epiphanius describes a class of zealous opponents of Montanism, who were probably the same mentioned by Irenaeus. Epiphanius styles them Alogi, as opposing the Logos Gospel. They maintained that the Gospel of John did not agree with the other three Gospels, in regard to various points in the life of Christ, — as in the omission of the forty days temptation, and in the number of passovers he is said to have kept.² Their opposition, however, is really an argument for the genuineness of John. It shows the general acknowledgment of this Gospel at the time when they made their opposition, which was not long after the middle of the second century. It proves that their opponents, the Montanists, and the church generally, received it. Moreover, their groundless ascription of the Gospel to Cerinthus is a valuable testimony from them to its age; for Cerinthus was a contemporary of John. Baur's unfounded praise of the critical spirit of this insignificant party, is strange, considering that they also rejected the Apocalypse, which he holds to be the genuine work of John. It seems probable that the Alogi were led by their strong hostility to the Montanistic enthusiasm to dislike the fourth Gospel when Montanism claimed to find a warrant for itself in the promise of the Spirit, and on this doctrinal ground, making use also of the apparent historical differ-

¹ Irenaeus, Lib. III. 11. 9.

² For a full explication of the character of the Alogi as they are described by Epiphanius and Irenaeus, see Schneider, s. 38 et seq.

ences between the fourth Gospel and the other three, they rejected it. Precisely what was the nature and reason of their opposition to the doctrine of the Logos we know not; but their feeling on this subject accords with their rationalistic turn of mind. The circumstances of their opposition, as we see, are a strong indirect argument for the antiquity and genuineness of the Gospel they rejected.¹

Thus far we have dealt, for the most part, with those isolated passages of the early writers wherein the existence and authoritative standing of John's Gospel are presupposed. Not all these separate items of evidence are of equal strength. Together they constitute an irrefragable argument. And yet the main, most convincing argument for the genuineness of this Gospel is drawn from the moral impossibility of discrediting, in such a case, the tradition of the early church. Let us consider for a moment the character of this argument.

We begin with observing that, on matters of fact in which men are interested, and to which, therefore, their attention is drawn, and in regard to which there are no causes strongly operating to blind the judgment, the evidence of tradition is, within reasonable limits of time, conclusive. An indi-

¹ We are also entitled to cite Celsus as a witness to the fourth Gospel. The date of Celsus is about the middle of the second century. He professed to derive his statements concerning the evangelical history from the writings of the disciples of Christ. The great body of his statements are plainly founded on passages in our canonical Gospels, especially in Matthew. But Celsus speaks of Christ being called by his disciples the Word. He speaks of the blood which flowed from the body of Jesus, — a circumstance peculiar to John's narrative. He also says: "To the sepulchre of Jesus there came two angels, as is said by some, or, as by others, one only." Matthew and Mark mention one only, Luke and John two. Again, Celsus gives the Christian narrative of the Resurrection as containing the fact that Christ, "after he was dead, arose, and showed the marks of his punishment, and how his hands had been pierced." This circumstance is recorded only in John xx. 27. It is indeed "possible," as Meyer suggests, that Celsus found these things in apocryphal gospels, but the probability is the other way. Meyer should not have so lightly valued the testimony afforded by Celsus. These passages from Origen against Celsus, may be found in Lardner, Vol. II. p. 220 and p. 239. To the testimony of the Clementine Homilies, we have before adverted.

vidual may perpetuate his testimony through the instrumentality of one who long survives him. The testimony of a generation may in like manner be transmitted to, and through, the generation that comes after. Next to the testimony of one's own senses is the testimony of another person whom we know to be trustworthy. And where, instead of one individual handing over his knowledge to a single successor, there is a multitude holding this relation to an equal or greater number after them, the force of this kind of evidence is proportionably augmented. Moreover, the several generations do not pass away, like the successive platoons of a marching army, but the young and the old, the youth and octogenarian are found together in every community; so that upon any transaction of public importance that has occurred during a long period in the past, witnesses are always at hand who can either speak from personal knowledge or from testimony directly given them by individuals with whom they were in early life familiar.

Few persons who have not specially attended to the subject, are aware how long a period is sometimes covered by a very few links of traditional testimony. Lord Campbell, in his *Lives of the Chancellors*, remarks of himself, that he had seen a person who had seen a spectator of the execution of Charles I., in 1649. A single link separated Lord Campbell from the eyewitness of an event occurring upwards of two hundred years before. Suppose this intervening witness to be known by Lord Campbell to be a discriminating and trustworthy person, and we have testimony that is fully credible. A neighbor of our own,¹ the most honored among the scientific men of the country, recalls the last years of a grandparent who in her turn remembered her own grandparent, who was the daughter of John Alden of Plymouth, an emigrant in the *Mayflower*. In this instance, the memories of three persons "reach back more than two hundred years, to the active life of the Pilgrims." Every man of seventy who can unite his memory

¹ Professor Silliman.

with the memories of the individuals who had attained the same age when he was young, can go back through a period of more than a hundred years. He can state what was recollected fifty years ago concerning events that took place a half century before. If in reference to a particular fact, we fix the earliest age of trustworthy recollection at fifteen, and suppose each of those, whose memories are thus united, to give their report at the age of eighty, there is covered a period of one hundred and thirty years. We can easily think of cases where from the character of both the witnesses the evidence thus derived would be entirely conclusive.

But traditionary evidence had a special security and a special strength in the case of the early Christian church. The church, as Mayer forcibly observes, had a physical and spiritual continuity of life. 'There was a close connection of its members one with another. "Like a stream of water, such a stream of youths, adults, and old men is an unbroken whole." The church was a community — an association. A body of this kind, says Mayer, recognizes that which is new as new. It is protected from imposition. How would it be possible, he inquires, for a new Augsburg Confession to be palmed upon the Lutheran churches as a document that had long been generally accepted?

In estimating the force of this reasoning we must take notice of the number of the early Christians. We must remember that at the close of the first century Christianity was planted in all the principal cities of the Roman Empire. It was in the great cities and centres of intercourse, as Jerusalem, Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Alexandria, Rome, that Christianity was earliest established. As early as Nero's persecution (A.D. 64) the Christians who were condemned, constituted, according to Tacitus, a "great multitude." In Asia Minor, in the time of Trajan, or at the close of the century, they had become so numerous that, according to Pliny, the heathen temples were almost deserted. A century later, making due allowance for the rhetorical exaggeration of Tertullian, and not depending on him alone, we

are certain that the number of the Christians had vastly multiplied. In every part of the Roman Empire, in all places of consideration, and even in rural districts, Christian assemblies regularly met for worship. And in all these weekly meetings, the writings of the apostles were publicly read, as we learn from so early a writer as Justin Martyr.

Now we have to look at the Christian churches in the second century, and ask if it was possible for a history of Christ, falsely pretending to be from the pen of the apostle John, to be brought forward twenty, thirty, or forty years after his death, be introduced into all the churches east and west, taking its place everywhere in the public services of Sunday? Was there no one to ask where this new Gospel came from, and where it had lain concealed? Was there no one of the many who had personally known John to expose the gigantic imposture, or even to raise a note of surprise at the unexpected appearance of so important a document of which they had never heard before? How was the populous church at Ephesus brought to accept this work on the very spot where John had lived and died?

The difficulty, nay the moral impossibility, of supposing that this Gospel first saw the light in 160 or 140 or 120, or at any of the dates which are assigned by the Tübingen critics, will be rendered apparent, if we candidly look at the subject. We have spoken of Irenaeus and of his testimony to the undisputed, undoubting reception, by all the churches, of the fourth Gospel. If this Gospel first appeared as late or later than 120, how does it happen that he had not learned the fact from the aged presbyters whom he had known in Asia Minor? Irenaeus, before becoming bishop, was the colleague of Pothinus at Lyons, who perished as a martyr, having, as the letter of his church states, passed his ninetieth year. Here was a man whose active life extended back wellnigh to the very beginning of the century, who was born before John died. Supposing John's Gospel to have appeared as late as 120, the earliest date admitted by

any part of the sceptical school, Pothinus was then upwards of thirty years old. Did this man, who loved Christianity so well that he submitted to torture and death for its sake, never think to mention to Irenaeus an event of so great consequence as was this late discovery of a Life of the Lord from the pen of his most beloved disciple, and of its reception by the churches? Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, at the time of his controversy with Victor, describes himself as being "sixty five years of age in the Lord," as having "conferred with the brethren throughout the world, and studied the whole of the sacred scriptures;" as being also of a family, seven of whose members had held at Ephesus the office of bishop or presbyter. According to his statement, his own life began as early at least as the year 125, while through his family he was directly connected with the contemporaries of John. How is it that Polycrates appears to have known nothing about this late appearance of the wonderful Gospel which bore the name of John, but was the work of a great unknown? How is it that the family of Polycrates either knew nothing of so startling an event, or if they knew anything of it preserved an absolute silence? Clement of Alexandria had sat at the feet of venerable teachers in different countries, of whom he says that they "have lived by the blessing of God to our time, to lodge in our minds the seeds of the ancient and apostolic doctrine." From none of these had he derived any information of that event, so remarkable, if we suppose it to have occurred — the sudden discovery of a gospel history by the Apostle John, of which the Christian world had not before heard. Justin says that in the churches there are many men and women of sixty and seventy years of age, who have been Christians from their youth; and he is speaking only of the unmarried class.¹

So at every preceding and subsequent moment in the first half of the second century, there were many old persons in every larger church whose memory went back far into the apostolic age. Now if the statement of Irenaeus and

¹ Apol. I. 15.

his contemporaries as to the composition of the fourth Gospel by the Apostle John was false, and this work in reality saw the light not till long after his death, when some forger offered it for acceptance, how is it possible that there should be none either to investigate its origin when it first appeared, and none afterwards to correct the prevalent opinion concerning it?

There is no way for the sceptical critic to meet this positive argument, founded on the unanimous voice of tradition, and this negative argument *ab silentio* in refutation of his theory, unless he can prove that the Christians of the second century were so indifferent as to the origin of their scriptures that they received whatever might offer itself to their acceptance, provided the contents were agreeable to their doctrines and prepossessions. If there were few or none who were either inquisitive or competent to judge of the real claims of a book that professed to be an authentic and apostolic history of Christ, then an imposture of this magnitude might be successful, provided a person were found shrewd and unscrupulous enough to undertake it. But how stands the fact? The greater portion of the early Christians were undoubtedly from the poorer class. Even these must have been deeply interested in obtaining authentic accounts of that Master for whom they were offering up life itself. But they had among them trained, inquisitive scholars — men educated in the schools of philosophy. Justin Martyr and the Greek Apologists are not liable to the charge of illiteracy. It was a time when Christianity had to answer for itself, as well in treatises addressed to the public magistrate as before the civil tribunals. It is, moreover, a noteworthy fact that the writers bring to the scriptures the test of historical inquiry. They do not ask what book is doctrinally acceptable, but what book bears the stamp of an apostolic approval. Clement may bring forward a statement from an apocryphal Gospel of the Egyptians, but he is careful to warn the reader that it is not contained in the four Gospels which “have been

handed down to us." Irenaeus and Tertullian insist only upon the historical evidence that the canonical scriptures are apostolic. Nothing but authentic tradition is of any weight with them on the question. All the knowledge we have relative to the formation of the New Testament canon goes to disprove the imputation of carelessness or incompetency brought against the Christians of the second century. There is proof that the four Gospels of our canon were distinguished, as having pre-eminent authority, from all other evangelical histories in the early part of the second century. All other narratives of the life of Christ, including those of the many writers of whom Luke speaks in the introduction to his Gospel, as well as those of subsequent authors, were discarded, and, if used at all, were explicitly treated as not endued with authority. Four, and only the four, in the time of Irenaeus and Tertullian, were regarded as apostolic and canonical. Lechler¹ mentions an example from Eusebius illustrating the feeling of church teachers at that time. Serapion, who was bishop of Antioch about 190, found in circulation at Rhosse (Orossus), a town of Cilicia, an apocryphal gospel called the Gospel of Peter. He says in regard to it: "We, brethren, receive Peter and the other apostles as Christ himself. But those writings which falsely go under their name, as we are well acquainted with them, we reject, and know also *that we have not received such handed down to us.*" This is one expression; but it falls in with the whole current of the evidence in relation to the temper of Irenaeus and his contemporaries.

Having thus surveyed the external proofs of the genuineness of John, we pass to consider the

INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

1. The fourth Gospel claims to be the work of the Apostle John; and the manner of this claim is a testimony to its truth. The author explicitly declares himself an eyewitness

¹ Studien u. Krit. 1856. 4. s. 871.

of the transactions recorded by him (i. 14. compared with 1 John i. 4, 14; John xix. 35; compare also xxi. 24). In the course of his narrative, one of the disciples, instead of being referred to by name, is characterized as that "disciple whom Jesus loved" (xiii. 23; xviii. 15; xix. 26; xx. 2 seq; xxi. 7). In the appendix to the Gospel (xxi. 24; compare v. 20) this disciple is declared to be its author. And we cannot well explain this circumlocution, except on the supposition that the author resorts to it in order to avoid the mention of his own name. Now, who of the disciples most intimate with Jesus is referred to under this description? Not Peter; for Peter is not only repeatedly spoken of by his own name, but is expressly distinguished from the disciple in question (xiii. 24; xx. 2 seq.; xxi. 7; 20 seq.). Not James; for besides the proof derived from the universal supposition of the ancient church, that James was not the person denoted, we know that he was put to death early in the apostolic age, while we learn from John xxi. 23, which is otherwise confirmed, that the disciple in question must have reached an advanced age. If it be granted that the author, whoever he may have been, was one of the original disciples, James is excluded, because the Gospel was evidently written later than his death and out of Palestine. But if the disciple whom Jesus loved is not Peter or James, who can it be but John? That the author would represent himself to be John, is also strongly suggested by his omitting to attach to the name of John (the Baptist) the usual appellation *ὁ βαπτιστής*, especially when we observe that he is elsewhere careful, as in the case of Peter and of Judas, to designate precisely the person meant. Supposing the writer to be himself John the *Evangelist*, and moreover to have stood, as a disciple, in an intimate relation with the Baptist, we have a double reason for his omitting in the case of the latter this usual title. The connection of the beloved disciple with Peter (xx. 2 seq.; xxi. 7; and also xviii. 15 seq., where the *ἄλλος μαθητής* is none other than the beloved disciple) is another argument tending to show that John is meant; since we

find afterwards, in the Acts, that John and Peter are closely associated.

Indeed, it is held by Baur that the design is to lead the reader to the inference that John is the author. Now, if we suppose that this inference is the simple fact, we have in the modest suppression of his name by John the manifestation of a certain delicacy of feeling, which is consonant with the spirit of the work. It would be connected with its real author by those to whom he gave it, without any proclamation on his part of his relation to it; as in truth it was ascribed to John from the outset. On the contrary, supposing the Gospel not to be genuine, we are obliged to attribute to the author a refinement in fraud, an outlay of skill in deception, wholly inconsistent with the simplicity and pure tone of this Gospel, and not likely to exist in a literary forger. Judging from other known specimens of apocryphal literature, and from the intrinsic probabilities in the case, we should expect of such a fraudulent writer, that he would boldly and openly assume the name and apostolic authority of John, instead of leaving the authorship to be ascertained in the manner we have indicated, by a careful inspection and combination of passages. The indirect, modest way, then, in which the author discovers himself carries with it the unmistakable character of truth.

2. The truth of this claim of the fourth Gospel to have John for its author, is confirmed by the graphic character of the narrative, the many touches characteristic of an eyewitness, and by other indications of an immediate knowledge, on the part of the writer, of the things he relates.

In respect to these points, which mark the narrative as the product of an eyewitness and of one directly cognizant of the facts, none of the other Gospels can be compared with the fourth. We have not in mind here the general plan and outline of the history, which will be considered under another head, but rather the style in which the various incidents are presented. Of this pervading peculiarity of the fourth Gospel our readers will be reminded by a few

examples. As one instance, we may refer to John ii. 35 seq., where an account is given of the calling of the disciples: "again the next day after" — the day is thus definitely given — "John stood and two of his disciples; and looking upon Jesus as he walked," — here we have the position of both John and Jesus, — "he saith, 'Behold the Lamb of God!' And the two disciples heard him speak, and they followed Jesus. Then Jesus *turned and saw them following*, and saith," etc. In reply to their question, "'Where dwellest thou?' He saith unto them, 'Come and see.' They came and saw where he dwelt, and abode with him that day, *for it was about the tenth hour.*" Supposing the writer to have been one of these two disciples, speaking of an event that would be indelibly stamped upon his memory, this minuteness of description would be natural. If we have not an eyewitness, we have a subtle and painstaking deceiver. For another example of vivid recollection we may refer to John xiii. 21 seq., in the description of the last supper. We are told that Jesus was troubled in spirit, "and said, 'Verily, verily I say unto you that one of you shall betray me.' Then the disciples *looked one on another*, doubting of whom he spake." There is first an interval of silence, and looks of inquiry and fear cast from one to another; but who would venture to ask the question which of their number was to be faithless? "Now there was leaning on Jesus' bosom one of the disciples whom Jesus loved. Simon Peter therefore *beckoned to him*" — he signified his wish by a motion of the hand — "that he should ask who it should be of whom he spake. He then lying on Jesus' breast, saith unto him, 'Lord, who is it?'" Jesus replies that he will point out the individual by handing him the sop. This silent act, understood by John, was followed by the remark of Jesus to Judas: "'That thou doest, do quickly. Now no man at the table knew for what intent he spake this unto him.'" Some of them, we are told, thought that Judas was directed to buy those things that they 'had need of against the feast, or to give something to the poor.'

Who can avoid feeling that the writer is here presenting a scene that was pictured on his memory? How unnatural, as well as painful, is the supposition of a carefully contrived fiction! Another instance of particular recollection is found in John xviii. 15 seq., where, in connection with the account of the bringing of Christ before Caiaphas, we read: "And Simon Peter followed Jesus, and so did another disciple; that disciple *was known unto the high priest*, and went in with the Jews into the palace of the high priest. *But Peter stood at the door without.*" Peter had no such means of admission. "Then went out that other disciple which was known unto the high priest, and *spake unto her that kept the door*, and brought in Peter." There the inquiry of this door-keeper drew from Peter his first denial of a connection with Christ; and we read further: "The servants⁹ and officers stood there, *who had made a fire of coals; for it was cold*: and they warmed themselves, and Peter stood with them and warmed himself." The circumstance of there being a fire is mentioned by Luke, but in the manner of stating it in John, as well as in the preceding circumstances that are peculiar to him, we find the clearest signs of a personal recollection. The record of the inward conflict and vacillation of Pilate as displayed in his conduct (ch. xix), is characterized by the same features, which show it to be a vivid recollection of circumstances witnessed by the writer. So there is much in the narrative of the crucifixion having the same peculiarity. Thus we read (vs. 26, 27): "When Jesus therefore saw his mother, and the disciple standing by whom he loved, he saith unto his mother, 'Woman, behold thy son.' Then saith he to the disciple, 'Behold thy mother.' And from that hour that disciple took her to his own home." And again we read (vs. 34, 35): "One of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and forthwith came thereout blood and water. *And he that saw it bare record*, and his record is true; and he knoweth that he saith true, that ye might believe." Is this too a fiction, which the author sought to

commend to credence by a solemn asseveration, or is it a simple, faithful reminiscence?

What a lifelike description, and how true to the conceptions elsewhere gained of the respective characters, is the account of the running of Peter and John to the empty sepulchre. They "ran both together;" but the other disciple, outrunning Peter and arriving first at the sepulchre, pauses, and, *stooping down* to look in, sees "the linen clothes lying;" yet struck, perhaps, with a feeling of awe, enters not. "Then cometh Simon Peter following him;" but not sharing in the hesitation of his companion, with characteristic impetuosity, at once goes in, "and seeth the linen clothes lie, and *the napkin that was about his head not lying with the linen clothes*, but wrapped together in a place by itself. Then," encouraged by the example of his more forward associate, "went in also that *other disciple*, which came first to the sepulchre, and he saw and believed" (xx. 3-9). The same freshness and naturalness which belong to the record of outward events are found in the portrayal of mental experiences. We mention, as an example, the notice of the refusal of Thomas to believe without seeing, and of the reaction of his mind on being shown the print of the nails (John xx. 24-30); and the refusal of Peter to have his feet washed by the Master, followed by the request: "Not my feet only, but also my hands and my head" (John xiii. 9). The ninth chapter, which describes the healing of a man who had been blind from his birth, and the eleventh chapter containing the narrative of the raising of Lazarus, in their naturalness, vividness, and fulness of detail, cannot fail to impress the candid reader with the conviction that the writer was personally cognizant of the circumstances he relates. In how simple, unartificial a strain does the narrative, in each case, proceed! And in how lifelike a way are the circumstances linked together! Observe, in the first narrative, the exclamation of the neighbors on seeing the man's sight restored: "Is not this he that sat and begged?" the different voices: "some said, 'this is he;,' others said,

‘it is like him;’ but he said, ‘I am he;’” the evident perplexity of the Pharisees; the parents’ way of prudently evading a direct answer to their interrogatories by referring them to the man himself: “he is of age, ask him;” the *naïf* energy with which he confronted the Pharisees’ queries. In reading this passage of the fourth Gospel, it is difficult to resist the impression that the writer is stating, in a perfectly artless manner, circumstances that fell within his own immediate knowledge. Not less strongly is this impression made of the writer’s immediate knowledge, as well as fidelity, in reading the eleventh chapter. Notice, for example, this passage in the conversation of Jesus with his disciples before he started for Bethany: “after that he saith unto them, ‘Our friend Lazarus sleepeth; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep.’ Then said his disciples, ‘Lord, if he sleep, he shall do well.’ Howbeit Jesus spake of his death; but they thought that he had spoken of taking of rest in sleep. Then said Jesus unto them plainly, ‘Lazarus is dead.’” This conversation was surely remembered. What motive would lead one to invent such a conversation? Observe, also, the graphic minuteness of the following statements (vs. 28 seq.): Martha, who had gone out to meet Jesus, when she had spoken with him, “went her way and *called Mary her sister secretly*, saying, ‘the Master is come and calleth for thee.’ As soon as she heard that, she arose quickly and came unto him. Now Jesus was not yet come into the town, but was in that place where Martha met him. The Jews then which were with her in the house, when they saw Mary that she rose up hastily and went out, followed her, saying, ‘she goeth unto the grave to weep there.’” We must suppose here either an accurate knowledge on the part of the writer, or an elaborate and gratuitous skill in contriving falsehood. Who can follow this narrative through, and note the expressions of deep-felt human feeling,—including the reference, in a single word, to the tears of Jesus,—and not be struck with the obvious truthfulness of the writer? Or are there no marks by which sincerity and truth can be distinguished from fraud?

It were easy to multiply illustrations of that quality of the fourth Gospel upon which we are remarking. Indeed there is no chapter, and hardly ten consecutive verses, where this immediate acquaintance of the writer with the facts he narrates does not appear. When he refers to the testimony of John the Baptist, the language is: "This is the record of John;" "John bare record" (John i. 19, 31). He gives the *name* of the servant whose ear was cut off by Peter: "the servant's name was Malchus" (John xviii. 10). The place of events is defined chronologically; e.g. "*The day following* Jesus would go forth into Galilee" (i. 43); "*The third day* there was a marriage in Cana" (ii. 1); both these dates referring back to the call of Andrew and of the other disciple whose name is suppressed; "and they continued there [in Capernaum] not many days" (ii. 12); he "sat thus on the well, and it was about the sixth hour" (iv. 6); "after two days he departed thence [from Sichem], and went into Galilee." There is evidence that the author was acquainted with portions of the evangelical history which he does not record. Thus we read (iii. 24): "for John was not yet cast into prison"; but no account of his being imprisoned is afterwards given. An acquaintance with this fact is presupposed in the reader, as well as indicated in the writer.

We have no need to pursue the topic further. We find everywhere in this Gospel the air and manner of an eyewitness and participant in the scenes recorded.¹

3. The general structure and contents of the fourth Gospel, considered as a biography of Christ, are a convincing argument for its historical truth and genuineness. We

¹ Among the illustrations of the present topic referred to by De Wette (Einl. in das. N. T. § 104), and which we have not especially noticed, are John v. 10 seq. (the circumstances that followed the cure wrought at the pool of Bethesda; the questions put to the man who had been healed, by the Jews; his not knowing who it was that had healed him; his subsequent meeting with Jesus in the temple); vii. 1 seq. (the secret journey of Christ to the feast of Tabernacles, after the conversation with his unbelieving relatives); xii. The whole of chap. iv. (the interview of Christ with the woman of Samaria), is a striking example of vivid, detailed narration.

come now to the decisive point in the conflict between the advocates and the opponents of the genuineness of this Gospel. It is contended by the latter that the representation which is found in the fourth Gospel, both of the course of events in the life of Christ and of the character of his teachings, is not only "divergent from that of the other Gospels, but absolutely incompatible with it;" and that since these Gospels in this respect are right, the fourth cannot be the work of an apostle.

The difference between the fourth Gospel and the other three, in the particulars referred to, is in truth very palpable and very important. The impression made by the first three, or synoptical Gospels, regarded by themselves, is that Jesus after his baptism and temptation, repaired to Galilee, and remained there until shortly before his death, when he went up to Jerusalem to the passover. They record his teachings and miracles in Galilee and on this journey to Jerusalem, but say nothing of any intermediate visits to that city, and nothing of any prior labors there. From the synoptical gospels alone, the impression would be gathered that the period of his ministry was only a year. On the other hand, John distinctly mentions not less than two journeys of Jesus from Galilee to Jerusalem previous to the last (ii. 13; v. 1), and seems to justify the conclusion that in each of these visits he remained a considerable time either in the city or in its neighborhood. The duration of his ministry, according to the fourth Gospel, cannot be less than two years and a half, and may possibly exceed three years. Not less remarkable is the difference in the style of the Saviour's teaching in this Gospel, compared with the representations found in the other three. In the synoptical gospels, Christ utters either brief, sententious apothegms, or parables; while in the fourth Gospel we have extended dialogues and long discourses in quite a different vein. Other minor points of difference might be mentioned, but these which we have named are of chief importance.

Before we proceed to consider in detail the bearing of these peculiarities of John upon the main question before

us, we offer one preliminary remark. The more serious the difference between the contents of the synoptical gospels and of John, the greater is the difficulty to be met by the opponents of the genuineness of the latter. For how could a Gospel which so runs athwart the accepted views of the life and teaching of Christ, be brought forward and gain credence unless it were *known* to have the sanction of an apostle? The later the date assigned to the Gospel, the greater is the difficulty. What *motive* for a forger, fabricating his work long after the apostolic age, to depart from the traditional and certified conception of Christ's life and teaching? And supposing him to have a motive to do this, how could he succeed? These are questions to which the opponents of the genuineness of the Gospel find it impossible to give any satisfactory answer. Even if they were to show that the contrast between John and the synoptical histories amounts to an incompatibility, they only increase thereby the difficulty of solving the problem we have suggested. What inducement had a writer of the second century to deviate, without necessity, and to so extraordinary an extent, from the long prevalent and authorized view of the Saviour's life? And how was the church persuaded to accept this new version of his career? Such is the hard problem presented to the sceptical critic. On the contrary, if it can be made to appear, on a careful investigation, that in these very particulars which are made the ground of objection, the fourth Gospel unquestionably presents historical truth; that incidentally it supplements the other three just where they need explanation; and especially that this Gospel alone presents a consecutive and connected view of the life of Christ, we have gone far towards establishing its apostolic authorship. We have not only obviated the principal objection, we have also furnished a positive and convincing argument on the other side. Its historical peculiarities, so far from being a fatal objection against, will be seen to be a conclusive argument for, its genuineness. Only an apostle could have thrown this flood of light upon the course of events in the life of Christ. Only an apostle could

have brought to the support of his narrative an authority sufficient to obtain for it credence. We shall be obliged to notice with brevity the various considerations connected with the present topic.

1. The journeys of Christ to Jerusalem and his ministry there. For reasons which we cannot with certainty determine, the synoptical gospels confine themselves to the Galilean ministry. The question is: have we ground for concluding, independently of John, that Jesus had repeatedly visited that city and labored there? The synoptical gospels say nothing inconsistent with his having done so; they are simply silent upon the subject. It would certainly be more natural to suppose that Jesus who claimed to be the Messiah, even if his ministry had continued but a year, would during this time have gone up to Jerusalem, both as an act of compliance with the law and as a means of gaining access to such a multitude as the festivals brought together. It is not easy to account for the fanatical hatred of the Pharisees in Jerusalem towards him, if we suppose that he had never crossed their path, save in casual encounters with them away from Jerusalem in Galilee.

Various facts mentioned in the synoptical gospels seem to presuppose such previous labors on his part in the capital. Thus Joseph of Arimathea, a member of the Sanhedrim, is said, in the synoptical Gospels, to be a disciple of Jesus (Matt. xxvii. 57 seq.; Luke xxiii. 50 seq.; Mark xv. 42 seq.); but Joseph was a resident of Jerusalem, having, as we are told, a tomb there. There, it is probable, he became acquainted with Christ. Again, we learn from Luke (x. 38 seq.) that Jesus stood in such intimate relations with the family of Martha and Mary, as imply a previous stay in that neighborhood prior to this last visit. But we are happily furnished with a conclusive proof of the Saviour's repeated visits to Jerusalem, in the lamentation he uttered over the city as recorded by both Matthew and Luke (Luke xiii. 34 seq.; Matt. xxiii. 37 seq.): *Ἱερουσαλήμ, Ἱερουσαλήμ ποσάκις ἠθέλησα ἐπισυνάξαι τὰ τέκνα σου καὶ οὐκ ἠδεύησατε κ. τ. λ.*

Baur would make it out that the whole Jewish people are apostrophized under the term "Jerusalem," as the centre and home of the nation. This interpretation seems improbable, when we remember that, when the Saviour uttered these words, he was gazing upon the city. It is demonstrated to be false by the context in Luke. Immediately before, in the preceding verse, the Saviour said: "*for it cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem.*"

This passage proves, therefore, that Jesus had again and again preached at Jerusalem and labored to convert its inhabitants. The fourth Gospel is incidentally but convincingly sustained, in attributing a prolonged ministry to Christ and repeated labors at Jerusalem, by the synoptical gospels themselves. But suppose a writer in the second century to have set himself to the work of composing a fictitious gospel for the purpose of indirectly inculcating a dogmatic system of his own; how certain that he would have adhered to the traditional view of the course of the Saviour's ministry! By giving it a longer duration, and introducing visits to Jerusalem and labors there not mentioned by the received gospels, he would only invite suspicion and expose himself to detection. No advantage could be conceived to follow such a wide departure from the prevalent conception, which would not be immeasurably outweighed by the certain disadvantages and perils attending it. It must have been, then, from a regard to historical truth and from a knowledge of the facts, that the author of the fourth Gospel has so constructed his history. And this author, whoever he was, had an authority with Christians so great as to enable him to vary thus widely, without the imputation of error, from the prevalent tradition.

The more the general plan of the fourth Gospel is examined, the more is it seen to rest upon the solid foundation of historical verity. The progress of events in the life of Jesus, from the beginning onward to the final result, is clearly understood from this Gospel. We see how it came to pass that though "he came to his own, his own received him

not." The vacillation of the people, now turning in his favor, and now, as he disappointed their expectations, turning against him, together with the origin and growth of the implacable hostility of the Jewish leaders, are made entirely comprehensible.

And the fourth Gospel alone gives an adequate explanation of the way in which the catastrophe was brought on. We see how the consequences of the raising of Lazarus obliged the Pharisees to proceed at once to the most decisive measures against Jesus. It was this event, and the effect of it upon the minds of the people, that precipitated the result. In regard to this closing portion of Christ's life, we have in John the clue to the solution of what is left, in part, unsolved in the other gospels. A narrative is commended to credence by being thus consistent and intelligible. The same distinction, the same verisimilitude, belongs to the account of the Saviour's resurrection, a section of the history in which the synoptical gospels are especially fragmentary. In John we have a view, as clear and coherent as it is artless and natural, of the transactions that followed his reappearance from the tomb.

2. In considering the credibility of the fourth Gospel, as this question is affected by a comparison of its matter with the contents of the other three, we have to notice the difficulty and apparent discrepancy upon the date of the crucifixion, and also the paschal controversies of the second century, in their bearing upon this point of chronology.

It is well known to every student of the Gospels that there is difficulty in reconciling the statement of the first three, respecting the date of the last supper, and consequently respecting the date of the death of Christ, with the statement of John. All the evangelists agree as to the day of the week, that the supper was on Thursday evening, and the crucifixion on the next or Friday morning. The synoptical gospels, however, appear to place the last supper in the evening when the Jews ate the passover meal; i. e. on the evening of the 14th Nisan, or, according to the Jewish reckon-

ing the beginning of the 15th Nisan. The fourth Gospel, on the other hand, appears to place the last meal of Jesus with the disciples on the evening before the passover supper of the Jews, i. e. on the 13th, or, according to the Jewish reckoning, the 14th, Nisan, and the crucifixion on the morning immediately before, instead of after, this Jewish festival.

The Tübingen critics regard the two representations as really inconsistent and irreconcilable; and on this ground, as they hold that the fourth Gospel is incorrect, they maintain that it could not have proceeded from John. If the two representations can be fairly harmonized with each other, of course their argument vanishes with the foundation on which it is built. Without pronouncing judgment on the various modes which have been proposed by Dr. Robinson and other harmonists for reconciling the two accounts, let us consider the effect, as regards the credibility and genuineness of the fourth Gospel, of admitting that the discrepancy is real and irremovable. The diversity of the principles of criticism which are adopted by the major part of the able defenders of supernatural Christianity and evangelical doctrine in Germany, from those in vogue among us, is remarkably exemplified by their treatment of the particular question before us. Not only do Neander, Bleek, Meyer, and others hardly less distinguished, coincide with their adversaries in admitting that the discrepancy is irremovable; but Bleek builds upon it an earnest argument for the credibility and apostolic authorship of John.¹ He insists, with much force, upon the improbability that a writer in the second century, who wished to be considered an apostle, would contradict the three gospels and the accepted tradition of the church, on such a point as the date of the last

¹ It should be stated that these critics do not consider the first Gospel, in its present form, to emanate from the Apostle Matthew. See Neander's *Leben Jesu*, s. 10. Bleek's *Einl.*, s. 88 seq. The first Gospel is held to stand in substantially the same relation to the apostles as the other two; and the historical position of all three is indicated in Luke i. 1, 2, i. e. they record the things which were *delivered to their writers* by eyewitnesses. It is not the eyewitnesses themselves, but those to whom they spoke.

supper and of the crucifixion. Who but an apostle, or one thoroughly acquainted with the facts, would think of making himself responsible for such a deviation? Who, but an apostle, could hope to be believed? In a word, how extremely unnatural that a forger should think of assigning another date to these leading facts in the evangelical history! Bleek, also, endeavors to show that the supposition that the crucifixion took place on the morning *before* the passover lamb was eaten, is corroborated by incidental statements in the synoptical gospels themselves, as well as by all the probabilities in the case; so that the accuracy of the fourth Gospel, in this particular, is established, and thus a strong argument is furnished for its general credibility.

The opponents of the genuineness of John attempt to draw a support for their cause from the paschal controversies of the second century. These arose from a difference in practice in regard to a certain festival celebrated about the time of the Jewish passover. There was discussion on this difference in which the churches of Asia Minor were opposed by the church of Rome, on the occasion of Polycarp's visit to Anicetus of Rome about the year 160; then ten years later, in which Claudius Apollinaris, bishop of Hierapolis, and Melito of Sardes took part; and especially at the end of the second century, when Victor, bishop of Rome, proposed to break off fellowship with the Asia Minor bishops on account of their refusal to abandon their ancient custom. In these controversies, and in the defence of their practice, the Asia Minor bishops were in the habit of appealing to the authority of the apostle John, who had lived in the midst of them.

Everything turns upon ascertaining the real point of difference and the real character of the Asia Minor observance. So much is certain, that this observance, whatever may have been its origin or significance, occurred on the evening of the 14th, or, in the Jewish reckoning, beginning of the 15th Nisan. Baur holds that it was established as a commemoration of the last supper, the passover meal of Jesus with his

disciples ; and hence infers that John, whose authority supported the Asia Minor observance, could not have written the account of the last supper in our fourth Gospel.

But Baur's argument is on a foundation of sand. It is clear from the earliest discussions on the subject, that the difference did not consist in a diverse mode of observing the same festival ; but that in Asia Minor *there was a festival which did not exist at Rome*. This commemoration was on the 14th Nisan, on whatever day of the week it might fall ; whence the adherents of the Asia Minor custom were called quartodecimani, while Occidental Christians observed Friday and Sunday of each week as the days, respectively, of the Lord's death and resurrection. A day was observed by the Asia Minor Christians which was not observed at Rome. Nor is there any probability that the Asia Minor festival was established as a commemoration of the last supper.

There are two views as to the origin of their festival. It was the final view of Neander, and is the opinion of Meyer and Schneider, that it commemorated the death of Christ — the sacrifice of the true paschal Lamb, of which the Mosaic paschal lamb was the type (1 Cor. v. 7 ; John xix. 36). If this be the fact the festival accords with the supposed chronology of John's Gospel. The fragment of Apollinaris has been supposed to connect the Asia Minor festival with the last supper and to defend the correctness of the day of its observance by an appeal to Matthew. But Schneider forcibly argues that Apollinaris is reporting, not his own view, which was that of the quartodecimani, but the view of a smaller party of Judaizers, from which he dissents ; so that Apollinaris (as also the fragment of Hippolytus) is really a witness to the agreement of the quartodecimani with the chronology of the fourth Gospel. The other hypothesis concerning the design of the Asia Minor festival, is that of Bleek, De Wette, and others, who consider this festival to have been originally the Jewish passover, which the Jewish converts at Ephesus and elsewhere had continued to observe, and with which in their minds Christian ideas and associations were more and

more connected. In particular, there was naturally associated with it the recollection of the last supper of Jesus with the disciples. There was no such reference originally connected with the festival, nor did this association of it with the last supper grow up until long after the death of John. This apostle did not interfere with a commemoration which he found established in Ephesus and other places in that region. Bleek shows that the theory of an original reference of the Asia Minor festival to the last supper would imply an earlier origin of the yearly Christian festivals than we have any reason to think belonged to them. It is not inconsistent with Bleek's general view, to adopt Schneider's interpretation of Apollinaris, in which case even this writer affords no proof of an association by the quartodecimani of their festival with the Saviour's last supper. This hypothesis relative to the character of their commemoration, that it was at the outset simply the Jewish passover, which in Rome and in other churches where the Gentiles were more predominant, was not kept up, appears to us to be best supported. In any case the charge that a contradiction exists between the early Asia Minor tradition concerning John's testimony and the chronology of the fourth Gospel is without foundation.

4. The discourses of Christ in the fourth Gospel. These have been used as an argument against the apostolic origin of this Gospel: an argument founded on their inherent character; their relation, both as to form and matter, to the teaching of Christ recorded by the synoptical evangelists; the portraiture of Christ which they convey; their fitness to the circumstances under which they are alleged to have been spoken; their uniformity, both with each other and with the expressions of other characters in the Gospel, as well as with those of the author himself.¹

Under this head we shall chiefly follow Bleek, regretting, however, that we are under the necessity of abridging his excellent suggestions.

¹ Bleek, s. 194.

That the discourses of Christ in John stand in contrast, in important respects, with his teaching in the other gospels, is not denied. The first question is whether the contrast is so great that both styles of teaching could not belong to the same person. Here Bleek pertinently refers to the case of Socrates, and to the opinion that is coming to prevail, that the representation in Plato has much more of truth than was formerly supposed; an opinion held by such men as Schleiermacher, Brandis, and Ritter, and commended by the apparent necessity of supposing a more speculative element in the teaching of Socrates than Xenophon exhibits, if we would account for the schools of speculative philosophy that took their rise from him. He must have had another side than that which we discern in Xenophon's record. How much easier is this to be supposed in the case of Him who was to act effectually upon every variety of mind and character! How natural and inevitable that each of his disciples should apprehend Christ from his own point of view, according to the measure of his own individuality; so that for the understanding of Christ in his fulness, we have to combine these various, but not incongruous, representations of him!

But, as in a former instance, we find in the synoptical writers proof that the fourth Gospel in the character of the discourses attributed to Christ, does not depart from historical truth. As to their form, we are told, especially in Matt. xiii. 10 seq., that the Saviour, at least in discoursing to the disciples, did not confine himself to the gnomes and parables; that he spake thus to the people on account of the dulness of their understanding, while to the disciples it was "given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven." The statements (Matt. xiii. 34; Mark iv. 34) that he never spake to the people save in parables, are of course of a general character, and, fairly interpreted, are not inconsistent with his addressing the people at times in accordance with the reports of John. Occasionally in the synoptical Gospels, moreover, we meet with expressions of Jesus in striking con-

sonance with his style in the Johannean discourses, and thus giving us a glimpse of another manner of teaching which the synoptical writers sparingly report. The most remarkable example is Matt. xi. 25 seq. (compare Luke xi. 21 seq.); the ejaculation of Jesus, beginning: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." How perfectly in harmony with the style of Jesus in the latter part of John!

As to the contents of the fourth Gospel, it is freely granted that the higher nature of Christ and the relation of the Son to the Father are here a much more predominant theme. Essentially the same conception of Christ, however, is found in the first three gospels. In them he is the Son of God, in a higher than any official sense: he is the judge of the world. And in several passages, we find him claiming the lofty attributes given him in John, and in the same style. Thus in Matt. xi. 27 he says: "All things are delivered to me of my Father; and *no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him.*" This mutual knowledge, exclusive, superhuman, and perfect, on the part of the Son and the Father, is affirmed here in the peculiar manner of the fourth Gospel. In Matt. xxii. 41 seq. (compare Mark xii. 35 seq.; Luke xx. 41 seq.) we have a plain suggestion of the fact of his pre-existence.

The objection that the discourses of Christ in John have a close resemblance to the style of the evangelist himself and to that of his first epistle, is obviated when we remember that, as a result of his peculiar relation to Christ, the Saviour's mode of expression would naturally be taken up; that we are under no necessity of supposing that he aimed to give a verbally accurate report of the Master's teaching; and that some freedom as to style is unavoidable in abbreviating and selecting the portions of his discourse for which there was a place in so brief a work. All this, as well as

that thorough inward digestion and assimilation, on the part of the evangelist, of the Saviour's discourses, which were consequent on the length of time that had elapsed since they were heard, will account for the peculiarity in question, without impairing in the slightest degree the historical truth and substantial accuracy of the Johannean reports.

The falsehood of the assertion that these discourses are fictitious and put into the mouth of Jesus by the writer, after the manner of the ancient Greek and Roman historians, is evinced in particular by certain briefer expressions which are interspersed in them, and which admit of no explanation except on the supposition that the reports are faithful. A signal example is John xiv. 31, where, in the midst of a long discourse to the disciples, occur the words: "Arise, let us go hence!"¹ They are not followed by any intimation that the company actually arose and left the place where they were. On the contrary, the discourse goes on, in the words: "I am the true vine," etc. But if we suppose what follows to have been spoken by the way; or, which is perhaps more natural, if we suppose that having spoken the words first quoted which summoned the disciples to quit the place where they were, the Saviour's interest in his theme and love for them led him to go on still longer, while, it may be, they all remained standing, then these words have a proper place and meaning. The circumstance would imprint itself on the recollection of John, and it affords an impressive proof of his fidelity in reporting his Master's discourses. But no reason can be given why a forger should have introduced this fragmentary, unexplained phrase. Had he chosen to interrupt the discourse by such a phrase, he would infallibly have added some other statement, such as: then they arose and went. This little phrase, to a candid reader, is a most convincing item of evidence. Bleek also dwells upon the character of the prophetic utterances of Christ in John, especially of the predictions relative to his own death. The fact that they are in the form of inti-

¹ ἐγείρεσθε, ἄγωμεν ἐντεῦθεν.

mations, rather than distinct declarations, will better account, in the view of Bleek, for the misunderstanding of them on the part of the disciples. The form in which they appear in John wears, in his opinion, the stamp of historical truth, since it is altogether probable that in this form they were actually spoken. Especially, as Bleek thinks, is the historical fidelity of the evangelist shown by those passages from Christ upon which the evangelist puts his own interpretation drawn from an observation of the subsequent event. Such are John ii. 19: "destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it again," where we are told that the obscure reference to the temple of his body was discerned by his disciples not till after the resurrection; and John xii. 32: "and I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me," to which the evangelist appends a similar explanation. There can be no doubt in these instances that the apostle has faithfully reported the sayings of Jesus; and this fact must be even more evident to those critics who do not hesitate to question, in these cases, the perfect correctness of the disciples' interpretation.

5. The Hellenic culture and the theological point of view of the author of the fourth Gospel are made an objection to the Johannean authorship. They prove, it is maintained, that the work does not belong to the apostolic age, was not written either by a Palestinian or by any other Jew, but by a Gentile Christian of the second century. In the notice of these several points we principally follow Bleek.

(1) Was the author of the fourth Gospel a Jew? It is objected that his manner of referring to the Jews proves him not to be of their number. Thus we read of the "Jews' Passover," "the Jews' feast of tabernacles," the "feast of the Jews," the "preparation of the Jews," the "ruler of the Jews" (ii. 6, 13; iii. 1; v. 1; vi. 4; vii. 2; xi. 55); and frequently the author, alluding to the adversaries of Jesus and those with whom he came in contact, speaks of them in general as *οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι*. This style is capable of explanation only on the hypothesis that the Gospel was written late

in the apostolic age, when the Christian church had come to be fully independent of the Jewish, and by a writer who was himself outside of Palestine, and addressed his work not only to Jews, but also, and still more, to Gentiles and Gentile Christians. And this supposition, which removes the difficulty, is itself the church tradition concerning the composition of John.¹ But independently of this tradition, there can be no doubt that the author was of Jewish extraction. In proof of this, Bleek refers to the writer's familiarity with the Jewish laws and customs, which is so manifest in his account of the events connected with the Saviour's death; to the pragmatism of the Gospel, so far as the fulfilment of Old Testament predictions and promises is frequently pointed out; and to the fact that a portion of these citations are translated directly from the Hebrew, instead of being taken from the Septuagint, — a fact that is conclusive in favor of his Jewish, and strongly in favor of his Palestinian, origin. It occurs to us, also, that Baur, in conceding that the author professes to be the Apostle John, may be himself challenged to explain why he is so negligent in affording evidence of a Jewish extraction. Surely, so expert a counterfeiter would not have forgotten a point so essential to a successful attempt to personate the apostle. The charge that errors are found in John inconsistent with the hypothesis that the author was a Palestinian Jew is without foundation. That Bethany (the true reading for "*Bethabara* beyond Jordan," in John i. 28) was either the name of a place in Peraea; or was a slip of the pen for Bethabara; that, at any rate, the writer did not misplace the Bethany where Lazarus dwelt, is demonstrated by John xi. 18, where this town is expressly said to be fifteen stadia from Jerusalem. The assertion that in the designation of Caiaphas as high priest for that year, ἀρχιερεὺς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐκείνου (xi. 51; xviii. 13), the author implies a belief that the high priest was changed every year, is entirely unwarranted

¹ Even Paul speaks of his "former conversation in the Jews' religion"; of his profiting "in the Jews' religion," Gal. i. 13, 14.

by anything in the text. The term "Sychar" for the old city Sichem, instead of being a blunder, may be an old pronunciation of the Jews and Samaritans of that time. As used by the Jews there may lurk under it a reference to the hated character of the Samaritans; or, finally, it may be simply an error of transcription.¹

(2) The objection is made that a Galilean fisherman, like John, could not be possessed of so much Greek culture as the fourth Gospel discovers. But the family of John were neither in a low station, nor in straitened circumstances. He was certainly trained by his pious mother in the knowledge of the Old Testament. He may have been early taught the Greek language, which was then so widely diffused. The report which the members of the Sanhedrim had heard that Peter and John were unlearned and uncultivated men (Acts iv. 13) can only signify that they were not educated in the schools of the Rabbis. Had John not attained some mastery of the Greek language, it is not so likely that he would have taken up his residence in the midst of Asia, where only Greek was spoken, even by the Jews. And during his prolonged residence there his familiarity with the language would doubtless increase.

(3) The type of doctrine in the fourth Gospel, and especially its Christology, have been thought to be an argument against its composition by John, the Palestinian Jew. In particular, the Logos idea in John, it is said, was an Alexandrian notion, borrowed from the Greek philosophy, and introduced into Christian theology at a later period. We cannot enter at length into the discussion of this point. We simply say that, as regards the language or the *form* of the doctrine, it may have been derived from the book of Proverbs and from Sirach, and not improbably was derived from this source, though further developed, by Philo himself. Elsewhere and earlier in the New Testament itself, if not in the Epistle to the Hebrews, yet undeniably in the Apocalypse, we meet with the Johannean terminology. But,

¹ See Bleek, s. 209.

even if the language pertaining to the Logos came at first from the Greek philosophy, it may have been taken up by John, as a fit designation of the preëxistent Christ. Properly qualified, it became a vehicle for conveying his conception of the Son in his relation to the Father. In the use of this term, John enters upon no speculation. He would rather turn away the mind from vain speculations, from the unprofitable discussions about the Logos that may have been current, to the living, historic Revealer of God, the actual manifestation of the Invisible One, the Word made flesh, which had "dwelt among us." And accordingly after the first few verses, we hear no more of the Logos. As to the matter of the conception, we utterly deny the theory of the school of Baur, that the early church was Ebionite, regarding Christ as a mere man. We hold that this theory is abundantly refuted by passages in the synoptical Gospels and Pauline Epistles, and is proved to be false by a fair view of the early history of the church. The theology of Philo, it deserves to be remarked, contains nothing more than the vaguest conception of the Messiah, and is throughout far more speculative than ethical; affording, therefore, no materials for that conception of Jesus Christ which is found in John, and which only an intuition of the living person of Christ could have awakened. The conception of Christ in John is the product of the impression made by Christ himself upon the soul of the disciple.

(4) We have to notice another objection emanating from the school of Baur, that the free and liberal spirit of the fourth Gospel toward the Gentiles is inconsistent with the position attributed to John in Galatians ii. 9. But this objection proceeds from the assumption underlying the whole system of the Tübingen school, that Peter and the other Jerusalem apostles were radically opposed to the doctrine of Paul relative to the rights of the Gentiles; that they were, in short, Judaizers. We hold this assumption to be demonstrably false, and the fabric of historical construction reared upon it to be a mere castle in the air. There is noth-

ing improbable in the circumstance of the inquiry for Jesus made by the devout Greeks (John xii. 20) at which Baur stumbles. Even in Matthew, which Baur regards as pre-eminently a Jewish-Christian Gospel, is recorded the Saviour's emphatic commendation of the Centurion's faith (viii. 10 seq.); the distinct prediction that the kingdom should be taken from the Jews, and given to another people (xxi. 43); the injunction to preach the gospel to every creature (xxviii. 19); the prophecy that it should be preached to all nations (xxiv. 14); and the parables describing the universal spread of the gospel (ch. xiii.). We are not to leave out of view, in considering the spirit of the fourth Gospel with reference to Gentile Christianity, the inevitable effect of great providential events, of which the destruction of Jerusalem was one, and of the long interval of time during which the distinct character of the Christian church and the broad design of Christianity had become more and more plain. In this objection of Baur, the attempt is made to uphold one false proposition by another that is equally false.

There is one objection not to be separated entirely from the one last considered, but which is more serious and important than any we have named. The other difficulties which we have noticed, though not unworthy of consideration, vanish, and in most cases even turn into arguments for the contrary side. But the difficulty we have now to speak of, is of greater magnitude. It is strongly maintained by those who impugn the genuineness of John that the Apocalypse which they hold to be his work, cannot come from the same author as the fourth Gospel. It cannot be denied that there exists a great disparity, both in language and thought, between the Apocalypse and this Gospel. "The language [of the Apocalypse] is incomparably rougher, harder, more disconnected, and exhibits greater errors than is true of any other book in the New Testament, while the language of the Gospel, though not pure Greek, is in a grammatical view incomparably more correct."¹ This con-

¹ Bleek, s. 626.

trast between the style of the two books was stated as long ago as the middle of the third century by Dionysius of Alexandria.¹ So there are various special peculiarities of language in the Gospel which are missed in the Apocalypse. "A still greater and more essential difference is discovered when we look at the contents, spirit, and whole character of these writings."² Under this head, Bleek refers in particular, to the different position of the Apocalypse with reference to the Jewish people, so opposite to that of the Gospel, where *οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι* is often, without qualification, the designation of the opposers of Christ; to the definite expectation of the second advent and millennium, together with the conception of anti-Christ as a particular individual, which is unlike the conception found in 1 John ii. 18 seq.; iv. 3. We have to weigh the objection to the genuineness of the Gospel which these differences have suggested.

1. The impossibility that both books should have the same author is not established. The Apocalypse was written shortly after the death of Nero and shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem. The interval prior to the composition of the Gospel was not far from twenty years, — a period giving room for important changes in the style and habits of thought of any writer; an era, too, most eventful, as concerns the development of the plan of providence relative to the Jewish nation. That they were destined, as a body, to reject the gospel, and to be rejected of God, was made manifest. It must be confessed that the force of our remark, so far as it pertains to the change in style and modes of thought, is weakened by the fact that, when the Apocalypse was written, John must have been sixty years old; a period of life after which important changes of this character are less likely to occur. But another consideration is to be taken into the account, — that the mood of mind and feeling out of which the Apocalypse was written was altogether peculiar and extraordinary, as was the state of

¹ Euseb., Lib. VII. 27.

² Bleek, s. 627.

things in the midst of which the author wrote. The same author, at such a time, when his soul was stirred to its depths by the terrible events, either present or "shortly to come to pass," and writing under the impulse of prophetic inspiration, would fall into quite a different style from one that would be natural in a calmer mood, when his only object was to set down recollections of Christ and his teaching. Moreover, there are not wanting various points of resemblance, both in language and matter, between the two works. To prove this relationship, we have the authority of Baur himself, from whom we translate the following passage: "We cannot ignore the fact that the evangelist put himself in thought in the place of the Apocalypsis, and designed to make use, for the ends aimed at in his Gospel, of the consideration enjoyed by the Apostle John, who, as apostle, as author of the Apocalypse, and as having been for so many years the principal head of their churches, had become the highest authority with the Asia Minor Christians. Nay, it is not merely the borrowing of the external support of so distinguished a name; there are not wanting, also, internal points of affinity between the Gospel and Apocalypse; and one cannot forbear to wonder at the deep geniality, the fine art with which the evangelist, in order to transmute spiritually the Gospel into the Apocalypse [um die Apokalypse zum evangelium zu vergeistigen] has taken up the elements which he has conveyed over from the point of view of the Apocalypse to the freer and higher point of view of the Gospel."¹ Now admitting that so close an inward relationship connects the Gospel with the Apocalypse, why not refer this to the natural development of the author's own mind and the progress of his views, rather than ascribe it to a hateful fraud and lie? If the art of the forger was so clever and admirable, how can we accept Baur's further view, that he has palpably and obviously betrayed himself? Whatever opinion is entertained of the authorship of the

¹ Baur's "Das Christenthum," etc., s. 132.

Apocalypse, the Tübingen theory is convicted of a gross inconsistency.

2. But even if it were established that the Apocalypse and the fourth Gospel are not from one author, the verdict must still be given in favor of the genuineness of the Gospel. Bleek agrees, on the whole, with De Wette and Baur in supposing that we are compelled to reject the Johannean authorship of one or the other, and in common with Neander and many other critics of the evangelical as well as the unbelieving school, holds the opinion that the Apocalypse is not the work of John. As we have said, *provided the dilemma can be made out to exist*, this is the reasonable opinion. The Apocalypse has no doubt been in the church since the date we have assigned for its composition. As early as Justin Martyr it was quoted as the work of the Apostle John; but its genuineness was also early questioned. It was questioned not only by the Alogi, but also by the Roman presbyter Caius (circa 200) who likewise ascribed it to Cerinthus.¹ Dionysius of Alexandria, the pupil and successor of Origen, to whose opinion on the style of the Apocalypse we have adverted, endeavors to prove from internal evidence that the Apostle John did not write the work, and is inclined to attribute it to a contemporary of the apostle at Ephesus, John the presbyter. Eusebius leans to the same opinion. He, also, hesitates about placing it among the Homologoumena, or New Testament writings, which were universally received as apostolical.² It was not included in the ancient Syrian version. Long after it was received universally in the Western church, doubts concerning its genuineness continued in the East. If written by John the presbyter, "a holy and inspired man," as Dionysius supposes him to be, the later habit of ascribing it to the apostle, may have been a mistake for which the real author was not responsible. And if the denial of its genuineness sprang from the great reaction of the church in the second century against Chiliastic views, it was supported, as we

¹ Euseb., Lib. III. 28.

² Euseb., Lib. III. 25.

have seen in the case of Dionysius by critical arguments. The evidence for the apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse is far from being equal to the accumulated weight of evidence for the Johannean authorship of the fourth Gospel. For the former, the main proofs of a composition by the apostle are external. In the case of the fourth Gospel, besides having all that can be asked in the way of external evidence, we are able to add the most impressive internal proofs of its genuineness.

In giving the internal evidence for the genuineness of John, it would be a great oversight to omit a notice of the proof afforded by the last chapter. Every reader of the Gospel will observe that in the last verses of the twentieth chapter the author appears to be concluding his work. It is evident that at least the last two verses of the twenty-first chapter are from another hand. One opinion is, that the whole chapter emanates from some other pen than that of the author of the Gospel, while others think that only these concluding verses constitute the addition by another. Let us first take for granted the last supposition. The whole chapter — these verses included — has been connected with the work from its first promulgation. These verses, then, are the independent testimony of one who was not himself the writer, to the fact of the composition of the work by John. If John be *not* the author, the writer of these verses was an accomplice in the fraud. But suppose the entire chapter to be written by him, which was the view of Grotius, and is held by many living critics on the evangelical side, as well as by Zeller and other disciples of the Tübingen school; the argument is then stronger. The statement in vs. 23, relative to the idea that the apostle was not to die, is one which could only have been required shortly after his death occurred. Forty or fifty years after that event there could have been no call for such an explanation. The appendix, then, was composed soon after the death of John. Suppose it to be written by friends to whom he had de-

livered his Gospel, and from whom it went forth to the world, and the whole phenomenon is explained.

In closing up this array of evidence, we beg the reader to apprehend distinctly the position of Baur and his school. When these critics come to John's Gospel they have to give up their favorite mythical theory. We hear nothing of the unconscious working of the mythopoeic faculty. Here is no collection of tales produced from the unreflecting imagination of the early church, brooding over their departed Lord. But the ground taken is that the fourth Gospel is a stupendous fraud, most cleverly executed, — a deliberate invention of incidents which were known by the writer never to have occurred, but which he has framed together into a history, not scrupling to introduce an ingenious lie for the purpose of assuring the reader that John was its author! Whether the Gospel bears the marks of being the child of so much mendacity we must leave the candid reader to judge.

It is incredible that a work of the power and loftiness of the fourth Gospel should have sprung up in the second century. Let any one who would understand the difference between the apostolic and the next following age undertake to read the apostolic Fathers. He will be conscious at once that he has passed into another atmosphere. He has descended from the heights of inspiration to the level of ordinary, and often feeble, thinking. In the first half of the second century there is no writer of marked originality; none who can be called fresh or suggestive. To set a work like the fourth Gospel in that age is a literary anachronism. That a writer, towering so above all his contemporaries, should stoop to wear a mask, and gain his end by a hateful, jesuitical contrivance, is a supposition burdened with difficulties. The irrational character of this hypothesis, Neander has well shown in a passage with which we conclude the present essay.

“The whole development of the church from Justin Martyr onward testifies to the presence of such a Gospel, which

operated powerfully on men's minds. It cannot be explained from any succeeding mental tendency in the following age, nor from the amalgamation of several. To be sure, this production existed as a representation of a higher unity, as a reconciling element with reference to the contrarieties of that age, and could exert an attractive power over minds of so opposite a kind as a Heracleon, a Clement of Alexandria, an Irenaeus, and a Tertullian. Where should we be able to find in that age a man, who was elevated above its contrarieties [gegensätze], by which everything is more or less swayed? And a man of so superior a Christian soul, must needs skulk in the dark, avail himself of such a mask, instead of appearing openly in the consciousness of all-conquering truth and in the feeling of his mental pre-eminence! Such a man, so exalted above all the church Fathers of that century, had no need, forsooth, to shrink from the conflict. He must certainly have put more confidence in the might of truth than in these arts of darkness and falsehood. And how can it be shown that such a man, when he is contemplated from the point of view of his own age, would have been restrained by no reverence for sacred history, by no scruples, from falsifying a history, the contents of which were holy to him, through arbitrary fictions, manufactured in the interest of a given dogmatic tendency,—through lies, in fact, which were to find their justification in the end to be attained by means of them? And how unskilfully would he have proceeded if, in order to attain his end, he presented the history of Christ in a way that was in absolute contrast with the universally accepted tradition! Nay, only from such an apostle, who stood in such a relation to Christ as a John stood, who had thus taken up into his own being the impression and image of that unique personality, could proceed a work which stands in such a relation to the contrarieties of the post-apostolic age. It is a work out of one gush, original throughout. The Divine in its own nature has this power of composing differences, but never could a product so fresh, so original

in its power (urkräftiges) proceed from a contrived, shrewdly planned, reconciliation of differences. This Gospel, if it do not emanate from the Apostle John and point to that Christ, the intution of whom, on the part of the writer, gave birth to it, is the greatest of enigmas."¹

ARTICLE II.

CHARLES WESLEY AND METHODIST HYMNS.

BY REV. FREDERIC M. BIRD, PHILADELPHIA.

(Continued from No. 81, p. 162.)

WE are now at liberty to glance over whatever may be most striking and important among the various poetical publications of the Wesleys. Their earlier volumes bear the names of both brothers, with nothing to distinguish the respective authorship of the separate poems; but it has been generally agreed by those who best understand the matter, to ascribe all the translations to John, and all the original poems — except in a very few cases, where there is some

¹ Neander's *Ges. d. Pflanz, u. Leit. d. Kirche*, 4 A. B. 2. s. 637.

The genuineness of the fourth Gospel has found an unexpected supporter in the person of M. Renan. In his recent *Life of Jesus*, he holds that the existence of this Gospel is presupposed, just as we have attempted to prove, in the controversies of the first half of the second century. By the force of the external evidence, and also by the historical truth which he is compelled to recognize in passages of the narrative, he is led to believe in the genuineness of at least the narrative parts of the work.

The embarrassment into which Renan is thrown by conceding that this history of Jesus is the work of an eyewitness, while he is yet unprepared to believe in miracles, is no concern of ours. We leave him to settle this matter with his disturbed friends of the *Westminster Review*. We simply record it as a very significant fact, that a writer who in treating of the *Life of Christ* plants himself on a theory of naturalism, is yet obliged in candor to allow that this Gospel is genuine. Strauss himself was for a time inclined to adopt the same view, and was finally kept from doing so only by seeing the fatal consequences that would ensue to his entire theory.

special reason to the contrary — to Charles (For particulars on this point, see Creamer's *Methodist Hymnology*, pp. 18–26 et al.). In their first publication, 1739, John's translations, adaptations, and selections occupy more room than Charles's originals; but to no subsequent volume does John contribute more than six or eight pieces. This first, and the two which followed it, in 1740 and 1742, were of the general character indicated by their common title: "Hymns and Sacred Poems."

In or before 1745 the Wesleys began to publish with reference to special subjects and occasions. Among the first and largest of these productions was "Hymns on the Lord's Supper," founded on Dr. Brevint's "Christian Sacrament and Sacrifice." This was one of their most popular books, and is valuable as an extensive, systematic, and well-versed collection of all that can be said on the subject; but not many of the hymns are in use, and a few only afford fair samples of the genuine Wesleyan power. Here is a sensible and pious acknowledgment of the mystery in the ordinance:

How he did these creatures raise, And make this bread and wine
Organs to convey his grace To this poor soul of mine;
I cannot the way descry, Need not know the mystery;
Only this I know, that I Was blind, but now I see.

Yet Charles's views of the rite were very churchly. Whatever he meant by the following, the sentiment is sufficiently high, and the language more than sufficiently strong:

Did thine ancient Israel go, With solemn praise and prayer,
To thy hallowed courts below, To meet and serve thee there?
To thy body, Lord, we flee: This the consecrated shrine;
Temple of the Deity, The real house divine.

His "Hymns on the Trinity" (1767) is a book of exceeding value and interest. Mr. Jackson is within the truth when he says: "There is not in the English language a volume that, in so small a compass, shows more clearly the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, with its practical importance; and it has this peculiar advantage, that it proposes the subject, not as a matter of controversy, but of faith and

adoration, of prayer, thanksgiving, and praise." The contents are arranged under five topics ; through four of these, which are essentially doctrinal, each hymn has one or more texts of scripture prefixed, to which it is supposed to bear some more or less intimate relation. Thus, on Matt. xxxiii. 9, " Call no man your Father," etc.

Our heavenly Father is but one With that paternity
In which the Father and the Son And Holy Ghost agree :
Each person of the triune God May his own creature claim,
For each impressed the earthly clod With his own awful name.

His distinctions are usually sound. 1 Cor. xi. 3, " The head of Christ is God."

The partner of our flesh and blood, As man, inferior is to God ;
The lower part of Christ, the heel, Was bruised, and did our sorrows feel ;
But though he would his life resign, His part superior is divine,
And doth, beyond the reach of pain, God over all forever reign.

Very rarely, in this volume, does he use an incorrect expression. The last three lines of the following are perhaps the only instance :

How could God for sinners die ? How could man the pardon buy ?
When thy human nature bled, Then the *blood divine* was shed, —
Blood of him who was in thee, God from all eternity.

These expressions — " blood of God," " death of God," and the like, which not unfrequently occur in Charles Wesley — are themselves, and the ideas which they represent, popish and unjustifiable. The man Jesus alone suffered and died for us. The divine nature which was in him, mysteriously conjoined with his humanity, gave an infinite merit and atoning power to those agonies ; and there we must stop. *How* the Godhead " made of infinite avail the sufferings of the man," is the mystery ; and the mystery is not explained, nor any good done, by the use of language justified neither by reason nor scripture.

But this is an exception. For the elucidation of difficult passages, the harmonizing of seemingly contradictory ones, and the systematic and satisfactory presentation of a great doctrine in all its various phases, this would be a most valu-

able manual. It appears never to have been appreciated or reprinted. The last of its five divisions contains "Hymns and Prayers to the Trinity:"

Full credence we give, And exult to believe
 What our reason in vain would aspire to conceive :
 Not *against* but *above* Our reason we prove
 Three persons revealed in the essence of love.
 No distinction we find Of will or of mind
 In the Maker, Inspirer, and Friend of mankind ;
 But one God we proclaim, In nature and name
 Indivisibly one, and forever the same.

Having thus outlined the scheme of orthodox doctrine, he is anxious to guard against formalism and mere intellectual belief ; and he expresses himself as strongly as usual :

Right notions have their slender use,
 But cannot a sound faith produce, Or vital piety.
 They cannot make the Godhead known,
 Or manifest Jehovah one In co-eternal three.

The orthodox, renowned in fight,
 Fierce champions for opinions right, May reason's strength display ;
 Their Arian and Socinian foes,
 And Heresy's whole household knows The truth as much as they.

He insists earnestly on the necessity of spiritually discerning spiritual truths :

Creeds and books can nothing do, Unaccompanied by grace ;
 Grace must form my heart anew, Give me to discern thy face,
 Bring my faithful heart the power God in persons three to adore.

Our faith is but a shadow vain, Unless it works by love,
 And, saved from sin and born again, We seek the things above ;
 Unless we have the sacred Trine Into our hearts received,
 And I can call each person mine, I have not yet believed.

Having thus satisfied his intellect, his orthodoxy, and his conscience, he, in a short hymn near the end of the volume, allows his innate poetry full swing. The piece is a fine example of that singularity of style and sentiment which he sometimes indulged without restraint :

Thy divinity's adorer, Thee that I may truly know,
 Jesus, be my soul's restorer, Bleeding Lamb, appear below :
 God, expiring on the tree, Love, be manifest in me.

Sharer of thy dereliction, Joining in thy plaintive cry,
 Pained with thy extreme affliction, Let my broken heart reply :
 O let all within me moan, Echo back thy dying groan !

Here would I maintain my station ; Never from the cross remove,
 Till I, in my last temptation, Pay thee back thy dearest love, —
 Faint into thy arms away ; Die into immortal day.

As a polemic poet, it is probable Charles Wesley has never been equalled. He possessed the combative qualities abundantly : intensity of thought and feeling, thorough sincerity and earnestness, unqualified devotion to his principles, a hearty hatred of whatever he thought unscriptural, false, and dangerous, outspoken and fearless honesty, keen wit, and unsurpassed vigor of language. He could be very satirical when he chose, — and he sometimes chose. The wretched formalism which everywhere prevailed, the deadness of the established church, the cruel bitterness of clergy and rulers against evangelical religion and its professors, aroused his wrath, and he frequently used words which must have been more true than pleasant. In his “Hymns of Intercession” (1758) occurs a picture, taken from life, of “the universities” :

Teacher divine, with melting eye
 Our ruined seats of learning see,
 Whose ruling scribes thy truth deny,
 And persecute thy saints and thee,
 As hired by Satan to suppress
 And root up every seed of grace.

Where knowledge vain, unsanctified,
 Fills every synagogue and chair ;
 Where pride and unbelief preside,
 And wage with heaven immortal war :
 The prophets’ nursing schools are these,
 Or sinks of desperate wickedness ?

The English Wesleyan Collection, and that of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, still contain part of a poem on Jer. vii. 4 : “The temple of the Lord are these,” headed in the latter collection : “Before Preaching to Formalists.” Our readers may be surprised to find so much irony in a hymn book.

The men who slight thy faithful word,
 In their own lies confide,
 These are the temple of the Lord,
 And heathens all beside !
 The temple of the Lord are these,
 The only church and true,
 Who live in pomp and wealth and ease,
 And Jesus never knew !

The temple of the Lord — they pull
 Thy living temples down,
 And cast out every gracious soul
 That trembles at thy frown ;
 The church — they from their pale expel
 Whom thou hast here forgiven ;
 And all the synagogues of hell
 Are the sole heirs of heaven !

But the most powerful, combative, and controversial poems that we have ever seen, appeared in "Hymns on God's Everlasting Love," published in 1741, and greatly enlarged in 1756. People seem to be shy of this polemic region : Mr. Jackson and Mr. Creamer pass the volume with very brief remarks ; but it is one of the most able, interesting, and remarkable among the Arminian poet's publications. It preaches an unlimited, universal atonement, and attacks the doctrines of reprobation and unconditional election. Calvinism in that age was a somewhat different thing from that which bears the name now : the doctrine supposed to be taught that infants in great numbers were lost, and that most souls were arbitrarily predestined to endless misery, came sharply into conflict with Wesleyan views ; and Charles thought he had a fair field for the exercise of spiritual archery. The famous controversy waged by Fletcher and John Wesley against Shirley, the Hills, Toplady, etc., was some years later ; but John had already published his sermon on "Free Grace," and war was declared. We had better let the poet tell his own story ; premising merely that it is the extreme and inhuman tenets of old-fashioned hyper-Calvinism which he is attacking, and that by the "hellish doctrine" and similar mild terms he means the dogma that Christ did not die for

all, but that some are, by a positive decree of the Almighty, shut out from any possible portion in the benefits of his atonement, and consigned irrevocably to endless punishment. The poet conceives, and pursues in several hymns, the bold idea of making a sinner, dying in his blood and without hope, justify the ways and attributes of Deity :

God forbid that I should dare To charge my death on thee ;
No, thy truth and mercy tear The *horrible decree* !
Though the devil's doom I meet, The devil's doctrine I disclaim :
Let it sink into the pit Of hell, from which it came.

God, the good, the just, I clear ; He did not die in vain :
Grace hath brought salvation near To every soul of man :
I *would not* be saved from death, And, self-destroyed, I justly fall ;
Publishing, with my last breath, The Saviour died for all.

And again,

A ransom for my soul was paid : For mine and every soul of man
The Lamb a full atonement made, The Lamb for me and Judas slain.

By my own hands, not his, I fall ; The *hellish doctrine* I disprove :
Sinners, his grace is free for all ; Though I am damned, yet God is love.

He cannot repeat the great truth too often or too earnestly :

Thou dost not mock our race With insufficient grace :
Thou hast reprobated none ; Thou from Pharaoh's blood art free ;
Thou didst once for all atone, Judas, Esau, Cain, and me.

He would make himself personally responsible for the truth he preaches :

We stake our interest in thy blood, On this, and this alone,
That it for all mankind hath flowed, And did for all atone.

He regards the sacrifice as complete, the atonement as positive, and personal salvation as the unavoidable result of appropriating faith :

Thou canst not now thy grace deny, Thou canst not but forgive ;
Lord, if thy justice asks me why — In Jesus I believe !

He accuses his antagonists of limiting the Infinite, and separating Christ from God :

Ye potsherds of the earth, presume To disunite the Trinity.

And he answers their predestinarian argument thus :

"Since God might justly let all die, And leave all to eternal woe,
Might he not justly some pass by?" The wounds of Jesus answer, No!

His wrath he might on all have shown, Had not his law been satisfied:
But now he cannot pass by one; He cannot, — for his Son hath died.

He makes one who is enjoying a state of grace, confess the possibility of falling therefrom:

The blackest crime upon record I freely *could* commit;
The sins by nature most abhorred My nature *could* repeat.

I *could* the devil's law receive, Unless restrained by thee;
I *could* (Good God!), I *could* believe the HORRIBLE DECREE!

I *could* believe that God is hate, The God of love and grace
Did damn, pass by, and reprobate The most of human race.

Farther than this I cannot go, Till Tophet take me in;
But O forbid that I should know This mystery of sin!

So much wit on such a subject would be wickedness in most writers; but Charles is perfectly honest and serious. In like manner he represents the hyper-Calvinists as teaching, with regard to the fate of sinners:

The righteous God consigned Them over to their doom,
And sent the Saviour of mankind To damn them from the womb;
To damn for falling short Of what they could not do,
For not believing the report Of that which was not true.

They think with shrieks and cries To please the Lord of hosts,
And offer thee, in sacrifice, Millions of slaughtered ghosts;
With new-born babes they fill The dire, infernal shade,
For such (they say) was thy great will Before the world was made.

The hymn, "Equip me for the war," in the present Methodist books, is part of a long poem in this volume, being a preacher's prayer. Here is one of the petitions:

Increase (if that can be) The perfect hate I feel
To Satan's HORRIBLE DECREE, That genuine child of hell,
Which feigns thee to pass by The most of Adam's race,
And leave them in their blood to die, Shut out from saving grace.

To most, as devils teach (Get thee behind me, fiend!)
To most, thy mercies never reach, Whose mercies have no end.

.....
This is that wisdom from beneath, That horrible decree!

My soul it harrows up, It freezes all my blood,
My tingling ears I fain would stop Against their hellish God,

Constrained, alas! to hear *His reprobating* roar,
And see him horribly appear All stained with human gore.

If Toplady ever saw that verse, no wonder that he called the Wesleys blasphemers. Comment is vain; human language cannot go beyond the terrible energy of these lines. If any one think that the author needs an excuse, it must be found in his thorough and intense sincerity. He believed he was battling for the glory of God; and he was perfectly ready to go to the stake for his convictions. Hear him on this:

My life I here present, My heart's best drop of blood,
O let it all be freely spent In proof that thou art good,—
Art good to all that breathe, Who all may pardon have;
Thou wilt not the sinner's death, But all the world wouldst save.

O take me at my word, But arm me with thy power,
Then call me forth to suffer, Lord, To meet the fiery hour;
In death will I proclaim That all *may* hear thy call,
And clap my hands amidst the flame, And shout, HE DIED FOR ALL!

Other polemic poems, on less catholic subjects, may be found in several of his works; supporting sometimes "the peculiar views of the Methodists," and sometimes views which were peculiar to himself. In the volume of 1749 is a long hymn on the text, "Let God be true, and every man a liar." It is an argument for sinless perfection, and against its disbelievers. Of some of these he says:

Saints without holiness are they, Elect without election's seal;
They *do*, yet cannot, fall away; In Christ, and yet in sin, they dwell;
Their freemen are to evil sold, Their creatures new are creatures old.

He was a strong advocate of complete and unspotted holiness, as attainable on earth. The expression, "unsinful state," frequently occurs in his writings. In one of his earliest volumes, he uses this strong and unjustifiable language:

Gifts, alas! cannot suffice, And comforts are in vain;
While one evil thought can rise, I am not born again.

And likewise on Luke vi. 44, "The tree is known by its fruits":

The trees of righteousness, Thy planting, O almighty Lord,
They never can thy law transgress, Or sin in deed, or thought, or word.

This and very many similar pieces were omitted by John Wesley, in a subsequent expurged edition of the Scripture Hymns. The founder of Methodism held very definite and practical views regarding Christian perfection; but Charles acquired notions which reduced it to a mere theory and abstract doctrine. At this time (1762) he considered the "unsinning state" to be the result only of long experience, and the fidelity of many years; thus on 2 Cor. xiii. 11. "Be perfect," i.e. Aspire to the highest degree of holiness:

Let down from heaven the ladder see,
And mount, till all the steps are past:
Perfection is the last degree;
Perfection is attained the last.

There were many Methodists at this time who professed to have attained this desirable state. In accordance with his own opposite views, Charles thought it necessary to rebuke their presumption; and the first edition of his Short Scripture Hymns contains many verses like this, on Phil. iii. 12. "Not as though I were already perfect":

Then know thy place (a novice cries,
Whose fancy has attained the prize);
Stand by thyself, nor rank with me,
For I am holier than thee:
Beyond the chief apostle I!
And you, who dare my grace deny,
The proof of my perfection know;
It is — because *I think* it so!

He puts a very severe test upon the practical perfectionists:

But if the smallest spark of pride Or self discover them at last,
Set the false witnesses aside, Yet hold *the truth* forever fast.

He says in the preface that he has taken great pains both to prove and to guard this troublesome doctrine. Most people would think that the pains were wasted, that his "guards" demolish his "proofs;" that he is busy with first building up what he directly proceeds to pull down. The truth is, the poet is inconsistent in this matter, as in some

others. The *practice* of Christian perfection is alone of consequence; the mere theory is of no value whatever. But Charles reduces it to pure theory. His brother rightly accuses him of having no fruits, no possible results to his creed; and a faith which thus ~~ex~~cludes works becomes totally insignificant. The sense of this matter, as most Christians take it, is expressed by Grimshaw of Haworth, a pious and faithful clergyman, who was strongly in sympathy with the Methodists. The letter was written to Charles Wesley, March 31, 1760. "The doctrine of perfection runs very high. Thirty profess sinless perfection; and thirty more, I expect, will pretend thereto shortly. If it be of God it is well. Time will prove it. I wish they knew their own hearts. My perfection is, to see my own imperfection: my comfort, to feel that I have the world, flesh, and devil to overcome through the spirit and merits of my dear Saviour; and my desire and hope is, to love God with all my heart, mind, soul, and strength, to the last gasp of my life. This is my perfection. I know no other, expecting to lay down my life and my sword together."

Yet the Methodist doctrine of perfection, or the doctrine of Methodist perfection, as outsiders are apt to call it, has been and is greatly misunderstood. If we of other denominations were better acquainted with the genuine, pure, original Wesleyan tenets on this subject, with what John preached and Charles usually sung, we should find less that is sectarian, and more that is scriptural, than we commonly fancy. Doubtless they used some strong and unguarded expressions (Charles, as we have seen, was perpetually doing that); and doubtless their teachings have often been perverted to false and dangerous uses by ignorant, fanatical, or dishonest men among their followers: but the wheat can be separated from the chaff. John Wesley seldom or never used the word *sinless*, or taught that the holiest believer was utterly exempt from human infirmities. He held, on the contrary, that certain unpleasant peculiarities and deficiencies, which he ascribes to the *intellect*, might still

interfere with the complete character and comfort of one who was living without sin. But the idea of a lofty state of grace, in which the believer enjoys unbroken communion with God, and lives, as it were, above the temptation to go astray, is surely not very averse to reason or scripture: and this is really the secret of the much abused Methodist perfection. The Wesleys were very strong and bold men; they took higher ground than most others had done: they attempted more, and they accomplished more. What precisely and fully were their doctrines and modes of thought, their aims and ways of working, may be best seen in their poetry. "All that these men of God have taught in the pulpit, and that thousands of their spiritual children have experienced, the hymns adequately express. They assume that it is the common privilege of believers to enjoy the direct and abiding witness of their personal adoption; to be made free from sin by the sanctifying spirit; to live and die in the conscious possession of that perfect love which casteth out fear: and they express a strong and irrepressible desire for these blessings, with the mighty faith by which they are attained." Thus the poet expects the annihilation of inward evil:

Come, O my God, the promise seal, This mountain, sin, remove!
Now in my gasping soul reveal The virtue of thy love.

Anger and sloth, desire and pride This moment be subdued;
Be cast into the crimson tide Of my Redeemer's blood!

And the setting up of Christ's image within:

Fully in my life express All the heights of holiness:
Sweetly let my spirit prove All the depths of humble love.

And the utter absorption of the human in the divine:

Come, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, And seal me thine abode!
Let all I am in thee be lost, *Let all I am be God!*

There is not much that is objectionable about this view of perfection. It is simply a question of how far we shall attempt to live up to our privileges and duties. That most professing Christians scarcely make that attempt at all, is a

melancholy fact. That the Wesleyan poetry should be above the comprehension and out of range of the experience of such, is a natural consequence: where known at all, Charles' hymns "are admired in proportion as the people are spiritually minded."

It has been made manifest that the Methodist poet was no latitudinarian. He was zealous for every minutest point of what he considered saving truth, and tenacious even of his individual peculiarities of opinion. The common notion, that he was of a mild, yielding, softly-poetical nature, without his brother's positiveness of character and fierceness of attachment to his own ways and views, is founded in ignorance. He had not his brother's administrative power, or uniform strength of cool comprehensive judgment; but he was quite as earnest and powerful in his affections and antipathies. Whatever he thought and felt the world might know. His multiplied verses were sure to publish his sentiments on every subject, in all their strength and variety. But the positiveness of his own principles, and his free comments on those of others, did not arise from a bigoted or sectarian spirit. In 1761 he and his brother published a Hymn Book "for the Use of Real Christians of all Denominations." This volume is what it professes to be; the Christian poet had a hearty sympathy and love for "all them that love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity." His hostility to Calvinism was quite as decided as that of his brother; but he maintained an unbroken friendship with the Calvinist Whitefield, his early college friend and predecessor in the itinerancy. Controversies frequently occurred, and sometimes raged, between them; but their personal affection and respect for each other was not destroyed. "I believe," wrote Whitefield, "we shall go on best when we only preach the simple gospel, and do not interfere with each other's plan." On the occasion of some friendly meeting between the brothers and their doctrinal opponent, Charles wrote a joyful hymn of thanksgiving:

Thy mind we surely know, In which we now agree,
And, hand in hand, exulting go To final victory.

Few will dispute the correctness of *that* sentiment. The parties concerned had grace to act up to it ever thereafter. With the manifold attempts which some hyper-Calvinists made to injure the Wesleys, Whitefield had no connection and no sympathy; nor was the conduct of the brothers towards him ever marked by anything but Christian courtesy and brotherly love. When that evangelist died, his old companion gave expression to his sorrow in an *Elegy* which shows that prejudice and party spirit had not obliterated affection and charity.

The two volumes of "Short Hymns on Select Passages of Scripture," published in 1762, form a remarkable work, and contain many gems. The ideas are largely taken from Bengel, Henry, and Gill. Sometimes the poet uses a text merely as a peg to hang his peculiar notions on; sometimes he develops the true idea of the passage, though usually in a way of his own. It is a spiritualizing commentary. We give a few further samples:

Exodus ix. 12. "The *Lord* hardened the heart of Pharaoh."

There needed, Lord, no act of thine,
If Pharaoh had a heart like mine:
One moment leave me but alone,
And mine, alas, is turned to stone!
Thus, if the blessing thou restrain,
The earth is hardened by the rain
Withheld: and thus, if God depart,
Jehovah hardens Pharaoh's heart.

Ruth ii. 19. "Where hast thou gleaned to-day?"

At evening to myself I say,
My soul, where hast thou gleaned to-day, Thy labors how bestowed?
What hast thou rightly said, or done?
What grace attained, or knowledge won, In following after God?

Matt. viii. 10. "Jesus marvelled."

But doth it, Lord, thy wonder raise,
The faith thou hast thyself bestowed?
Oh what a mystery of grace!
The man in Christ admires the God!

Matt. xxvii. 12. "He answered nothing."

Speechless the Saviour stood Beneath my guilty load;
He answered not, for I Have nothing to reply;

But when condemned and dumb I before God become,
His mouth is opened then for me, His blood proclaims the sinner free.

John x. 10. "I am come that they might have life," etc.
Answer then thy blest design, Bring to me the life of grace ;
Bring me larger life divine ; Fill my soul with holiness ;
Fit me for the life above, All the life of heavenly love.

Rev. viii. 1. "There was silence in heaven."
What doth that silence mean ? Can man or angel show ?
Away this noisy world between, And let me die to know !

The Funeral Hymns of Charles Wesley are perhaps the noblest specimens of his genius. Mr. Jackson inclines to this opinion, basing it upon all the hymns referring to death and eternity which are scattered through his various works. The spirituality of the poet's views regarding the last change has been already mentioned : he infused it thoroughly into his songs, and through them into his converts. There is a joyous, triumphant tone about the Wesleyan elegies, very different from the doleful sound of an ordinary death-knell. Other poets offer solemn or languid consolation in the hackneyed strains of long and common metre ; but the Methodist bursts forth :

Rejoice for a brother deceased ! Our loss is his infinite gain !

Our propriety is apt to be shocked by such abrupt and untimely raptures ; but our propriety is in fault. We may talk unimpassionedly about the shortness of life, the solemnities of eternity, and the sorrows of the bereaved, when the circumstances forbid our getting higher ; but at the funeral of a genuine and positive Christian, nothing else can be sung so appropriate as several of the Wesleyan hymns. What can be more edifying, consolatory, or instructive, at such a time, than that noble poem,

Blessing, honor, thanks, and praise, Pay we, gracious God, to thee :
Thou, in thine abundant grace, Givest us the victory !

Yes, the Christian's course is run ; Ended is the glorious strife ;
Fought the fight, the victory won ; Death is swallowed up of life.

This jubilant tone was in perfect harmony with the spirit

of the early Methodists, who used to make the streets or valleys ring with such songs of triumph, as they carried their dead to the grave. Religion was a living reality to them; they shared in their Master's victory over the last foe. Said a physician to Charles Wesley: "Most people die for fear of dying; but I never met with such people as yours. They are none of them afraid of death; but calm and patient and resigned to the last." "Madam, be not cast down," was said to a dying woman. She answered, smiling: "Sir, I shall never be cast down."

Such examples in the poet's daily experience supplied him with ever fresh and varying themes. Often tried by the loss of near and dear friends, his sensitive heart learned the lesson of perfect resignation and unquestioning faith:

If death my friend and me divide, ♫
Thou dost not, Lord, my sorrow chide, Or frown my tears to see :
 Restrained from passionate excess, ♫
Thou bidst me mourn in calm distress For them that rest in thee.

When his children, one after another, were taken from him, he could say with David:

Wherefore should I make my moan, Now the darling child is dead ?
He to early rest is gone, He to paradise is fled :
I shall go to him, but he Never shall return to me.

Some respectable hymn books still offer to mourners such cold comfort as this :

"Though nature's voice you must obey,
Think, while your swelling griefs o'erflow,
That hand, which takes your joys away,
That sovereign hand can heal your woe."

But Charles Wesley sees hope and heaven very much nearer, and cries :

Disconsolate tenant of clay, In solemn assurance arise,
Thy treasure of sorrow survey, And look through it all to the skies.

In the larger tract of "Funeral Hymns," published in 1759, are two very remarkable poems "On the Death of Mr. John Hutchinson, July 23, 1754." They are preceded by a prayer for the same person, "a Backslider," when near his end.

Very little is said of this individual in Wesley's life, but the poet must have been tenderly attached to him. A year after the event, Charles spent an hour, weeping, in the room where he died. Notwithstanding their singular beauty, the poems have never, to our knowledge, been quoted or reprinted, except in the author's "Journal and Poetry." We give a few verses from each. The first is a model of truthful delicacy, and generous catholic sympathy, in the handling of a very difficult subject. He alludes to the faults and errors of the departed with a grace and tenderness which are inimitable :

'Scaped from a life of pain, Disburdened of his load,
The struggling soul hath burst its chain Of peevish flesh and blood ;
Safe to the haven brought, Where storms can never come,
And every folly, every fault, Is buried in his tomb.

The pain, whose lingering strife And frequent impulse tore
The wasted seats of irksome life, Shall never vex him more :
Nor love's severe excess, Nor anger's furious start,
Can his indignant spirit oppress, Or rend his frantic heart.

The tyrannizing power Of his own wayward will,
The buffetings of sin are o'er, The stubborn pulse is still :
Jesus hath heard our prayer, And caught him to his breast,
And lulled the self-tormentor there To everlasting rest.

The other is in a different vein, and bears a remarkable affinity to some of the finest passages of "In Memoriam." "That friend of mine who lives in God" is near of kin to the transplanted spirit with whom Charles Wesley is communing :

Why should my tears forever flow ?
Why should I wail the close of woe, The end of misery ?
His real life doth still remain ;
Nothing is dead but grief and pain, But that which wished to die.

My HUTCHINSON himself survives ;
He lives, to GOD he greatly lives ! The imperishable part
Is rapt beyond our world of care ;
Yet now by faithful love I bear His image on my heart.

I see the generous friend sincere ;
His voice still vibrates in my ear, The voice of truth and love !
It calls me to put off my clay ;
It bids me soar with him away To fairer worlds above.

Not even in death his friendship dies :
With grateful pity and surprise I ask, how can it be ?
Loosened from all he leaves behind,
Yet still, — unutterably kind — Yet still he cleaves to me.

Some have considered the “Family Hymns” as the most meritorious of Charles Wesley’s various works. It certainly displays to great advantage the versatility, vigor, and elegance of his genius, and contains many poems of extreme beauty, interest, and practical value. The following is one of eleven hymns “for a Woman near the Time of her Travail”:

Jesus, thou son of Mary, Thou Son of the Most High,
Lo, at thy feet I tarry, And on thy truth rely ;
In awful expectation Of my distressing hour,
I look for thy salvation, For all thy mercy’s power.
On thee, my health in sickness, My feeble soul is stayed ;
Thy strength in human weakness Is perfectly displayed :
Thou never wilt forsake me, Who on thy love depend,
But to thy bosom take me, Till pain with life shall end.

Here is a very natural idea under the circumstances :

But wilt thou suffer me to bear A sad reverse of thee ;
A graceless, miserable heir Of endless misery ;
Expose it to the world’s black wild, And sin’s malignant power ?
And must I, Lord, bring forth a child For Satan to devour ?

Here is a “Hymn for a Newborn Child”:

Father, Son, and Spirit come, Enter now thy human shrine,
Take my offspring from the womb ; Mine he is not, Lord, but thine :
Thine this moment let him be, Thine to all eternity !

Seize, O seize his tender heart, Beating to the vital air ;
Everlasting life impart, Sow the seed of glory there :
Grace be to my infant given, Grace, the principle of heaven.

In “the Mother’s Hymn,” he enters his protest against the popular melodies of that day:

What follies abound, Where reason is drowned
By a heathenish nurse in a torrent of sound !
When by Satan beguiled, With sonnets defiled,
She angers her Maker To quiet her child !
Who the Saviour and son Of Mary have known,
They delight to converse With their Jesus alone :

They at all times proclaim His wonderful name,
And in tending their infants they sing of the Lamb.

The subjects of the several poems in this volume are as various as the varying occasions of domestic and individual life. The titles of some are: "For a Child in the Small Pox"; "For a Child Cutting his Teeth"; "At sending a Child to the Boarding School." Where others would produce mere 'prose tagged with rhyme,' Charles Wesley shows the genuine poet; where others would be drearily and lifelessly commonplace, he has solid ideas, expressed with elegance, originality, and force; where others are either pompous or mawkish, he is natural, tender, manly, and earnest. No other poet has been able to write on such minute and common subjects, without first leaving his poetry behind him; but the Methodist Pegasus ambles through bedrooms and parlors, or soars from the house-top to heaven, as gracefully as if he were on the smoothest and most frequented road. Many of these poems—especially the hymns for Parents and Masters in the present Wesleyan Collection—are wonderful examples of minute comprehensiveness of thought and petition. There is a liberal and sensible discrimination between natural goodness and the righteousness of faith, in a wife's prayer "for an Unconverted Husband":

Thy goodness formed and turned his mind;
Thou mad'st him generous, just, and kind; Yet, O incarnate God,
Through thee escaped the gulf of vice,
In nature's deadly sleep he lies, Nor pants to feel thy blood.

Thou know'st, if not a foe professed,
A stranger to thy cross, at rest Without thy grace he lives;
Thoughtless of death and judgment near,
His joy, his good, his portion here, Contented he receives.

Some of the hymns are for "Various Occasions." Here is a fine description of a peculiar state of mind, "Written in Uncertainty":

My every choice, desire, design, I now implicitly submit;
My will is fixed to follow thine, And lies indifferent at thy feet.

Parties and sects I now forego, From all their schemes and systems free :
After the flesh no more I know Those dearest souls thou gav'st to me.
Loosed and detached, I cease from man ; Opinions, names, are clean forgot ;
This all my aim, and all my plan, To do, and be — I know not what.

In 1766 Charles published 100 "Hymns for Children and Others of Riper Years." It is more especially the latter; for most of the contents are hardly within the grasp of infantine minds. The preface, supposed to be by John Wesley, says: "There are two ways of writing or speaking to children: the one is to let ourselves down to them; the other, to lift them up to us." Dr. Watts, he says, used the first style; his brother attempts the second, with "strong and manly sense, yet expressed" so as "even children may understand. But when they do understand them, they will be children no longer, only in years and stature." This is rather a contradiction in terms. The impossible promise is hardly fulfilled; and the book, in our opinion, shares the fate of all attempts to "lift children up to us," i. e. to put old heads on young shoulders. Dr. Watts and Peter Parley are the best instructors of babes, after all. Some things in the present volume are interesting, a few are edifying, and more are amusing; but with a few notable exceptions, the writer is either too high for the children or too low for others and himself. Children can hardly understand this kind:

Teacher of babes, to thee I for instruction flee ;
In my natural estate, Thee, my God, I cannot know :
Let thy grace illuminate, Thee let thy own Spirit show.

Or,

Let the potsberds of the earth Boast their virtue, beauty, birth :
A poor, guilty worm I am, Ransomed by the bleeding Lamb.

Or, "when they do understand them, they will be children no longer," and so will be able to use the hymns for "others of riper years," without needing any specially manufactured for them. In a very few instances, the poet took especial pains to get out of himself, and become entirely comprehensible to the meanest understanding. Whether it were worth the

pains, except to show that he *could* write otherwise than well, is doubtful :

How wretched are the boys at school, Who wickedly delight
To mock, and call each other fool, And with each other fight :
Who soon their innocence lose, And learn to curse and swear ;
Or if they do no harm, suppose That good enough they are !

An undeniable proposition ; but it scarcely required a great lyric poet to state it. Again,

Idle boys and men are found Standing on the devil's ground :
He will give them work to do ; He will pay their wages too.

Enough of this, which is about the level of Watts's most juvenile melodies. First among the "Hymns for Girls," Charles, rather unkindly, proposes to make the female children of his disciples sing this :

Ah, dire effect of female pride !
How deep our mother's sin, and wide, Through all her daughters spread !
Since first she plucked the mortal tree,
Each woman would a goddess be In her Creator's stead.

This fatal vanity of mind,
A curse entailed on all the kind, Her legacy we feel :
We neither can deny nor tame
Our inbred eagerness for fame, And stubbornness of will.

See from the world's politest school
The goddess rise, mankind to rule, As born for her alone !
Unclogged by thought, she issues forth,
And, justly conscious of her worth, Ascends her gaudy throne.

With lust of fame and pleasure fired,
The virgin shines, caressed, admired, And idolized by all ;
Obedient to her dread command,
Around her throne the votaries stand, Or at her footstool fall.

And so on through sixteen verses. Charles had been married some years when he wrote this : his wife was a woman of birth and refinement, but it seems she was not able to correct his ideas on this point. He teaches his infants the true ascetic doctrine :

We for no worldly pleasures plead,
No *innocent diversions* need, As Satan calls his joys :
His rattles let the tempter keep,
Or his own children rock to sleep With such amusing toys.

He also edifies the young people with a fancy picture of "Primitive Christianity," founded on fact, and somewhat singularly presented. Where, unless from his own vivid imagination, he got the facts as to the model children of those early days, does not appear :

The Christians of old, United in one,
As sheep in a fold, Were never alone ;
As birds of a feather They flocked to their nest,
And sheltered together in Jesus's breast.

Small learning they had, And wanted no more :
Not many could read, But all could adore :
No help from the college or school they received,
Content with his knowledge In whom they believed.

Men in their own eyes Were children again,
And children were wise and solid as men ;
The women were fearful Of nothing but sin,
Their hearts were all cheerful, Their consciences clean.

He was more successful in his "Hymns for the Youngest," some of which combine solid piety and poetry with infantine simplicity and sweetness. Two verses beginning: "Loving Jesus, gentle Lamb," have been transferred to the present church hymn books of the Methodists; and their Sunday School collections contain part of another, which is one of the prettiest of its kind :

Gentle Jesus, meek and mild, Look upon a little child ;
Pity my simplicity ; Suffer me to come to thee.

Put thy hand upon my head, Let me in thine arms be stayed :
Give me, Lord, thy blessing give ; Pray for me, and I shall live.

I shall live the simple life, Free from sin's uneasy strife ;
Sweetly ignorant of ill, Innocent and happy still.

O that I may never know What the wicked people do !
Sin is contrary to thee, Sin is the forbidden tree.

This volume also contains several of its author's finest hymns, which are not exactly "hymns for children." The noble poem, "And am I born to die," really unites "strong manly sense" with perfect simplicity of language, and is adapted to impress any mind, young or old. Beside this appeared the hymn "And am I only born to die," and one

or two others, whose close, earnest, and lofty vein of thought commend them rather to those "of riper years."

We have yet to notice Charles Wesley's *Hymns and Sacred Poems*, published in 1749: two stout volumes, containing a great deal of interesting and valuable matter. Many of the poems are in some sense autobiographic, and several have been quoted in this Article to illustrate their author's life and character; but there remain a number, arranged under special heads and subjects, which exhibit the poet's wealth and power of imagination. He seems to have possessed, in a rare degree, the faculty of putting himself into some mental state entirely foreign to his personal experience and condition, and building up, on that ideal basis, a complete and symmetrical edifice. No one has described with equal fluency and minuteness the feelings of backsliders and impenitent sinners. A few minutes' conversation with such a person, or a fit of depression on his own part, would doubtless suffice to elicit a cry as from the depths, and produce a lifelike picture of hopeless misery. He has reached the middle period of life; a sober retrospect, perhaps, brings on a momentary gloom, and he dashes into the following:

And have I measured half my days, And half my journey run,
Nor tasted the Redeemer's grace, Nor yet my work begun?
The morning of my life is past, The noon is almost o'er;
The night of death approaches fast, When I can work no more.

O what a length of wretched years Have I lived out in vain!
How fruitless all my toils and tears, — I am not born again!
O'er earth a banished man I rove, But cannot feel Him nigh;
Where is the pardoning God of love, Who deigned for me to die?

There are a number of "Hymns for one fallen from Grace."

O how sore a thing and grievous Is it from our God to run!
When we force our God to leave us, Wretched are we and undone:
Are we not our own tormentors, When from happiness we flee?
Yes, our soul the iron enters; Sin is perfect misery.

Plague and curse I now inherit, Fears and wars and storms within,
Pain and agony of spirit, Sin chastising me for sin;
Weeping, woe, and lamentation, Vain desire and fruitless prayer,
Guilt and shame and condemnation, Doubt, distraction, and despair.

He closes with a pathetic exhortation to others to take warning by his fate :

Dead to praise and wealth and beauty,
Cast on Christ your every care ;
Walk in all the paths of duty,
Praying, watching unto prayer :
Pray ; and when the answer's given,
When ye find the passage free,
When your faith hath opened heaven,
Faithful souls, remember me !

The poet's usual style is diffuse rather than concise : but here is a perfect epigram :

That sudden flash of heavenly light
Which once broke in upon my night,
Has made my darkness visible,
And left me to a deeper hell.

He cannot paint too strongly the horrors of the fallen and backslidden spirit :

Would to God that I had died, Ere I the deed had done,
Mocked afresh, and crucified, And trampled on his Son !
All in vain I wish and pray ; It is, and cannot but have been :
Who can call back yesterday, Or nullify my sin ?

With a diamond's point it stands Engraven on my heart,
Wrote by mine and Satan's hands, It mocks the eraser's art :
Deep as hell's foundations driven Into my soul the marks remain :
Is there dew in that fair heaven To purge so foul a stain ?

Again, and yet more intensely ; but this time with a glimmering of hope :

Oh hell of sin ! thy fiery rage
Not many waters can assuage, Not all the ocean's flood ;
Thy flames would, spite of all, increase :
What then can make thy burnings cease ? A drop of Jesus' blood.

In the second volume are a number of hymns for widows. Here is a specimen of proud and magnanimous sorrow :

Weep, ye common mourners, weep, Tell aloud your shallow woe :
Silent all my griefs, and deep, In an even current flow,
Till they reach the peaceful sea, Lost in calm eternity.

The poet's views as to the recognition of friends in heaven, were clear and positive :

Can a true believer doubt If souls each other know ?
Surely I shall find him out Whom most I prize below.

He is quite explicit as to the reunion of husband and wife :

Inflamed with seraphical love, Combined in a manner unknown,
Not given in marriage above, Or given to Jesus alone ;
The just who, admitted by grace, That first resurrection attain,
With rapture each other embrace, And one with the Deity reign.

A manuscript version of most of the Psalms, by the Methodist poet, was accidentally discovered some years ago, and has since been published both in England and this country : the latter under the auspices of the Methodist Church, South. These paraphrases are written with ease and grace, and some of them possess much strength and beauty. A few had found their way into the volumes printed by the Wesleys, and are in the present hymn books.

With the standard collections of the Methodists we have no present concern, further than as they almost alone contain the accessible poems of Charles Wesley. The great Hymn Book of his brother, published in 1780, contained 525 hymns, and, with slight alterations and a considerable Supplement, is still used by the Wesleyan connection in England. Of 770 hymns herein, 627 are by Charles. This volume, or rather the old editions without the Supplement, is, taken all in all, the best collection of Wesleyan poetry extant, and the most essential manual for one who desires to study this attractive and important department of sacred literature. It by no means contains all of Charles's best poems, nor even all which are thoroughly suited to public worship ; but it is profoundly impressed with his spirit, and presents, in a purer form than any volume extant, many of the noblest fruits of his genius.

The present collection of the American Methodist Episcopal church is not what it might be. The compilers seem scarcely to have appreciated the treasures which were all their own ; for the smaller book which it superseded was, as a selection of Wesleyan poetry, superior to this volume. The long hymns of Charles Wesley, whether they will bear

it or not, are cut down to six, four, three verses; a task always delicate and difficult, and here not always executed with a tender hand. The unity and literary value of many poems are thus destroyed, while verses and whole hymns of the highest character are thrown out, to make room for comparatively indifferent matter from outside sources: for the extensive selections from the rich fields of non-Methodist hymnology have not been made with uniform good judgment.

The collection of the Methodists South is more satisfactory. That is a very bad church, but has a very good hymn book. This volume, it is sufficient to say, is not open to the charges just brought against the other; but does fair justice to the poet who is its chief contributor, and contains, within a less number of hymns, more real poetry and more solid, useful matter than the northern compilation.

Our extracts have been made chiefly from poems which are not exactly hymns, and are utterly unknown to the public. It is proper, before closing this Article, to refer briefly to those productions by which Charles Wesley is generally known, and which are supposed, or offered, to be sung in public and social worship.

That not all of these are fitted for congregational use any person of competent judgment will soon discover. Some are too private and personal in their experiences; some too ecstatic in feeling; some too loftily imaginative or unrestrainedly poetical; some too minute and lengthy to be strictly lyrical; and some are in metres not to be sung. In all these respects John Wesley's hymn book is reduced and elected from the wide scope and vast variety of style, of its materials; but, in all these respects, the Wesleyan matter which goes into any modern collection must be yet further elected and reduced from it. Charles Wesley invented or adopted no end of metrical habits to contain his poetry, some of which were as "peculiar" as this:

Speechless am I, till thy kind sigh From this dumb fiend deliver:
Then, my Lord, my God, I cry, And sing and shout forever!

That sort is not admitted into the Wesleyan hymn book, which contains only twenty-six different metres; but of those twenty-six we have to drop several. So of other things. The poet was wont to express innate depravity in strong terms:

Worse than all I find The bitter root within,
The beastly heart, The devilish mind, The hell of inbred sin.

And

The beast and devil I deny, Sensual and animal delight;
The wanton and the curious eye Be closed in everlasting night;
My learned lust be cast aside, And all my filth of self and pride.

This, in the authorized books, is reduced to

The beast and devil in my soul.

But this, though merely a strong expression for an undoubted truth, is not exactly lyrical, nor adapted to edify a promiscuous audience. So, when the itinerant preacher, in the tender fidelity of his ministerial and poetical heart, exclaims:

Outcasts of men, to you I call,
Harlots and publicans and thieves!
.
Come, Oh my guilty brethren, come,
Groaning beneath your load of sin;
His bleeding heart shall make you room,
His open side shall take you in:

.
For you the purple torrent flowed
In pardons from his wounded side;
Languished for you the eternal God;
For you the Prince of glory died;
Believe, and all your sin's forgiven;
Only believe, and yours is heaven!

We admire the powerful and elegant verses, but do not propose to sing them on ordinary occasions. Yet there is abundance that we *can* sing: a number, quite as large, we believe, as can be found in any other hymn-writer, that are not only poetical in a high degree, but thoroughly lyrical, and suited to the purposes of general worship. Where shall we find finer *practical* hymns than those beginning "A

charge to keep I have"; "Sinners, turn, why will ye die?" "And am I born to die"; "O God, my inmost soul convert"; or nobler songs of Christian triumph than: "Rejoice, the Lord is King!" "Blow ye the trumpet, blow"; "Oh for a thousand tongues to sing"; "Christ the Lord is risen to-day"; or more appropriate vehicles and helps to a spirit of prayer than: "Oh for a heart to praise my God"; "I want a principle within"; "Jesus, my strength, my hope"; "Love divine, all loves excelling"; or sweeter devotional hymns than: "Jesus, lover of my soul"; "Arise, my soul, arise"; "Vain delusive world adieu"; or truer expressions of appropriating faith than, "Jesus, the sinner's friend, to thee"; "Jesus hath died that I might live"; "Forever here my rest shall be." Nor is our author confined to one style or tone. If we want quiet, thoughtful hymns, where solid doctrines and strong ideas are crowded into concise and mellifluous measures, we find our very ideal in such as "Father, to thee my soul I lift"; "Father of Jesus Christ, my Lord" (the greater part of it: the middle verses are a rhapsody); "Thy ceaseless, unexhausted love"; "Jesus, if still thou art to-day." Or, if we wish more intense and fiery melodies, we can have

Oh that thou wouldst the heavens rend, In majesty come down,
Stretch out thine arm omnipotent, And seize me for thine own!

We may either sing the Incarnation in decorous and theological long metre, or burst forth:

With glorious clouds encompass round, Whom angels dimly see;
Will the Unsearchable be found, Or God appear to me?
Will he forsake his throne above, Himself to worms impart?
Answer, thou man of grief and love, And speak it to my heart!

No hymn-writer is more *intellectual*: none puts more doctrine, thought, solid mental pabulum, into his poems. And certainly none is more awakening and edifying; few others, in fact, approach him in native moral earnestness, force, fire; and none possesses a higher, purer, more consistent, uniform, and positive spirituality. How and why then does it happen, all this being so, that his writings are not more largely known, honored, and used? We shall attempt

several suggestions towards an answer to this difficult question.

First, then, — it may seem absurd, but it is true, — the very merit of these productions has stood, and still stands, in the way of their more extended usefulness and honor. Says Mr. Burgess. “The peculiar excellence of many of the hymns; the high tone of devout sentiment which pervades them; the exalted spirit of piety which they breathe, — are in fact the very things that make them unfit for general and indiscriminate use. They are *too good* for such purposes; too deep in meaning, too minute, and too accurate in describing the feelings and wants, the exercises and desires of genuine Christians. Hymns of an inferior order might be used more freely and with less danger.” This is an honest, discriminating, and just remark, by one who had deeply studied the subject. And the criticism is honorable to its subject. There are few things in this world “too good” for their destined place and use; and we do not know another hymn-writer whose effusions are liable to this objection. That not merely the poetical, but the spiritual character of hymns should be too high for common and promiscuous use is a unique defect. But so it is. Of course it is largely our fault; as people become more spiritually minded they learn better to understand, enjoy, and profit by such poems. If the English language and the recognized metres be used in heaven, doubtless the Wesleyan hymns will be sung there with thorough appreciation. With so low a standard of spiritual experience and ambition as prevails here and now, of course they are above our heads. But if it be worth while to attempt to raise that standard, to teach the people more than they at present or usually know, to seek a higher point and larger measure of holiness, — then it will be well to introduce more of the Wesleyan poetry into our hymn books.

Secondly; it is commonly supposed, with some slight foundation of truth, that the Methodists have in some sense a gospel of their own; that they look at divine truth in a

way peculiar to themselves, have built on the common foundation a superstructure of wood, hay, stubble, and hold certain views, habits, doctrines, which are an appendix to catholic Christianity, but essential to their system, as immersion and close communion to the Baptist, reprobation and Rouse's Psalms to the Old style Puritan, apostolic succession and exclusiveness to the Episcopalian. Now, as aforesaid, some little of this is so; and in proportion as it is, or as we of other names fancy it is, we are naturally disposed to shrink with a sort of suspicion from peculiarities which we do not endorse. There is a *definiteness* about the Methodist system of which the rest of us do not see the correctness or point. The idea of Christians generally — be it right or wrong — has been expressed by Samuel Wesley, Jr., the brother of John and Charles. "As it was in the beginning, I believe it will continue to the end, in another sense. Darkness will be, when the Spirit of God moveth upon the face of the waters. It is enough for us, that we are not concerned to tell how these things be." But John and Charles were concerned to tell it, and took a very different view of the matter. They soon had the region mapped out, with roads and distances and rules and technical terms. In their account, the mysterious operations of the Holy Ghost within man's heart become as clear and plain as external, sensuous, worldly matters. There must be a time of agony and darkness, then instantaneous conversion, then a period of ecstatic joy, then a "wilderness state," and subsequently various ups and downs, for which the rules would vary to suit circumstances. Whether all this scheme was right or wrong, it is not our business to decide. That the Wesleys committed no sin in believing and teaching it, we are satisfied; that it was a part of the necessary means to accomplish certain great ends at that time, appears probable; that it was wonderfully popular and did much good, is abundantly proved; that it or its perversions have done some harm, is likewise apparent. But the point is, that, correct or incorrect, this extreme

definiteness; this dividing and arranging and explaining of mysteries; this carnalizing — which it sometimes almost runs into — of spiritual things; this incarnating of the Spirit as well as Christ, in a visible, tangible form; this attaching so much importance to human emotions; this resting so positively on human evidences and inward signs, — does not exactly tally with the views of the church at large. A genuine Methodist cannot see that this is not an essential part of the gospel; and Mr. Burgess expatiates, with enthusiastic approbation and delight, upon the following couplets, which our readers will be more apt to consider sentimental than otherwise: “What a depth of meaning,” he says, “what propriety, what truth is there in such lines as these.” We cannot see it, nor that tears and sighs do any such thing:

The tears that tell your sins forgiven,
The sighs that waft your souls to heaven:
The guiltless shame, the sweet distress,
The unutterable tenderness;
The genuine meek humility:
The wonder, “Why such love to me?”

One would think he was painting an earthly heroine in some very human scene. The present writer would not put these verses in a hymn book, because he sees neither doctrine, devotion, nor practical profit in them: only well-meant human emotion and misplaced prettinesses of fancy.

Again; this hymn is very popular among the Methodists:

How can a sinner *know* His sins on earth forgiven?
How can my gracious Saviour show My name inscribed in heaven?
What we have *felt and seen* With confidence we tell;
And publish to the sons of men The *signs infallible*.

The “infallible” signs are, of course, inward and chiefly emotional. Here is the first and chief:

Exults our rising soul, Disburdened of its load,
And swells unutterably full Of glory and of God.

Our readers need not fear the contagion. These two are by far the strongest specimens in the Wesleyan hymn book. If the Methodist poet be sifted a little, he is not dangerous. Not often is there enough distinctive Methodism in him to

prevent his use by the "holy church universal"; but the facts and illustrations we have given present one cause, things being as they are, why he is used so little. We have never heard the subject discussed; but this peculiar feature of his theology must have done much towards hindering the church at large from knowing, honoring, and using him as she might and should have done.

These two reasons existed in the nature of the subject: the others are more casual and less creditable. One springs from — soften the terms as we may — the sectarianism, the denominational spirit, the party pride and prejudice, not of Methodism, but of other churches. We are not so bigoted as our grandfathers were: a catholic and liberal spirit, thank heaven, is advancing fast; but there is still room for improvement. When Cowper wrote his poetry, though he revered the character and labors, he dared not mention the name, of Whitefield. Some of us are still afraid of the brother name, Wesley. Why do several of the Methodist's finest hymns — "Blow ye the trumpet, blow"; "Light of those whose dreary dwelling"; "From the throne of God there springs"; almost universally appear credited to Toplady? Why are numerous others with the same origin wildly credited to Montgomery, Cowper, Cudworth, or any but the true author, or still more wildly fathered upon Whitefield's Collection, Pratt's Collection, Tiebout's Collection, or any obscure compilation which had no more to do with them than we have, in putting them likewise into our hymn books? Ignorance or mistake, of course: but what caused the mistake or ignorance? It was wilful somewhere, with somebody; and it is quite time it were rectified. The blunders of hymn-book manufacturers have been multifarious and disgraceful; and never so numerous or inexcusable as when they fell upon Charles Wesley. But one ought to be thankful if he is named at all. We have seen collections of size and respectability, in which his poems are either totally kept out, or carefully ascribed to some one else, or — with but one or two exceptions — left anonymous. This is

simply contemptible, and the practice is fortunately abating. But Calvinists still have some dread of the heresy-monger, and churchmen affect to dispise the schismatic. It is time all Christians should learn that no instrument is to be slighted which God uses for his own glory, and that this psalmist was not merely, nor chiefly, the poet of a party, but of the holy church universal.

If the present writer were a Methodist, he would blush to mention the last reason why Charles Wesley is so little known. It is the fault of those who were the natural heirs of the treasures he left, and guardians of his reputation. The spiritual children of the great itinerants profess to venerate the memory of their founder's brother, and to admire beyond measure his poetry; but they have done almost nothing towards bringing the mass of that poetry within their own reach, or making it generally known. While the "complete works" of a thousand obscure scribblers have been presented to the world; while every unfinished fragment and posthumous relic of many an inferior literary light has been carefully edited and published; the Bard of Methodism has been treated as though he had written nothing that could interest posterity, nor ever left a great church under incalculable obligations. It may be guessed, from the samples we have given of his forgotten poetry, that it is worth reprinting and reading. His brother's entire prose works are still sold; Charles's poems should be no less interesting, and would occupy less space. Two large octavos might contain all that were ever published; and meantime a volume of judicious selections from the whole would be one of the most attractive books of poetry in the language. But neither the American Methodists nor the English Wesleyans — both large, powerful, thoroughly organized bodies — seem to possess the enterprise, liberality, and spirit for such an undertaking. The latter did indeed republish a few of Charles's smaller volumes; and, with a keen eye to business, purchased of his heirs the vast mass of his manuscripts (already referred to), which they never attempted to print.

In this country, nothing whatever has been done. Mr. Creamer, in his *Hymnology*, raises a cry of natural and honest indignation about this, and vainly urges his church to republish the "*Hymns for Children*." It is difficult to understand this lethargy, when a very simple action of obvious propriety and duty would open an additional revenue to the church; for the Wesleyan volumes, officially put forth, would sell largely. But so it is. That the Methodist body knows anything about her own hymnology, and is able to tell which separate lyrics in her hymn book are by her own poet, she owes to the spirit and zeal of a few private individuals like Mr. Creamer. Excepting his *Hymnology*, the present Article is probably the most extensive dissertation on the subject which has been printed in America. If any wish to be further acquainted with Charles Wesley and his poetry, they must consult the above-mentioned volume, and Mr. Jackson's *Life*. The former contains much important information, not to be found elsewhere; the latter is one of the most thorough, interesting, and appreciative of biographies. We speak of the English edition, in two volumes; that published in America is abridged, and the poetical quotations much diminished.

The immense power of the Wesleyan poetry upon those who use it has been noticed. "One of the greatest blessings," said Fletcher, "that God has bestowed upon the Methodists, next to the Bible, is their Collection of Hymns." We cannot but believe that this blessing was intended for wider use than the limits of a single denomination; and that the piety and taste of the rest of us will be improved, when we shall raise enough of both to make much larger inroads into the Wesleyan poetry, and enrich our reservoirs by more copious streams from that neglected but generous fountain.

It has been considered a difficult point to decide which is entitled to stand first among hymn-writers, Charles Wesley or Dr. Watts. The difficulty lies simply here, that Dr. Watts was merely a hymn-writer, and could and did, most naturally, put all his powers within the proper limits of a

song suited to public worship. The only question to ask relative to anything of his is, is it good enough? Whereas twenty reasons may unfit Wesley's poems for that use. If a piece of the Doctor's is unfit to sing, it is probably unfit to read: not so with the other; for Wesley was a poet in a larger sense. Their relative claims *as poets* will soon be settled, by the good taste of competent judges, whenever Wesley's poetry becomes sufficiently known. Dr. Watts's confession that his rival's "Wrestling Jacob" was worth all his own effusions, proves nothing but the modesty and generosity of the speaker; but there are other grounds for believing that Wesley excelled him in originality, variety, intensity, and elevation. Dr. Watts has been appreciated within the church at large; Charles Wesley has not. Let him not be judged further than as he is known.

It is an easy task to compare our poet with the other more eminent hymnists. Doddridge and Steele are diluted reproductions of Dr. Watts. Montgomery, a professed and lifelong poet, is inferior to Wesley in all the qualities mentioned above, and in no respect above him in propriety, harmony, and grace of style. Heber, the most elegant and mellifluous of sacred poets, is not more polished and fluent than his Methodist predecessor; nor has he anything of his solidity, strength, and fire. Cowper is the greatest name in the hymn books; but Cowper's best poems, which are very few, are but equal, not superior, to Wesley's best, which are very many. Toplady approaches most nearly to the Methodist poet; but Toplady borrowed his inspiration from Wesley, and reproduced his style; and it is the Calvinist's highest praise that his finest pieces are undistinguishable from those of his Arminian neighbor. No other names in British sacred lyric poetry can be mentioned with that of Charles Wesley; and when it is remembered that all these counted their poems by dozens or hundreds, while he by thousands; and that *his* thousands were in power, in elegance, in devotional and literary value above *their* few, we call him, yet more confidently, great among poets, and prince of English hymnists.

ARTICLE III.

THE AUTHOR OF THE APOCALYPSE.

BY PROF. R. D. C. ROBBINS, MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

Reasons for the following Discussion.

To some persons it may seem useless to occupy the pages of the Bibliotheca with an argument in favor of the genuineness of the Apocalypse, and of its composition by John the beloved apostle. It is enough for them that it is prefaced with the words: "The Revelation of Jesus Christ to his servant *John*," or "*John* to the seven churches which are in Asia," and "*I John* who am also your brother and companion in tribulation was in the isle called Patmos," etc.; and that near the close it is said, "*I John* saw the holy city," etc. Others, however, from the peculiarities of the book, may be inclined to excuse themselves from its study with the lingering feeling that while it has indeed "some things hard to be understood," it yet does not come under the injunction: "search *the scriptures*, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me."

Such certainly has been the feeling of some in modern days; and some, as Oeder, Semler, and Corrodi, in Germany, have opposed it with bitterness and acrimony, and denied it aesthetical merit as well as inspiration.

The majority of the leading writers in Germany are unequivocal in their denial of its apostolic origin. De Wette says: "In New Test. criticism nothing stands so firm as that the apostle John, if he be the writer of the Gospel and the First Epistle did not write the Apocalypse; or if the latter be his work, that he is not the author of the former."¹ Ewald is equally positive in his opinion. "That the Apocalypse was not written by the same author who composed the

¹ Einl. N. Test., § 189.

Gospel and Epistles is," says he, "clear as the light of the sun."¹ Credner, too, expresses himself to the same effect: "Between the author of the Apocalypse and the apostle John there exists a diversity so deeply pervading, that even to the mere supposition, that the Gospel and First Epistle were the productions of the same mind, when it had attained to higher spiritual progress, which at an earlier period would have composed the Apocalypse, no place can be given; since it would be altogether unnatural and inadmissible."² Others, as F. Lücke, Bleek, and Schott, might be quoted to the same purpose.

At the beginning of the Reformation, as well as more recently in Germany, the Apocalypse was discarded. Luther says: "There are many reasons why I regard this book as neither apostolical nor prophetic. First, and principally, the apostles do not make use of visions, but prophesy in clear and plain language, as do Peter, Paul, and Christ also in the Gospel; for it is suitable to the apostolic office to speak clearly and without figure or vision respecting Christ and his acts. There is also no prophet in the Old Testament, not to mention the New, who treats of visions throughout, so that the fourth book of Esdras is almost equal to it in my estimation; and certainly I cannot perceive that it proceedeth from the Holy Spirit. Besides, it seems to me too much for him to enjoin it rigorously on his readers to regard his own work as of more importance than any other sacred book, and to threaten that if any one should take aught away from it, God will take away from him his part in the book of life. Again, even if they are to be blessed who hold to what is contained in it, no man knows what that is, much less what *holding to it* means. The curse is all the same as though we had it not; and many more valuable books exist for us to hold to. Many of the Fathers, too, rejected it long ago; and though St. Jerome employs big words, and says that it is above all praise, and contains as

¹ Comm. p. 76.

² Einl. § 267. The above are quoted by Stuart, Comm., Introd. § 17.

many mysteries as words, yet he cannot prove that; and in several places his praise is moderate. Finally, let every man think of it as his spirit prompts him. My spirit cannot adapt itself to the book; and it is reason enough for me why I should not esteem it very highly that Christ is neither taught in it nor acknowledged, which above all things an apostle is bound to do; for he says (Acts i.) *ye shall be my witnesses*. I abide, therefore, by the books that give Christ to me clearly and purely.”¹ Luther subsequently became more mild and reasonable in his opposition to it, although he does not seem ever to have cordially accepted it as divine: “We have,” he says, “hitherto, on account of these doubtful interpretations and hidden meanings, left it to itself, especially since one of the ancient Fathers believed that it was not written by the apostle, as is related in Lib. iii. Hist. Eccles.”² In this uncertainty we, for our part, let it remain; but do not prevent others from taking it to be the work of St. John the apostle, if they choose.”³ Others of the Reformers, as Zuingli, Carlstadt, and Erasmus, agree with Luther in denying that the Apocalypse is a “divine book.”

Even Professor Stuart says: “there are so many apparent difficulties in the way of giving credit to the alleged apostolic origin of the Apocalypse, that it may easily be believed by even a fair-minded critic, who should proceed only a moderate length in the examination of the question of authorship, that grounds are not wanting to persuade one to doubt or disbelieve such an origin. Indeed we know that such is the state of the case. My own mind, if I may be permitted to speak of myself, has in the different stages of examination, gone through a process of this sort to a certain extent. I have never positively disbelieved the *apostolical* origin of the book; but I have, in certain states of knowledge and certain stages of inquiry, been compelled to hold myself in

¹ Quoted by Davidson, Introd., Vol. III. 550, 551.

² This passage of Eusebius is quoted and commented upon below, in examining the testimony of that historian.

³ Davidson, Vol. III. 551.

suspense, and wait for more light." If, then, anything can be accomplished in rescuing any from a state of suspense into which they may have fallen, by a brief outline of the arguments for the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse, our labor will not have been in vain. The discussion naturally falls into two general divisions, the *external* argument, i. e. the reception which the book received in the church of the early ages; and the *internal*, i. e. the declarations in the book itself, and the characteristics of form, style, and sentiment, when compared with the other works of the reputed author.

I. EXTERNAL ARGUMENT.

Proof that John the Apostle was the Author, from the Belief and Testimony of the early Fathers and the Church itself.

Direct testimony to the Johannean authorship of the Revelation, in the generation immediately following the death of the apostle, i. e. from the end of the first to the middle of the second century, is not found, and could hardly be expected on the supposition that the apostle John is the author. Had his claim been questioned, there would doubtless have been allusion to it; but now there is merely incidental reference to it in verbal coincidences, as in other acknowledged apostolical productions.

In the "Shepherd of Hermas," the references, which may be found in Lardner and Kirchhofer, are such as to indicate that the author of it had perhaps read and imitated the Apocalypse.¹

Ignatius, a contemporary of John, makes no direct reference to the Revelation or the circumstances attending the life of John, in his works now extant; but there are some coincidences of language which have been referred to as showing familiarity with that writing.² Still, as Barnes

¹ Lardner, Vol. II. 69, 87.

² E.g. Ep. ad Romanos: "In the patience of Jesus Christ," Rev. i. 9; Ep. ad Eph., sect. 9: "Stones of the temple of the Father, prepared for the building of God," Rev. xxi. 2-19; and, as added by Mr. Knight in his "New Argument

says:¹ "It must be admitted that this coincidence of language does not furnish any certain proof that Ignatius had seen the Apocalypse, though the language is such as he *might* have used if he had seen it. There was no known necessity, however, for his referring to this book if he was acquainted with it, and nothing can be inferred from his silence."

Of Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, who was in part contemporary with John, we have only one relic — his epistle to the Philippians. There is, however, an epistle of the church in Smyrna to the churches in Pontus, in reference to the martyrdom of Polycarp, in which Elliot and others claim that there is allusion to the Apocalypse, but without much evidence. Polycarp is here, however, referred to as furnishing *indirect* testimony to the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse. "As Polycarp was the personal friend and attendant of John, so was Irenaeus of Polycarp. Now Irenaeus everywhere, and on all occasions, testifies his full belief in the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse. Could he have done so if Polycarp had not believed the same? And must not Polycarp have certainly known what was the fact in regard to the authorship of the Apocalypse?"² A remark of Irenaeus upon the reading in xiii. 18, $\chi\xi\xi$, as substantiated by those who had seen John face to face (*ἐκείνων τῶν κατ' ὄψιν τὸν Ἰωάννην ἑωρακότων*, Lib. V. 30. 1.) gives additional force to this testimony, since Polycarp is doubtless prominent in the mind of Irenaeus in this remark, and he could not have failed to refer to it if he had differed with him in his general opinion of the whole book.

Papias, who is declared by Irenaeus to be a *hearer of John* and a friend (*ἑταῖρος*) of Polycarp, is evidently supposed by that author³ to have derived his millenarian views from the

for the Genuineness and Authenticity of the Revelation of John," Ep. ad. Philadel., sect. 6: "If they do not speak of Jesus Christ, they are but *sepulchral pillars*, and upon them are written only the names of men," Rev. iii. 12. Quoted by Davidson and Barnes.

¹ Introduction to Comm., p. 12.

² Stuart's Comm., Intro. § 17 (2).

³ V. 33.

Apocalypse. The same thing is implied in a remark of Eusebius, with the additional idea that the work from which his views were derived were of *apostolic*, i. e. Johannean origin, for no other apostle than John was ever thought of by the ancients as its author.¹ But we have direct testimony in the latter part of the fifth century and the beginning of the sixth, from Andreas, bishop of Caesarea, and his successor Arathos, that Papias received the Apocalypse as inspired : "In regard now to the inspiration of the book, we think it superfluous to speak further, since the blessed Gregory the Θεολόγον, and Cyril, and moreover those of an earlier age, Papias, Irenaeus, Methodius, and Hippolitus, bear witness to the credibility of this work."² Andreas not only thus refers to Papias, but in commenting on Rev. xii. 7 cites two passages from him. This *inspiration* is equivalent to Johannean authorship, as none but apostles and those who wrote at their dictation were counted worthy of the appellation *inspired*.

Melito, bishop of Sardis, "wrote a work exclusively upon this book," calling it the Apocalypse of John (τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰωάννου).³ Barnes sums up the value of his testimony thus : "(a) Melito was bishop of one of the churches to which the Apocalypse was directed ; (b) he lived near the time of John ; (c) he was a diligent student on this very subject ; (d) he had every opportunity of ascertaining the truth on the subject ; (e) he regarded it as the work of the apostle John ; (f) and he wrote a treatise, or commentary, on it as an inspired book. It is not easy to conceive of stronger testimony in favor of the book."⁴

¹ *Α καὶ ἡγοῦμαι, τὰς ἀποστολικὰς παραδεξάμενου διηγήσεις, ὑπολαβεῖν, τὰ ἐν ὑποδείγμασι πρὸς αὐτῶν μυστικῶς εἰρημένα μὴ συνειρωράκτα, κ. τ. λ. Hist., III. 39. See a full discussion of the testimony of Papias in Hengstenberg's Commentary, Vol. II. 395 seq.

² Περὶ μέντοι τοῦ Θεοπνεύστου τῆς βίβλου περιττὸν μηκύνειν τὸν λόγον ἡγούμεθα, τῶν μακαρίων, Γρηγορίου φημὶ τοῦ Θεολόγου, καὶ Κυρίλλου, προσέτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων, Παππίου, Ἰρηναίου, Μεθοδίου, καὶ Ἰππολίτου ταύτῃ προσμαρτυρούντων τὸ ἀξιόπιστον. Comm. on Apocal. Quoted by Stuart in his Introd. and by Hug in Introd., Vol. I. 652.

³ Eusebius, Eccl. Hist., p. 26, quoted by Davidson.

⁴ Comm., Introd. xvi.

Melito seems to have made this book not only the object of his special study, but to have taken it into his heart, and allowed it to have a moulding influence upon his character. Hence, probably, he gained the reputation of having a spirit of prophecy. Polycrates of Ephesus, says of him (Euseb., ch. V. 24), shortly after his death: "And Melito the eunuch who accomplished everything in the Holy Spirit (τὸν ἐν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πάντα πολιτευσάμενον), who rests at Sardis, waiting for the visitation from heaven, in which he shall rise from the dead." Jerome also says of him, that he was accounted "by the most of our people" as a prophet.¹

Justin Martyr flourished about the middle of the second century. He was a Greek by birth, and a heathen philosopher until he was converted to Christianity, about 132. After that time, he travelled in Egypt, Italy, and Asia Minor, and, according to Eusebius, held his "dialogue with Tripho the Jew," at Ephesus. He expressly attributes the Revelation to John the Apostle. "And since," he says, "among us a man named John, one of Christ's apostles, in the revelation made to him, prophesied that the believers in our Messiah should live a thousand years in Jerusalem,"² etc. This passage (the genuineness of which Rettig in vain attempted to impugn, as it is found in all the manuscripts of the work, and was unquestionably received when Eusebius wrote his Ecclesiastical History; for he says, he [Justin] mentions the Apocalypse of John, and says expressly [σαφῶς] that it belongs to the apostle) not only shows what Justin's belief was, but that it was a belief that would not be questioned, as it is adduced in proof of a controverted dogma,³ and at Ephesus, "where," according to Hengsten-

¹ Hengstenberg's Comm., Vol. II. 412.

² Καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀνὴρ τις, ᾧ ὄνομα Ἰωάννης, εἰς τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐν Ἀποκαλύψει γενομένη αὐτῷ, χίλια ἔτη ποιήσκειν, ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ, τοὺς τῷ ἡμετέρῳ Χριστῷ πιστεύσαντας προεφήτευσεν, κ. τ. λ. Dial. cum Tryph., c. 80 and 81.

³ See Stuart's Introd., § 17 (4); Hengstenberg's Comm., Vol. II. 407, and likewise Schott, Lücke, Credner, and others upon this point.

berg, "the best information was to be obtained regarding the origin of the Apocalypse."

Besides, this direct mention of the Apocalypse does not stand alone, as has been sometimes alleged, but is "the centre of a wide circle of unquestionable references."¹ So many and distinct are they, that Hengstenberg thinks he has found in them an explanation of the passage in the Catalogue of Jerome, in which he attributes commentaries on the Apocalypse to Justin and Irenaeus." "It was long," he says, "before a proper commentary on the Apocalypse appeared, but at a comparatively early period the materials for such a work were prepared. A purpose in regard to this is found even in Papias, who expressly intimates, that he meant to give an exposition of this book, as well as of the discourses of the apostles. But Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, with whom also may be coupled Melito, were the first who endeavored seriously to make good such a purpose. Often do we perceive in them the effort to arrange the contents of the Apocalypse in connection with the whole scheme of biblical truth, to form a bridge between it and the Christian views and sentiments of the time, and to break through the shell of its figurative language into the kernel of its ideas. We could give from Irenaeus especially a series of passages which would be similar to a commentary, if not on the whole, yet certainly on particular parts of the Apocalypse. If the peculiar character of the book and its relation to the Greek spirit is duly considered, it will be manifest that the matter could proceed in no other way, and that proper exegetical works could only begin to appear at a later period. But so much is clear from this expression of Jerome, that he had read Justin more attentively than our modern critics, who have been so sadly perplexed with his statement."²

A passage in Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus in the latter half of the second century, is worthy of notice here. In a

¹ See the references in Hengstenberg's Commentary, Vol. III. 408 seq.

² Comm., II. 410, 411.

letter to Victor and the church of Rome (Euseb. B. III. 31 and V. 24) in enumerating the illustrious dead who had adorned the church in Asia, he says: "We have also to add John, who rested on the Lord's bosom, who was *a priest that bore the holy plate on the forehead* (τὸ πέταλον) and a witness and teacher; he reposes at Ephesus." Hengstenberg here naturally finds a plain allusion in the characteristics of John to his different writings. The words: "who rested on the Lord's bosom," taken from, also characterizes, his Gospel; "a priest that bore the holy plate on his forehead, and a witness," refer to the Apocalypse; and "a teacher," to the Epistles, where the address, "my children," is so frequent.¹

Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, a man of some note, also in the latter half of the second century, in a book against the heresy of Hermogenes, drew arguments from the *Apocalypse of John*.² That by John was meant John the Apostle, and that the Apocalypse was quoted as scripture, there cannot be much doubt.

A very similar remark is made by Eusebius in respect to the book of Apollonius, a writer of Asia Minor, against the Montanists: "He employs testimony from the Apocalypse of John."³ What John is meant is shown by the next clause: "And he relates that a dead person was raised by this same John, through divine power."

Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, is a witness whose testimony if it stood alone, would be difficult to combat. His life extended back to "the first succession of the apostles" (Euseb. V. 20), and he was intimately acquainted with those who had been associated with John, as Polycarp, Papias, and others; he even appeals to the testimony of those who had seen John in respect to the number 666 in Rev. xiii. 18. His faithfulness in recording and handing down the tradi-

¹ Comm., II. 412, 413.

² Euseb. Eccl. Hist. IV. 24: ἐν ᾧ ἐκ τῆς Ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰωάννου κέχρηται μαρτυρίαις.

³ Κέχρηται δὲ καὶ μαρτυρίαις ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰωάννου ἀποκαλύψεως.

tions of the church unmutilated is abundantly established. Neander, in his Church History, says of him: "From the school of John in Asia Minor there went forth an impulse, opposing itself to the arbitrary speculations of the Gnostics, which sought to preserve and uphold in their integrity the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and to separate from them all false ingredients. And it was this impulse which was carried into the West by Irenaeus, who had been trained in Asia Minor in the school of those worthy presbyters, *the disciples of the Apostle John*." ¹

Now what is the proof that he furnishes of the authenticity of the Apocalypse? It is unnecessary to quote only some of the more prominent passages. Contr. Haer. IV. 20, 11 he cites at length Rev. i. 12-16 with the words: "But John also, the disciple of our Lord, seeing in the Apocalypse the priestly and glorious advent," ² etc. In V. 26 he quotes xvii. 12 seq., using the preface: "John, the disciple of our Lord, makes known," ³ etc. The same or similar language is used in IV. 30. 4; 21. 3; V. 35. 2; 36. 3. In other passages, as V. 30, the argument is based upon the idea that John is the author of the Apocalypse. And if any proof were necessary what John is designated so often by the words *Johannes Domini discipulus*, he says in III. 1, "that he also wrote the Gospel." ⁴ In these references of Irenaeus, many more of which might be quoted, ⁵ we have not only proof what Irenaeus's opinion was, but what was the common opinion of those who were contemporaneous with John, and of those of the next generation after them,

¹ See additional proofs on this point in Hengstenberg, Vol. II. 421.

² Sed et Johannes Domini discipulus in Apocalypsi sacerdotalem et gloriosum regni ejus videns adventum, etc.

³ Significabit Johannes Domini discipulus in Apocalypsi, etc.

⁴ Postea Johannes, discipulus Domini, et ipse edidit evangelium.

⁵ Stuart gives the following list of passages, many of which are quite long: Rev. i. 12 seq., p. 256 in Mussuet's edition; i. 15, p. 244; i. 17, 18, p. 256; iii. 7, p. 253; iv. 7, p. 190; v. 6, p. 256; vi. 2, p. 258; xi. 19, p. 252; xii. 2 seq. (nearly the whole chapter), p. 326; xvii. 8, p. 330; xvii. 12 seq. p. 323; xix. 11 seq., p. 256; xix. 20, p. 326; xx. 6, p. 334; xx. 11 seq., p. 336; xxi. 1 seq., 336; xxi. 3, p. 252; xx. 5, 6, p. 336.

since he refers back with so much trust and confidence to their authority. He says: "I can still point out the place where the blessed Polycarp sat and spake, his going in and out, his manner of life and the shape of his person, and the discourses which he addressed to the people; and how he told of his converse with John and the rest who had seen the Lord; and how he remembered their sayings, and what he had heard of them concerning the Lord, and concerning his miracles and his doctrine."

The estimation in which the Apocalypse was held by the church is perhaps better exhibited in the *Epistle* written in the name of the churches of Vienne and Lyons to the churches of Asia Minor, about 177, concerning the steadfastness of the martyrs in persecution under Marcus Aurelius. "At the very beginning of this production," says Hengstenberg, "the servants of Christ, write of 'the great anger of the heathen against the saints' with reference to Rev. xi. 18; 'and the heathen were *angry*, and thy wrath is come, and the time to give reward to thy *servants*, the prophets and the *saints*.'" ¹ Vettius Epagathus is described as one who "was and is a genuine disciple of Christ, *following the Lamb wherever he goes*," ² applying to him the words of Rev. xiv. 4: "which follow the Lamb wherever he goeth." ³ Sanctus is said to have been "refreshed and strengthened by the celestial fountain of the water of life, which flows from the body of Christ." So in Rev. vii. 17: "The Lamb in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters," and xxi. 6: "And to him that is athirst I will give to drink of the fountain of the water of life freely." There are numerous similar allusions, but I will refer here only to one more, which is striking, as referring to the fulfilment of the declaration in Rev. xxii. 11: "That the scripture might

¹ Comm., II. 416.

² Ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἔστι γνήσιος Χριστοῦ μαθητῆς, ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἀρνίῳ, ὅπου ἂν ὑπάγῃ.

³ Οἱ ἀκολουῦντες τῷ ἀρνίῳ ὅπου ἂν ὑπάγῃ.

be fulfilled, Let the wicked be wicked still, and the righteous be righteous still.”¹ Hengstenberg says well of this letter: “It affords us a deep insight into the position which the Apocalypse then held in the church. We are not met there with an inactive theoretical conviction of its genuineness; we see how it formed during the persecution the centre of the church’s views and feelings; how from it especially sprung the invincible courage of the martyrs; how its threatenings and its promises wrought with such power upon the minds of believers that all the fury of the heathen was baffled and put to shame! We perceive the high importance which belongs to this particular portion of scripture, which the church often fails in *quiet* times to understand, and then suffers itself to be drawn into a denial of its apostolic origin!”

Hippolytus, a disciple of Irenaeus, seems to have written an apology for the Revelation, probably in opposition to the Montanists, as Ebedjesu² says of him: “St. Hippolytus, martyr and bishop, composed a work concerning the dispensation and an apology for the Apocalypse and Gospel of John the apostle and evangelist.”³ He also often quotes from the Apocalypse. In his work *De Antichristo*, § 36, he says: “He [John], when he was in the isle of Patmos, sees the revelation of awful mysteries, declaring which he abundantly instructs others. Tell me, blessed John, apostle and disciple of the Lord, what thou didst see and hear respecting Babylon”; and then quotes the whole of Rev. xvii. and xviii. In § 50 he cites Rev. xiii. 18, with the words: “For John the prophet and apostle says.”⁴

¹ “Ἰνα ἡ γραφή πληρωθῇ, ὁ ἄνομος ἀνομησάτω ἔτι, καὶ ὁ δίκαιος δικαιοδότητω ἔτι. Euseb. Hist. Eccl., V. 1. See further references in Hengstenberg’s Comm., Vol. II. 416 seq.

² Asseman, in *Bibliothèque Oriental*, Vol. III. Part 1, p. 15, quoted by Davidson, *Introd.*, Vol. III. 542.

³ Sanctus Hippolytus martyr et episcopus composuit librum de dispensatione et apologium pro Apocalypsi et evangelio Joannis apostoli et evangelistae.

⁴ λέγει γὰρ ὁ προφήτης καὶ ἀπόστολος. In addition to these, Stuart cites §§ 47, 48, 50, 60, 65, and several passages where the Apocalypse is quoted by him.

At the beginning of the third century Clement of Alexandria, without question, also attributes the Apocalypse to John the apostle. He says; "He [the righteous man] will sit on the twenty-four thrones judging the people, as John says in the Apocalypse."¹ And again: "The Apocalypse says, I saw under the *altar* the souls of those who had been martyred, and to each one a white robe was given,"² words taken from Apocalypse vi. 9 and 11. Davidson also quotes another passage in which reference is made to Rev. xxi. 19 seq.: "And the twelve gates of the heavenly city, like the twelve precious stones, we regard as intimating the excellence of the grace of apostolic (or apostle's) voice."³ Lücke justly says: "Clement of Alexandria used the Apocalypse without hesitation, and as if he had never heard of the opposition of the Alogi, as the work of the Apostle John."⁴ "The well-known character of Clement,"⁵ says Barnes, "makes his testimony of great value."

The declarations of the learned Tertullian, bishop of Carthage, are direct and explicit. It is unnecessary to quote but a small part of them. In reference to Rev. i. 16. he says: "For the *Apostle* John in the Apocalypse describes a sword proceeding out of the mouth of God, two-edged, sharp,"⁶ etc. In the same writing, § 24, speaking of the New Jerusalem, he says: "Both Ezekiel knew of this, and the Apostle John saw it";⁶ Rev. xxi. 2. In *De Pudicitia*, cap. 19, he speaks of the sentiments of Paul and John, and in so doing quotes largely from the Apocalypse, as contain-

¹ Ἐν τοῖς εἴκοσι, καὶ τέσσαρσι καθεδρεῖται θρόνοις, τὸν λαὸν κρίνων, ὡς φησὶν ἐν τῇ Αποκαλύψει Ἰωάννης. Strom., Lib. VI. 667, and Heb. IV. 4.

² Καὶ ἡ Ἀποκάλυψις φησι· Εἶδον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν μεμαρτυρηκότων ὑποκάτω τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, καὶ ἔδωκεν ἑκάστῳ στολὴ λευκή.

³ Καὶ τὰς δώδεκα τῆς οὐρανοπόλεως πύλας, τιμίαις ἀπικασμένας λίθοις, τὸ περίοπτον τῆς Ἀποστολικῆς φωνῆς αἰνίττεσθαι χάριτος ἐκδεχόμεθα. Strom., Lib. II. 207.

⁴ Komm., p. 314.

⁵ Nam et apostolus Joannes in Apocalypsi ensem describit ex ore Dei prodeuntem, bis acutum, praeacutum, etc. Advers. Marcionem, III. 14.

⁶ Hanc et Ezekiel novit et apostolus Joannes vidit.

ing the expression of John's views. In *De Resurrectione*, cap. 25, he appeals to Rev. vi. 9 respecting the souls of the martyrs as asking for retribution on the persecutors of the church, and also to various other passages in the Apocalypse, and cites them as scripture." We will quote but one more passage, although there are multitudes of the same general tenor of the preceding, penned both before and after he adopted the sentiments of the Montanists. This we quote because he refers to the opposition of Marcion to the Apocalypse, as of no significance in comparison with the united testimony of the successors of the bishops of the church back to the time of its composition: "We have churches the foster-children of John. For though Marcion rejects his Revelation, the succession of bishops traced to its origin is sufficient to establish the authorship of John."¹

Origin, than whom no one is better qualified by judgment and learning to give testimony, does not question the authorship of the Apocalypse. In reference to the Hebrews he indicates that there are objections in respect to its Pauline origin; but not a question seems to have occurred to him in regard to the Revelation. In speaking of the canon of the New Testament according to Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.*, VI. 25) he says: "*But what shall I say of him who leaned on the bosom of Jesus, viz. John?* He has left us one Gospel, confessing that he could compose so many that the world could not contain them; and he moreover wrote also the Apocalypse, being commanded to keep silence and not write what the seven thunders uttered."² In *Commentary on John* he says: "John, the son of Zebadee, says in the Apocalypse."³

¹ Habemus et Joannis alumnas ecclesias. Nam etsi Apocalypsin ejus Marcion respuit, ordo tamen episcoporum ad originem recensensus in Joannem stabit Auctorem. Contr. Marc. IV. 5.

² Τί δεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἀναπεσόντος λέγειν ἐπὶ τὸ στήθος τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, Ἰωάννου, Ἐγραψε δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἀποκάλυψιν, κελευσθεὶς σιωπῆσαι καὶ μὴ γράφαι τὰς τῶν ἑπτὰ βροντῶν φωνάς.

³ Φησὶν οὖν ἐν τῇ Ἀποκαλύψει ὁ τοῦ Ζεβεδαίου Ἰωάννης. Stuart also cites pp. 300, 303, ed. Wircceb., Opp. I. pp. 34, 58, 755; II. pp. 169, 347, 473, 525, 632;

Passing over the testimony of several persons of less note, as Nepos and Coracion, we come to Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, who often appeals to the Apocalypse as a part of the scripture, and as the composition of John. "In the Apocalypse the angel refused the adoration which John wished to render him," quoting Rev. xxii. 8.¹ Again: "The divine word in the Apocalypse declares that *the waters* designate the people, saying: "Aquae," etc. (Rev. xxii. 8).² A letter written to Cyprian, from several presbyters and deacons at Rome, in which the Apocalypse is cited, "quasi quadam tuba Evangelii," shows the estimation in which it was held there.³

Victorinus of Pettau, who suffered martyrdom under Diocletian A.D. 303, wrote a commentary on the Apocalypse, in which he frequently speaks of it as the work of John.⁴ Methodius, bishop of Olympus, and Lactantius of Firmium, might both be quoted as recognizing the divine inspiration and Johannean origin of the Apocalypse;⁵ but we pass on to Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, about A.D. 326, who classes the Apocalypse among the books which he calls *canonical* and "the source of salvation; in which only is the true doctrine of religion declared; to which no man can add, and from which none can take away."

We need scarcely enumerate the several witnesses for the Apocalypse in the last half of the fourth century, such as Ephrem Syrus, Hilary of Poitiers, Epiphanius bishop of Salamis, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Tichonius, Julius Firmicus Maternus, Philastrius, Rufinus, and others, showing how generally this book

III. pp. 60, 63, 75, 105, 405, 406, 408, 555, 719, 720, 867, 869, 909, 947, 961. "Nor are these," he says, "all," Comm., § 17 (14).

¹ In Apocalypsi, angelus Johanni volenti adorare se resistit, et dicit; Vide ne feceris, etc. Opp. p. 368.

² *Aquas* namque *populos* significare, in Apocalypsi scriptura divina declarat, dicens, Opp. p. 176. Cf. also pp. 59, 354, 400, 402, 403, 408, 410, 424, 425, 427, 430, etc.

³ Opp. p. 58 seq., quoted by Stuart, § 17.

⁴ See Stuart's Commentary, Vol. I. § 17.

⁵ Ibid.

was acknowledged as belonging to the canon. Ruffinus not only gives his own opinion but, in speaking of the canonical books, in which he includes the Apocalypse, says: "These are the writers of the Old and New Testaments, which are esteemed such from the tradition of the Fathers, which were inspired by the Holy Spirit and intrusted to the church, as we learn from the writings of the Fathers." At the conclusion of this catalogue he adds: "These are the books which were incorporated into the canon by the Fathers, and have been designated by them as the proper sources of our faith."¹

Augustine, bishop of Hyppo, constantly appeals to it as canonical, and quotes "John the apostle in the Apocalypse."² "John the evangelist in the book called the Apocalypse";³ "the Apocalypse of that John who is the author of the Gospel,"⁴ etc.

The learned and critical Jerome is not less explicit than Augustine. He shows that he was aware that objections had been raised against it, but that they were not of such a nature as to shake his faith, or that of the churches⁵ about him, in it.⁶ He speaks of John, in reference to his different writings, as *apostle*, evangelist and prophet.⁷ In his epistle to Dardanus he says: "If the Latins do not receive the

¹ Quoted in Hug's Introduction, p. 662.

² Johannes apostolus in Apocalypsi, Ep. 118.

³ Joannes Evangelista in eo libro qui dicitur Apocalypsis. De Civitat. Dei XX. 7.

⁴ Apocalypsi ipsius Joannis, cujus est hoc Evangelium. De Pecc. Mer. I. 27.

⁵ Legimus in Apocalypsi Joannis, quae in *Ecclesiis* legitur et recipitur, neque enim inter Apocryphas scripturas habetur, sed inter ecclesiasticas, etc. Comm. on Ps. cxlix; quoted by Stuart, § 17.

⁶ In his enumeration of the books of the canon of the Old and New Test. he includes the Apocalypse, of which he says: Apocalypsis Joannis tot habet sacramenta, quot verba. Parum dixi pro merito voluminis. Laus omnis inferior est. In verbis singulis multiplies latent intelligentiae. Opp. IV. 571 seq.

⁷ Johannes et Apostolus et evangelista, et propheta. *Apostolus*, quia scripsit ad ecclesias ut magister; *evangelista* quia librum Evangelii condidit. *Propheta* vidit enim in Patmos insula, in quam fuerat a Domitiano principe ob Domini martyrium relegatus, *Apocalypsin* infinita futurorum mysteria continens. Opp., Vol. IV. 168, 169.

Epistle to the Hebrews among the canonical scriptures, so with equal freedom, the Greek churches do not receive John's Apocalypse. I, however, acknowledge both; for I do not follow the customs of the times, but the authority of older writers, who drew arguments from both, *as being canonical* and ecclesiastical writings, and not merely as Apocryphal books are sometimes used."¹

The authority of two or three councils should here, perhaps, be attended to. That assembled at Hyppo in 393 is full and explicit in respect to the canonical character of the Apocalypse.² That held at Carthage in 397 is equally explicit.³ In both these cases, as a matter of courtesy, they defer to the church at Rome;⁴ but what the decision at Rome would be does not seem to be doubtful, since Innocent, bishop of Rome, in a letter to Exuperius, bishop of Toulouse, gives a catalogue of canonical books, in which the Apocalypse is included. There cannot be much doubt that from this time, the beginning of the fifth century, the Apocalypse was generally received by the churches. We will merely enumerate Sulpitius Severus, Innocent I., Primasius, Cassiodorus, the Synod of Toledo in 633, Isidorus of Seville, about 630, Nilus, Isidore of Pelusium, Dionysius the Areopagite, Cyrill of Alexandria, Andreas of Caesarea, Arethas, the fourth Council of Carthage, Jacob of Edessa, John of Damascus, Theophylact, Novatus and his followers, the Donatists, and Arians—persons of different countries and various phases of culture and modes of thought, who all received the Apocalypse as canonical and the work of John the apostle and evangelist.

The alleged Testimony against the Authorship of the Apostle.

In the last half of the second century the first intimation of any question in reference to the authenticity of the Apoc-

¹ Non ut interdum de apocryphis facere soleat, sed quasi canonicis et ecclesiasticis.

² See Mansi Nov. Collect. Concil., III. 924, Canon xxxvi.

³ Canon, XLVII.

⁴ De confirmando isto canone transmarina [Romana] ecclesia consulatur.

apocalypse is found; and indeed until the middle of the third century there is nothing which deserves the name of authority, or is really of any weight in an argument of this kind. The Montanists, as is well known, made their appearance as a sect toward the end of the second century. Montanus, the founder of the sect, supported his claim to be the Paraclete by John's Gospel, and drew proofs for the personal reign of Christ on the earth of a thousand years, from the Apocalypse. The opponents of this sect, instead of wresting these books from them by properly explaining them, and refuting their claims, took the short method of rejecting them both from the canon. From their rejection of these books they subsequently received the appellation Alogi (*'Αλογοι*). It is plain that the only ground of their opposition to these books was the perversion of them by those whom they opposed, and their inability so to interpret them that their heresies should not receive support from them. They ascribed the writings of John to Cerinthus. "It is obvious," as Davidson says, "that they had no critical grounds for their decision. They appealed to no historical testimony. They relied upon doctrinal reasons alone; and these were of the weakest nature.¹ But it is unnecessary to delay upon this part of our argument, as even the present opponents of the Apocalypse, as Lücke and Credner, acknowledged that the opposition of the Alogi is "a mere makeshift," and that "it is as clear as the light, that they rejected it, not on any historical ground, but only and simply because of their exegetical ignorance of it, and from lack of being well informed in matters pertaining to polemical theology."²

The rejection of it by Marcion, who also mutilated Luke's Gospel, is merely accidentally mentioned by Tertullian, and passed over with the remark that John, the author

¹ *Introd.*, Vol. III. 545.

² See Stuart's *Introd. to Apoc.*, § 17. Lücke's *Comm.*, p. 306. Hengstenberg's *Commentary*, Vol. II. 424.

of it, was the first bishop of the seven Asiatic churches ;”¹ thus showing that he considered the doubt as utterly unfounded, and unworthy of further notice. It need only be added that the doubt of Marcion belongs to about the same time and cause as those of the Alogi previously spoken of.

Caius, a presbyter of Rome, who wrote at the beginning of the third century, in a Dialogue against the Montanist Proclus, according to Eusebius,² says: Moreover, Cerinthus, by revelations, as if written by a great apostle, deceptively imposes upon us narrations of wonderful things as shown to him by angels, saying, that after the resurrection Christ will reign on the earth, and that under this dispensation men will give themselves up to the enjoyment of the sensuous desires and pleasures at Jerusalem; and as an enemy to the holy scriptures, and wishing to lead astray, he asserts that a space of a thousand years will be spent in marriage feasts,”³ etc. The question has been much discussed whether the Apocalypse of John is here referred to and attributed to Cerinthus, or whether a forged Apocalypse of Cerinthus was then in existence, but has since been lost, or, what is much the same thing, whether Cerinthus was guilty of corrupting the Apocalypse of John, so as to make it assume his peculiar notions. A very brief view of the arguments used in respect to this matter is all that our limits allow.

The whole manner and import of the passage would seem to indicate that it does not refer to the Apocalypse, but to a work of Cerinthus. Cerinthus, by *revelations* (not

¹ Si Apocalypsin ejus Marcion respuit, ordo tamen episcoporum ad originem recensens, in Johannem stabit auctorem.

² Eccl. II. 28.

³ Ἀλλὰ καὶ Κήρυθος, ὁ, δι' ἀποκαλύψεων ὡς ὑπὸ ἀποστόλου μεγάλου γεγραμμένων, τετραλογίας ἡμῖν ὡς δι' ἀγγέλων αὐτῷ δεδειγμένας ψευδόμενας ἐπεισάγει, λέγων· Μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐπείγειον εἶναι τὸ βασίλειον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ πάλιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ τὴν σάρκα πολιτενομένην δουλεύειν. Καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων ταῖς γραφαῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀριθμὸν χιλιοῦταετίας ἐν γάμῳ ἐορτῆς θείων πλανᾶν λέγει γίνεσθαι.

a revelation, as Eusebius, in whom this passage is found, always designates the Apocalypse of John), *as if* written by a great apostle, *deceptively imposes upon us*, etc. And then the sentiments are so different from those obtained by any just interpretation of the work of John — *the reign of Christ on the earth after the resurrection, and devotion of men to sensuous desires and pleasures at Jerusalem, and a thousand years spent in nuptial feasts*. On the other hand, if Cerinthus had written such revelations, we should expect other notices of them in writers of the time. Only one author, as far as is known, makes any allusion to such a work of Cerinthus. Theodoret says: “Cerinthus forged certain revelations, as if he himself had seen them, and added descriptions of certain monstrous things, and declares that the kingdom of the Lord will be established on earth,”¹ etc. There does not, then, seem to be data for a positive opinion either, for or against the reference of this passage to the Apocalypse. Paulus, Hartwig, Hug, Barnes, and others maintain that it does not refer to the Apocalypse of John. Hug says: “Cerinthus, then, invented revelations in the name of a great apostle. The language is so general that it may have reference to Peter’s Apocalypse, or Paul’s, or even one bearing John’s name, and still not the one now in our possession. But, it will be said, the sequel points more definitely to John. . . . It rather evinces the contrary. The reign of a thousand years in the midst of sensual delights, which he [Cerinthus] cunningly devised out of enmity to the holy scriptures, seems to intimate a composition which was intended as a kind of counterpart to our Apocalypse. For if he maliciously invented a sensual reign of a thousand years out of opposition to the sacred scriptures, this opposition must have reference to John’s Apocalypse, which alone assigns to departed spirits a thousand years reign with

¹ Κήρινθος καὶ ἀποκαλύψεις τινὰς ὡς αὐτὸς θεασάμενος ἐπλάσατο, καὶ ἀπειλῶν τινων διδασκαλίας συνέθηκε, καὶ τοῦ κυρίου τὴν βασιλείαν ἔφησεν ἐπίγειον ἔσεσθαι. Fab. Haeret., II. 3.

Christ (xx. 4, 5).¹ Lücke, De Wette, Davidson, and others adopt the contrary opinion. But the question is hardly worth the time we have given to it, for the opinion of Caius is of very little importance, as it is plain that, if he referred to the Apocalypse of John, his opinion was the result of his opposition to Chiliasm, and of no more weight than that of the Alogi above referred to.²

The testimony of Dionysius of Alexandria is really the first of any weight, and when all the circumstances are considered, even this is shorn of most, if not all, of its critical value. He was a pupil of Origen, and bishop of Alexandria from 248 to 265. His work against Nepos, an Egyptian bishop, and a strenuous advocate of a literal millennium and earthly reign of Christ, led him to speak of the Apocalypse, upon which Nepos and his followers based their theories, and whose credit he therefore seemed to think it necessary to invalidate. He first refers to the opinions that had been previously promulgated, and says: "Some of those before us have rejected the book," etc. "The very inscription, they aver, is false, for John is not the author."³ On the other hand, Cerinthus, he from whom the heresy was derived which is called after his name, gave to this his own work a name that was venerable, in order to obtain credit for it. For this is the purport of his doctrine, that Christ will reign on the earth, and that his kingdom will consist of those things which he, with his animal and carnal appetites, gloated over,—the gratification of the appetite, and sensual pleasures, i.e. in meats and drinks and marriage, and (as means by which such desires may be more decently gratified) in feasts and sacrifices and the slaughter of victims."

The whole account of the opinion of those designated

¹ See Hug's Introd., p. 660, and G. Paulus, Comm. Theol. Hist. Cerinthi. illustr., Pars prior, § 30.

² See Stuart's Commentary, Introd., § 17 (2).

³ He does not here say *the ancients* (ἀρχαῖοι ἄνδρες, or some such phrase), but merely τινὲς τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν, *some of our predecessors*, those of the preceding generation. See Hug's Introd., p. 655.

“his predecessors” shows that he refers merely to the opponents of the Millenarians, such as the Alogi and Marcion. The argument, as will not escape notice, is not that the contemporaries of the apostle gave the information that John did not compose the Apocalypse, or that well-informed men ascribed it to others than John, but that some persons had endeavored to “make it suspicious on the score of its contents,” and were not able to bring the slightest historical evidence against it.¹ It is plain, as Stuart says, that Dionysius had no knowledge of more weighty objections to the Apocalypse among his predecessors. For if he had, most surely “would he have produced them. Could he but have appealed to ancient tradition, i.e. to historical testimony, in favor of his position, it was impossible that he should have failed to perceive its superior importance and cogency; and of course he would have placed it in the front of all his arguments.”

Dionysius himself, it is plain, did not place much confidence in those whose opinions he quoted, but still, from the character of the book, conjectures that John the apostle was not the author. He goes through with the contents of the book, showing that it cannot be interpreted *literally*. It has, he supposes, some hidden and mysterious meaning that he cannot understand. “Not measuring or judging these things by our own reason, but assigning more to faith, I attribute to it things higher than can be comprehended by me. I do not reject those things which I cannot comprehend; but they are more the objects of my wonder because I can not fathom them.”² “That the author was called *John*, and that this composition is *John’s*, I do not deny. I agree that it belongs to some holy and inspired man. I could not indeed concede that he was the apostle, the son of Zeb-edee, the brother of James, to whom belongs the Gospel according to John and the catholic epistle.” “My belief is, that another John, among those who lived in Asia, was the

¹ See Hug’s *Introd.*, p. 656.

² Quoted by Stuart, *Commentary*, Introduction, § 17.

author; inasmuch as the report is, that there are two sepulchral monuments in Ephesus, each of which bears the name of John." This belief in another John as author is, as is plain, the merest conjecture. He pretends to no tradition to that effect, and offers no *proof* that there was any other John whose character, station, or attainments rendered it probable that he was the author. The writer claimed the name *John*, and the style and language and some of the thoughts (though he does not dwell much upon these) are different from those of the Gospel and Epistle of John; therefore some other John, of whom there were probably several, was the author. The evangelist nowhere in the Gospel and Epistle gives his name, or speaks of himself in the first person, but the author of the Apocalypse at the outset (i. 1) says: "The Revelation of Jesus Christ to his servant John;" and in verse 4: "John^{*} to the seven churches," etc. and again, verse 9: "I John, who also am your brother;" and then at the close, xxii. 8: "I John, who saw and heard these things." But the evangelist designates himself as, "The disciple whom Jesus loved" (John xxi. 7, 20), the brother of James, an eye and ear witness of Jesus. The Gospel and Epistle harmonize well together, and they commence in the same manner. The one: "In the beginning was the word;" the other: "that which was from the beginning." The Gospel: "The word became flesh," etc.; the Epistle exhibits the same thing with slight variations: "What we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes," etc. Dionysius gives some varieties in thought in the Apocalypse and the Gospel and Epistle, and likewise avers that the language is different: They (the Gospel and Epistle) are written not only without offence against the Greek idiom, but are most eloquent in diction, modes of reasoning, and arrangement of expression." "But I perceive that his (the author of the Apocalypse) diction and idiom is not accurate Greek, and that he uses barbarous expressions and solecisms."

These methods of proof will be canvassed when we speak

of the internal proofs of the authorship of John; they are only referred to here, to show what arguments Dionysius used against the Johannean authorship of the Apocalypse. It will be perceived that they are such, and such only, as are used in modern times; and in the historical argument his opinion is worth no more than that of any one candid scholar of the present day. Indeed it is worth far less, for he had not the facilities for interpreting the book that we now have, and was pressed upon and annoyed by those who wished to give it a literal interpretation, and substantiate sentiments in opposition to the whole tenor of the rest of the scriptures, and subversive of piety and good morals. Besides, as Hengstenberg says: "He comes direct from the classical literature of Greece, and is still destitute of any taste properly cultivated and formed of a sacred kind. The Greek spirit is not to be found in the book, which, more than any other, has deeply impressed on it the Old Testament, Israelitish character. For him it has something of a foreign, strange aspect."¹

One further circumstance must not be passed over here. In a letter to Hermammon² upon Valerian and the persecution under him, written some years later than the work previously quoted, he says: "And to John was this likewise revealed. And there was given to him a mouth speaking great things and blasphemy (Apoc. xiii. 5). Both (viz. his speaking great things and blasphemy and the duration of the persecution) can be seen to have wonderfully taken place in Valerian." Hengstenberg thinks "There can be no doubt that the genuineness of the Apocalypse is here acknowledged. The John mentioned can be no other than the apostle. He utters the language not of concession but of conviction." It does not however, seem to us *certain* that John the apostle is here meant. Still it is not *improbable*; and "perhaps Dionysius during that persecution

¹ Comm., Vol. II. 427.

² Eusebius, VII. c. 10.

(under Valerian), in which he had many things to suffer,¹ obtained an insight into the glory of the book, and had his eyes also opened for apprehending the testimony of the church. We can also suppose that in his work on the promises, Dionysius, carried away by his polemical zeal, had given expression to his views only on one side, and that he here brings out the other side, his previous doubts having at bottom appeared to himself no more than doubts."²

Eusebius, in the first part of the fourth century, half a century later than Dionysius, sometimes speaks hesitatingly of the Apocalypse. "Among the writings of John, besides the Gospel, his first Epistle is acknowledged, without dispute, both by those of the present day, and also by the ancients; the other two Epistles, however, are disputed. But on the Revelation contrary views are still maintained. But we will at some convenient time give our judgment upon it, as it respects the testimony of the ancients." In the following chapter (xxv.), after speaking of the scriptures generally acknowledged as divine (*ὁμολογουμένων θείων γραφῶν*), he says: "to these may be added, if it seem good (*εἰ φανεῖν*), the Revelation of John." He afterwards goes on to enumerate the disputed (*νόθα* or *ἀντιλεγόμενα*) books, and adds: "Moreover, as I said, the Apocalypse of John [may be added], if it seem good (*εἰ φανεῖν*), which, as before said, some reject, but others acknowledge as genuine."³ Eusebius never seems to have redeemed his pledge made in the first of the above quotations. But when he again speaks at length of the Apocalypse in vii. 25, he quotes the passage of Dionysius above commented upon, and seems inclined to adopt substantially his view, attributing it to the presbyter John, plainly from the same reasons, his anti-millenarian belief, and his inability fully to reconcile the Apocalypse

¹ Eusebius, VIII. 11.

² Hengstenberg's Commentary, Vol. II. 430.

³ III. 24. Τῆς δ' ἀποκαλύψεως ἐφ' ἑκάτερον ἔτι νῦν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς περιέλκεται ἡ δόξα· ὅμως γὰρ μὴν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων μαρτυρίας ἐν οἰκείῳ καιρῷ τὴν ἐπίκρισιν δέχεται καὶ αὕτη.

with views obtained from other parts of the scriptures. Hengstenberg says of the manner in which Eusebius speaks of the Apocalypse: "Clearly and distinctly he recognizes the fact, that the book had the unanimous approval of antiquity, and the external grounds were entirely on its side. He makes no attempt whatever to invalidate the importance of this testimony, but acknowledges its full value."¹ In accordance with his knowledge of the historical testimony, in its favor, he at times, when nothing called to mind the difficulties arising from internal characteristics, quotes it, without question, as the work of John the evangelist.²

It has been urged as an objection to the canonical authority of the Apocalypse that it is not found in the Peschito version. Neither are the second and third Epistles of John, the second of Peter, and that of Jude; but we should not on that account reject them. When this version was made is not known, probably not before the end of the second or the beginning of the third century, if indeed as early as that. The first traces of its use are in the Commentaries of Ephrem Syrus, who flourished in the latter part of the fourth century. He speaks of it as "our translation," and it was plainly in use by the churches of his time. This same commentator often refers to the Apocalypse as to other parts of the scriptures, in such a way as to show that he not only unhesitatingly received it as genuine, but that it was so received by the churches for whom he wrote.³ Besides, he quotes in such a manner as to show that he must have had a Syriac translation before him. What this was it is impossible to say. But it is certainly most natural to suppose in the circumstances, that the Peschito at this time contained the Apocalypse, and that in some way

¹ Comm., Vol. II. 432 seq.

² See the references in Stuart's Commentary, Introduction, § 17 (4).

³ See Opp. Syr. II. 332. "John, in his Revelation, saw a great, wonderful, divinely written book, sealed with seven seals," etc., Rev. v. 1. Cf. also III. 636. In Opp. Graec. (transl.), I. 39; II. 53, 194, 252: *Καθὼς καὶ Ἰωάννης ὁ θεόλογος ἐκήρυξε*. In Opp. Graec. III. 191, he makes a sort of synopsis of the Apocalypse. Stuart's Commentary, Introduction, § 17 (21).

or other it was afterwards excluded. It seems hardly possible that Ephrem Syrus, quoting the Apocalypse often, as he does, and having so high a regard for the Peschito, should not have somewhere alluded to the fact that it was wanting in it. How it lost its place, on condition it was ever there, unless as Eichhorn and Hug and some others suppose, that in consequence of the doubts of the Greek churches, and because it was not read in the regular service, it was omitted, we can not say.

On the supposition that the Peschito never contained the Apocalypse, it may be supposed that, as that version was made for reading in the churches, the Apocalypse with the Epistles mentioned above, were omitted from some supposed want of adaptation to that purpose, or because they did not readily come into the plan of the translator. The person who made the translation may have been interrupted by death or some other cause before he had completed his work, or the copy which he used may have been defective. Besides, the translator himself may, as Dionysius did, from internal grounds, have doubted its genuineness, and so omitted it. We cannot, therefore, feel that its omission in the Peschito is a matter of much importance in the historical argument. Even "Lücke himself acknowledges that nothing of any consequence *against* the book can be made out from the circumstance of its omission there."¹

No other trace of opposition to the Apocalypse is found until the latter part of the fourth century, and none then of a decisive character. Some catalogues of the books of scripture are

¹ See Stuart, § 17 (5). Hengstenberg, Comm. II. 432, says: "If the doubts [in respect to the genuineness of the Apocalypse], wherever they are presented to us, appear destitute of an historical basis, if they always proceed from exegetical incapacity and controversial heat, if they lean exclusively on internal grounds, we must suppose the same to have been the case here, where we have simply to deal with the fact of doubt. This also is the result to which we are led by a comparison of the analogy of the other omitted books. They are all such as furnished in their matter an occasion for doubt, while no positive grounds of an external kind existed against their genuineness, although certainly the inferior external credibility in their case left criticism more at liberty to deal with internal considerations."

found in poetry, in which it is omitted, while the authors of these catalogues expressly say elsewhere that it belongs to the sacred canon, and is the work of John. So Gregory of Nazianzen, in a poetical catalogue, omits the Apocalypse, and says: "You have all. If there be any besides these, they belong not to the genuine."¹ And yet Gregory refers to and quotes the Apocalypse as a part of the divine scriptures, and as the work of John.² Besides Andreas, a contemporary of Gregory and an inhabitant of the same province, and his successor Arethas, attest to Gregory's belief in the apostolic origin and inspiration of the Apocalypse.³ Philastrius of Brixia (at the end of the fourth century) gives a catalogue of books to be read in the churches, omitting the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse,⁴ and in the same work says expressly, that "those who do not receive the Gospel of John and the Apocalypse are heretics."⁵ Such instances as these show plainly that the ground of the disregard of the Apocalypse, and its omission in catalogues of books of scriptures, was the danger of its perversion to the support of Millenarianism; and that while the historic evidence did not allow the rejection of the Apocalypse and the denial of its inspiration, yet on account of its recondite and mystical character, it was thought unsafe to have it generally read. So Philastrius speaks of the mystical writings (*scripturae absconditae*), which ought to be read by advanced Christians, but not by all.⁶ Gregory of Nyssa, too, says: "I have heard John the evangelist enigmatically saying to such persons, in his mystical or concealed works: "I would thou wert either

¹ Πάσας ἔχεις. Εἴ τι δὲ τούτων ἐκτὸς, οὐκ ἐν γνησίοις.

² See, e.g. Opp. I. 573, where Rev. i. 8 is cited verbatim; Opp. I. 516, where Rev. i. 20 is referred to, with the words: ὡς Ἰωάννης διδάσκει μὲ διὰ τῆς Ἀποκαλύψεως.

³ In the preface to his Commentary on the Apocalypse Andreas says: Περὶ μέντοι τοῦ θεοπνεύστου τῆς βίβλου περιττὸν μηχανεῖν τὸν λόγον ἡγούμεθα, τῶν μακαρίων, Γρεγορίου φημι τοῦ θεολόγου καὶ Κυρίλλου, etc., and Arethas uses nearly the same words.

⁴ De Haeresibus, c. 88.

⁵ C. 60.

⁶ Quae etsi legi debent morum causa a perfectis, non ab omnibus legi debent.

cold or hot," etc. (Rev. iii. 15),¹ while in another place he calls the Apocalypse the "last book of grace,"² i.e. the last of the New Testament books, plainly indicating its place in the canon. Dionysius the Areopagite designates the Apocalypse as "the hidden and mystical vision of the beloved and inspired one of the disciples."³

After the fourth century there seems to have been little if any question of the genuineness of the Apocalypse in the ancient church. Some there doubtless were, as there have been in all modern times, who were inclined to give up the attempt to understand and explain it, but yet recognized it as genuine, and as the work of John.

The result of a careful examination of ancient authors seems to be overwhelmingly in favor of the apostolical origin of the Apocalypse. Nothing really worthy of account can be adduced from the Fathers adverse to it. Wheresoever it was questioned, the doubts were so manifestly from the internal character of the book, and so plainly the result of the perversion of it to substantiate views considered erroneous, that they are scarcely worthy of consideration when placed in contrast with the almost unbroken chain of testimony from the age in which it originated onward. Thus Hengstenberg, at the close of his examination of ancient authorities, well says: "It has been shown that the testimonies for the genuineness of the Apocalypse reach up to the age of its origin; that they are derived from all parts of the Christian world; that down even to the middle of the third century it was unanimously acknowledged, and had struck its roots very deeply into the Christian church; and also that the doubts and objections which were afterward entertained respecting it, only served to render more clearly manifest the recognition of its genuineness by the church."⁴

¹ Ἦκουσα τοῦ Εὐαγγελιστοῦ Ἰωάννης, ἐν ἀποκρύφοις πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους δι' αἰνίγματος λέγοντος, κ. τ. λ. Opp. II. 44. Quoted by Stuart, Comm., Vol. I. 330.

² Ἡ τελευταία τῆς χάριτος βίβλος.

³ Τὴν κρυφίαν καὶ μυστικὴν ἀποψίαν τοῦ τῶν μαθητῶν ἀγαπητοῦ καὶ δεσποῦ. Opp. I. 246, 247.

⁴ Comm., Vol. II. 436.

ARTICLE IV.

FINAL CAUSE OF VARIETIES.

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ACCEPTING the common definition of varieties in the organic kingdom, we regard them as forms produced by the *variation of species*. The cause of this variation has never been explained. Probably the only answer that will ever be given is: Such is the nature of species. It is a law written on the plant and animal, that in their development there shall be variation from the original stock, but only in certain directions. On this point we quote the language of a distinguished scientific man who has lately written much upon this subject. It would be difficult to find in the writings of any other author, all that we really know on this subject, condensed into so few words:

“The former [variation] has never yet been shown to have its cause in ‘external influences,’ nor to occur at random. As we have elsewhere insisted, if not inexplicable, it has never been explained; all that we can yet say is, that plants and animals are prone to vary, and that some conditions favor variations.”¹

We thus confess our ignorance of the natural causes that produce variation. We propose to discuss its *final cause*. This implies that there is in it a purpose. If there is in the variation of objects in nature a purpose, that purpose must have relation to the objects themselves, or to some other beings connected with them or in some way related to them. In all arrangements merely for the good of the object itself, final cause may be denied. It may be said that the thing exists because it happens to have a constitution fitting it for the mode of existence in which we find it. We shall therefore confine ourselves, in this discussion, mainly to those contri-

¹ Prof. Asa Gray, in *Silliman's Journal*, May, 1863, p. 440.

vances that seem to have relation to something out of the object in which they are found. But our special object will be to show that all variation from original forms in the animal and vegetable kingdoms is not in general for the good of the object in which it occurs, but for the good of other objects in some way related to it. We think it will readily appear to any careful observer, that much of the variation in both of these kingdoms has special reference to man as an intellectual and moral being. But we shall confine our present examination mainly to plants. It would be most natural, perhaps, to commence with the mineral kingdom, had we time for a full discussion of the subject. And we might inquire: For what end is the beauty of the crystal? Certainly it is not for the crystal itself. We have great beauty in the primary crystal. But the law of secondary forms adds new beauty, by the variety it gives in modifying, with mathematical exactness, the faces and angles of the primary. We may be told that there is no final cause in all this arrangement of matter. It is so, is all that we can say. Because we admire the beauty of the crystal, and wonder at this law by which its beauty is increased, we are not to believe that the original beauty of the gem, or that the law of variation, was made for us, or with any reference to us. Nor are we to believe, necessarily, that they were *made* at all. *They are*—they always have been; and they would be the same they now are, were there no intelligent being in the universe to behold them. We may believe that they have a purpose, or not. If one doubts it, there is certainly little room for argument. When the facts are stated, different minds will be differently affected by them, and argument will have little effect on either class.

But when we study the kingdom of life, the facts that meet us are different in kind. There is here a succession of beings, descending one from another; there is a complicated machinery by which this succession is secured, and a different kind of machinery by which the individual is built up and preserved. It is certainly a legitimate inquiry: For what purpose is each part of these beings? For what purpose —

or, if any object to this word, for what *use* — are the various organs of the plant? To answer this question is the work of the botanist: he examines the root, the stem, the leaf, the flower, and the fruit. In this investigation he has been successful, so that most of the plant machinery is now understood in its relations to the individual plant and to the succession of plants. Who doubts the use of the root and leaf in taking up and elaborating nutriment for the plant? Who doubts the use of the anther in producing pollen, or of the pollen grains in fertilizing the seed? Although we may be uncertain about the use of some parts, it does not affect the certainty of our knowledge respecting those we have mentioned. Let us push our inquiries further, and see if we find in the structure of the plant any contrivances, or in its development any variations of form, not required by the economy of the plant itself. We omit for the present all discussion as to the method by which these were produced, *or how they came to be*, but simply inquire if there are such. Selecting a few from the many, we might inquire: For what purpose are the petals of the flower, the crown of beauty, to the plant? Certainly they are not absolutely essential in the production of seed, for many plants are without them. And if in any case they are deemed essential, certainly the beautiful pattern of the petal, its numberless modifications and delicate tints, adjusted with masterly accuracy, are not necessary parts in the economy of plants. Of what use to the plant is that row of sterile flowers that adorns so many of our Compositae, the Rudbeckias and Helianths; or that curious circle of sterile flowers bordering the cymes of Hydrangeas and some of our Viburnums? We may be told that they have no use, or that these apparently useless parts will at some time be found to be of importance in the economy of the plant, aiding directly or indirectly in the perpetuation of the species, as the honey of plants attracts bees, and thus secures the continuance of the species by the fertilization of the seed. We will go one step further, then, and ask: What end is subserved by double flowers? All

agree that one use of the flower is to produce seed. But the perfectly double flower loses the organs of reproduction. The rose unfolds its stamens and pistils into petals, and thus gains in beauty, till it becomes the perfection of a flower, but all at the expense of seed. What use, in the economy of the plant, does the flower subserve when it can no longer produce seed? It does not perpetuate the species, and it is a draft upon the nutriment that would otherwise go to build up the plant that produces it. By becoming double, the flower has ceased to be of advantage either to the species or the individual plant. But does Nature thus defeat her own ends, and provide for the destruction of some species by the very law of their growth? Not at all. In every plant which by cultivation is so far changed as to lose the power of producing seed, there is some other provision for the propagation of the plant, as by slips, by grafting, by bulblets, and the like. Nature seems thus to provide, in the structure of other parts of these plants, for the development of their flowers in the line of beauty at the expense of seed.

Let us examine another group of plants, belonging to the same natural order as the rose. For what purpose is the fruit of the apple tree, the pear tree, and the peach? Their seed is evidently for the propagation of the species. But still we ask: For what purpose are the *apple* and the *peach*? The germ is in the seed, or within the stone. The economy of the plant does not require that the covering of the seeds should be increased in quantity or heightened in flavor, for they come to their fullest development in the unchanged native fruit. If the improvement of size and flavor is not for the *seed*, it has no relation to the plant. And probably no candid person will contend that the change in cultivated fruits which renders them more valuable to man, has any more relation to the wants of the individual plant, or of the species, than the milk of the mother has to her own wants. If this change has any purpose at all, it is for something outside of the plant. The seed is not for the plant that produces it, but for the species. The change of covering, as

already indicated, is of no advantage to the seed. Its increase in size is therefore a draft upon the tree, without having any relation to the species. So far as the economy of the plant is concerned, it is a mistake. The machinery is out of order. There is an absolute throwing away of material and of vital energy.

We are now prepared to introduce and illustrate certain propositions, which seem warranted by plant development:

1. In some plants the *idea of beauty* is the most prominent idea, inasmuch as under the best cultivation the variation of these plants is always in the line of beauty. The beauty of the flower — the rose, for example — often increases at the expense of the reproductive organs, until the power of producing seed is lost.

2. In other plants, utility of *fruit* is the prominent *idea*, as in the apple and the peach. Such plants, under careful cultivation, produce larger and more delicious kinds of fruit, without increase of beauty in the flower.

3. From these two propositions another follows: that the plants best known to us from long continued cultivation can be readily divided into two great series, without reference to their botanical relationship, but according to their lines of development. In one series *utility of fruit* is the prominent idea; and in the other, *beauty of flower*; as under the best cultivation these series are developed in these two directions respectively.

The idea of utility is not manifested by fruit alone. The sugar of the sugar-cane constitutes its utility, while that of the Indian corn lies in its grain. These plants, so nearly allied botanically, are developed in these two directions, according to the leading idea in their products. The apple and the rose, already referred to, belong to the same botanical family; yet they are developed, in nearly all their variations, in opposite directions. The potato has, for its leading idea the formation of underground stems or tubers; while its brother, the tomato, has for its idea the production of a fruit corresponding in structure to the potato-grape.

They show this in all their variations. In the pine tree the leading idea is wood, and in the mint, essential oil. But in such plants as do not readily produce varieties, the line of development is determined with difficulty.

4. Some plants in their native state give indications of the kind of change likely to take place in them by cultivation. The rose, for example, by its large corolla in comparison with the fruit, shows that change of flower is most likely to take place. In the apple, the large fleshy fruit indicates a tendency to variation and improvement in that direction. The *Viburnum Opulus*, the *Hydrangea*, and other plants, by the circle of sterile flowers, much larger than the fertile flowers, indicate change in the direction of beauty. These beautiful circles of sterile flowers in some of our native shrubs, and the neutral rays of some of our *Compositae*, may be regarded as ornaments, rather than as of use in the economy of the plant. When, therefore, a new plant is brought under cultivation, there is little doubt in what direction it will vary, if at all. The increase of beauty in the flower by doubling, and the increase of the fruit in size, beauty, and flavor, are of no advantage to the plant itself, nor to the species; but in some cases they are a draft upon the plant for no purpose in its own economy.

5. Those plants that by variation lose the power of producing seed can always be propagated in other ways, as by slips or bulbs. Nature, as though careful for the preservation of the species, never allows any plant, by its own law of growth, to lose the power of producing seed, unless she has given to it means other than the seed for the perpetuation of its kind.

6. Variation is most common and rapid in those plants which are most useful to man for cultivation, and which must go with him over most of the earth. It may be said that they are most useful because they happen to vary. But their readiness to vary, certainly was not the cause of their first cultivation. They were selected for some particular good, as for fruit, or for beauty of flower, or some other

useful property. The characteristic for which each one was first selected, was the leading idea of the plant, and in that direction all its variations under cultivation have tended. The rose, in all its varieties, is to-day cultivated for the same reason for which it was first cultivated—for its beauty; the apple tree for its fruit, the sugar cane for its sweetness, and so on through the list of cultivated plants. We might multiply propositions and examples, if our space allowed. As they would not differ in kind, they are not needed for the argument. Apparent exceptions to the propositions already stated, may undoubtedly be pointed out, for it is well understood by naturalists that Nature does nothing *per saltum*. Hardly a group of plants can be examined in which there will not be found one or more that the family description will not embrace in all particulars. There are also some plants so valuable for several purposes, that it would be difficult to determine in every case the leading idea. They are made for a double purpose, and may develop in either direction. The apple tree with double blossoms, or the tomato with tubers upon it, would not therefore, with any candid person, affect the bearing of the propositions. If a law of nature is really discovered, all exceptions are either merely apparent, or if real, are found to be special provisions for some wise purpose. It is the general law of variation that we now wish to present for consideration in the propositions just enunciated. If these propositions have any significance, to what do they tend? Certainly to show that the vegetable kingdom is not an end to itself. Men and animals do not make use of plants because they happen to be what they are; but the plants are constituted as they are for the sake of the animal kingdom, and many of them with a direct reference to man as an intellectual and moral being. It is by the law of variation that they are most perfectly fitted for these high purposes.

In almost every department of plant-life the changes can be referred primarily to the good of the plant itself, and thus it is easy to say, and no doubt easy for some to believe, that

there is in them no purpose other than the continuance of the species, if any purpose at all. The cereals — wheat, rye, barley, Indian corn, and rice — furnish the great bulk of food for the human race. We have no doubt that most men will believe they were made for this purpose, and not that they happened to be what they are, or that the primary object in importance was that they might propagate their kind, and that the support of animal life was no part of the plan, but accidental or subsidiary.

Yet there is much that seems to favor the theory that all the machinery of fruiting is for the continuance of the species alone. If the germ fails to be fertilized by the pollen, no sugar nor starch nor gluten is stored up in the seed for man. But when the pollen has touched the germ, there is power of independent life, and from that moment all the energies of the plant are taxed to store the kernel with food; but food for what? For whom? For the young plant, all agree. It puts in the seed the food which that germ needs for its support, till its roots and leaves are large enough to collect from the earth and air the crude materials and elaborate them for use. For what purpose is the starch garnered up in the potato, and the sugar in the beet, the carrot, and the parsnip? We shall be told that they are stored up for the plants themselves, to supply the great draft made upon them in producing fruit. We cannot deny it, nor do we wish to do so. We love to contemplate the parent plant providing for every one of the thousand plantlets folded in its seeds, destined to beautify the earth when its own withered stalk has passed away. Would that men might learn a lesson from it, and provide for their offspring enough, and only enough, for their wants till able to provide for themselves. We can hardly help admiring the seeming prudence of the honest beet and parsnip, that industriously gather stores of food the first year for the flowering time, when both roots and leaves would fail to supply their wants. In all these things we have been compelled to recognize a wisdom and a skill that thus arranged this machinery of the plant.

But in the very arrangement for the plant itself there seems to shine forth a higher and nobler purpose. In the multitude of germs, an apparent waste of energy, there seems to be a provision for their legitimate destruction by a higher creation. And if the grain of wheat fails to fill unless the germ is there, who does not see that it is better for man that it should be so? It is best for him that every grain of wheat should represent both so much food, and also a certain centre of new plant-life. With what uncertainty would the husbandman sow his field, if perchance only one in a thousand of the precious grains scattered on the furrow would give the green blade, and, in time of harvest, the full ear! He who regards the support of animal life as the highest use of the vegetable kingdom, must also see that certainty of propagation is of prime importance in the plants already mentioned.

But we have, perhaps, too far prolonged this discussion on this lower phase of plant-life — the production of food. We readily grant that in the majority of cases the food for animals is produced in a way that seems primarily for the benefit of the plant as an individual or species. To some it may appear to be prepared solely for the plant. To this, however, we think there are plain exceptions; and among them we mention our soft fruits, which are the envelop or mere accompaniment of the seed. The seeds need a covering, it is true. But why should the covering of the apple seed give the thousand kinds of this delicious fruit, of every tint and flavor and varied time of ripening? Why do the pear and peach vie with the apple in the diversified forms and flavors they offer? Why does the strawberry enlarge its receptacle into that most delicious fruit? Why does the grape bury its seeds in such a luscious pulp, and sometimes form the pulp without the seed? That the perfection and variety of the soft portion of such fruits play any part in the economy of the plant, no one will probably contend. The pulp of the grape represents to man so much food. If it forms without seed, it is the cause of no indirect injury,

as the filling of wheat grains without the germ would be, because it never represents new plant-life. If the soft fruits have no purpose except to cover the seed, their increase in size and improvement in flavor are a mistake. The native apple, in all its harshness; the frost grapes, which the animals allow to fall, with their seeds, untouched, unless driven to eat them or starve; the peach, in its hard covering, and the button pear, which no cooking can fully conquer — all these are for the plant the perfection of fruits. They perfect and protect their seeds. But our Black Hamburgs and Sweetwaters, our Pippins and Bartletts, are mistakes, and evidences of imperfection and want of design in such plants, if they have no end out of themselves; for all these variations from the original stock either weaken the seed or invite to its destruction. Because they are of no advantage to the plant, must we grant that they are a mistake or without significance? By no means. Nor do we think it possible for the majority of men ever to believe that we have not here a direct provision for the animal kingdom as a whole, and for man in particular; a provision that shows wisdom, though through it plant-life is made entirely secondary. The continuance of the species must be provided for by some means, or its creation would be a failure. This being done, sometimes by one method and sometimes by another, all the remaining parts of the plant may be modified for the benefit of this higher kingdom. It seems to us that all these modifications indicate this ulterior purpose, to which the interests of the plant, so to speak, are made to yield. This follows certainly, if our first and fifth propositions are accepted. We have no doubt, indeed, the three kingdoms of nature are all arranged with reference to man, especially as an intellectual and moral being. We have already referred to crystallography, and we might enter with profit into the consideration of chemical equivalents and chemical combinations, but they would open a wide field, and are not required for our present brief discussion. We never could see how the plan of structure, the whole science of homologies in

the animal and vegetable kingdoms, could be fully comprehended by any one without the recognition of a direct provision for man as an intellectual being. Animals and plants are constructed with parts apparently for no other purpose than to show their true place in the organic kingdom. We believe that they are thus linked together by homologous parts that they might be comprehended by man, that he might more surely trace the plan of the Great Architect. We believe this, also, without reference to the question whether these parts came to be as they are through secondary causes or by direct creation.

In the provision made for the increase of beauty in the flower by doubling, there is certainly no reference to the welfare of the plant, for beauty increases at the expense of the seed, the final cause, or one use of the flower, as all will allow. When we see this tendency to variation in such a multitude of flowers; when we see it confined to those plants having methods of propagation other than the seed; when we see this tendency conferring no possible benefit upon the individual plant nor upon the species; when we see what a source of enjoyment this law is to man in his highest cultivation, we might say, how necessary for that highest cultivation — can we doubt for what purpose this law of variation was given? Who can fail to feel that the plant is not for itself; but so far as it seems to be for itself, it is that it may exist; but it exists for a higher kingdom; and that *the final cause of plant variation is found mainly in the wants of man, not only as a physical, but as an intellectual being.*

There is another significance of varieties, besides their adaptation to these wants of man, although to some it may seem a mere accident. We refer to the conditions thus presented to man for continual progress. In consequence of this wonderful law of varieties, there is opened the possibility of continued improvement; to reach the limit of this possibility is impossible. Were it true that each species produced from age to age the same identical forms without variation, whenever each species was secured, all would be

done that could be done in that direction. We have but one species of apple. From this have been produced hundreds of distinct kinds. There might, indeed, have been as many distinct species created in the beginning. But even then, all that could be done, would be to secure the kinds created. In consequence of this wonderful law, the same end is reached as in the creation of numberless distinct species, and in a manner far better for man. From one species have sprung unnumbered forms; the next year may produce others still more desirable, and the next year others, and so on forever. It is impossible for man to say that he has now the most delicious apple, peach, or pear, or the most beautiful rose, or the most prolific variety of corn possible. The next year a better apple, a more beautiful rose, a more prolific variety of corn may be produced; and this shall be true forever. There is thus laid in this law of the animal and vegetable kingdoms the surest conditions of continued progress in man. The possibility of better forms is ever saying to him, Onward! Upward!

In thus viewing the law of variation in all its manifestations, we have forced upon us the conviction that, while it sometimes has reference undoubtedly to the plant or animal itself in the preservation of the species, in its higher manifestations, especially in the vegetable kingdom, it is for something out of the plant, and for a higher creation — the animal kingdom; above all, for man as a rational creature. If all these things were created by an infinitely wise Being, this is what we should expect. If they were created directly, we should expect it; *if through secondary causes operating through myriads of years, we should expect the same.*

And so at this point we are ready to say that we do not see the atheistic tendency of the so-called development theory at all, except so far as it has a tendency to remove us further from God in nature, and in this way makes it easier for men to forget him or doubt his existence. What difference can it make in our belief in the existence, the wisdom, or the power of God, whether he created the first oak as a

tree or as a germ, that through secondary causes — the sunlight, the air, and the rain — should expand into the oak? The microscopic germ, with this force lodged in it, that determines the growth of the oak, the form and strength of every fibre, the outline of every leaf, the outward sculpture and inward structure of every acorn that shall cover it for a thousand years, is as much a proof of infinite wisdom and almighty power as the oak in its perfection. If one fails to be proof, the other must. If, to go further, we were to suppose a single germ to be placed upon this globe, which, with untold ages for its development, should give rise to all the myriad forms of vegetable and animal life, with all their wonderful relations to each other, as the germ of the oak develops the woody fiber, the root, the stem, the leaf, the flower, and the fruit, all unlike, but having a relation to each other — if we could believe that from one such germ all life upon our globe had sprung, would it shake our belief for one moment in God, or alter our conception of his character? Do we look upon the trees and the animals around us — upon our own bodies — as any the less the work of God, or evidence of his existence and illustrative of his character, because produced through secondary causes, than they would be if they came full grown from the hand of God, as we believe that Adam came? Not at all. If one looks at his own body, and fails to see so much of purpose there as to imply a designer, then he would fail to see it if he were created full grown. There is a certain kind or degree of scepticism for which there is no cure : it is an incapacity to weigh proof. This may exist in connection with great learning and great power of scientific investigation. Where this defect exists, all labor spent in accumulating proof is labor lost. When you have presented one object to a man in clear sunlight and he cannot see it, you know he is blind, and no accumulation of objects will enable him to see. This principle was forcibly illustrated by our Saviour when Abraham says : “If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.”

We consider the scientific discussion as to how animals and plants came upon this globe to be a matter of investigation as to facts. How that question will be ultimately decided we have no doubt. Biologists can throw light upon many dark points, but it is upon geology that we must mainly rely for facts. We have not yet seen any strong argument made out, nor do we believe that geology has yet given one whisper of satisfactory testimony in favor of the development theory. And if we are threatened with the authority of great names, we will not be dismayed while we have on our bookshelves the works of the same great men, in which the opposite view is most ably maintained. We can afford to wait, certainly, till they have refuted their own arguments, unless we get new light in other directions. When the proof comes, we are not only bound to receive it, but are ready to do so. And it will have no more to do with the argument for the existence and attributes of God, than the discussion before an aged oak whether it were created as a tree or sprung, like ordinary oaks, from the germ within an acorn. We welcome all the labors of the development theorists, and feel thankful for them. We welcome them as contributions to science. We never read a more convincing work on natural theology than Darwin's book on the fertilization of orchids. We have no doubt that he and his co-laborers are accumulating weapons that will yet batter down his philosophy and the leading theory upon which it rests. "We heartily adopt," says a distinguished scientific man, "the science of Darwin, but not his philosophy." The distinction is a just one; and such a spirit will guide us safely. The subject of variations, which we have been discussing, has given rise to the development theory. We accept the facts of variation and the influence of "natural selection," but not the inferences that are drawn from them. We see the need of variation for the best good of the world, for man himself. If provided for in the creation of certain species, and those species most useful to man, we see in this a mark of wisdom as much as in the adaptation of the parts

of our bodies to each other, or of our bodies to the external world. We regard, then, the law of variation as a means of preserving the species under certain circumstances, and as a means of better fitting created things for their various uses, and not as the creator of the thing, nor in any sense the originator of the species. Variation is the quality of a species, and not its producer. We see nothing yet to shake this belief; but if the lessons we have learned from geology and living forms are to be modified or proved to be mistakes, we will welcome the new light. It will not be hard to change opinion in such goodly company.

ARTICLE V.

EXAMINATION OF PHILIP. III. 11 AND REV. XX. 4.

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THE first of these passages, as found in our common version, reads thus: "If by any means, I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." That the general resurrection of mankind, both good and bad, is not here referred to, appears quite evident from the context, which represents it as an object of the apostle's greatest concern to secure personally for himself. To share in the general resurrection, he had only to live and die as a heathen man or an unbelieving Jew; but to attain to the resurrection here spoken of, he must "know Christ, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, and be made conformable unto his death." Even then, possessed of all these high spiritual attainments, there is an *εἴπως* (*if possibly, if by any means*), which, connected as here with the indicative mood, implies indeed no uncertainty of result, but nevertheless emphasizes most strongly the great difficulty of the achievement.

The resurrection here spoken of, must then be a resurrection of the righteous dead, who, as Paul in 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17 informs us, are to rise first—that is, before those living on the earth are changed—and be caught up to meet the Lord in the air, and so to be ever with the Lord. To this resurrection, as being distinct from, and antecedent to, that of the wicked dead, our Lord may have had reference in Luke xiv. 12–14, when he exhorted the chief Pharisee at whose table he was reclining, to bid the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind to his entertainments, adding for his encouragement, that he should be recompensed therefor at *the resurrection of the just*. A reference to the resurrection of the righteous dead, apart from that of the wicked, appears also clearly to be found in our Saviour's reply to the Sadducees (Luke xx. 35), “but they who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry,” etc.

It cannot be denied, that Paul may have had such a beatific vision of the glory of this resurrection of the just, that it seemed to him an object of attainment, in comparison with which everything else seemed insignificant and worthless. The marvellous disclosure of revelation, that from the loathsome grave the body so long held in its putrid embrace was to come forth, no more an object of aversion and horror, but one of resplendent beauty and loveliness, fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body, to dwell forever with God and the holy angels, was enough, perhaps, of itself to fill the soul of the apostle with an intense longing to have a part in so wonderful a resurrection and transformation.

But, nevertheless, this is a resurrection to which all the righteous will attain. Although it is an inference from scripture, and from our reasonings of the future life from what we see around us, that saints in heaven will be possessed of different grades of glory and blessedness, according as may have been their spiritual attainment on earth, yet we are assured in the word of God, that all the dead in

Christ shall rise in his likeness, and be admitted into his glorious presence. Why then, it may be asked, was there such an intense desire on the part of Paul to attain to that which will be reached by all the pious dead? Why did he struggle for a blessing which belonged so clearly even to the humblest believer?

Interpreters have felt this difficulty, and have resorted to various methods to overcome it. It is the opinion of some, that the apostle simply expresses his desire to put himself under the transforming influence of this fact of the resurrection, and thus make it conducive to growth in grace and holiness. But such an exposition would do great violence both to the language and drift of the passage. The verb *καταντάω* is employed in the New Testament and elsewhere, signifying *to come to, arrive at*, and, metaphorically, *to attain to the possession of a thing*. It is never used to denote the passive reception of that which follows as the object, but the acquisition of it—as the end or goal of one's aim and desire. Very harsh also would be that metaphor which would refer the *resurrection of the dead* here spoken of, to the influence of that fact upon the soul of the believer. Not that we would deny the power of this great truth, when fully apprehended, to excite the highest aspirations after holiness; but the phrase, “resurrection of the dead,” is too specifically used, here and elsewhere in the New Testament, to justify our interpreting it as an influence or motive excited by the fact, and not the very fact itself.

Similar to this interpretation is that which refers the words now under consideration to Christ's resurrection, spoken of in the preceding verse. But there is a wide difference in the relations which that resurrection and the one here spoken of sustain to the apostle's line of argument. The knowledge of Christ's resurrection is introduced as a means to an end, which end is made known in the following verse: *εἵπως καταντήσω εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τῶν νεκρῶν*. The knowledge of that resurrection cannot be regarded logically as the means of attaining to its power or in-

fluence upon the soul of the apostle, for, as thus interpreted, the phrases would be essentially identical. Furthermore, if Christ's resurrection were the one referred to in the passage before us, there would be, most unquestionably, some word of limitation or adjunct which would remove all ambiguity. The usual form is, "the resurrection of Christ from the dead," or "his resurrection," when reference is had to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ, and not the more general form, "resurrection of the dead." This interpretation is, therefore, too constrained and forced to be adopted as the true one. The same may be said also of every interpretation which regards it other than a veritable resurrection of the pious dead.

The difficulty, therefore, to which we have alluded still confronts us ; and we reiterate the inquiry, why Paul was stirred up to such sublime efforts to reach that in which all his fellow Christians were sure to participate. Do we err in attaching to this resurrection of the dead, for the attainment of which he would make such intense and persistent effort, a more special significancy than that which refers it to the resurrection of all the pious dead ?

Let us, then, in the spirit of candid and honest inquiry, see if we may not interpret the passage of a resurrection which shall embrace a portion only of those who have died in the Lord ; and whether countenance is not given elsewhere in the New Testament to such a partial *ἀνάστασις* of the righteous. Let us see if there be not an order in the rising of the dead, so that every one shall rise "in his own order ; Christ the first-fruits, afterward they that are Christ's at his coming," and then, by implication, those who are to be delivered over to the power of the second death.

On the very threshold of our inquiry, we notice that the word rendered *resurrection* is not *ἀνάστασις*, the usual term, but *ἐξανάστασις*, a form found nowhere else in the New Testament, and only twice, if we mistake not, in the classic Greek authors. It must be admitted that *ἐκ* in composition may here have the sense *out of* or *from* the grave, and

that ἐξανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν may be translated, *resurrection of the dead from the grave*. But why did Paul lay such stress on the coming forth from the grave, as to adopt so unusual a form of the verb? It was an enlarged measure of personal holiness, a more entire conformity to his Divine Master, a resurrection to a life of happiness and glory, upon which his eye was fixed; and not upon the mere deliverance of his body from the corruption of the grave. It would degrade the sublime sentiment of the passage, to suppose that Paul adopted so unusual a form as ἐξανάστασις, merely to give prominence to the idea of a resurrection *out of* or *from* the grave. Such an ellipsis would also be harsh and obscure, especially as the preposition compounded with the verb, is here followed by the genitive τῶν νεκρῶν, to which it would be more naturally referred.

We would, then, translate the phrase ἐξανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν, *resurrection out of or from the dead*, the usual form for *resurrection of the dead* being ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν. The expression τῶν νεκρῶν is not abstractly put for *death*, or, metaphorically, for those exposures to death which characterized the missionary labors of all the apostles, and especially of Paul, but is used of the society or company of the dead. The ἀνάστασις in this passage is predicated, not of all this company of the dead, but of a definite number, who are to rise *out of* or *from among* others remaining yet in the grave.

It has been remarked that the form ἐξανάστασις is not found elsewhere in the New Testament. But we have its equivalent, ἀναστάσεως ἐκ νεκρῶν, in 1 Pet. i. 3, and in Acts iv. 2. In the former of these passages reference is had to the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the company of the dead, and in the second, while at first glance it would seem that the general resurrection was that which Peter and John preached, a closer inspection will show that it was the doctrine of the resurrection proved from that of Christ which was preached, and that the language was substan-

tially the same as that which Peter afterwards employed in his epistle, which we have just quoted. The phrase translated *through Jesus* is ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ, *in Jesus*. Dr. Addison Alexander, in view of the phraseology of the Greek, gives as the meaning, that Peter and John taught the doctrine of the resurrection proved and exemplified in that of Christ, and that the words ἐκ νεκρῶν strictly mean “*from [among] the dead, from their society, from a share in their condition.*”

No one presumes to deny the pertinency and exactness of this phraseology when used of the resurrection of Christ, for he rose *from among* the dead and became the first-fruits of them that slept. Why then shall the same form of language, when employed by Paul to denote an ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν to which he is earnestly aspiring, be deprived of its obvious meaning, and made to refer to a general resurrection of the pious dead, if not of all mankind, both good and bad? This is not sound philology. The plain is ever to throw light upon the obscure. If ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν signifies that Christ rose *from among* the company of the dead, then the parallel phrase, ἐξανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν, must be interpreted of Paul's desire to share in a resurrection *from among* the company of the dead. We see not how this philological necessity can be avoided.

It may be claimed, however, that τῶν νεκρῶν here refers to the wicked dead, and that this ἐξανάστασις is to be predicated therefore of the whole, and not of a portion of the pious dead. But this, as has been remarked, would convict Paul of a groundless anxiety to attain to a resurrection which will be shared by all the pious dead, and thus deprive his language of all force and pertinency. Furthermore, it would appear somewhat strange, that the apostle should employ, in this connection, τῶν νεκρῶν of the wicked dead, when he elsewhere makes no mention of them, except in Acts xxiv. 15, where he speaks of the resurrection both of the just and unjust. A resurrection from among the wicked dead! Does Paul mean to imply that he and his fellow saints are to repose in the grave with the wicked dead, and

to arise from among them, and that he is to put forth the most intense and persistent efforts to attain unto this ἀνάστασις from among the enemies of his Lord? He speaks of departed saints as sleeping in Jesus, but never as making their grave with the wicked dead. How surpassingly strange that he should refer here so specifically and emphatically to that class, as though the pious dead were left wholly out of sight, and the unrighteous dead were of such relative importance, that even the article in τῶν νεκρῶν was required to give them due prominence.

It is not a sufficient reply to this, that Paul in no other way could have given precision to this language, for he might have written ἀνάστασις τῶν δικαίων, *the resurrection of the just*, or ἀνάστασις τῶν ἁγίων or τῶν πιστῶν, *the resurrection of the saints or the faithful*, and thus have avoided, according to his custom elsewhere, any mention or reference to the wicked dead. Indeed, the ellipsis needs only to be filled out, to put this interpretation of τῶν νεκρῶν out of the question: "If in any way I may attain to the resurrection of the righteous from among the company of the wicked dead."

There can be no doubt, then, that τῶν νεκρῶν refers here to the pious dead. If so, the passage incontrovertibly teaches that, antecedent to the resurrection of the whole company of the righteous dead, there will be a resurrection of the most eminent saints, and that this ἀνάστασις is to be one of such transcendent glory and blessedness, and requires in those who are to be its subjects such high attainments in holiness, that Paul made it an object of intense and continuous effort to be included in the number of those who were thus to rise.

But is this resurrection of a part of the pious dead antecedent to that of the rest, taught elsewhere in the New Testament? In 1 Thess. iv. 16, Paul says: "the dead in Christ shall rise first"; but this πρῶτον finds its correlate in ἔπειτα ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες, which introduces the change that shall pass upon living believers immediately upon the ἀνάστασις

of the pious dead. One thing, however, is clearly taught in this passage, namely, that the order of the resurrection shall be such, that the living and the risen saints will ascend in one company to meet and welcome their coming Lord and Judge. It may be inferred also from this, that the wicked dead will be raised last of all, and that their eyes will open upon him whom they have rejected, "coming, with ten thousands of his saints, to execute judgment" upon them for their ungodliness and unbelief. An order, therefore, in the resurrection of the good and the bad would seem in this passage to be very clearly established.

In 1 Cor. xv. 23, to which reference has already been made, Paul speaks also of an order in the resurrection of the good, Christ being the first-fruits, and then they also which are Christ's at his coming. The words *ἐκαστος δὲ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι*, *every man in his own order, rank, or band*, would seem to indicate, that as Christ rose first of all from the dead, so in the *ἀνάστασις* of his followers there would be an order, a *series, succession*, like the advance of the divisions of a great army. Every believer will rise and ascend in the band or division (*τάγμα*) for which he has been qualified during his probationary state. If no other passage than this bore upon the subject of our discussion, it might be deemed as furnishing quite satisfactory proof that the resurrection of the righteous will not be simultaneous and *en masse*, but progressive, serial, and in divinely constituted order.

It may be proper to remark in this connection, that the phrases, "end of the world," "day of judgment," "day of the Lord," and the like, are not to be compressed to an inconsiderable period of time, like our day of twenty-four hours, but in the very nature of things must be referred to an indefinitely prolonged period, the length of which is known only to God. It is called the *day* of the Lord, because it refers to a period definitely fixed in the councils of eternity, and not because it is embraced within the limits of a common day. Thus in Gen. ii. 4, the work of creation

is referred to as performed in a single day, whereas we are told in the foregoing chapter that God was employed six days in the creation of the heavens and the earth. These days were probably great time-periods, and yet we are not misunderstood, nor do we use language improperly, when we speak of the *day* of creation. In like manner, the process of the resurrection and final judgment may embrace long extended periods of time, and yet be properly referred to as *the day of the Lord, the day of judgment*, or still more concisely, the *hour* when all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of man, and come forth (John v. 28, 29).

The texts which we have thus far considered lead us to the belief that the resurrection of a part of the pious dead will antedate that of the rest. We now proceed to the examination of a passage which, when fairly interpreted, seems to place the doctrine of a *first* resurrection, or a resurrection embracing a portion only of the pious dead, beyond a reasonable doubt. We refer to Rev. xx. 4, 5: "And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them; and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. But the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished. This is the first resurrection."

It may be premised here, that whatever theory may be adopted in the interpretation of the Apocalypse, all expositors of any note are agreed that the twentieth chapter embraces a series of events, beginning with the confinement of Satan in the abyss, and running on to the end of time. But there is a difference of opinion, whether a single thread of prophetic events runs through the whole chapter, or whether events are referred to which are cotemporaneous, and therefore mutually dependent and correlate. Thus many, if not the majority of evangelical commentators, find a synchronism in the thousand years of Satan's confinement

in the bottomless pit and the thousand years of what is termed the martyr-reign. But this has proved the starting point whence many have wandered far away from the principles of sound hermeneutics, and in the end have fallen into great errors. The Millenarians, assuming that these epochs are one and the same, hold the opinion that Christ, in bodily form, is to descend to this earth, and having established his seat of empire at Jerusalem, is to reign in great pomp and splendor, the most eminent of the pious dead reappearing in risen, glorified bodies with him, and forming the nobility and court of his kingdom.

To avoid this unscriptural theory of the Millennium, the sounder class of expositors fall into the opposite error, and deny that any reference is had in vs. 4 to a physical resurrection of the martyrs and other eminent saints, the language being purely symbolical. They synchronize the two epochs of a thousand years, but seek to escape the millenarian heresy to which such an interpretation exposes them, by reducing the sublime truth revealed in vs. 4 to a metaphor. Prof. Moses Stuart refers the two chiliads to one and the same period of time, but nevertheless interprets vs. 4 of a physical resurrection of the martyrs, who live and reign with Christ in heaven during the confinement of Satan in the bottomless abyss. He was too able and honest an interpreter to evade the obvious sense of vs. 4, although his exegesis is cramped and distorted by erroneously synchronizing the two epochs of a thousand years. But we know of no other interpreter of note, especially among those of a past generation, who does not refer the second chiliad of years to a metaphorical representation of great events which are to take place contemporaneously with the first chiliad. It is quite evident that they do this to relieve themselves from the consequences which would inevitably follow, were they to give vs. 4 a literal sense, and at the same time synchronize it with the time of the binding and confinement of Satan. Can any one believe that Doddridge would have so paraphrased this verse: "I saw the souls of

them who had been beheaded, and they *appeared* to rise in triumph, and they lived and reigned with Christ," and in his note on the passage, express his doubt that a *proper* resurrection is referred to, thus making the whole scene a mere phantasm passing before the eye of the seer, unless through fear of being entangled in the meshes of Millenarianism, if he held to a veritable resurrection of the martyrs? Or that Thomas Scott, an expositor of such sturdy common sense, would have interpreted the martyr-resurrection as a reappearance of the *martyr-spirit* on earth during the millenium, had he not feared that a literal interpretation would expose him to the charge of being a Millenarian, or at least of favoring their views? The clouds and mists which have obscured this passage, and concealed in a great measure its sublime truth from the apprehension of the readers of God's word, are in the main to be referred to the unwarrantable blending together of these two epochs, and compelling, by a sort of Procrustean torture, a harmony which has no substantial basis on which to rest.

We have so recently, in another connection,¹ presented the readers of this Review with what we deem satisfactory proof, that two distinct epochs are referred to in the thousand years of Satan's confinement in the bottomless pit, and the thousand years of the martyr-reign, that we deem it unnecessary to repeat in the present Article what has there been written. Suffice it here to say, that the train of thought is greatly interrupted by the theory of two concurrent and contemporaneous series of events, and that the two epochs have no characteristics in common, the one being a period of rest from the active opposition of the adversary, the other, of jubilant triumph and glory; the one being followed by a wide spread and awful apostasy, and another desperate encounter with the enemies of truth; the other, by the general resurrection and the final judgment. The absence of the article in *χίλια ἔτη* of vs. 4, also proves very clearly that a new and distinct epoch is there introduced;

¹ See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. XVIII. 363.

for had it been identical with the *χίλια ἔτη* of vs. 2, the article, according to Greek usage, would have been prefixed, as it is in vs. 3 and 7, where reference is had to the thousand years of Satan's confinement, and vs. 5, where reference is had to the thousand years of the martyr-reign.

The second *χίλια ἔτη* must, then, be regarded as a distinct period from that which precedes. It commences when the enemies of truth have been utterly destroyed, and extends onward into the future, until lost in the effulgence of Christ's second and final coming to judge mankind and close up his mediatorial reign.

We are now prepared to inquire who are the persons, in this second thousand years, said to live and reign with Christ. In the commencement of the verse they are called *αἱ ψυχαί*, "*the souls* of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads or in their hands." Two classes of persons seem here to be referred to, they who had suffered martyrdom, and they who had been steadfast in times of great spiritual declension. It is quite clear that these classes are put generically for the most eminent of the pious dead. They are called *souls* (*ψυχαί*), in reference to their mode of existence antecedent to their reunion with the body,—which body is represented as *living*, that is, rising from the grave,—and not in reference to their mode of existence during the thousand years of their triumphal reign with Jesus Christ. It is mainly because they overlooked this use of *ψυχαί*, and erroneously referred it to the condition or state of these persons during their reign with Christ, that most of the earlier English commentators explain this beatific vision of the martyr-resurrection as symbolical of a moral renovation of mankind, and not as an actual resurrection of the bodies of the persons spoken of.

But is this *living again*, this *ἀνάστασις ἡ πρώτη*, nothing more than a revival of the martyr spirit, a metaphorical re-

appearance of this class of the pious dead in Christians of the same spirit? Wherein consists the antithesis, then, between those persons who lived and reigned with Christ, and the rest of the dead (οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν νεκρῶν), who were to live not again (i. e. whose resurrection was not to take place) until the martyr-reign had come to a close? Are the resurrections, one or more, which are to follow, and to which this martyr-resurrection stands correlated as the *first* in order, to be expounded as mere metaphorical representations of the prevalence of a spirit on earth which has found its prototype in the good and bad men of a former period? To such a result are we brought by the exegesis which we are attempting to refute. If we affix a symbolical sense to the first resurrection, the laws of interpretation require us to regard all which follows as symbolical. Where is the line to be drawn, on the one side of which is metaphor and symbol, and on the other a narrative of what is actually to take place? There can be no such line of demarcation. Either the resurrections spoken of, the great white throne and him who sat thereon, the dead small and great who stood before it, the books of judgment which were opened, and the final award to each man according to his works, are mere symbolical representations of great moral changes which are to take place in the latter days, or they are all to be regarded as events which are actually to take place in the order and manner here revealed to the eye of John. So Alford well remarks: "if in a passage where *two resurrections* are mentioned, when certain *ψυχὰὶ ἔζησαν* at the first, and the rest of the *νεκροὶ ἔζησαν* only at the end of a specified period after that first, — if in such a passage the first resurrection may be understood to mean *spiritual* rising with Christ, while the second means *literal* rising from the grave, — then there is an end of all significance in language, and scripture is wiped out as a definite testimony to anything. If the first resurrection is spiritual, then so is the second, which I suppose none will be hardy enough to maintain; but if the second is literal, then so is the first, which,

in common with the whole primitive church, and many of the best modern interpreters, I do maintain."

For a similar reason, we must reject that interpretation of the passage which refers the martyr-resurrection and reign to an increase of happiness and joy to which, during the millennium, the more eminent of departed saints shall attain in view of the extension of Christ's kingdom on the earth. Such an exposition would make the subsequent resurrection, to which this stands related as the first, a mere increase of happiness, and not a veritable resurrection of the body. The expression οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν νεκρῶν οὐκ ἀνέζησαν ἕως τελεσθῆναι τὰ χίλια ἔτη, *but the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished*, would then be nothing more nor less than that they experienced no additional joy or happiness at the universal spread and triumph of the gospel until the martyr-reign was brought to a close, at which time they would *live again*, that is, be permitted to share in the blessedness which their martyr companions had enjoyed during the preceding thousand years. There is an absurdity on the very face of such an interpretation of the passage, which should insure its rejection without a moment's hesitation. It is also opposed to a well-established fact of revelation, that all the souls of the righteous dead are with Christ, and that no blessedness resulting from the universal spread of the gospel on earth is shared by a portion to the exclusion of the rest. "There is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth." The triumphs of Christianity will not awaken joy in a portion only of the blessed; but all, according to their spiritual capacity, will be supremely happy at the renovation of the earth under the prevalent sway of the gospel.

There is no interpretation which fully answers the conditions of the passage, except that which refers it to a resurrection of the bodies of these martyrs and eminent saints. Observe how direct and sharply marked is the antithesis: "they lived (ἔζησαν) and reigned with Christ a thousand years — the rest of the dead lived not again (οὐκ ἀνέζησαν)

until the thousand years were finished." If ἀνέζησαν, in the second member, signifies not mere continuance of existence, but a resumption of the former condition of the dead, when soul and body were united, then ἔζησαν, in the first member, must have the same signification. But such, most unquestionably, must be the meaning of ἀνέζησαν. It is employed in Rom. xiv. 9 of Christ's resurrection: "for to this end Christ both died and rose, and revived (ἀνέζησαν, *lived again*), that he might be Lord both of the dead and living (ζώντων)." Here ἀνέζησαν refers to the reviving or returning to life of Christ's body; and this is rendered still more emphatic by the antithetic νεκρῶν and ζώντων (*dead and living*) with which the verse closes. When it is, then, said οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν νεκρῶν οὐκ ἀνέζησαν, *the rest of the dead lived not again*, in the passage before us, we ought without hesitation to give ἀνέζησαν the same sense which it has in the passage just cited.

The verb ἀναζάω is elsewhere found in only two places in the New Testament, namely in Luke xv. 24 (repeated in vs. 32): "this my son was dead, and is alive again (ἀνέζησε)"; and in Rom. vii. 9: "but when the commandment came, sin revived (ἀνέζησεν) and I died." In both these instances the word is used metaphorically; but the metaphor is based on the prevalent signification of the word *to rise to life* from a state or condition of death. The restoration of the prodigal son to his father was, as it were, a resurrection from the dead, or the entering upon a new existence. Sin, by the presence and power of the commandment, was quickened from its death-like stupor to life and activity; or, in other words, the sinner was made to feel that he was under the fell influence of sin, of which he had been previously as insensible as though it had no living hold upon him. But in the passage before us, a metaphorical use of ἀνέζησαν would be inadmissible, viewed not only in relation to the passage itself, but its context, both preceding and following; for it would compel us to affix a metaphorical sense to the whole passage, if not to the whole chapter,

unless we mix the plain and figurative, the literal and metaphorical, in defiance of all hermeneutical laws.

We see, then, that ἀνέζησαν in the second member, employed as it is in *Rom.* xiv. 9, of Christ's resurrection from the dead, leaves us no room to doubt what sense shall be given to ἐζησαν in the first member, with which it stands in such marked antithesis. It must relate to a physical resurrection, a reunion of soul and body, not in the gross material sense in which the union takes place on earth, but in accordance with the laws of that higher existence to which the blessed will attain after the resurrection.

But not only is ἐζησαν to be interpreted of a physical resurrection, from its antithesis with ἀνέζησαν in the second member, but from the *usus loquendi* of the word as found elsewhere in the New Testament. It is employed in several instances of persons restored to life or raised from the dead. "My daughter is now dead, but come and she *shall live* (ζήσεται)." *Matt.* ix. 18. "And they, when they had heard that he [the Lord Jesus] was *alive* (ζῆ), believed not." *Mark* xvi. 11. "And when they found not his body, they came saying that they had seen a vision of angels, which said that he was *alive*" (ζῆν). *Luke* xxiv. 23. "To whom also he showed himself *alive* (ζῶντα) after his passion." *Acts* i. 3. "And he gave her his hand and lifted her up, and when he had called the saints and widows, presented her *alive* (ζῶσαν)." *Acts* ix. 41. See also *Acts* xx. 12. These citations will suffice to show that ἐζησαν, in the cognate passage before us, is not to be taken in a metaphorical sense, nor as denoting mere continuance of existence, but a veritable restoration from death to life. As this could not be predicated of the souls of these martyrs, which, from the time when they had sealed with their blood their testimony for the truth, had always been with Christ, it must be referred to their bodies, that had lain so many centuries in the grave, but were now raised to a life of incorruptible glory.

With every philological argument, then, in its favor, why should we hesitate to refer the vision in *Rev.* xx. 4 to an

actual resurrection of the martyrs and other eminent saints? Is there any violation of scripture analogy in such a view? Will there not be grades of glory and happiness throughout eternity, as the firmament reveals to us stars of various magnitude and brightness? This seems to be clearly implied in Dan. xii. 3; nor can we question it, unless we place all the blessed on the same level of enjoyment, without respect to their comparative eminence in piety on earth, or their self-denial and labors in their Master's service. There are some historical facts in the Bible which bear directly upon the subject of this discussion. Enoch and Elijah were exempted from the power and dominion of the grave, and translated immediately from earth to heaven. After the resurrection of our Lord, "the graves were opened, and many bodies of the saints which slept arose, and came out of their graves, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many (Matt. xxvii. 52, 53). It is strange that any should be in doubt as to whether these bodies were received up into heaven, or returned again to the grave, there to sleep until the general resurrection. Had the latter been true, the Jewish priests could have disputed with some show of reason the reality of their appearance, finding their bodies, as they would have done, in the grave. This leads us to believe, with much assurance, that they were taken up into heaven at the time of our Lord's ascension. He was the first-fruits of them that slept; they, the precursors of a glorious harvest yet to be gathered in.

If, then, the bodies of Enoch and Elijah, and those saints that came forth from the grave after Christ's resurrection, were raised to heaven, and are now there, while the bodies of Abraham, David, Isaiah, Daniel, and other patriarchs and prophets, are yet mouldering in the grave, shall we regard it strange if these worthies of the Old Testament, together with the eminent saints and martyrs of the new dispensation, are to be honored by a resurrection which shall antedate that of the rest of the pious dead, who, in accordance with God's sovereign pleasure, are to remain in the grave until this thousand years of the martyr-reign is ended?

But our examination of this passage would be incomplete if we did not inquire to what class of persons οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν νεκρῶν in vs. 5 refers. It seems to be the general opinion of expositors that reference is had in these words to the whole company of the dead, both good and bad. But is not this an erroneous view? Has not the apoclypt in his eye the righteous dead, and these only? Do not the persons in vs. 5, designated by οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, revive and live again in precisely the same sense as the martyrs, who have been raised to thrones of glory during the preceding chiliad of years? Very reluctantly ought we to employ a word of such high import as ἀνέζησαν, which, as we have seen, is found elsewhere in its literal sense only in one passage in the New Testament, where it refers to the reanimation of Christ's body; we say, very reluctantly ought we to employ this great word of the wicked, who are to rise to shame and everlasting contempt (Dan. xii. 2), and whose resurrection is one of damnation instead of life and happiness (John v. 29).

But the words οἱ λοιποὶ place this reference of the passage to the pious dead beyond a reasonable doubt. Λοιποὶ is derived from λείπω, and signifies *those who are left* of a number from which some have previously been taken. The same class of persons must be referred to in the correlates *some, others*, unless they are accompanied by adjuncts which characterize them as belonging to different classes. We will not deny that the language might have been so shaped, that οἱ λοιποὶ would have referred naturally and properly to the whole congregation of the dead; yet as the words here stand, we cannot, without great violence, make οἱ λοιποὶ embrace any other than the class of the pious dead, from which the martyr-saints have previously been taken to participate in the first resurrection.

The exegesis which we have adopted receives further confirmation from the declaration in vs. 5, αὕτη ἡ ἀνάστασις ἡ πρώτη, *this is the first resurrection*. There can be no doubt whatever that this refers to the thousand years of the martyr-reign; for in the following verse it is declared that he who

has part in the first resurrection is blessed and holy, and that upon such the second death hath no power, but they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years. What then is the *second* resurrection, to which this stands related as the *first* resurrection? It is manifestly found in the words, "but the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished." The second resurrection follows immediately upon the close of the first, which embraces in its whole sweep of events one thousand years. We do not turn aside here to inquire into the length of these prophetic years, since our argument is wholly apart from the discussion of that point. But here are evidently two resurrections, the one following the other; and our assumption is, that if one is literal the other is literal, and if one is metaphorical the other is metaphorical. Every principle of interpretation demands this. Now the declaration, "blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection," does not imply that they who share in the second or following resurrection, are not also blessed and holy; but the sentiment is, that the persons embraced in the first ἀνάστασις are pre-eminently blessed and holy, and exempt from the power of the second death. This idea is rendered still more emphatic by the clause which follows: "they shall be priests of God and of Christ," and the repetition from vs. 4: "and shall reign with him a thousand years." What conceivable meaning can be attached to this verse, if the resurrection in vs. 4 is to be interpreted as metaphorical or symbolical of some great moral change which is to take place in the latter day upon the earth? The passage is deprived of all sense, if the resurrection in vs. 4 be regarded as other than what is actual and real. Are we not justified, then, in claiming from this passage the most abundant and conclusive evidence that there are to be two distinct and successive resurrections of the pious dead? Have we perverted the laws of grammar or the meaning of words in reaching this conclusion? Have we turned aside from the sacred text to follow the wild speculations and vagaries of

human reasoning? We are not ignorant of the objections which may be advanced against this view, nor would we undervalue them. We may not be able to give a satisfactory answer to them; the subject lying, as it does, so far in the distant future, and relating to that which so far transcends the unaided power of the human intellect to compass. But formidable as these objections may be, they are powerless when confronted with the great utterance of the passage, that there is to be a resurrection of the martyrs and a portion of the righteous dead, which shall antedate by a chiliad of prophetic years that of the rest of the dead, and which is therefore called ἡ ἀνάστασις ἡ πρώτη, *the first resurrection*, or more literally, *the resurrection (viz.) the first*. It may not be unprofitable, however, to notice several of the more common objections to the doctrine of a first and second resurrection of the pious dead.

It is alleged as adverse to this view, that it is taught nowhere else in the word of God. What if this were so? It would not invalidate the testimony of the passage before us. Some of the sublimest truths of revelation are unfolded in single passages. The fact that Christ's mediatorial kingdom is to be given up to the Father, when he shall have put all enemies under his feet, is revealed only in 1 Cor. xv. 24-28. The nature of the resurrection-body is discussed only in this same chapter. The marvellous declaration that saints shall judge angels is made only once, and that too in the form of an interrogation. The allegation, then, that this doctrine of a first and second resurrection is found only in the passage now under consideration, if it were so, would not invalidate its truth. But, as we have shown in the former portion of this Article, it seems clearly referred to by Paul, in his ἐξανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν, and in the order (ἐν τῇ ἰδίῳ τάγματι) in which the dead are to arise; so that were this text in Rev. xx. 4 blotted out, the hiatus might be quite readily filled from the teachings of Paul.

It may also be objected, that the exegesis of these passages which we have adopted, would raise to heaven a portion of

the pious dead without the preliminary process of the judgment; or, in other words, that it is opposed to the great fact of revelation, that the righteous are to be first judged, and then enter into life eternal. But may not a virtual judgment be passed upon the pious, in whole or in part, so that they may have a foretaste of the blessedness which shall be confirmed to them in the solemn award of the final judgment? Is not a preliminary judgment of this sort passed upon all who die in the Lord and are admitted into the presence of Christ? It does not preclude their standing with the rest of the human family before the judgment seat of Christ, that Enoch and Elijah were translated bodily to heaven. The resurrection of those who came forth from their graves after the resurrection of Christ will not stand in the way of their appearance at his bar, in whose triumphal train they ascended to heaven, and whose bodies, fashioned after the image of his glorified body, are the pledge of his redemptive grace that all, in due time, shall be raised from the grave and transformed into his glorious likeness. Nor can it be reasonably charged upon the doctrine of the resurrection of the martyr-saints, to live and reign with Christ antecedent to the resurrection of the rest of the righteous dead and the final judgment, that this class will be exempted thereby from standing before the bar of God, to be judged like all the rest of mankind. As Professor Stuart well remarks: "The decisions of conscience need no protracted time for examination. Each spirit takes, of course, the place to which its character necessarily assigns it, and all this, as we may suppose, without any general or even any particular and formal judgment after the manner of human tribunals."

We believe fully in the doctrine of a general judgment; but this is not inconsistent with the belief of an order in the resurrection of the pious, nor of the admission to blessedness of those who attain unto the first resurrection, long anterior to the Parousia of the Son of man to sit upon the throne of judgment. Preliminary to the final act in the drama of time, the most stupendous scenes will be enacted, which, as

precursors of scenes of greater glory and blessedness yet to come, will fill all holy beings with admiration and rapture. The glory of the first millennium will be far transcended by that of the second, when the devil having been cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where have already been consigned the beast and the false prophet (Rev. xx. 10), the whole earth shall be at rest and be quiet (Isa. xiv. 17), and heaven above shall resound with new hallelujahs as the martyr-saints enter upon the glory and blessedness of the first resurrection. Then shall be realized the predictions of the latter-day glory, made by Isaiah, Zechariah, and other prophets of the Old Testament. Then, in view of the vast multitudes who in successive generations shall throng the ways of Zion, and come up to her solemn feasts, the blessed Redeemer "shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied," and it shall be rapturously exclaimed: "Who are these that fly as a cloud, and as the doves to their windows?"

To the first resurrection (*ἡ ἀνάστασις ἡ πρώτη*), which shall be the crowning event of this glorious epoch, we believe that Paul had reference in the passage under consideration. It was to be attained only by the most intense and persevering efforts after holiness. With all his devotion to the cause of his Master, with all his self-denying labors, with all his high spiritual attainments and gifts, even though he had been caught up into paradise and heard unspeakable words which it was not lawful for man to utter, with all these gifts and graces and abundance of revelations, he was not certain of having fully attained to this *ἐξανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν*, but he avowed it as his fixed and unalterable determination, "to press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." "Let our conversation be in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ; who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue even all things unto himself."

ARTICLE VI.

RISE AND PROGRESS OF MONASTICISM.¹

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ORIGIN OF CHRISTIAN MONASTICISM. COMPARISON WITH
OTHER FORMS OF ASCETICISM.

THE monastic institution arose in the beginning of the fourth century, and thenceforth occupies a distinguished place in the history of the church. Beginning in Egypt, it spread in an irresistible tide over the East and the West, continued to be the chief repository of the Christian life down to the times of the Reformation, and still remains in the Greek and Roman churches an indispensable institution, and the most productive seminary of saints, priests, and missionaries.

The germs of the ascetic tendency are found among the heretics and the weak, Judaizing Christians opposed in the writings of Paul. Monasticism is only the full development and organization of asceticism. It is by no means confined to the Christian church, but belongs also to other religions, both before and after Christ, especially in the East. It proceeds from religious seriousness, enthusiasm, and ambition, from a sense of the vanity of the world, and an inclination of noble souls towards solitude, contemplation, and freedom from the bonds of the flesh and the temptations of the world; but it gives this tendency an undue predominance over the social, practical, and world-reforming spirit of Christianity.

Among the Hindus the ascetic system may be traced back

¹ The Monks of the West. By Count de Montalembert. Translated from the French. Edinburg and London: 1861. 2 vols. Vol. I. contains the history of Monasticism before St. Benedict of Nursia. Vol. II. is devoted mainly to St. Benedict. The French original is to embrace six volumes, and to come down to St. Bernard.

almost to the time of Moses, certainly beyond Alexander the Great, who found it there in full force, and substantially with the same characteristics which it presents at the present day.¹ Let us consider it a few moments.

The Vedas, portions of which date from the fifteenth century before Christ, the Laws of Menu, which were completed before the rise of Buddhism, that is six or seven centuries before our era, and the numerous other sacred books of the Indian religion, enjoin by example and precept entire abstraction of thought, seclusion from the world, and a variety of penitential and meritorious acts of self-mortifi-

¹ Compare the occasional notices of the Indian gymnosophists in Strabo (Lib. XV. c. 1, after accounts from the time of Alexander the Great), Arrian (Exped. Alex., Lib. VII. c. 1-3, and Hist. Ind., c. 11), Plinius (Hist. Nat., VII. 2), Diod. Sic. (Lib. II), Plutarch (Alex., 64), Porphyry (De abstinent, Lib. IV.), Lucian (Fugit. 7), Clemens Alex. (Strom. Lib. I. and III.), and August. (De civit. Dei., Lib. XIV. c. 17: "Per opacas Indiae solitudines, quum quidam nudiphilosophentur, unde gymnosophistae nominantur; adhibent tamen genitalibus tegmina, quibus per cetera membrorum carent"; and Lib. XV. 20, where he denies all merit to their celibacy, because it is not "secundum fidem summi boni, qui est Deus"). With these ancient representations agree the narratives of Fon Kounki (about 400, translated by M. A. Rémusat, Par., 1836), Marco Polo (1280), Bremer (1670), Hamilton (1700), Papi, Niebuhr, Orlich, Sonnerat, and others. See the older accounts of Catholic missionaries to Thibet, in Pinkerton's Collection of Voyages and Travels, Vol. VII., and also the recent work of Huc, a French missionary priest of the congregation of Lazare: *Souvenirs d'un Voyage dans le Tartarie, le Thibet, et la Chine, pendant les années 1844-1846*. Compare also on the whole subject, the two works of R. S. Hardy, "Eastern Monasticism," and "A Manual of Buddhism in its Modern Development; transl. from Singalese MSS." Lond. 1850. The striking affinity between Buddhism and Romanism extends, by the way, beyond monkery and convent-life to the hierarchical organization, with the Grand Lama for pope, and to the worship, with its ceremonies, feasts, processions, pilgrimages, confessional, a kind of mass, prayers for the dead, extreme unction, etc. The view is certainly at least plausible, to which the great geographer, Carl Ritter (Erdkunde, II. p. 283-299, 2d ed.), has given the weight of his name, that the Lamaists in Thibet borrowed their religious forms and ceremonies in part from the Nestorian missionaries. But this view is a mere hypothesis, and is rendered improbable by the fact that Buddhism in Cochin China, Tonquin, and Japan, where no Nestorian missionaries ever were, shows the same striking resemblance to Romanism as the Lamaism of Thibet, Tartary, and North China. Respecting the singular tradition of Prester John, or the Christian priest-king in Eastern Asia, which arose about the eleventh century, and respecting the Nestorian missions, see Ritter, l. c.

cation, by which the devotee assumes a proud superiority over the vulgar herd of mortals, and is absorbed at last into the divine fountain of all being. The ascetic system is essential alike to Brahmanism and Buddhism, the two opposite and yet cognate branches of the Indian religion, which in many respects are similarly related to each other, as Judaism is to Christianity, or also as Romanism to Protestantism; Buddhism is a later reformation of Brahmanism; it dates probably from the sixth century before Christ (according to other accounts, much earlier); and, although subsequently expelled by the Brahmins from Hindostan, it embraces more followers than any other heathen religion, since it rules in Farther India, nearly all the Indian islands, Japan, Thibet, a great part of China, and Central Asia to the borders of Sibera. But the two religions start from opposite principles. The Brahmanic asceticism¹ proceeds from a pantheistic view of the world; the Buddhistic, from an atheistic and nihilistic, yet very earnest, view; the one is controlled by the idea of the absolute but abstract unity and a feeling of contempt of the world; the other, by the idea of the absolute but unreal variety and a feeling of deep grief over the emptiness and nothingness of all existence; the one is predominantly objective, positive, and idealistic; the other, more subjective, negative, and realistic; the one aims at an absorption into the universal spirit of Brahma; the other, consistently, into an absorption into nonentity, if it be true that Buddhism starts from an atheistic rather than a pantheistic or dualistic basis. "Brahmanism," says a modern writer on the subject,² "looks back to the beginning; Buddhism, to the end; the former loves cosmogony; the latter, eschatology. Both reject the existing world; the Brahman despises it because he contrasts it with the higher being of Brahma; the Buddhist bewails it because of its

¹ The Indian word for it is *tapas*, i.e. the burning out, or the extinction, of the individual being, and its absorption into the essence of Brahma.

² Ad. Wuttke, in his able and instructive work, *Das Geistesleben der Chinesen, Japaner, und Indier* (second part of his *History of Heathenism*), 1853, p. 593.

unrealness; the former sees God in all; the other, emptiness in all." Yet, as all extremes meet, the abstract all-entirety of Brahmanism and the equally abstract nonentity or vacuity of Buddhism come to the same thing in the end, and may lead to the same ascetic practices. The asceticism of Brahmanism takes more the direction of anchoretism, while that of Buddhism exists generally in the social form of regular convent life.

The Hindu monks or gymnosophists (naked philosophers), as the Greeks called them, live in woods, caves, on mountains or rocks, in poverty, celibacy, abstinence, silence, sleeping on straw or the bare ground, crawling on the belly, standing all day on tiptoe, exposed to the pouring rain or scorching sun, with four fires kindled around them, presenting a savage and frightful appearance, yet greatly revered by the multitude, especially the women, and performing miracles, not unfrequently completing their austerities by suicide at the stake or in the waves of the Ganges. Thus they are described by the ancients and by modern travellers. The Buddhist monks are less fanatical and extravagant than the Hindu yogis and fakirs. They depend mainly on fasting, prayer, psalmody, intense contemplation, and the use of the whip, to keep their rebellious flesh in subjection. They have a fully developed system of monasticism in connection with their priesthood, and a large number of convents, also nunneries for female devotees. The Buddhist monasticism, especially in Thibet, with its vows of celibacy, poverty, and obedience, its common meals, readings, and various pious exercises, bears such a remarkable resemblance to that of the Roman Catholic church, that older Roman missionaries thought it could be only explained as a diabolical imitation. But the original always precedes the caricature, and the ascetic system was completed in India long before the introduction of Christianity, even if we should trace this back to Saint Bartholomew and Saint Thomas.

The Hellenic heathenism was less serious and contem-

plative, indeed, than the Oriental; yet the Pythagoreans were a kind of monastic society, and the Platonic view of matter and of body not only lies at the bottom of the Gnostic and Manichæan asceticism, but had much to do also with the ethics of Origen and the Alexandrian school.

Judaism, apart from the ancient Nazarites,¹ had its Essenes in Palestine,² and its Therapeutæ in Egypt;³ though these betray the intrusion of foreign elements into the Mosaic religion, and so find no mention in the New Testament.

Lastly, Mohammedanism, though in mere imitation of Christian and pagan examples, has, as is well known, its dervises and cloisters.⁴

Now, were these earlier phenomena the source, or only analogies, of the Christian monasticism? That a multitude of foreign usages and rites made their way into the church in the age of Constantine, is undeniable. Hence many have held that monasticism also came from heathenism, and was an apostasy from apostolic Christianity, which Paul had plainly foretold in the Pastoral Epistles.⁵ But such a

¹ Comp. Num. vi. 1-21.

² Compare the remarkable description of these Jewish monks by the elder Pliny (Hist. Natur. V. 15): "Gens sola, et in toto orbe præter cæteros mira, sine ulla femina, omni venere abdicata, sine pecunia, socia palmarum. Ita per seculorum millia (incredibile dictu) gens æterna est in qua nemo nascitur. Tam foecunda illis aliorum vitæ penitentia est."

³ Eusebius (Ecl. Hist. II. 17) erroneously takes them for Christians.

⁴ H. Ruffner (The Fathers of the Desert, Vol. I. chap. II. - IX., N. York, 1850) gives an extended description of these extra-Christian forms of monasticism, and derives the Christian from them, especially from the Buddhist.

⁵ So even Calvin, who, in his Commentary on 1 Tim. iv. 3, refers Paul's prophecy of the ascetic apostasy primarily to the Eueratites, Gnostics, Montanists, and Manichæans, but extends it also to the Papists: quando coelibatum et ciborum abstinentiam severius urgent quam ullum Dei præceptum. So, recently, Ruffner, and especially Isaac Taylor, who, in his "Ancient Christianity" (Vol. I. p. 299 sqq.), has a special chapter on the Predicted Ascetic Apostasy. The best modern interpreters, however, are agreed that the apostle has the heretical Gnostic dualistic asceticism in his eye, which forbade marriage and certain meats as intrinsically impure; whereas the Roman and Greek churches make marriage a sacrament, subordinate it only to celibacy, and limit the prohibition of it to priests and monks. The application of 1 Tim. iv. 1-3 to the Catholic church is therefore admissible, at most, only in a partial and indirect way.

view can hardly be reconciled with the great place of this phenomenon in history; and would, furthermore, involve the entire ancient church, with its greatest and best representatives, both east and west,—its Athanasius, its Chrysostom, its Jerome, its Augustine,—in the predicted apostasy from the faith. And no one will now hold that these men, who all admired and commended the monastic life, were antichristian errorists, and that the few and almost exclusively negative opponents of that asceticism, as Jovinian, Helvidius, and Vigilantius, were the sole representatives of pure Christianity in the Nicene and next following age.

In this whole matter we must carefully distinguish two forms of asceticism, antagonistic and irreconcilable in spirit and principle, though similar in form — the Gnostic dualistic and the Catholic. The former of these did certainly come from heathenism; but the latter sprang independently from the Christian spirit of self-denial and longing for moral perfection, and, in spite of all its excrescences, has fulfilled an important mission in the history of the church.

The pagan monachism, the pseudo-Jewish, the heretical Christian, above all the Gnostic and Manichæan, is based on an irreconcilable metaphysical dualism between mind and matter; the catholic Christian monachism arises from the moral conflict between the spirit and the flesh. The former is prompted throughout by spiritual pride and selfishness; the latter, by humility and love to God and man. The false asceticism aims at annihilation of the body and pantheistic absorption of the human being in the divine; the Christian strives after the glorification of the body and personal fellowship with the living God in Christ. And the effects of the two are equally different. Though it is also unquestionable that, notwithstanding this difference of principle, and despite the condemnation of Gnosticism and Manichæism, the heathen dualism exerted a powerful influence on the catholic asceticism and its view of the world, particularly upon anchoritism and monasticism in the East, and has been fully transcended only in evangelical Protestantism. The precise

degree of this influence, and the exact proportion of Christian and heathen ingredients in the early monachism of the church, were an interesting subject of special investigation.

The germs of the Christian monasticism may be traced as far back as the middle of the second century, and, in fact, faintly even in the anxious ascetic practices of some of the Jewish Christians in the apostolic age. This asceticism, particularly fasting and celibacy, was commended more or less distinctly by the most eminent ante-Nicene Fathers, and was practised, at least partially, by a particular class of Christians (by Origen even to the unnatural extreme of self-emasculation). So early as the Decian persecution, about the year 250, we meet also the first instances of the flight of ascetics, or Christian philosophers, into the wilderness, though rather in exceptional cases, and by way of escape from personal danger. So long as the church herself was a child of the desert, and stood in abrupt opposition to the persecuting world, the ascetics of both sexes usually lived near the congregations or in the midst of them, often even in the families, seeking there to realize the ideal of Christian perfection. But when, under Constantine, the mass of the population of the empire became nominally Christian, they felt that in this world-church, especially in such cities as Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople, they were not at home, and voluntarily retired into waste and desolate places and mountain clefts, there to work out the salvation of their souls undisturbed.

Thus far monachism is a reaction against the secularizing state-church system and the decay of discipline, and an earnest, well-meant, though mistaken, effort to save the virginal purity of the Christian church, by transplanting it in the wilderness. The moral corruption of the Roman empire, which had the appearance of Christianity, but was essentially heathen in the whole framework of society, the oppressiveness of taxes,¹ the extremes of despotism and

¹ Lactantius says it was necessary to buy even the liberty of breathing; and, according to Zosimus (Hist. II. 38), fathers prostituted their daughters to have means to pay their tax.

slavery, of extravagant luxury and hopeless poverty, the repletion of classes, the decay of all productive energy in science and art, and the threatening incursions of barbarians on the frontiers, — all favored the inclination towards solitude in just the most earnest minds.

At the same time, however, monasticism afforded also a compensation for martyrdom, which ceased with the Christianization of the state, and thus gave place to a voluntary martyrdom, a gradual self-destruction, a sort of religious suicide. In the burning deserts and awful caverns of Egypt and Syria, amidst the pains of self-torture, the mortification of natural desires, and relentless battles with hellish monsters, the ascetics now sought to win the crown of heavenly glory, which their predecessors in the times of persecution had more quickly and easily gained by a bloody death.

The native land of the monastic life was Egypt, the land where oriental and Grecian literature, philosophy, and religion, Christian orthodoxy and Gnostic heresy met, both in friendship and hostility. Monasticism was favored and promoted here by climate and geographic features, by the oasis-like seclusion of the country, by the bold contrast of barren deserts with the fertile valley of the Nile, by the superstition, the contemplative turn, and the passive endurance of the national character, by the example of the Therapeutae, and by the moral principles of the Alexandrian Fathers; especially by Origen's theory of a higher and lower morality, and of the merit of voluntary poverty and celibacy. Aelian says of the Egyptians, that they bear the most exquisite torture without a murmur, and would rather be tormented to death than compromise truth. Such natures, once seized with religious enthusiasm, are eminently qualified for saints of the desert.

DEVELOPMENT OF MONASTICISM.

In the historical development of the monastic institution, we must distinguish four stages. The first three were completed in the fourth century; the remaining one reached maturity in the Latin church of the Middle Age.

The first stage is an ascetic life, as yet not organized nor separated from the church. It comes down from the ante-Nicene age, and has been already noticed. It now took the form, for the most part, of either hermit or cenobite life, but continued in the church itself, especially among the clergy, who might be called half monks.

The second stage is hermit life or anchoretism.¹ It arose in the beginning of the fourth century, gave asceticism a fixed and permanent shape, and pushed it even to external separation from the world. It took the prophets Elijah and John the Baptist for its models, and went beyond them. Not content with partial and temporary retirement from common life, which may be united with social intercourse and useful labors, the consistent anchorite secludes himself from all society, even from kindred ascetics, and comes only exceptionally into contact with human affairs, either to receive the visits of admirers of every class, especially of the sick and the needy (which were very frequent in the case of the more celebrated monks), or to appear in the cities on some extraordinary occasion as a spirit from another world. His clothing is a hair shirt and a wild beast's skin; his food, bread and salt; his dwelling, a cave; his employment, prayer, affliction of the body, and conflict with Satanic powers and wild images of fancy. This mode of life was founded by Paul of Thebes and Saint Anthony, and came to perfection in the East. It was too eccentric and impractical for the West, and hence less frequent there, especially in the rougher climates. To the female sex it was entirely unsuited. There was a class of hermits, the Sarabaites in Egypt and the Rhemoboths in Syria, who lived in bands of at least two or three together; but their quarrelsomeness, occasional intemperance, and opposition to the clergy, brought them into ill repute.

¹ From ἀναχωρέω, to retire (from human society), ἀναχωρητής, ἐρημίτης (from ἐρημία, a desert). The word μοναχός (from μόνος, alone, and μονάζειν, to live alone), *monachus* (whence monk), also points originally to solitary, hermit life, but is commonly synonymous with cenobite or friar.

The third step in the progress of the monastic life brings us to cenobitism or cloister life,—monasticism in the ordinary sense of the word.¹ It originated likewise in Egypt, from the example of the Essenes and Therapeutae, and was carried by Saint Pachomius to the East, and afterwards by Saint Benedict to the West. Both these ascetics, like the most celebrated order-founders of later days, were originally hermits. Cloister life is a regular organization of the ascetic life on a social basis. It recognizes, at least in a measure, the social element of human nature, and represents it in a narrower sphere, secluded from the larger world. As hermit life often led to cloister life, so the cloister life was not only a refuge for the spirit weary of the world, but also in many ways a school for practical life in the church. It formed the transition from isolated to social Christianity. It consists in an association of a number of anchorets of the same sex for mutual advancement in ascetic holiness. The cenobites live somewhat according to the laws of civilization, under one roof, and under a superintendent or abbot.² They divide their time between common devotions and manual labor, and devote their surplus provisions to charity, except the mendicant monks, who themselves live by alms. In this modified form monasticism became available to the female sex, to which the solitary desert life was utterly impracticable; and with the cloisters of monks there appear at once cloisters also of nuns.³ Between the anchorets

¹ Κοινόβιον, *coenobium*; from κοινὸς βίος, *vita communis*; then the congregation of monks; sometimes also used for the building. In the same sense μάνδρα, stable, fold, and μοναστήριον, *claustrum* (whence cloister). Also λαῦραι, *laurae* (literally streets), that is cells, of which usually a number were built, not far apart, so as to form a hamlet. Hence this term is often used in the same sense as *monasterium*. The singular λαύρα, however, answers to the anchoret-life. On this nomenclature of monasticism compare Du Cange, in the *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis*, under the respective words.

² Ἡγούμενος, ἀρχιμανδρίτης, ἀββᾶς, i.e. father, hence abbot. A female superintendent was called in Syriac ἀμμή, mother, abbess.

³ From *nonna*, i.e. casta, chaste, holy. The word is probably of Coptic origin, and occurs as early as in Jerome. The masculine *nonnus*, monk, appears frequently in the Middle Age. Compare the examples in Du Cange, s. v.

and cenobites no little jealousy reigned; the former charging the latter with ease and conformity to the world; the latter accusing the former of selfishness and misanthropy. The most eminent church teachers generally prefer the cloister life. But the hermits, though their numbers diminished, never became extinct. Many a monk was a hermit first, and then a cenobite; and many a cenobite turned to a hermit.

The same social impulse, finally, which produced monastic congregations, led afterwards to monastic orders — unions of a number of cloisters under one rule and a common government. In this fourth and last stage monasticism has done most for the diffusion of Christianity and the advancement of learning,¹ has fulfilled its practical mission in the Roman Catholic church, and still wields a mighty influence there. At the same time it became, in some sense, the cradle of the German Reformation. Luther belonged to the order of Saint Augustine, and the monastic discipline of Erfurt was to him a preparation for evangelical freedom, as the Mosaic law was to Paul a schoolmaster to lead to Christ. And for this very reason Protestantism is the end of the monastic life.

NATURE AND AIM OF MONASTICISM.

From the first, monasticism was contemplative, and was thus distinguished from the practical life.² It passed, with the ancient Catholic church, for the true, the divine, or Christian philosophy,³ an unworldly, purely apostolic, angelic

¹ Hence Middleton says, not without reason: "By all which I have ever read of the old, and have seen of the modern monks, I take the preference to be clearly due to the last, as having a more regular discipline, more good learning, and less superstition among them than the first."

² *Bíos θεωρητικός* and *bíos πρακτικός*, according to Gregory Nazianzen and others. Throughout the Middle Age the distinction between the *vita contemplativa* and the *vita activa* was illustrated by the two sisters of Lazarus (Luke x. 38-42).

³ 'Η κατὰ θεὸν οὐ Χριστὸν φιλοσοφία, ἡ ὑψηλὴ φιλοσ., i.e. in the sense of the ancients, not so much a speculative system, as a mode of life under a particular

life.¹ It rests not only upon an earnest view of life—upon the instinctive struggle after perfect dominion of the spirit over the flesh, reason over sense, the supernatural over the natural, after the highest grade of holiness and an undisturbed communion of the soul with God; but also upon a morbid depreciation of the body, the family, the state, and the divinely established social order of the world. It recognizes the world, indeed, as a creature of God, and the family and property as divine institutions, in opposition to the Gnostic Manichæan asceticism, which ascribes matter, as such, to an evil principle. But it makes a distinction between two grades of morality: a common and lower grade, democratic, so to speak, which moves in the natural ordinances of God; and a higher, extraordinary, aristocratic grade, which lies beyond them, and is attended with special merit. It places the great problem of Christianity not in the transformation, but in the abandonment, of the world. It is an extreme unworldliness, over against the worldliness of the mass of the visible church in union with the state. It demands entire renunciation, not only of sin, but also of property and of marriage, which are lawful in themselves, ordained by God himself, and indispensable to the continuance and welfare of the human race. The poverty of the individual, however, does not exclude the possession of common property; and it is well known that some monastic orders, especially the Benedictines, have in course of time grown very rich. The Cenobite institution requires also absolute obedience to the will of the superior, as the visible representative of Christ. As obedience to orders and sacrifice of self is the first duty of the soldier and the condition of military success and renown, so also in this Christian war against the spiritual enemy, the flesh, the world, and the devil. Monks are not allowed

rule. So in the Pythagoreans, Stoics, Cynics, and Neo-Platonists, ascetics and philosophers are the same.

¹ Ἀποστολικὸς βίος, ὁ τῶν ἀγγέλων βίος, *vita angelica*; after an unwarranted application of Christ's word respecting the sexless life of the angels (Matt. xxii. 30), which is not presented here as a model for imitation, but only mentioned as an argument against the Sadducees.

to have a will of their own. To them may be applied the lines of Tennyson :

Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs but to do and die.

Voluntary poverty, voluntary celibacy, and absolute obedience, form the three monastic vows, as they are called, and are supposed to constitute a higher virtue and to secure a higher reward in heaven.

But this threefold self-denial is only the negative side of the matter, and a means to an end. It places man beyond the reach of the temptations connected with earthly possessions, married life, and independent will, and facilitates his progress towards heaven. The positive aspect of monasticism is unreserved surrender of the whole man, with all his time and strength, to God, though, as we have said, not within, but without the sphere of society and the order of nature. This devoted life is employed in continual prayer, meditation, fasting, and castigation of the body. Some votaries went so far as to reject all bodily employment for its interference with devotion. But in general a moderate union of spiritual exercises with scientific studies, or with such manual labor as agriculture, basket-making, weaving, for their own living and the support of the poor, was held not only lawful but wholesome for monks. It was a proverb, that a laborious monk was beset by only one devil ; an idle one, by a legion.

With all the austerities and rigors of asceticism, the monastic life had its spiritual joys and irresistible charms for noble, contemplative, and heaven-aspiring souls, who fled from the turmoil and vain show of the city as a prison, and turned the solitude into a paradise of freedom and sweet communion with God and his saints ; while to others the same solitude became a fruitful nursery of idleness, despondency, and the most perilous temptations and ultimate ruin.¹

¹ Compare the truthful remark of Yves de Chartres, of the twelfth century, Ep. 192 (quoted by Montalembert) : " Non beatum faciunt usa hominem secreta syl-

MONASTICISM AND THE BIBLE.

Monasticism, therefore, claims to be the highest and purest form of Christian piety and virtue, and the surest way to heaven. Then we should think it must be pre-eminently commended in the Bible, and actually exhibited in the life of Christ and the apostles. But just in this biblical support it falls short.

The advocates of it uniformly refer, first, to the examples of Elijah, Elisha, and John the Baptist;¹ but these stand on the legal level of the Old Testament, and are to be looked upon as extraordinary personages of an extraordinary age; and though they may be regarded as types of a partial anchoritism (not of cloister life), still they are nowhere commended to our imitation in this particular, but rather in their influence upon the world.

The next appeal is to a few isolated passages of the New Testament, which do not, indeed, in their literal sense, require the renunciation of property and marriage, yet seem to recommend it as a special, exceptional form of piety for those Christians who strive after higher perfection.²

varum, casumina montium, si secum non habet solitudinem mentis, sabbatum cordis, tranquillitatem conscientiae, ascensiones in corde, sine quibus omnem solitudinem comitantur mentis aedia, curiositas, vana gloria, periculosae tentationum procellae."

¹ So Jerome, Ep. 49, ad Paulinum, where he adduces, besides Elijah and John, Isaiah, also, and the sons of the prophets as the fathers of monasticism; and in his Vita Pauli, where, however, he more correctly designates Paul of Thebes and Anthony as the first hermits, properly so called, in distinction from the prophets. Comp. also Sozomen, Hist. Eccl., Lib. I. c. 12: Ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης φιλοσοφίας ἤρξατο, ὡς τινες λέγουσιν, Ἠλίας ὁ προφήτης καὶ Ἰωάννης ὁ βαπτιστής. This appeal to the example of Elijah and John the Baptist has become traditional with the Catholic writers on the subject. Alban Butler says, under Jan. 15, in the life of Paul of Thebes: "Elias and John the Baptist sanctified the deserts, and Jesus Christ himself was a model of the eremitical state during his forty days' fast in the wilderness; neither is it to be questioned but the Holy Ghost conducted the saint of this day (Paul of Thebes) into the desert, and was to him an instructor there."

² Hence called *consilia evangelica*, in distinction from *mandata divina*; after 1 Cor. vii. 25, where Paul does certainly make a similar distinction. The *consilium* and *votum paupertatis* is based on Matt. xix. 21; the *votum castitatis*, on 1 Cor.

Finally, as respects the spirit of the monastic life, reference is sometimes made even to the poverty of Christ and his apostles, to the silent, contemplative Mary in contrast with the busy, practical Martha, and to the voluntary community of goods in the first Christian church in Jerusalem.

But this monastic interpretation of primitive Christianity mistakes a few incidental points of outward resemblance for essential identity; measures the spirit of Christianity by some isolated passages, instead of explaining the latter from the former; and is, upon the whole, a miserable emaciation and caricature. The gospel makes upon all men virtually the same moral demand, and knows no distinction of a religion for the masses and another for the few.

Jesus, the model for all believers, was neither a cenobite, nor an anchorite, nor an ascetic of any kind, but the perfect pattern-man for universal imitation. There is not a trace of monkish austerity and ascetic rigor in his life or precepts, but in all his acts and words a wonderful harmony of freedom and purity, of the most comprehensive charity, and spotless holiness. He retired to the mountains and into solitude, but only temporarily and for the purpose of renewing his strength for active work. Amidst the society of his disciples of both sexes, with kindred and friends in Cana and Bethany, at the table of publicans and sinners, and in intercourse with all classes of the people, he kept himself unspotted from the world, and transfigured the world into the kingdom of God. His poverty and celibacy have nothing to do with asceticism, but represent, the one the condescension of his redeeming love, the other his ideal uniqueness and his absolutely peculiar relation to the whole church, which alone is fit and worthy to be his bride. No single daughter of Eve could have been an equal partner of the Saviour of mankind, and the representative head of the new creation.

vii. 8, 25, 38-40. For the *votum obedientiae* no particular text is quoted. The theory appears substantially as early as in Origen, and was in him not merely a personal opinion, but the reflex of a very widely-spread practice.

The example of the sister of Lazarus proves only that the contemplative life may dwell in the same house with the practical, and with the other sex, but justifies no separation from the social ties.

The life of the apostles and primitive Christians in general was anything but a hermit life; else had not the gospel spread so quickly to all the cities of the Roman world. Peter was married, and travelled with his wife as a missionary. Paul assumes one marriage of the clergy as the rule; and notwithstanding his subjective and relative preference for celibacy in the then oppressed condition of the church, he is the most zealous advocate of evangelical freedom, in opposition to all legal bondage and anxious asceticism.

Monasticism, therefore, in any case, is not the normal form of evangelical religion. It is an abnormal phenomenon, a humanly devised service of God, and not rarely a sad enervation and repulsive distortion of the Christianity of the Bible. And it is to be estimated, therefore, not by the extent of its self-denial, nor by its outward acts of self-discipline (which may all be found in heathenism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, as well), but by the Christian spirit of humility and love to God and man which animated it. For humility is the groundwork and love the all-ruling principle of the Christian life, and the distinctive characteristic of the Christian religion. Without love the severest self-punishment and the utmost abandonment of the world are worthless before God.²

LIGHTS AND SHADES OF MONASTIC LIFE.

The contrast between pure and normal Bible Christianity and abnormal monastic Christianity, will appear more fully if we enter into a closer examination of the latter as it actually appeared in the ancient church.

The extraordinary rapidity with which this world-forsaking form of piety spread, bears witness to a high degree of self-

¹ Compare Col. ii. 16-23.

² Compare 1 Cor. xiii. 1-3.

denying moral earnestness, which, even in its mistakes and vagrancies, one must admire. Our age, accustomed and wedded to all possible comforts, and far in advance of the Nicene age in respect to the average morality of the masses, could beget no such ascetic extremes. But in our estimate of the diffusion of the monastic life, the polluting power of the theatre, oppressive taxation, slavery, the multitude of civil wars, and the hopeless condition of the Roman empire, must all come into view. Nor must we by any means measure the moral importance of this phenomenon by numbers. Monasticism, from the beginning, attracted persons of opposite character and from opposite motives. Moral earnestness and religious enthusiasm were accompanied here, as formerly in martyrdom, though even in larger measure than there, with all kinds of sinister motives — indolence, discontent, weariness of life, misanthropy, ambition for spiritual distinction, and every sort of misfortune or accidental circumstance. Palladius, to mention but one illustrious example, tells of Paul the Simple,¹ that from indignation against his wife, whom he detected in an act of infidelity, he hastened, with the current oath of that day, “in the name of Jesus,”² into the wilderness; and immediately, though now sixty years old, under the direction of Anthony, he became a very model monk, and attained an astonishing degree of humility, simplicity, and perfect submission of will.

In view of these different motives, we need not be surprised that the moral character of the monks varied greatly, and presents opposite extremes. Augustine says he found among the monks and nuns the best and the worst of mankind.

Looking more closely, in the first place, at anchoritism, we meet in its history unquestionably many a heroic character, who attained an incredible mastery over his sensual nature, and, like the Old Testament prophets and John the

¹ Ἀπλᾶστος.

² Μὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν (*per Christum*, in Salvian), which now took the place of the pagan oath; μὰ τὸν Δία, *by Jupiter*.

Baptist, by their mere appearance and their occasional preaching, made an overwhelming impression on his contemporaries among the heathen. Saint Antony's visit to Alexandria was to the gazing multitude like the visit of a messenger from the other world, and resulted in many conversions. His emaciated face, the glare of his eye, his spectral yet venerable form, his contempt of the world, and his few aphoristic sentences, told more powerfully on that age and people than a most elaborate sermon. Saint Symeon, standing on a column from year to year, fasting, praying, and exhorting the visitors to repentance, was to his generation a standing miracle and sign that pointed them to heaven. Sometimes, in seasons of public calamity, such hermits saved whole cities and provinces from the imperial wrath by their effectual intercessions. When Theodosius, in 387, was about to destroy Antioch for a sedition, the hermit Macedonius met the two imperial commissaries, who reverently dismounted and kissed his hands and feet; he reminded them and the emperor of their own weakness, set before them the value of men as immortal images of God, in comparison with the perishable statues of the emperor, and thus saved the city from demolition.¹ The heroism of the anchoritic life, in the voluntary renunciation of lawful pleasures and the patient endurance of self-inflicted pains, is worthy of admiration in its way, and not rarely almost incredible.

But this moral heroism — and these are the weak points of it — oversteps not only the present standard of Christianity, but all sound measure; it has no support either in the theory or the practice of Christ and the apostolic church; and it has far more resemblance to heathen than to biblical precedents. Many of the most eminent saints of the desert differ only in their Christian confession and in some Bible phrases, learned by rote, from Buddhist fakirs and Mohammedan dervises. Their highest virtuousness consisted in bodily exercises of their own devising, which, without love,

¹ In Theodoret, *Hist. Relig.*, c 13.

at best profit nothing, very often only gratify spiritual vanity, and entirely obscure the gospel way of salvation.

To illustrate this by a few examples, we may choose any of the most celebrated eastern anchorets of the fourth and fifth centuries, as reported by the most credible contemporaries.

The Holy scriptures instruct us to pray and to labor; and to pray not only mechanically with the lips, as the heathen do, but with all the heart. But Paul the Simple said daily three hundred prayers, counting them with pebbles, which he carried in his bosom (a sort of rosary); when he heard of a virgin who prayed seven hundred times a day he was troubled, and told his distress to Macarius, who well answered him: "Either thou prayest not with thy heart, if thy conscience reproves thee, or thou couldst pray oftener. I have for six years prayed only a hundred times a day, without being obliged to condemn myself for neglect." Christ ate and drank like other men, expressly distinguishing himself thereby from John, the representative of the old covenant; and Paul recommends to us to use the gifts of God temperately, with cheerful and childlike gratitude.¹ But the renowned anchoret and presbyter Isidore of Alexandria (whom Athanasius ordained) touched no meat, never ate enough, and, as Palladius relates, often burst into tears at table for shame, that he, who was destined to eat angels' food in paradise, should have to eat material stuff, like the irrational brutes. Macarius the elder, or the great, for a long time ate only once a week, and slept standing and leaning on a staff. The equally celebrated younger Macarius lived three years on four or five ounces of bread a day, and seven years on raw herbs and pulse. Ptolemy spent three years alone in an unwatered desert, and quenched his thirst with the dew, which he collected in December and January, and preserved in earthen vessels; but he fell at last into scepticism, madness, and debauchery.² Sozomen tells

¹ Compare Matt. xi. 18, 19; 1 Tim. iv. 3-5.

² Compare Hist. Laus., c. 33 and 95,

of a certain Batthaeus, that, by reason of his extreme abstinence, worms crawled out of his teeth; of Alas, that to his eightieth year he never ate bread; of Heliodorus, that he spent many nights without sleep, and fasted, without interruption, seven days.¹ Symeon, a Christian Diogenes, spent six and thirty years, praying, fasting, and preaching, on the top of a pillar thirty or forty feet high, ate only once a week, and in fast-times not at all. Such a heroism of abstinence was possible, however, only in the torrid climate of the East, and is not to be met with in the West.

Anchoretism almost always carries a certain cynic roughness and coarseness, which, indeed, in the light of that age, may be leniently judged, but certainly have no affinity with the morality of the Bible, and offend not only good taste, but all sound moral feeling. The ascetic holiness, at least according to the Egyptian idea, is incompatible with cleanliness and decency, and delights in filth. It reverses the maxim of sound evangelical morality and modern Christian civilization, that cleanliness is next to godliness. Saints Anthony and Hilarion, as their admirers, Athanasius the Great and Jerome the learned, tell us, scorned to comb or cut their hair, save once a year (at Easter), or to wash their hands or feet. Other hermits went almost naked in the wilderness, like the Indian gymnosophists.² The younger Macarius, according to the account of his disciple Palladius, once lay six months naked in the morass of the Scetic desert, and thus exposed himself to the incessant attacks of the gnats of Africa, "whose sting can pierce even the hide of a wild boar." He wished to punish himself for his arbitrary revenge on a gnat, and was there so badly stung by gnats and wasps, that he was thought to be smitten with

¹ Hist. Eccles., Lib. VI, cap. 34.

² These latter themselves were not absolutely naked, but wore a covering over the middle, as Augustine in the passage above cited (*De civit. Dei*, Lib. XIV. c. 17), and later tourists tell us. On the contrary, there were monks who were very scrupulous on this point. It is said of Ammon, that he never saw himself naked. The monks in Tabennae, according to the rule of Pachomius, had to sleep in their clothes.

leprosy, and was recognized only by his voice.¹ Saint Symeon the Stylite, according to Theodoret, suffered himself to be incessantly tormented for a long time by twenty enormous bugs, and concealed an abscess full of worms, to exercise himself in patience and meekness. In Mesopotamia there was a peculiar class of anchorets, who lived on grass, spending the greater part of the day in prayer and singing, and then turning out like beasts upon the mountains.² Theodoret relates of the much-lauded Akepsimas, in Cyprus, that he spent sixty years in the same cell, without seeing or speaking to any one, and looked so wild and shaggy, that he was once actually taken for a wolf by a shepherd, who assailed him with stones, till he discovered his error, and then worshipped the hermit as a saint.³ It was but a step from this kind of moral sublimity to beastly degradation. Many of these saints were no more than low sluggards or gloomy misanthropes, who would rather company with wild beasts, with lions, wolves, and hyenas, than with immortal men, and above all shunned the face of a woman more carefully than they did the devil. Sulpitius Severus saw an anchoret in the Thebaid who daily shared his evening meal with a female wolf, and upon her discontinuing her visits for some days, by way of penance for a theft she had committed, he besought her to come again, and comforted her with a double portion of bread.⁴ The same writer tells of a hermit who lived fifty years secluded from all human society, in the clefts of Mount Sinai, entirely destitute of clothing, and all overgrown with thick hair, avoiding every visitor, because, as he said, inter-

¹ Compare Hist. Lausiaca, c. 20, and Tillemont, Memoires, etc., Tom. VIII. p. 633.

² The *Βοσκοί*, or pubulatores. Compare Sozom., Hist. Eccl., Lib. VI. 33. Ephraim Syrus delivered a special eulogy on them, Op. 140, cited in Tillemont, Mem., Tom. VIII. p. 292 seq.

³ Hist. Rel., cap. XV.

⁴ Dial., I. c. 8. Severus sees in this a wonderful example of the power of Christ over wild beasts.

course with men interrupted the visits of the angels ; whence arose the report that he held intercourse with angels.¹

It is no recommendation to these ascetic eccentricities that, while they are without scripture authority, they are fully equalled and even surpassed by the strange modes of self-torture practised by ancient and modern Hindu devotees, for the supposed benefit of their souls and the gratification of their vanity, in the presence of admiring spectators. Some bury themselves, we are told by ancient and modern travellers, in pits, with only small breathing holes at the top ; while others, disdaining to touch the vile earth, live in iron cages suspended from trees. Some wear heavy iron collars or fetters, or drag a heavy chain, fastened by one end round their privy parts, to give ostentatious proof of their chastity. Others keep their fists hard shut, until their finger nails grow through the palms of their hands. Some stand perpetually on one leg ; others keep their faces turned over one shoulder, until they cannot turn them back again. Some lie on wooden beds, bristling all over with iron spikes ; others are fastened for life to the trunk of a tree by a chain. Some suspend themselves for half an hour at a time, feet uppermost, or with a hook thrust through their naked backs, over a hot fire. Alexander von Humboldt, at Astracan, where some Hindus had settled, found a yogi in the vestibule of the temple naked, shrivelled up and overgrown with hair, like a wild beast, who in this position had withstood, for twenty years, the severe winters of that climate. A Jesuit missionary describes one of the class called Taparoinas, that he had his body enclosed in an iron cage, with his head and feet outside, so that he could walk, but neither sit nor lie down ; at night his pious attendants attached a hundred lighted lamps to the outside of the cage, so that their master could exhibit himself walking as the mock-light of the world.²

In general, the hermit life confounds the fleeing from the

¹ L. c. I. c. 11.

² See Ruffner, l. c. I. 49 seq. and Wuttke l. c. p. 369. seq.

outward world with the mortification of the inward world of the corrupt heart. It mistakes the duty of love ; not rarely, under its mask of humility and the utmost self-denial, cherishes spiritual pride and jealousy ; and exposes itself to all the dangers of solitude, even to savage barbarism, beastly grossness, or despair and suicide. Anthony, the father of anchorets, well understood this, and warned his followers against overvaluing solitude, reminding them of the proverb of the Preacher (iv. 10) : “ Woe to him that is alone when he falleth ; for he hath not another to help him up.”

The cloister life was less exposed to these errors. It approached the life of society and civilization. Yet, on the other hand, it produced no such heroic phenomena, and had dangers peculiar to itself. Chrysostom gives us the bright side of it, from his own experience. “ Before the rising of the sun,” says he of the monks of Antioch, “ they rise hale and sober, sing as with one mouth hymns to the praise of God, then bow the knee in prayer under the direction of the abbot, read the Holy scriptures, and go to their labors ; pray again at nine, twelve, and three o’clock ; after a good day’s work enjoy a simple meal of bread and salt, perhaps with oil, and sometimes with pulse ; sing a thanksgiving hymn, and lay themselves on their pallets of straw without care, grief, or murmur. When one dies, they say : he is perfected ; and all pray God for a like end, that they also may come to the eternal sabbath-rest and to the vision of Christ.” Men like Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory, Jerome, Nilus, and Isidore, united theological studies with the ascetic exercises of solitude, and thus gained a copious knowledge of scripture and a large spiritual experience.

But most of the monks either could not even read, or had too little intellectual culture to devote themselves with advantage to contemplation and study, and only brooded over gloomy feelings, or sank, in spite of the unsensual tendency of the ascetic principle, into the coarsest anthropomorphism and image worship. When the religious enthusiasm faltered or ceased, the cloister life, like the hermit life,

became the most spiritless and tedious routine, or hypocritically practised secret vices. For the monks carried with them into their solitude their most dangerous enemy in their hearts, and there often endured much fiercer conflicts with flesh and blood than amidst the society of men.

The temptations of sensuality, pride, and ambition externalized and personified themselves to the anchorets and monks in hellish shapes, which appeared in visions and dreams, now in pleasing and seductive, now in threatening and terrible, forms and colors, according to the state of mind at the time. The monastic imagination peopled the deserts and solitudes with the very worst society, with swarms of winged demons and all kinds of hellish monsters.¹ It substituted thus a new kind of polytheism for the heathen gods, which were generally supposed to be evil spirits. The monastic demonology and demonomachy is a strange mixture of gross superstitions and deep spiritual experiences. It forms the romantic, shady side of the otherwise so tedious monotony of the secluded life, and contains much material for the history of ethics, psychology, and pathology.

Especially besetting were the temptations of sensuality, and irresistible without the utmost exertion and constant watchfulness. The same saints, who could not conceive of true chastity without celibacy, were disturbed, according to their own confession, by unchaste dreams, which at least defiled the imagination.² Excessive asceti-

¹ According to a sensuous and local conception of Eph. vi. 12 : τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ; "die bösen Geister unter dem Himmel" (evil spirits under heaven), as Luther translates, while the Vulgate gives it literally, but somewhat obscurely : *Spiritualia nequitiae in coelestibus* ; and the English Bible quite too freely : "Spiritual wickedness in high places." In any case πνευματικά is to be taken in a much wider sense than ἐπνεύματα or δαιμόνια ; and πονήρνια, also, is not fully identical with the cloud-heaven, or the atmosphere, and besides admits a different construction, so that many put a comma after ἐπονηρίας. The monastic satanology and demonology, we may remark, was universally received in the ancient church and throughout the Middle Age. And it is well known that Luther retained from his monastic life a sensuous, materialistic idea of the devil and of his influence on men.

² Athanasius says of St. Anthony, that the devil sometimes appeared to him

cism sometimes turned into unnatural vice; sometimes ended in madness, despair, and suicide. Pachomius tells us, so early as his day, that many monks cast themselves down precipices, others ripped themselves up, and others put themselves to death in other ways.¹

A characteristic trait of monasticism in all its forms is a morbid aversion to female society and a rude contempt of married life. No wonder, then, that in Egypt and the whole East, the land of monasticism, woman and domestic life never attained their proper dignity, and to this day remain at a very low stage of culture. Among the rules of Basil is a prohibition of speaking with a woman, touching one, or even looking on one, except in unavoidable cases. Monasticism not seldom sundered the sacred bond between husband and wife, commonly with mutual consent, as in the cases of Ammon and Nilus, but often even without it. Indeed, a law of Justinian seems to give either party an unconditional right of desertion, while yet the word of God declares the marriage bond indissoluble. The council of Gangra found it necessary to oppose the notion that marriage is inconsistent with salvation, and to exhort wives to remain with their husbands. In the same way monasticism came into conflict with love of kindred, and with the relation of parents to children; misinterpreting the Lord's command to leave all

in the form of a woman; Jerome relates of St. Hilarion, that in bed his imagination was often beset with visions of naked women. Jerome himself acknowledges, in a letter to a virgin (!) (Epist. 18, ad Eustochium): "O quoties in eremo constitutus in illa vasta solitudine, quae exusta solis ardoribus horridum monachis praebebat habitaculum, putavi me Romanis interesse deliciis. . . . Ille igitur ego, qui ob gehennae metum tali me carcere ipse damnaveram, scorpionum tantum socius et ferarum, saepe choris intereram puellarum. Pallebant ora jejuniis, et mens desiderii aestuabat in frigido corpore, et ante hominem suum jam in carne praemortua, sola libidinum incendia bulliebant. Itaque omni auxilio destitutus, ad Jesu jacebam pedes, rigabam lacrymis, crine tergebam et repugnantem carnem hebdomadarum inedia subjugabam." St. Ephraim warns against listening to the enemy, who whispers to the monk: Οὐ δυνατόν πᾶσασθαι ἀπὸ σου, ἐὰν μὴ πληροφορήσῃς ἐπιθυμίαν σου.

¹ Vita Pach. § 61 Compare Nilus, Epist., Lib. II. ep. 140: Τινὲς. . . . ἐαυτοὺς ἔσφαζαν μαχαίρᾳ, etc. Even among the fanatical Circumcelliones, Donatist mendicant monks in Africa, suicide was not uncommon.

for his sake. Nilus demanded of the monk the entire suppression of the sense of blood-relationship. Saint Anthony forsook his younger sister, and saw her only once after the separation. His disciple Prior, when he became a monk, vowed never to see his kindred again, and would not even speak with his sister without closing his eyes. Something of the same sort is recorded of Pachomius. Ambrose and Jerome, in all earnest, enjoined upon virgins the cloister life, even against the will of their parents. When Hilary of Poitiers heard that his daughter wished to marry, he is said to have prayed God to take her to himself by death. One Mucius, without any provocation, caused his own son to be cruelly abused, and at last, at the command of the abbot himself, cast him into the water, whence he was rescued by a brother of the cloister.¹

Even in the most favorable case, monasticism falls short of harmonious moral development, and of that symmetry of virtue which meets us in perfection in Christ, and next to him in the apostles. It lacks the firm and gentler traits of character, which are ordinarily brought out only in the school of daily family life, and under the social ordinances of God. Its morality is rather negative than positive. There is more virtue in the temperate and thankful enjoyment of the gifts of God than in total abstinence; in charitable and well-seasoned speech than in total silence; in connubial chastity than in celibacy; in self-denying, practical labor for the church than in solitary asceticism, which only pleases self and profits no one else.

Catholicism, whether Greek or Roman, cannot dispense with the monastic life. It knows only moral extremes, nothing of the healthful mean. In addition to this, Popery needs the monastic orders, as an absolute monarchy needs large standing armies, both for conquest and defence. But evangelical Protestantism — rejecting all distinction of a two-

¹ Tillem., VII. 430. The abbot thereupon, as Tillemont relates, was informed by a revelation, "que Muce avait égalé par son obeissance celle d'Abraham," and soon after made him his successor.

fold morality; assigning to all men the same great duty under the law of God; placing the essence of religion, not in outward exercises, but in the heart; not in separation from the world and from society, but in purifying and sanctifying the world by the free spirit of the gospel—is death to the great legalistic institution.

INFLUENCE AND EFFECT OF MONASTICISM.

The influence of monasticism upon the world, from Anthony and Benedict to Luther and Loyola, is deeply marked in all branches of the history of the church. Here, too, we must distinguish light and shade. The operation of the monastic institution has been, to some extent, of diametrically opposite kinds, and has accordingly elicited the most diverse judgments. "It is impossible," says Dean Milman,¹ "to survey monachism in its general influence, from the earliest period of its inworking into Christianity, without being astonished and perplexed with its diametrically opposite effects. Here it is the undoubted parent of the blindest ignorance and the most ferocious bigotry, sometimes of the most debasing licentiousness; there, the guardian of learning, the author of civilization, the propagator of humble and peaceful religion." The apparent contradiction is easily solved. It is not monasticism, as such, which has proved a blessing to the church and the world; for the monasticism of India, which for three thousand years has pushed the practice of mortification to all the excesses of delirium, never saved a single soul, nor produced a single benefit to the race. It was *Christianity* in monasticism which has done all the good, and used this abnormal mode of life as a means for carrying forward its mission of love and peace. In proportion as monasticism was animated and controlled by the spirit of Christianity, it proved a blessing; while, separated from it, it degenerated and became a fruitful source of evil.

At the time of its origin, when we can view it from the most favorable point, the monastic life formed a healthful

¹ History of (ancient) Christianity, Am. ed., p. 432.

necessary counterpart to the essentially corrupt and doomed social life of the Graeco-Roman empire, and the preparatory school of a new Christian civilization among the Romanic and Germanic nations of the Middle Age. Like the hierarchy and the papacy, it belongs with the disciplinary institutions, which the spirit of Christianity uses as means to a higher end, and, after attaining that end, casts aside. For it ever remains the great problem of Christianity to pervade like leaven and sanctify all human society, in the family and the state, in science and art, and in all public life. The old Roman world, which was based on heathenism, was, if the moral portraitures of Salvianus and other writers of the fourth and fifth centuries are even half true, past all such transformation; and the Christian morality therefore assumed at the outset an attitude of downright hostility towards it, till she should grow strong enough to venture upon her regenerating mission among the new and, though barbarous, yet plastic and germinal nations of the Middle Age, and plant in them the seed of a higher civilization.

Monasticism promoted the downfall of heathenism and the victory of Christianity in the Roman empire and among the barbarians. It stood as a warning against the worldliness, frivolity, and immorality of the great cities, and a mighty call to repentance and conversion. It offered a quiet refuge to souls weary of the world, and led its earnest disciples into the sanctuary of undisturbed communion with God. It was to invalids a hospital for the cure of moral diseases, and at the same time to healthy and vigorous enthusiasts an arena for the exercise of heroic virtue.¹ It

¹ Chataubriand commends the monastic institution mainly under the first view: "If there are refuges for the health of the body, ah! permit religion to to have such also for the health of the soul, which is still more subject to sickness, and the infirmities of which are so much more sad, so much more tedious and difficult to cure." Montalembert (l. c. I. 25) objects to this view as poetic and touching but false, and represents monasticism as an arena for the healthiest and strongest souls which the world has ever produced, and quotes the passage of Chrysostom: "Come and see the tents of the soldiers of Christ; come and see their order of battle; they fight every day, and every day they defeat and immolate the passions which assail us."

recalled the original unity and equality of the human race, by placing rich and poor, high and low, upon the same level. It conduced to the abolition, or at least the mitigation, of slavery.¹ It showed hospitality to the wayfaring, and liberality to the poor and needy. It was an excellent school of meditation, self-discipline, and spiritual exercise. It sent forth most of those catholic missionaries who, inured to all hardship, planted the standard of the cross among the barbarian tribes of northern and western Europe, and afterwards in eastern Asia and South America. It was a prolific seminary of the clergy, and gave the church many of her most eminent bishops and popes, as Gregory I. and Gregory VII. It produced saints like Anthony and Bernard, and trained divines like Chrysostom and Jerome and the long succession of schoolmen and mystics of the Middle Ages. Some of the profoundest theological discussions, like the tracts of Anselm and the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, and not a few of the best books of devotion, like the "Imitation of Christ," by Thomas a Kempis, have proceeded from the solemn quietude of cloister life. Sacred hymns, unsurpassed for sweetness, like *Jesu dulcis memoria*, or tender emotion, like the *Stabat mater dolorosa*, or terrific grandeur, like the *Dies iræ, dies illa*, were conceived and sung by mediaeval monks for all ages to come. In patristic and antiquarian learning the Benedictines, so lately as the seventeenth century, have done extraordinary service. Finally, monasticism, at least in the West, promoted the cultivation of the soil and the education of the people, and by its industrious transcriptions of the Bible, the works of the church Fathers, and the ancient classics, earned for itself, before the Reformation, much of the credit of the modern civilization of Europe. The traveller in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, England, and even in the northern regions of Scotland and Sweden, encounters innumerable traces of useful mo-

¹ The Abbot Isidore of Pelusium wrote to a slave-holder, (Ep., Lib. I. 142, cited by Neander): "I did not think that the man who loves Christ, and knows the grace which makes us all free, would still hold slaves."

nastic labors in the ruins of abbeys, of chapter-houses, of convents, of priories, and hermitages, from which once proceeded educational and missionary influences upon the surrounding hills and forests. These offices, however, to the progress of arts and letters were only accessory, often involuntary, and altogether foreign to the intention of the founders of monastic life and institutions, who looked exclusively to the religious and moral education of the soul. In seeking first the kingdom of heaven, these other things were added to them.

But, on the other hand, monasticism withdrew from society many useful forces; diffused an indifference for the family life, the civil and military service of the state, and all public practical operations; turned the channels of religion from the world into the desert, and so hastened the decline of Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the whole Roman empire. It nourished religious fanaticism, often raised storms of popular agitation, and rushed passionately into the controversies of theological parties; generally, it is true, on the side of orthodoxy, but often, as at the Ephesian "council of robbers," in favor of heresy, and especially in behalf of the crudest superstition. For the simple, divine way of salvation in the gospel, it substituted an arbitrary, eccentric, ostentatious, pretentious sanctity. It darkened the all-sufficient merits of Christ by the glitter of the over-meritorious works of man. It measured virtue by the quantity of outward exercises, instead of the quality of the inward disposition, and disseminated self-righteousness and an anxious, legal, and mechanical religion. It favored the idolatrous veneration of Mary and of saints, the worship of images and relics, and all sorts of superstitious and pious fraud. It circulated a mass of visions and miracles, which, if true, far surpassed the miracles of Christ and the apostles, and set all the laws of nature and reason at defiance. The Nicene age is full of the most absurd monks' fables, and is, in this respect, not a whit behind the darkest of the Middle

Ages.¹ Monasticism lowered the standard of general morality in proportion as it set itself above it and claimed a corresponding higher merit; and it exerted in general a demoralizing influence on the people, who came to consider

¹ The monkish miracles, with which the *Vitae Patrum* of the Jesuit Rosweyde and the *Acta Sanctorum* swarm, often contradict all the laws of nature and of reason, and it would be hardly worthy of mention, but that they come from such Fathers as Jerome, Rufinus, Severus, Palladius, and Theodoret, and go to characterize the Nicene age. We are far from rejecting all and every one as falsehood and deception, and accepting the judgment of Isaac Taylor (*Ancient Christianity*, II. 106): "The Nicene miracles are of a kind which shocks every sentiment of gravity, of decency, and of piety: in their obvious features they are childish, horrid, blasphemous, and foul." Much more cautious is the opinion of Robertson (*Hist. of the Christ. Church*, I. 312) and other Protestant historians, who suppose that, together with the innocent allusions of a heated imagination and the fabrications of intentional fraud, there must have been also much that was real, though in the nature of the case an exact sifting is impossible. But many of these stories are too much even for Roman credulity, and are either entirely omitted, or at least greatly reduced and modified, by critical historians. We read not only of innumerable visions, prophecies, healings of the sick, and the possessed, but also of the raising of the dead (as in the life of Martin of Tours), of the growth of a dry stick into a fruitful tree, and of a monk's passing unseared, in absolute obedience to his abbot, through a furnace of fire as through a cooling bath (Compare Sulp. Sever., *Dial. I.* c. 12 and 13). Even wild beasts play a large part, and are transformed into rational servants of the Egyptian saints of the desert. At the funeral of Paul of Thebes, according to Jerome, two lions voluntarily performed the office of sexton. Pachomius walked unharmed over serpents and scorpions, and crossed the Nile on crocodiles, which of their own accord presented their backs. The younger Macarius, or (according to other statements of the *Historia Lausiaca* — compare the investigation of Tillemont, *Memoires*, Tom. VIII. p. 811 seq.) the monk Marcus, stood on so good terms with the beasts, that a hyaena, (according to Rufinus, *V. P. II.* 4, it was a lioness) brought her young one to him in his cell, that he might open its eyes; which he did by prayer and application of spittle and the next day she offered him, for gratitude, a large sheep-skin; the saint at first declined the gift, and reproved the beast for the double crime of murder and theft, by which she had obtained the skin; but when the hyaena showed repentance, and with a nod, promised amendment, Macarius took the skin, and afterwards bequeathed it to the great bishop Athanasius! Severus (*Dial. I.* c. 9) gives a very similar account of an unknown anchorite; but, like Rufinus, substitutes for the hyaena of Palladius a lioness with five whelps, and makes the saint receive the present of the skin without scruple or reproof. Shortly before (c. 8) he speaks, however, of a wolf which once robbed a friendly hermit, whose evening meals he was accustomed to share, showed deep repentance for it, and with bowed head begged forgiveness of the saint. Perhaps Palladius or his Latin translator has combined these two anecdotes.

themselves the *profanum vulgus mundi*, and to live accordingly. Hence the frequent lamentations, not only of Salvian, but of Chrysostom and of Augustine, over the indifference and laxness of the Christianity of the day; hence to this day the mournful state of things in the southern countries around the Mediterranean sea, where monasticism is most prevalent, and sets the extreme of ascetic sanctity in contrast with the profane laity; but where there exists no healthful middle class of morality, no blooming family life, no moral vigor in the masses. In the sixteenth century the monks were the bitterest enemies of the Reformation and of all true progress. And yet the greatest of the Reformers was a pupil of the convent and a child of the monastic system, as the freest and boldest of the apostles had been the strictest of the Pharisees.

POSITION OF MONKS IN THE CHURCH.

As to the social position of monasticism in the system of ecclesiastical life, it was at first, in East and West, even so late as the council of Chalcedon, regarded as a lay institution; but the monks were distinguished as *religiosi* from the *seculares*, and formed thus a middle grade between the ordinary laity and the clergy. They constituted the spiritual nobility, but not the ruling class; the aristocracy, but not the hierarchy, of the church. "A monk," says Jerome, "has not the office of a teacher, but of a penitent, who endures suffering either for himself or for the world." Many monks considered ecclesiastical office incompatible with their effort after perfection. It was a proverb, traced to Pachomius: "A monk should especially shun women and bishops, for neither will let him have peace."¹ Ammonius, who accompanied Athanasius to Rome, cut off his own ear, and threatened to cut out his own tongue, when it was proposed to make him a bishop.² Martin of Tours thought his miraculous power deserted him on his transition from the cloister

¹ Omnino monachum fugere debere mulieres et episcopos.

² Sozom., IV. 30.

to the bishopric. Others, on the contrary, were ambitious for the episcopal chair, or were promoted to it against their will, as early as the fourth century. The abbots of monasteries were usually ordained priests, and administered the sacraments among the brethren, but were subject to the bishop of the diocese. Subsequently the cloisters managed, through special papal grants, to make themselves independent of the episcopal jurisdiction. From the tenth century, the clerical character was attached to the monks. In a certain sense they stood, from the beginning, even above the clergy; considered themselves pre-eminently *conversi* and *religiosi*, and their life *vita religiosa*; looked down with contempt upon the secular clergy; and often encroached on their province in troublesome ways. On the other hand, the cloisters began, as early as the fourth century, to be most fruitful seminaries of clergy, and furnished, especially in the East, by far the greater number of bishops. The sixth novel of Justinian provides, that the bishops shall be chosen from the clergy or from the monastery.

In dress, the monks at first adhered to the costume of the country, but chose the simplest and coarsest material. Subsequently they adopted the tonsure and a distinctive uniform.

OPPOSITION TO MONASTICISM.—JOVINIAN, HELVIDIUS, VIGILANTIUS, AND AERIUS.

Although monasticism was a mighty movement of the age, engaging either the co-operation or the admiration of the whole church, yet it was not exempt from opposition. And opposition sprang from very different quarters: now from zealous defenders of heathenism, like Julian and Libanius, who hated and bitterly reviled the monks for their fanatical opposition to temples and idol-worship; now from Christian statesmen and emperors, like Valens, who were enlisted against it by its withdrawing so much force from the civil and military service of the state, and in the time of peril from the barbarians, encouraging idleness and passive contemplation, instead of active, heroic virtue; now from friends

of worldly indulgence, who found themselves unpleasantly disturbed and rebuked by the religious earnestness and zeal of the ascetic life; lastly, however, also from a liberal, almost protestant, conception of Christian morality, which set itself at the same time against the worship of Mary and the saints, and other abuses. This last form of opposition, however, existed mostly in isolated cases, was rather negative than positive in its character, lacked the spirit of wisdom and moderation, and hence almost entirely disappeared in the fifth century, only to be revived long after, in more mature and comprehensive form, when monasticism had fulfilled its mission for the world.

To this class of opponents belong Helvidius, Jovinian, Vigilantius, and Aerius. The first three are known to us through the passionate replies of Jerome; the last, through the Panarion of Epiphanius. They figure in Catholic church history among the heretics, while they have received from many Protestant historians a place among the "witnesses of the truth" and the forerunners of the Reformation.

We begin with Jovinian, the most important among them, who is sometimes compared—for instance, even by Neander—to Luther, because, like Luther, he was carried by his own experience into reaction against the ascetic tendency and the doctrines connected with it. He wrote in Rome, before the year 390, a work now lost, attacking monasticism in its ethical principles. He was at that time himself a monk, and probably remained so in a free way until his death. At all events he never married, and, according to Augustine's account, he abstained "for the present distress,"¹ and from aversion to the encumbrances of the married state. Jerome pressed him with the alternative of marrying and proving the equality of celibacy with married life, or giving up his opposition to his own condition.²

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 26.

² Adv. Jovin., Lib. I. c. 40 (Opera II. 304): "Et tamen iste formosus monachus, crassus, nitidus, dealbatus, et quasi sponsus semper incidens aut uxorem ducat ut aequalem virginitatem nuptiis probet; aut, si non duxerit, frustra contra nos verbis agit, cum opere nobiscum sit."

Jerome gives a very unfavorable picture of his character, evidently colored by vehement bitterness. He calls Jovinian a servant of corruption, a barbarous writer, a Christian Epicurean, who, after having once lived in strict asceticism, now preferred earth to heaven, vice to virtue, his belly to Christ, and always strode along as an elegantly dressed bridegroom. Augustine is much more lenient, only reproaching Jovinian with having misled many Roman nuns into marriage, by holding before them the examples of pious women in the Bible. Jovinian was probably provoked to question and oppose monasticism, as Gieseler supposes, by Jerome's extravagant praising of it, and by the feeling against it, which the death of Blesilla (384) in Rome confirmed. And he at first found extensive sympathy. But he was excommunicated and banished, with his adherents, at a council about the year 390, by Siricius, bishop of Rome, who was zealously opposed to the marriage of priests. He then betook himself to Milan, where the two monks Sarmatio and Barbatian held forth views like his own; but he was treated there after the same fashion by the bishop, Ambrose, who held a council against him. From this time he and his party disappear from history, and before the year 406 he died in exile.¹

According to Jerome, Jovinian held these four points: (1) Virgins, widows, and married persons, who have once been baptized into Christ, have equal merit, other things in their conduct being equal. (2) Those who are once, with full faith, born again by baptism, cannot be overcome (subverti) by the devil. (3) There is no difference between abstaining from food and enjoying it with thanksgiving. (4) All who keep the baptismal covenant will receive an equal reward in heaven.

He insisted chiefly on the first point; so that Jerome

¹ Augustine says (*De Haer.*, c. 82): "Cito ista haeresis oppressa et extincta est"; and Jerome writes of Jovinian, in 406 (*Adv. Vigilant.*, c. 1), that, after having been condemned by the authority of the Roman church, he dissipated his mind in the enjoyment of his lusts.

devotes the whole first book of his refutation to this point, while he disposes of all the other heads in the second. In favor of the moral equality of married and single life, he appealed to Gen. ii. 24, where God himself institutes marriage before the fall; to Matt. xix. 5, where Christ sanctions it; to the patriarchs before and after the flood, to Moses and the prophets, Zacharias and Elizabeth, and the apostles, particularly Peter, who lived in wedlock; also to Paul, who himself exhorted to marriage,¹ required the bishop or the deacon to be the husband of one wife,² and advised young widows to marry, and bear children.³ He declared the prohibition of marriage and of divinely provided food a Manichean error. To answer these arguments Jerome indulges in utterly unwarranted inferences, and speaks of marriage in a tone of contempt, which gave offence even to his friends.⁴ Augustine was moved by it to present the advantages of the married life, in a special work, *De bono conjugali*, though without yielding the ascetic estimate of celibacy.⁵

Jovinian's second point has an apparent affinity with the Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine of the *perseverantia sanctorum*. It is not referred by him, however, to the eternal and unchangeable counsel of God, but simply

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 36, 39.

² 1 Tim. iii. 2, 12.

³ 1 Tim. v. 14; compare 1 Tim. ii. 15; Heb. xiii. 4.

⁴ From 1 Cor. vii. 1, for example ("It is good for a man not to touch a woman"), he argues, without qualification (Lib. I. c. 7) (Opera II. 246): "Si bonum est mulierem non tangere, malum est ergo tangere. Nihil enim bono contrarium est, nisi malum; si autem malum est, et ignoscitur, ideo conceditur, ne malo quid deterius fiat. . . . Tolle fornicationem, et non dicet [apostolus], unusquisque uxorem suam habeat." Immediately after this (II, 247) he argues from the exhortation of Paul to pray without ceasing, 1 Thess. v. 17: "Si semper orandum est, numquam ergo conjugio serviendum, quoniam quotiescunque uxori debitum reddo, orare non possum." Such sophistries and misinterpretations evidently proceed upon the lowest sensual idea of marriage, and called forth some opposition even, at that age. He himself afterwards felt that he had gone too far, and in his Ep. 48. (ed. Vallars., or Ep. 30, ed. Bened.) ad Pammachium, endeavored to save himself by distinguishing between the gymnastic (polemically rhetorical) and the dogmatic mode of writing.

⁵ De bono conj., c. 8: "Duo bona sunt connubium et continentia, quorum alterum est melius."

based on 1 John iii. 9 and v. 18, and is connected with his abstract conception of the opposite moral states. He limits the impossibility of relapse to the truly regenerate, who "plena fide in baptismate renati sunt," and makes a distinction between the mere baptism of water and the baptism of the Spirit, which involves also, a distinction between the actual and the ideal church.

His third point is aimed against the ascetic exaltation of fasting, with reference to Rom. xiv. 20 and 1 Tim. iv. 3. God, he holds, has created all animals for the service of man; Christ attended the marriage feast at Cana as a guest, sat at table with Zaccheus, with publicans and sinners, and was called by the Pharisees a glutton and a wine-bibber; and the apostle says: To the pure all things are pure, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving.

He went still further, however, and, with the Stoics, denied all gradations of moral merit and demerit, consequently also all gradations of reward and punishment. He overlooked the process of development in both good and evil. He went back of all outward relations to the inner mind, and lost all subordinate differences of degree in the great contrast between true Christians and men of the world, between regenerate and unregenerate; whereas the friends of monasticism taught a higher and a lower morality, and distinguished the ascetics, as a special class, from the mass of ordinary Christians. As Christ, says he, dwells in believers without difference of degree, so also believers are in Christ without difference of degree or stages of development. There are only two classes of men, — righteous and wicked, sheep and goats, five wise virgins and five foolish, good trees with good fruit and bad trees with bad fruit. He appealed also to the parable of the laborers in the vineyard, who all received equal wages. Jerome answered him with such things as the parable of the sower and the different kinds of ground; the parable of the different numbers of talents with corresponding reward; the many mansions in the Father's house (by which Jovinian singularly understood the different

churches on earth); the comparison of the resurrection bodies with the stars, which differ in glory; and the passage: "He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparingly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully."¹

Helvidius — whether a layman or a priest at Rome it is uncertain, a pupil, according to the statement of Gennadius, of the Arian bishop Auxentius of Milan, — wrote a work, before the year 383, in refutation of the perpetual virginity of the mother of the Lord — a leading point with the current glorification of celibacy. He considered the married state equal in honor and glory to that of virginity. Of his fortunes we know nothing. Augustine speaks of Helvidians, who are probably identical with the Anti-dicomarianites of Epiphanius. Jerome calls Helvidius, indeed, a rough and uneducated man;² but proves by quotations of his arguments, that he had at least some knowledge of the scriptures and a certain ingenuity. He appealed in the first place to Matt. i. 18, 24, 25, as implying that Joseph knew his wife, not before, but after, the birth of the Lord; then to the designation of Jesus as the "first-born" son of Mary, in Matt. i. 25 and Luke ii. 7; then to the many passages which speak of the brothers and sisters of Jesus; and finally to the authority of Tertullian and Victorinus. Jerome replies, that the "till" by no means always fixes a point after which any action must begin or cease;³ that, according to Exod. xxxiv. 19, 20; Num. xviii. 15 seq., the "first-born" does not necessarily imply the birth of other children afterwards, but denotes every one who first opens the womb; that the "brothers" of Jesus may have been either sons of Joseph by a former marriage, or, according to the wide Hebrew use of the term, cousins; and that the authorities cited were more than balanced by the testimonies of Igna-

¹ 2 Cor. ix. 6.

² At the very beginning of his work, he styles him "*hominem rusticum et vix primis quoque imbutum literis.*"

³ Compare Matt. xxviii. 20.

tius, Polycarp (?), and Irenaeus. "Had Helvidius read these," says he, "he would doubtless have produced something more skilful."

This whole question, it is well known, is still a problem in exegesis. The *perpetua virginitas* of Mary has less support from scripture than the opposite theory. But it is so essential to the whole ascetic system, that it became from this time an article of the Catholic faith, and the denial of it was anathematized as blasphemous heresy. A considerable number of Protestant divines,¹ however, agree on this point with the Catholic doctrine, and think it incompatible with the dignity of Mary that, after the birth of the Son of God and the Saviour of the world, she should have borne ordinary children of men.

Vigilantius, originally from Gaul,² a presbyter of Barcelona in Spain, a man of pious but vehement zeal, and of literary talent, wrote in the beginning of the fifth century against the ascetic spirit of the age, and the superstition connected with it. Jerome's reply, dictated hastily in a single night at Bethlehem, in the year 406, contains more of personal abuse and low witticism than of solid argument. "There have been," he says, "monsters on earth, centaurs, syrens, leviathan, behemoth Gaul alone has bred no monsters, but has ever abounded in brave and noble men; when, of a sudden, there has arisen one Vigilantius, who should rather be called Dormitantius,³ contending in an impure spirit against the Spirit of Christ, and forbidding to honor the graves of the martyrs; he rejects the vigils; only at Easter should we sing hallelujah; he declares abste-

¹ Luthur, for instance (who even calls Helvidius a "gross fool"), and Zuingli, among the Reformers; Olshausen and J. P. Lange, among the later theologians.

² Respecting his descent, compare the diffuse treatise of the tedious but thorough Walch, l. c. p. 675-677.

³ This cheap pun he repeats (Epist. 109, ad Ripar. Opera, I. p. 719), where he says that *Vigilantius* (wakeful) was so called κατ' ἀντίφρασιν, and should rather be called *Dormitantius* (sleepy). The fact is Vigilantius was wide awake to a sense of certain superstitions of the age.

miousness to be heresy, and chastity a nursery of licentiousness (*pudicitiam, libidinis seminarium*) This inn-keeper of Caligurris¹ mingles water with his wine, and would, according to ancient art, combine his poison with the genuine faith. He opposes virginity, hates chastity, cries against the fastings of the saints, and would only amidst jovial feastings amuse himself with the psalms of David. It is terrible to hear that even bishops are companions of his wantonness, if those deserve this name who ordain only married persons deacons, and trust not the chastity of the single."² Vigilantius thinks it better for a man to use his money wisely and apply it gradually to benevolent objects at home, than to lavish it all at once upon the poor or give it to the monks of Jerusalem. He went further, however, than his two predecessors, and bent his main efforts against the worship of saints and relics, which was then gaining ascendancy, and was fostered by monasticism. He considered it superstition and idolatry. He called the Christians who worshipped the "wretched bones" of dead men ash-gatherers and idolators.³ He expressed himself sceptically respecting the miracles of the martyrs, contested the practice of invoking them, and of intercession for the dead, as useless, and declared himself against the vigils, or public worship in the night, as tending to disorder and licentiousness. This last point Jerome admits as a fact, but not as an argument, because the abuse should not abolish the right use.

The presbyter Aërius of Sebaste, about 360, belongs also among the partial opponents of monasticism. For, though himself an ascetic, he contended against the fast-laws and

¹ In South Gaul, now Casères in Gascogne. As the business of inn-keeper is incompatible with the spiritual office, it has been supposed that the father of Vigilantius was a *caupo Calagurritanus*. Compare Rössler's *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, part IX. p. 880 seq., note 100; and Walch, l. c.

² Adv. Vigil. c. 1 and 2, (Opera. Tom. I. p. 387 seq.).

³ "Cinerarios et idolatras, qui mortuorum ossa venerantur." Hieron., ep. 109 ad Riparium (Tom. I. p. 719).

the injunction of fasts at certain times, considering them an encroachment upon Christian freedom. Epiphanius also ascribes to him three other heretical views : denial of the superiority of bishops to presbyters, opposition to the usual Easter festival, and opposition to prayers for the dead.¹ He was hotly persecuted by the hierarchy, and was obliged to live, with his adherents, in open fields and in caves.

¹ Epiph. Haer., 75. Compare also Walch, *Ketzergeschichte* III. p. 351 - 338. Bellarmine, on account of this external resemblance, styles Protestantism the Arian heresy.

ARTICLE VII.

EGYPTOLOGY, ORIENTAL TRAVEL AND DISCOVERY.

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THE great event of the year 1863, in the department to which these pages are devoted, was the discovery of the source of the White Nile, in the equatorial lake Victoria N'yanza.¹ The geographical problem of centuries approaches its solution; the proverb *Nili quaerere caput* has lost its point. This discovery confirms substantially the guesses and traditions concerning the lake region of inner Africa, which have come down from a remote antiquity; confirms the almost discarded report of the snowy mountains of the moon; and also confirms in the main the geological hypothesis advanced by Sir Roderic Murchison in 1852, that "the whole African interior is a vast watery plateau-land of some elevation above the sea," — "a net-work of lakes and rivers," discharging themselves, by transverse gorges, through the loftier mountains of the coast-lines. This hypothesis was suggested before Dr. Livingstone had traced the course of the Zambesi; and when, in 1858, Captain Speke reported his famous discovery of the Victoria N'yanza, Sir Roderic expanded his hypothesis with regard to the outlets of the "central reservoirs" of the continent, so as to allow of a possible connection between this reservoir and the Nile. "If the great N'yanza shall really be found to flow into the White Nile, it is simply because there is no great eastern transverse fracture, like that of the Zambesi, by which the waters can escape; so that, subtended on that flank by lofty and continuous mountains, the stream has no course open to it but northwards." It was largely due to the enlightened zeal of Murchison that the discoverer of the Victoria N'yanza was enabled to verify his own confident belief that this vast inland sea "gave birth to that interesting river, the source of which has been the subject of so much speculation, and the object of so many explorers."²

Before giving the details of captain Speke's discovery, and in order that we may measure its exact scientific value, it is well to remind ourselves of the state of the Nile question previous to his first expedition with Burton. "Of the sources of the Nile no one can give any account," was the despairing conclusion of Herodotus, after a careful digest of all the opinions upon this point that were brought to his knowledge in Egypt.³ Strabo

¹ Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile. By John Hanning Speke, Captain H. M. Indian Army. Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society; Hon. Corr. Member of the French Geographical Society. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons; New York: Harper and Brothers.

² Speke, in Blackwood's Magazine for October, 1859.

³ For the state of the Nile problem in that age, see Euterpe, c. 19 – 35, where all known speculations of geographers and reports of travellers are discussed.

compiled, from Egyptian sources, an imperfect account of the Astaboras or Atbara (Tacazzè) and of the junction of the Astapus (Bahhr el Azrek or Blue Nile) and the Astasobas (Bahhr el Abiad or White Nile) to the south of Meroe.¹ Pliny adds, "from common report," that the Nile "rises in a mountain of Lower Mauritania, not far from the ocean; immediately after which it forms a lake of standing water, which bears the name of Nilides."² From these authorities, together with the brief references of Seneca and Lucan, Dr. Beke infers that "in or previously to the first century of the Christian era, the main stream of the Nile had been ascended as far as the ninth parallel of the North latitude," and that three or four of its principal tributaries were known; "in other words, the actual personal knowledge of the Upper Nile possessed by the Greeks and Romans at the commencement of the Christian era was very far superior to that possessed by the civilized world till near the middle of the nineteenth century."³ We think this overstated; since the most pains-taking collation of the authorities quoted by Beke fails to yield us materials for the construction of an accurate map of the Nile above Meroe. Herodotus confesses the absence of any definite knowledge upon this point: "With regard to the *sources* of the Nile, I have found no one among all those with whom I have conversed, whether Egyptians, Libyans, or Greeks, who professed to have any knowledge, except a single person." This was the scribe at Sais, who told the story of the water-shed at the "two conical hills between Syene and Elephantine," where were unfathomable fountains, from which "half the water runs northward into Egypt, and half to the south towards Ethiopia." But the wary traveller adds, that this informant "did not seem to be in earnest in what he said."⁴ That Strabo had never fairly digested the fragmentary accounts of his predecessors is evident from his vague statement that "near Meroe is the confluence of the Astaboras with the Nile." Ptolemy, deriving his information mainly from Greek traders to the eastern coast of Africa, traced the sources of the Nile to two lakes, situated far to the south, at some distance asunder, and both fed from the snowy mountains of the moon. These lakes are located by Beke, and also by Kiepert, in about 7° S. lat., and 57° and 65° E. long., respectively. After all, the geography of the Upper Nile, as conceived by the ancients, is substantially expressed by Seneca: "*magnas altitudines pervagatus, et in paludes diffusus, gentibus sparsus.*"⁵ Such was the report brought by the explorers sent by Nero; and these lagoons, in which the sluggish stream was supposed to lose itself, are described as a fatal barrier to the discovery of its source: "*immensas paludes, quarum exitum nec incolae noverant, nec sperare quisquam potest, ita implicitae aquis herbae sunt.*"

The nineteenth century found the problem of the sources of the Nile substantially where Ptolemy had left it in the second; since in the long in-

¹ Strabo, XVII. 1.

² Nat. Hist., V. 10.

³ The Sources of the Nile, by Charles T. Beke, Ph.D., p. 61.

⁴ Euterpé, c. 28.

⁵ Nat. Quaest., IV. 2.

terval geographers had rested in the belief, first, that the Tacazzè, and next that the Bahhr el Azrek or Blue river (both streams of Abessinia), was the true Nile. Diodorus¹ portrays the difficulties and dangers of a tour of discovery in the marshy and desolate regions beyond Meroë; and in the absence of commercial enterprize and of political ambition, these sufficed to deter explorers from that field. The Bahhr el Azrek or Blue river sustains to the Bahhr el Abiad or White river, at their junction near the modern Khartum, much the same relation as the Missouri sustains to the Mississippi after their union; and hence this was naturally mistaken for the parent stream, when the claims of the Tacazzè had been finally abandoned. But since the beginning of the eighteenth century the White river has gradually come to be recognized as the true Nile, and the curiosity of explorers has been directed toward its source. A great impulse in this direction was given by the three expeditions of Mohammed Ali, between the years 1835 and 1841. These discovered the Sobat, and traced that stream to within four degrees of the equator; but the region beyond, and the course of the principal stream, were left unexplored. What has since been accomplished is distinctly traced upon Petermann and Hassenstein's Chart of Inner Africa, especially its eighth and tenth sections. The points ascertained by d'Arnaud and Werne in 1840-41, being the second expedition of Mohammed Ali, by J. Kœblecher in 1849-50, by Brun-Rollet and Angelo Vinco in 1848-51, by Petherick in 1858, by Jules Poncet in 1860, by F. Morlang in 1859-60, by Miani in 1860, by Antinori in 1860-61, by Peney, de Bono, and Lejean in 1861, by von Harnier in 1860-61, and von Heuglin in 1861-63, with various incidental confirmations from other travellers, cartographers, and missionaries, are all here collated upon an ample sheet, and indicated by appropriate colors; yet these various lines of travel and of conjecture, — black, brown, blue, purple, orange, red, green, — while they mark years of patient toil, and make familiar a once doubtful region, all fall short of the true source of the Nile. It is only when we strike the route of Burton and Speke in 1857-58, and again that of Speke and Grant in 1861-63, that we approach the solution of the great problem. We are now prepared to appreciate the results of captain Speke's labors.

Already, in 1851, Messrs. Krapf and Rebmann, missionaries in the service of the Church missionary society in Eastern and Equatorial Africa, had announced the existence in that region of snow-capped mountains, of which the principal, the Koenia and the Kilimanjaro, lie in $1^{\circ} 45'$ and 3° S. lat., and between 36° and 37° E. long. From native sources, they reported also the existence of a lake, the receptacle of the waters from these mountains, through numerous streams; and, at a later date, Krapf sought to identify these mountains with those to which Ptolemy had conjecturally traced the sources of the Nile. Again, in 1856, their fellow-laborer, Rev. T. Erhardt, published a map of Eastern Africa, compiled from native

¹ Diod. Sic., I. 30.

sources, in which a great inland sea was represented as filling an interior basin in the region of the equator. In a memoir accompanying this map, Liebmann, arguing by analogy from the physical conformation of Africa in the south and north, advanced the hypothesis of "an enormous valley and an inland sea" in the centre of the continent; and he also suggested that in the mountain barriers to the eastward "must we look for the more eastern sources of the White Nile." Dr. Beke regards the "snow-mountains" of Krapf and Rebmann as belonging to Ptolemy's "Mountains of the Moon," which he would transfer from their traditional location in Abessinia to the immediate region of the equator, parallel with the eastern coast, in about 37° and 39° E. long. Captain Speke locates these mountains to the west of lake N'yanza, in 30° E. long., at the northern extremity of Tanganjika.

In 1854 Dr. Krapf published his own conjecture with regard to the sources of the Nile, in the following terms: "There can be no question that the opinion of the ancients, who believed the *Caput Nili* to be in Ethiopia, is truly correct; for the Wakuafi, whose language is of Aethiopico-Semitic origin, are in possession of the countries which give rise to that river. The real sources of the Nile appear to me to be traceable partly to the woody and marshy land of the Wamau people, about $2\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ or 3° south of the equator, of whom Rumu wa Kikandi told me, in Ukambani, in 1851."¹ This "marshy land" Dr. Krapf supposed to be identical with the "paludes" of Seneca's *Quaestiones Naturales* (Lib. VI.): "Ibi, inquit, vidimus duas petras, ex quibus ingens vis fluminis exidebat. Sed sive caput illa, sive accessio est Nili, sive tunc nascitur, sive in terras ex priore recepta cursu redit: nonne tu credis illam quidquid est, ex magno terrarum lacu ascendere? Habeat enim oportet pluribus locis sparsum humorem, et in imo coactum, ut eructare tanto impetu possit."

The publication of Erhardt's map, together with the crude but stimulating conjectures of his associates, gave a new impulse to geographical exploration in Eastern Africa; and in September, 1856, an expedition was sent thither by the Royal Geographical Society, of which Captain R. F. Burton was principal and Captain J. H. Speke associate. On the 14th of February, 1858, this expedition reached the great lake Tanganjika, which stretches from the third to the eighth parallel of south latitude. This they explored, by boat and coastwise, to its northern extremity, where it is enclosed by a chain of mountains, which Speke supposes to be Ptolemy's Mountains of the Moon. Returning to Kazé or Unyanzembe, where Burton was obliged to remain as an invalid, Speke journeyed northward, and on the 3d of August, 1858, struck the southern border of the great N'yanza, to which he gave the name Victoria. He heard also of a river upon the upper side of the lake, which was believed to flow northward to the sea; but as he was only a subordinate in the expedition, he was not able, at that

¹ Travels and Researches in Eastern Africa by Rev. Dr. J. Lewis Krapf. The Appendices to this volume, upon East African History and the Sources of the Nile, are worthy of renewed study, in the light of Speke's discoveries.

time, to test the truth of this report. Still his confident opinion was, that the Nile would be found to take its rise from this great inland sea.

It will be seen that the numerous explorations and determinations made in the twenty years between the first expedition of Mohammed Ali and the expedition of Burton and Speke, had reduced the problem of the sources of the Nile to a comparatively limited and definite area. The head-waters of the mystic river *must* be found somewhere between 3° N. and 3° S. latitude and between 28° and 38° E. longitude. A glance at the map of Petermann and Hassenstein shows how completely the converging routes of travel during these twenty years had hemmed in the enchanted problem. It was reserved for Speke finally to break its spell.

When the discovery of N'yanza was announced, Dr. Petermann made the following judicious comments upon the state of the question : " The solution of the old problem of the Nile's sources will yet require a good deal of labor ; but in consequence of the travels and researches made by Captain Speke and the Protestant missionaries in the south, and by the Egyptians and the Roman Catholic missionaries, the region yet unsurveyed, and in which the sources of the Nile must be situated, is so much circumscribed, that probably a single journey of a scientific traveller proceeding from Zanzibar to Gondokoro, or *vice versa*, would suffice to solve definitely this famous geographical problem."

In October, 1860, Captain Speke was again at Zanzibar, with his chosen friend Captain J. A. Grant as his associate, prepared to enter with enthusiasm upon an exploration which he felt would be decisive. From Zanzibar his route followed the course of the Kingani river, making gradual ascent to the Gara country, " U-Sagara," a hilly region forming a link of the great East Coast Range, and stretching westward about a hundred miles, from the bifurcation of the Kingani and Mgéta rivers to the great interior plateau. Upon striking the Usagara uplands, he thus describes the scene :

" Our ascent by the river, though quite imperceptible to the eye, has been 500 feet. From this level the range before us rises, in some places, to 5,000 or 6,000 feet, not as one grand mountain, but in two detached lines, lying at an angle of forty-five degrees from N. E. to S. W., and separated one from the other by elevated valleys, tables, and crab-claw spurs of hill, which incline towards the flanking rivers. The whole having been thrown up by volcanic action, is based on a strong foundation of granite and other igneous rocks, which are exposed in many places in the shape of massive blocks ; otherwise the hill-range is covered in the upper part with sandstone, and in the bottoms with alluvial clay. This is the superficial configuration of the land as it strikes the eye ; but knowing the elevation of the interior plateau to be only 2,500 feet above the sea immediately on the western flank of these hills, while the breadth of the chain is 100 miles, the mean slope or incline of the basal surface must be on a gradual rise of twenty feet per mile. The hill tops and sides, where not cultivated, are well covered with bush and small trees, among which the bamboo is conspicuous ; while the

bottoms, having a soil deeper and richer, produce fine large fig-trees of exceeding beauty, the huge calabash, and a variety of other trees. Here, in certain places where water is obtainable throughout the year, and wars, or slave-hunts more properly speaking, do not disturb the industry of the people, cultivation thrives surprisingly; but such a boon is rarely granted them. It is in consequence of these constantly-recurring troubles that the majority of the Wasagara villages are built on hill-spurs where the people can the better resist attack, or failing, disperse and hide effectually."

On leaving the Usagara, Speke's course lay in a northwesterly direction to Unyamüezi, the "Country of the Moon," one of the largest kingdoms in Africa. This he describes as "a high plateau, from 3000 to 4000 feet above the sea-level, studded with little outcropping hills of granite, between which, in the valleys, there are numerous fertilizing springs of fresh water, and rich iron ore is found in sandstone." The Wanyamüezi are superior to the negroes generally, as agriculturists and manufacturers: they "make cloths of cotton in their own looms, smelt iron, and work it up very expertly." Their capital Kazé, in $5^{\circ} 0' 53''$ S. lat., and $33^{\circ} 1' 34''$ E. long., is a principal depot of the trading caravans.

It will be remembered that in 1858, Captain Speke made two explorations from Kazé, as a depot; the first westward, with Burton, to the Tanganyika, the second northward, alone, to the Victoria N'yanza, which he then discovered. He now proceeded in a course bearing north by north-west, through the Uzinza country to the Karagwe, and thence to the country of the Uganda, his route skirting the eastward slope of the "Mountains of the Moon," as identified by him in 1858. His course was determined by the necessity of conciliating the chiefs of various powerful and jealous tribes, and the expedition was obstructed, imperilled, and at times well-nigh defeated, by the vexatious exactions of these "bloody and deceitful men."

A great part of Speke's journal is made up of the monotonous story of his haggings with these ignorant, suspicious, and cunning lords of the soil. But this recital, while it detracts somewhat from the scientific value of the book, both certifies the authenticity of the narrative, and enables us to appreciate the cost and pains of the exploration. Moreover, while depicting the characters of his successive African hosts, the author unconsciously reveals his own character as one of courage, patience, perseverance, and generosity, rather than of prudence and tact.

In Usui Captain Speke remarked a great variety of facial features, — a consequence of the intermingling of tribes, — and in particular he noticed "many men and women with hazel eyes."

In Karagwe, he had a pleasant detention at the residence of Rumanika, the most intelligent and friendly of the South African princes. Upon leaving Karagwe, to enter the Uganda territory, Speke struck upon a river of which he had heard in 1858, and which he regards as an important link in the mountain sources of the Nile. This first affluent of the Nile, the Kitangülé, was reached on the 16th of January, 1862. This river, which

falls into the Victoria N'yanza on the west side, runs at a velocity of from three to four knots an hour, and has an average breadth of about eighty yards. "I viewed it with pride,"¹ says Captain Speke, "because I had formed my judgment of its being fed from high-seated springs in the Mountains of the Moon solely on scientific geographical reasonings; and, from the bulk of the stream, I also believed those mountains must attain an altitude of 8,000 feet or more, just as we find they do in Rūanda." This conjecture was published by Speke, in *Blackwood's Magazine* for August, 1859. The banks of the river, at intervals, are covered with impenetrable forests; and long before reaching the N'yanza the traveller came upon "a rich, well-wooded, swampy plain, containing large open patches of water," which are said to have been navigable within a recent period, but are now gradually drying up. Captain Speke conjectures that the N'yanza has shrunk away from its original margin.

Uganda is the most powerful state of the ancient Kittara. The Wabūma or Gallas are a pastoral people of Abessinian origin. Their king Mtésa, who rivals the king of Dahomey in his cruelties, detained the expedition, under various pretexts, for the greater part of a year; and it was not until the 7th of July, 1862, that Captain Speke was enabled to set out upon the last stage, which was to solve the great problem of the Nile. Journeying by slow marches, with many hinderances, he reached the river on the morning of the twenty-first. "Here, at last, I stood on the brink of the Nile. Most beautiful was the scene; nothing could surpass it! It was the very perfection of the kind of effect aimed at in a highly-kept park; with a magnificent stream, from six hundred to seven hundred yards wide, dotted with islets and rocks, the former occupied by fishermen's huts, the latter by sterns and crocodiles basking in the sun, — flowing between fine, high, grassy banks, with rich trees and plantains in the background, where herds of the nsunnū and hartebeest could be seen grazing, while the hippopotami were snorting in the water, and florikan and guinea fowl rising at our feet."²

Following up the left bank of the river, after passing several rapids, he came upon the falls (now named Ripon Falls), by which the N'yanza pours itself into the Nile. Speke records this discovery with a tone of moderation which shows that with him it was a foregone conclusion: "Though beautiful, the scene was not exactly what I expected; for the broad surface of the lake was shut out from view by a spur of hill, and the falls, about twelve feet deep, and four hundred to five hundred feet broad, were broken by rocks. Still it was a sight that attracted one to it for hours — the roar of the waters, the thousands of passenger fish, leaping at the falls, with all their might, the Wasoga and Waganda fishermen coming out in boats and taking post on all the rocks with rod and hook, hippopotami and crocodiles lying sleepily on the water, the men at work above the falls, and cattle driven down to drink at the margin of the lake — made in all, with the pretty nature of the country, — small hills, grassy-topped, with trees on the hills, and gardens on the lower slopes, — as interesting a picture as

¹ Page 263.² Page 458.

one could wish to see. The expedition had now performed its functions. I saw that old father Nile, without any doubt, rises in the Victoria N'yanza, and, as I had foretold, that lake was the great source of the holy river which cradled the first founder of our religious belief. I mourned, however, when I thought how much I had lost by the delays in the journey, it having deprived me of the pleasure of going to look at the furthest corner of the N'yanza to see what connection there was, by the strait so spoken of, with it and the other lake where the Waganda went to get their salt, and from which another river flowed to the north, making 'Usoga an island.' But I felt I ought to be content with what I had been spared to accomplish; for I had seen full half of the lake, and had confirmation given me of the other half, by means of which I knew all about the lake, as far, at least, as the chief objects of geographical importance were concerned."

From this point, Captain Speke journeyed north by northwest, following mainly the direction of the river, though at times deviating considerably from its banks, and once losing it for several days, where the Nile makes a detour westward about sixty miles from Kaiuma Falls to the Little Luta Nzigé. The connection of this salt and marshy lake with the drainage of the Mountains of the Moon, Captain Speke had already satisfactorily established; it is therefore the more to be regretted that tribal wars in that vicinity prevented him from verifying by personal observation the common report of the junction of the Little Luta with the Nile. This junction takes place in the Madi country, which Speke describes as a marshy flat. May not the "paludes" of Senaca be sought in this direction?

Again striking the main stream, in $3^{\circ} 40'$ N. lat., at the confluence of the Asua, which drains the northeast corner of the N'yanza, Captain Speke followed its course to Gondokoro in $4^{\circ} 54'$ N. lat. and $31^{\circ} 46'$ E. long., where he arrived on the 15th of February, 1863, having left Zanzibar on the 2d of October, 1860. Here he met Petherick's party, which had been equipped for his relief—a duty which Speke complains was neglected for the sake of trading in ivory. We notice with regret the disposition of Captain Speke to speak slightly of other explorers, and even to dwarf the truly important and valuable labors of his associate Captain Grant. Such expedients are not needed by one who can claim the exclusive honor of the discovery of the N'yanza and of its connection with the Nile. Captain Speke gives the following as the net results of his labors:

"Let us now sum up the whole, and see what it is worth. Comparative information assured me that there was as much water on the eastern side of the lake as there is on the western; if anything, rather more. The most remote waters, or *top head of the Nile*, is the southern end of the lake, situated close on the third degree of south latitude, which gives to the Nile the surprising length, in direct measurement, rolling over thirty-four degrees of latitude, of above 2,300 miles, or more than one eleventh of the circumference of our globe. Now, from this southern point, round by the west to where the great Nile stream issues, there is only one feeder of any importance, and that is the Kitangulé River, while from the southernmost

point, round by the east to the strait, there are no rivers at all of any importance; for the travelled Arabs, one and all, aver, that from the west of the snow-clad Kilimanjaro to the lake, where it is cut by the second degree and also the first degree of south latitude, there are salt lakes and salt plains, and the country is hilly, not unlike Unyamüézi; but they said there were no great rivers, and the country was so scantily watered, having only occasional runnels and rivulets, that they always had to make long marches in order to find water when they went on their trading journeys; and further, those Arabs who crossed the strait, when they reached Usoga, as mentioned before, during the late interregnum, crossed no river either."

This is a very modest statement; and yet we cannot quite adopt the author's confident tone with regard to the eastern side of N'yanza.

Three points remain to be determined: First, what affluents, if any, the Victoria N'yanza receives upon its eastern side, yet unexplored. Secondly, what is the exact connection between the Nile, the Little Luta Nzigé, and the crescent-shaped mountains at the head of lake Tanganyika. Thirdly, are these mountains to be regarded as the Mountains of the Moon, or must these be found upon the eastern side of N'yanza? Dr. Beke still contends stoutly for the latter opinion, and that there will yet be found a great eastern affluent flowing into N'yanza from these mountains, which will prove to be the Nile of Ptolemy. Captain Speke argues, *per contra*, that the name "Mountains of the Moon" was derived from Unyamüézi, which signifies the country of the moon; that the Wauyamuezi, the people of the moon, have from time immemorial visited the eastern coast for trade; and that the name of the people and their country was given to mountains which they reported to exist, but which inquirers at the coast confounded with the snowy peaks of Kœnia and Kilimanjaro. It is certain at last that the supposed equatorial line of mountains that so long figured upon the maps as the Mountains of the Moon, was a geographical fiction. The N'yanza belt is a great plateau, from which there is a descent to the Tanganyika. This lake, Speke supposes, from native authority, to have an outlet through the Marungü river, thus forming one of a chain of lakes leading to the Nyassa of Dr. Livingstone, and through it, by the Zambezi, to the sea. We cannot sufficiently honor the enterprize and fidelity which have gained such solid and substantial results upon the great problem of the Nile.

It must be peculiarly gratifying to Captain Speke to be able to answer, with the tangible evidence of his new discovery, the ungenerous, and even malicious, cavils with which his former leader, Captain Burton, received his discovery of the N'yanza in 1858. Burton speaks of the conjecture of the N'yanza causing the flood of the Nile, as one "which no geographer can admit, and which is at the same time so weak and flimsy that no geographer has yet taken the trouble to contradict it." He also alleges that Speke has exaggerated "a thin ridge of hill fringing the Tanganyika to the portentous dimensions of the Mountains of the Moon;" adding, "Thus men *do* geography! and thus discovery is stultified."¹

¹ The Lake Regions of Central Africa, pp. 336 and 413.

The republication of Captain Speke's *Journal* by Harper and Brothers, of New York, brings it within easy reach of American readers. To the same house we are already indebted for available editions of Barth, Burton, Livingstone, Andersson, Du Chaillu, Davis, Cumming, Wilson, Lander, — in short, of nearly every modern explorer or adventurer in Africa. Their Catalogue of works upon Africa represents a valuable library of geographical discovery.

The map of Inner Africa referred to above, deserves a more particular notice. It appears as a Supplement to Petermann's *Mittheilungen*,¹ and is divided into ten sections, as follows: section 1. Fessan; 2. Aegypten; 3. Tebu-Land; 4. Nubien; 5. Wadai und Bagirmi; 6. Dar-Fur und Kordofan; 7. Dar-Banda; 8. Gondokoro; 9. Kongo; 10. Unyamwesi. Accompanying the maps is a memoir upon each section, by B. Hassenstein, working up carefully the results of all recent travels and explorations within its area. In addition to this memoir, there is a brief chapter upon each section, giving original narratives or dissertations from various authorities. Among these are Moritz von Beurmann's Travels through the Nubian Desert, Theodore Kotschy's Travels from Chartum to Kordofan, Brun Rollet's Travels in the Sumpe District; the Country and People of Tebu by Dr. E. Behm; Antinori's Travels from Bahhr el Gagal to Djur; von Heuglin's Researches in Soudan, Dor, and along the Bahhr el Abiad and Bahhr Ghasal and Franz Morlang's Travels eastward and westward from Gondokoro. Thus this map, with the memoir and the dissertations that accompany it, lays before us the African continent from 30° N. lat. to 8° S. lat., and between 12° and 35° E. long. It brings the geography of Africa down to the present date in a clear, distinct, and reliable form.

Dr. Charles T. Beke, referred to above as a theoretical discoverer of the Nile sources, proposes to transfer *Haran* or *Charran* from Mesopotamia to the vicinity of Damascus. His opinion is, that "the country watered by the Pharpar and Abana — the fertile district known in after times as the *Ager Damascusus* — is Padan-Aram, the country into which, by the Divine direction, Terah and his family removed, and in which was situate the city of Haran or Charran, whence Abraham was called, and which afterwards was the residence of Laban." The precise locality he finds in the modern village of *Harrân-el-Awamid*, or "Haran of the Columns," lying about fourteen miles east of Damascus, on the western border of the lake into which the Barada and the Awaj empty themselves. Dr. Beke argues, with some plausibility that seven days was much too short a time for the journey of Laban from Haran to Gilead, if Haran was beyond the Euphrates, a distance of 350 miles, but was a reasonable time from Damascus to Gilead. He urges also the resemblance of name and of natural scenery, in evidence that this was the Haran of Abraham; but these two points will apply equally to the Haran of Mesopotamia, which has in its favor also traditions

² Inner Afrika nach dem Stande der Geographischen Kenntniss in der Yahrer 1861 bis 1903. Nach den Quellen Bearbeitet von A. Petermann und B. Hassenstein.

of the patriarch, which do not appear to exist at *Harrân-el-Awamid*. Mr. Porter briefly describes this village in his *Hand-Book for Syria and Palestine* (p. 497), but it does not seem to have occurred to him to associate it with Abraham.

The question must turn somewhat upon the location of Ur in Chaldea, which Rawlinson places at the junction of the Tigris with the Euphrates, near the head of the Persian Gulf.¹ Dr. Beke's argument is given in the *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* for 1862, and has also been published in a separate form, by Clowes and Sons of London, under the title of "Notes on an Excursion to Harran in Padan-Aram, and thence over Mount Gilead and the Jordan to Shechem." An important feature of this narrative is a vivid description of Mount Gilead, Jebel Ajlû, and of the route of Jacob from Padan-Aram.

It is well known that Dr. Robinson was engaged upon a Biblical Geography, which was interrupted by his death. His plan included both the physical and the historical geography of Syria and of the outlying regions. Only the physical geography of Syria is found complete among his manuscripts. This exhibits upon every page his thoroughness of research and accuracy of statement. It will soon be published simultaneously in this country, in England, and in Germany, and it will at once take its place as a standard authority upon the physical geography of Palestine. The materials for a historical geography must be sought in the Biblical Researches.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.¹

We gave a favorable Notice of the first volume of this work, in the January Number for 1861, p. 250. For the general scope and character of the Dictionary, we refer to that Notice. The favorable opinion there expressed is fully sustained by the volumes just published. The work was originally intended to be comprised in two volumes; but it was found, after the publication of the first, that the remaining topics must be very imperfectly treated if they were compressed within one more. The editor therefore has wisely extended the work to three volumes. This "has enabled him to give at the end of the third an Appendix to Volume I, containing many important articles on Natural History, as well as some subjects

¹ The Five great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World, Vol. I.

² A Dictionary of the Bible; comprising its Antiquities, Biography, Geography, and Natural History. Edited by William Smith, LL.D. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1863. Vols. II. and III. 8vo. pp. 1862. Appendix to Vol. I. pp. cxvi.

omitted in the first volume." The three volumes embrace 3154 octavo pages, in small but clear type; and the contributions are made by sixty-eight different writers, most of them well known as eminent scholars. Professors George E. Day, C. E. Stowe, and H. B. Hackett, and Dr. J. P. Thompson, of our own country, furnish contributions.

Something is lost in symmetry and unity by so great variety of authorship, but it is more than compensated by the advantages gained. This division of labor gives to the several writers such subjects as they are particularly qualified to treat, and secures more breadth and thoroughness of investigation, and brings together the results of the most mature and critical study on all points tending to elucidate the Bible. Whatever has been gained from oriental travel, from exhumed and deciphered monuments, from geographical investigations, from the critical discussions respecting the canonical authority and genuineness of particular books, biblical chronology, biography, or history, is here made ready for the student's use. The subjects are generally treated with great fairness and candor, and are not shaped for the interests of any party. Persons of extreme views on either side will on some points find fault. Bishop Colenso thinks that the Article on the Pentateuch is as amenable to the sentence of the church courts as his own treatment of the same; while other members of the progressive church will be dissatisfied with the Article, because it makes Moses the author of the whole Pentateuch. In questions admitting doubt, the leaning is generally to the received view rather than to a possible one, in favor of which some plausible arguments might be adduced. Thus the writers of the Articles "The Epistle to the Hebrews" and "the Revelation" adopt the generally received belief that Paul and the Evangelist John were the respective authors. Still there is no such conservatism as rejects new facts, or new phases of truth that are well established.

But it would be too much to expect in a work of so great extent, and involving such a variety of topics, entire freedom from fault. A just measure is not always observed in the space given to the topics — some having too much and others too little. Others, still, which deserved attention have been wholly omitted. The Mount of Olives is said to be "hardly more than 100 feet above the so-called Zion"; and yet by the table of elevations by Van de Velde, given on the same page (II. 624. *b*) as this statement, it is 187 feet above Zion. Bethlehem is made but three miles from Jerusalem (II. 989. *b*), while it is nearly six.

The views given of the position of Sodom, and the other "cities of the plain," seem not well founded; and some of them are contradictory. In the first volume, so far as the situation of Gomorrah is fixed at all, it is placed at the south part of the Dead Sea, the writer evidently coinciding with the views of Dr. Robinson, whom he quotes as placing it there (I. p. 703. *b*). But the writer of the Article "Sodom" inclines to the opinion that the five "cities of the plain" (Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, Zeboim, and Zoar), were at the north part of the Dead Sea. True, in summing up the previous arguments, he says: "It thus appears that on the situa-

tion of Sodom no satisfactory conclusion can at present be come to. On the one hand the narrative of Genesis seems to state positively that it lay at the *northern* end of the Dead Sea. On the other hand the long continued tradition and the names of existing spots seem to pronounce with almost equal positiveness that it was at the *southern* end" (III. 1340. *b*). Yet the author of this Article subsequently (III. 1856. *b*) refers to the considerations here presented as reasons for placing the "cities of the plain" at the north end of the sea.

But the question, which in the Article "Sodom" is left with little preponderance in either scale, takes a much more positive shape in the Article "Zoar," written by the same author as that of "Sodom." He says "the definite position of Sodom is, and probably will always be, a mystery, but *there can be little doubt* that the plain of the Jordan, was at the north of the Dead Sea, and that the cities of the plain must therefore have been situated there, instead of at the southern end of the lake, as is generally taken for granted they were. The grounds for this CONCLUSION have been already indicated under 'Sodom.'" (III. 1856. *b*).

The Article "Lot" is by the same writer as "Sodom" and "Zoar." In this Article (II. 144. *b*) he says: "Where Zoar was situated* we do not know with absolute certainty. If, *as is most probable*, it was at the mouth of *Wady Kerak*, then," etc. Now, *Wady Kerak* is at the southeast part of the Dead Sea, where Zoar generally has been placed. Under the Article "Lot," then, Zoar was "most probably" at the southeast part of the Dead Sea, and under the Article "Zoar," there "can be little doubt" that it was at the north.

We have not space to examine what seems to us the fallacy of placing these five cities at the north end of the Dead Sea. We add but a single point. The almost uniform belief and tradition has been that they were at the south end of the Sea. Tradition in that land, in regard to the situation of places, we know to be of little value generally; but it is incredible that tradition, wild as its vagaries often are, should place a city forty miles (the length of the Dead Sea) from its true position; and more incredible still that it should change to that extent the position of five cities that were near each other, two of which at least were prominent places. — Our faith is still unshaken in the received locality of the "cities of the plain."

The defects, however, in this Dictionary are very few compared with its great excellences. It is the most valuable work of the kind yet published; a monument of learning, and of patient, unwearied investigation.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.¹

A HISTORY of Christian Doctrine — of the various stages and courses of thought through which the church has come to the full maturity of faith, and the most exact and complete expression of belief in her symbols — is

¹ A History of Christian Doctrine. By William G. T. Shedd, D.D. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 408 and 508. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

certainly of the greatest consequence. No important doctrine can be fully understood, until we see something of the mental struggles through which the soul has gained the clear sunlight of an assured belief. Professor Shedd, in supplying a deficiency in our theological literature, has rendered an essential service to all thoughtful men, not only in their historical but their theological studies. The results to which we are brought, tend to show us the essential unity as well as the development of Christian ideas. It is one living, unbroken stream which flows down from the time of Christ and his apostles. Professor Shedd divides his work into seven books, according to the principal subjects which are discussed, and in each he shows the progress of scientific thought, from the earliest times to the period when the doctrine assumes its accepted and established form.

After an introduction on Methodology, the subjects of the several books in their order, are as follows: Influence of Philosophical Systems upon the Construction of Christian Doctrine; History of Apologies; History of Theology (Trinitarianism) and Christology; History of Anthropology; History of Soteriology; History of Eschatology; History of Symbols.

It is many years since a more valuable contribution has been made, in this country or in England, to theological literature; one, the study of which will yield riper fruits of Christian knowledge. We come to a full knowledge of the profound truths of theology only through long reflection, and sometimes by a painful experience. When we see, too, what assaults they have met and overcome, we are better prepared to understand and to prize those symbolical statements into which the church, after much pondering, has compressed its creed. Professor Shedd well says: "The endeavor to defend Christianity very often elicits a more profoundly philosophical statement of it. The defence of the doctrine of the Trinity against Sabellian and Arian objections, resulted in a deeper view of the subject than had heretofore prevailed. The subtle objections, and dangerous half-truths of the Tridentine divines, were the occasion of a more accurate statement of the doctrine of justification by faith without works than is to be found in the ancient church. Indeed, a clear, coherent, and fundamental presentation is one of the strongest arguments. Power of statement is power of argument." Thus, although the sum and substance of Christian truth is contained in the Holy scriptures, we gather up the various statements into one compact formula only after many struggles with ourselves and with unbelievers; and almost every dogmatic statement is the result of a battle. Hence different ages have been marked by progress in different elements of Christian thought; and a knowledge of past contests and victories is necessary, if we would save ourselves from error, or come to the fulness of theological attainment.

These volumes are marked by thoroughness of knowledge and clearness of statement, as well as by a certain *vital* element which pervades them, and which shows the love of the author for his great themes, and that he takes his position, not without but within his subject, and so relates the transformations and developments of religious thought, as if he had himself passed through them.

CRAIK'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.¹

THE increased attention paid to our own language and literature is among the more favorable signs of our general culture. Mr. Marsh's two learned, thorough, and independent volumes were an honor to American scholarship. And now the same enterprising publisher has given us, in two ample and elegant volumes, a reprint of Professor Craik's really valuable work. It is now twelve or thirteen years since Professor Craik first published, in a thin duodecimo, his "Outlines of the History of the English Language," the germ of the present publication, new editions having from time to time appeared, each fuller than the preceding, till we are favored with a work embracing all the old, and yet essentially new. Commencing with the earliest period of English history, the author brings his survey down to our own day. The first illustrative specimen is a fragment from a song which king Canute is said to have composed as he was one day rowing on the Nen, while the holy music of the monks of Ely came floating over the water. The last is from Leigh Hunt, who died in 1859. With what wealth of thought and feeling, of imagination and wisdom, is the interspace crowded! It is of course impossible to devote very much space to a single writer; but Professor Craik, by dwelling comparatively less on those poets who are most familiarly known, has contrived to give a fair representation of all. His criticisms are temperate, candid and just, with a full recognition of the genius even of those against whom the moral objection might be the most strong. To the poets, as of right, more ample room is assigned than to the prose writers. The selections are made with taste and skill. Chaucer he discusses with fulness and with ample illustrations, in sixty-two pages. To Shakspeare, as better known, he gives but nine. Spenser has forty pages, and Milton but ten. The wisdom of Burke demands twenty-five pages, the poetry of Wordsworth twenty-three, and that of Coleridge nineteen.

Besides the general survey of literature, we have an account of the early universities and colleges; of the metaphysics and philosophy; of the progress of the natural sciences, of the Royal Society, and the establishment of the Royal Observatory, of whatever, indeed, has tended to swell that powerful current of thought which, for more than four hundred years, has been flowing with such ample and resistless volume.

With this history of the literature, the author combines also a history of the language, of England. This he divides into three stages: the first, that of Pure or simple English (commonly called *Saxon* or *Anglo-Saxon*), extending to the eleventh century; the second, that of Broken or semi-English, coming down to the thirteenth century; and the third, that of Mixed or Composite English, which includes our own time. On the whole, we think that no history of our language and literature has appeared so complete as this, or so valuable for assisting one to a general knowledge of the course of English thought in the departments of which it specially treats.

¹ A Compendious History of English Literature and of the English Language from the Norman Conquest. By George L. Craik, LL.D., Prof. of Hist. and of Eng. Lit. in Queen's College, Belfast. 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner.

MEMOIR OF JOHN ROGERS.¹

THE author of this Memoir is traditionally a descendant of John Rogers. In his investigations to establish the genuineness of his claim, he was satisfied that neither he nor the thousands in New England who claim connection with the martyr of Smithfield have any grounds on which to establish such a relationship. The researches, however, in the line of genealogies, convinced the author that History had not done justice to the subject of the Memoir. "He soon discovered that the only original account concerning him, which has been received as authentic for nearly three centuries, was full of the widest discrepancies and grossest errors."² This volume has therefore been prepared to redeem his character from the oblivion which has gathered about it; and to show from the important labors he performed, and from his fearless and unwavering firmness in the various crises of his life, that "he was even a greater and nobler man than he has heretofore been accounted."³

The work claims that John Rogers was the compiler of the first authorized English Bible. Tyndale, who had previously published a translation of the New Testament, had translated a considerable part of the Old. In this he had been assisted by John Frith, who suffered martyrdom before the arrest of Tyndale. Tyndale was at Antwerp, and was preacher to English merchants; and Rogers had gone there in a similar capacity about the time of Frith's death. It is reasonable to suppose that he at once became acquainted with Tyndale's labors in translating the Bible, if indeed he did not assist him. But Tyndale was soon after arrested and imprisoned, and at length died at the stake, and his manuscripts, just as he had left them, without any explanation, — as he was suddenly seized, — passed into the hands of Rogers, who made such use of them as he could in the further translation and preparation of the Bible. To what extent the labors of Frith and Tyndale had extended before Rogers assumed the work, cannot be determined; but so far as the literary preparation is concerned, "the world is indebted to Rogers alone for the production of the first authorized and recognized English translation of the Bible, — the basis of every subsequent one, even that now in use." Although the title-page of this Bible says: "truly and purely translated into English by Thomas Matthew," there is reason to suppose that this is a pseudonyme, under which it was thought best that the book should make its appearance. Hence this is called the Matthew Bible. It has been conjectured by some that Thomas Matthew was the name of an English merchant at Antwerp; but no proof of this has yet been found.

John Rogers prepared and published the first English Commentary on the

¹ John Rogers: the Compiler of the First Authorized English Bible; the Pioneer of the English Reformation; and its first Martyr. Embracing a genealogical account of his family, biographical sketches of some of his principal descendants, his own writings, etc. etc. By Samuel Lemuel Chester. 8vo. pp. ix and 452. London: Longman, Green, and Co.

² Preface, p. viii.

³ Page 34.

Bible, which led to the preparation of other similar works ; also, " A Table of the principal Matters contained in the Bible, in which the Reader may find and practise many Common Places." Hence he is the author of the first English Commentary on the Bible and of the first English Concordance.

Ordered to preach at Paul's Cross on the first sabbath after the arrival of queen Mary in London, though he knew that the appointment was made with a view of finding charges against him in what he uttered, and though he saw the stake before him, he never wavered. He uttered fearlessly the truths which he believed. This was his last sermon. There was no position in the whole history of the Reformation more critical than this. Had he shrunk from the responsibility which rested on him, what would have been the consequences ? He did not shrink ; and for his heroic adherence to the truth, and for the firmness which his example imparted to others, he may well be called the Pioneer of the Reformation, as well as its first Martyr.

These are the claims which the writer has advanced, and in support of which he has adduced weighty and cogent considerations. The whole work shows careful research and fairness.

Eleven children attended the martyr at the stake, the youngest of which he had never seen before. This puts to rest the long unsettled question as to the number of his children.

REDEEMER AND REDEEMED.¹

THIS book is evidently a collection of sermons, published for two purposes : first, in self-justification, in order that it may be known what the writer holds and teaches ; and secondly, that the larger audience of the reading public may receive new light upon the subject of the atonement. The first object is fully accomplished. None can rise from a perusal of the book without a clear perception of the author's peculiarities of belief, or without a tenderness of feeling toward one who can write with such clearness and beauty, and with such fervor of Christian feeling, that which the deliberate judgment must reject as visionary and unscriptural. We do not deny that here there is a presentation of some truths which the church is in danger of losing sight of, such as the existence and works of Satan ; but, to say the least, we see no benefit that can arise from the acceptance of this new theory of the atonement. We cannot willingly comply with Mr. Beecher when he asks us to give up the doctrine of the atonement as generally held, for his, when at the outset he tells us that the doctrine of pre-existence, on which it rests, is as susceptible of proof by evidence as cogent as that which establishes the doctrine " of the immortality of the soul, the inspiration of the Bible, or any of the great doctrines of the Bible."

The book takes it for granted that the church is in perishing need of a new adjustment of its views of the character of God (page 216) : " The church, in all its branches, publicly professes that the Divine dealings with

¹ An Investigation of the Atonement and of Eternal Judgment. By Charles Beecher, Georgetown, Mass. pp. xii and 347. Boston : Lee and Shepard. 1864.

the human race are incapable of rational explanation and defence." Here, then, is the Copernican theory to be substituted for the cumbrous Ptolemaic; yet it is so full of complicities in comparison with the old, that to believe it would require such a surrender of reason as few, if any, who calmly read the scriptures could be guilty of, and a blind credulity such as none could give but those who, like the author, have a firm belief in the capacity of the human intellect to solve all questions that may present themselves, and who, like him, are prone to build up arguments on figures of speech, and to take rhetorical expressions as logical statements. There is a great show of logical fairness, but at times a startling conclusion is reached, which was not in the premise, having been slipped in by some verbal legerdemain. We doubt if the various writers cited in the abstracts of the different theories of the atonement, would recognize their own views after the manipulation they have received. If they should acknowledge the words, we think they would disclaim the meaning put upon them.

This book, we have no doubt, was conscientiously written in the interest of Christianity. No evangelical doctrine is denied, but all are held in a way peculiar to itself. The fierce polemic statements in the beginning and middle of the chapters, are nullified by the warmth and glow of Christian exhortation with which they close. A sceptic might find satisfaction in very much that is written. A Christian might read passages with an awakened devotion. This very combination, it seems to us, will effectually prevent any injury it might otherwise occasion to the cause of Christianity, while it will completely destroy its power as a work in defence of the faith.

SATAN'S DEVICES.¹

A PRACTICAL treatise, based on the scriptural doctrine of the personality of Satan, and his agency in seducing men into error and sin. The author shows that, while Satan's object is to pervert the action of the human will, he "must fit his measures to the laws of the mind he seeks to control by them," lodging in the soul the most pernicious delusions, warping the judgment and conscience through the feelings, exaggerating difficulties in the way of duty, painting the pleasures of sin in false colors, and especially misleading men in every way in respect to the precise work of faith required of them in the gospel; his first and great object being to make and keep a separation between the soul and Christ. He shows also how the especial work of the Christian, most of all the Christian minister, is to guide the tempted and bewildered soul, through all these cunning devices, directly to the Redeemer, in whose presence and grace alone is deliverance from "the prince of the power of the air." We regard the work as particularly timely in this age, when so much scepticism prevails in respect to "the devil and his angels."

¹ Satan's Devices and the Believer's Victory. By Rev. William L. Parsons, A.M., Pastor of the Congregational Church, Mattapoisett, Mass. 12mo. pp. 312. Boston: Published by the Author. 1864.

DALETH; OR THE HOMESTEAD OF THE NATIONS.¹

THE name of this book is significant of the relation of Egypt to other countries. Daleth, a Hebrew letter, signifies a "door." Through Egypt, as a gateway, there have passed out to other lands, her arts, sciences, rites of religion, and civilization. Egypt was the homestead, the cradle of the nations. Her most famous cities were in their pride centuries before Troy was built, and before the rich cities of Phœnicia had a name. Her temples, in all that is grand and imposing, have never been surpassed; the results of her arts and sciences still excite our wonder, and her schools of philosophy attracted the Grecian Plato.

It is into the door of this old and mysterious land that the author invites his readers to enter, while he shows them what it was in the past, and what it is in the present.

The author has visited the most celebrated places of this country with the eye of a keen observer; he has studied their past history, institutions, learning, arts, refinement, their religious customs and private life. With these he has made himself fully acquainted. He seems to move among the scenes of the past as if they were present; and the pictures which have grown up in his own mind, he faithfully daguerrotypes for his readers. His efforts and success in this feature of his book remind us of what Becker has done in his "Chariots" and "Gallus" to illustrate and reproduce Grecian and Roman private life. With these pictures of the past he mingles graphic sketches of the present, giving customs, costumes, scenes of interest among the ruins of magnificent temples, at the pyramids, on the Nile, and in the Desert. His personal experiences and adventures are gracefully interwoven with the whole. He writes with an earnestness which shows a hearty love for his subject. The work is popular in its form; it does not deal with the dry details of measurements or dates; it is not intended to be a contribution to Egyptology, nor a guide-book for travellers. But it is a better popular view of Egypt than any we have seen. Those who shrink from scientific treatises will read this with unabated interest and with profit. While the style and arrangement are generally clear, we occasionally detect a vagueness of statement, which, in a severe review, the author will no doubt correct.

The book is fully and richly illustrated, and in the beauty and neatness of its whole appearance is scarcely equalled by anything published in the country.

DANA'S TEXT-BOOK OF GEOLOGY².

FOLLOWS the general plan of his Manual of Geology, which we highly commended in a previous Number of our Review. The Text-book does

¹ Daleth; or the Homestead of the Nations. Egypt illustrated. By Edward L. Clark. 8vo. pp. 289. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1864.

² A Text-Book of Geology; designed for Schools and Academies. By James D. Dana, LL.D. Illustrated by 375 wood-cuts. 12mo. pp. 354. Philadelphia: Theodore Bliss and Co. 1864.

not consist of extracts merely from the Manual; it has been wholly rewritten and adapted to the class of students for which it was designed. It covers the same ground as the larger work, but the principles and facts are given with less fulness and in a more simple style.

The work embodies the results of the latest studies and investigations in Geology, and in all its parts gives evidence of eminent scientific attainments. It is happily adapted to introduce the study of this important science into our schools and academies.

THE POEMS OF JEANE INGELOW¹

HAVE the stamp of genuine poetry. They are not the product of imitation, but of genius. Rich in variety, sweet, vigorous, pathetic, and cheerful, objective rather than subjective, picturing the beauties of external nature more than inward feelings,—they find an answering chord in every breast. It is long since a new poet of so much promise and merit has claimed attention. The clergyman who reads “Brothers and a Sermon” cannot fail the better to reach the hearts of his hearers.

ARTICLE IX.

RECENT GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

BY PROF. W. F. WARREN OF BREMEN.

WE open our quarterly report on recent German theological publications by warmly recommending a new monograph on the Freedom of the Will in its relation to Grace. *Die Lehre vom freien Willen und seinem Verhältniss zur Gnade in ihre geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt. Von Chr. Ernst Luthardt.* 8vo. pp. 480. Leipzig: 1863. Dr. Luthardt is a Leipsic professor, not yet old, who has acquired an enviable reputation by various exegetical writings, a work on Eschatology, etc. The work before us is an admirable contribution to the literature of Doctrine-History, the most extensive and thorough survey of the opinions, controversies, and philosophizings which have centered about Free-will and its relation to Divine Grace, which we as yet possess. It embraces the whole sweep of Christian history, from apostolic times to the present year of grace. But more than history is presented: in a second exegetical part a new and fresh investigation of the scripture doctrine is attempted, and then follows a concluding section setting forth the author's own views. After a philosophical Introduction of twelve pages, the chapter-headings of the historical part are as follows: I. The Greek Church; II. The Latin Church; III. The Romish Church; IV. The Doctrine of Luther (pp. 87–148); V. Melancthon's Doctrine (pp. 149–261); VI. The Struggle of

¹ Poems by Jeane Ingelow. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1864.

the Antitheses; VII. Conclusion in the *Concordienformel*; VIII. The Orthodox Dogmatik; IX. The Century of Transition; X. The Renovation of the Doctrine of the Church. The exegetical part occupies pp. 388–428; the concluding Dogmatic statement, pp. 429–470. The author has an uncommonly perspicuous style for a German theologian, and the gift of lucid statement and historical reproduction in a rare degree. After doing such full justice, however, to the new work, we cannot leave it without alluding to what seems to us a grand defect, viz. the author's total neglect of everything outside of the domain of Lutheran theology in the period since the Reformation. Dr. Luthardt justifies himself in this procedure (p. 3) by simply remarking that “here, in the development of the dogma in the Lutheran church, the most comprehensive and thorough-going investigations of the subject have been made,”—a statement which not a few will be disposed to controvert. But granting it were true, a work which purports to be a historical portraiture of the whole subject has no right to reject such developments as that in France associated with the names of Amyraut and Pajon, or that in America associated with the name of Edwards, without stating that by its plan they are necessarily excluded. An unsophisticated reader of the book before us would finish it with the impression that he had been introduced to every author and to every theory related to the subject worthy of historic mention, and yet there is not in the whole work the name of a Protestant author outside of Lutheran Germany! This bigotted onesidedness and superciliousness of the school of new-Lutheran divines to which Dr. Luthardt belongs, is a sad drawback to the pleasure with which one welcomes their learned and acute productions. Apart from this defect, the work may be regarded as almost a model monograph.

2. *Die Entstehung und Fortbildung des Lutherthums von 1548–1576.* Von Dr. H. Heppe. 8vo. p. 264. Cassel: 1863. The body of this work is taken up with extracts from twenty old Lutheran Confessions, prepared and adopted in various state churches between the time of the rise of the Adiaphoristic Controversy and the adoption of the Form of Concord. The most of these Confessions are wholly unknown to ordinary historians, and have been brought to light by Dr. Heppe's antiquarian researches. They compose a documentary history of the rise and formation of the dogmatic system of Lutheranism, and are here presented and commented upon as such. At the same time he finds in them a justification of the positions taken in his former works, “*Die confessionelle Entwicklung der altprotestantischen Kirche Deutschlands*,” and “*Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus in den Jahren 1555–1581*,” which positions have been violently controverted by zealous Lutheran writers. In an Appendix he pays his respects to the two chief critics of his views, viz. Plitt and Calinich, the latter, author of a prize essay, entitled “*Luther and the Augsburg Confession*” (Leipsic: 1861). Heppe evidently has the best of the argument, though the prize essay is uncommonly interesting and able.

3. *Wahrheiten des Himmelreichs. Aus Predigten und Betrachtungen von Henry Ward Beecher.* 12mo. pp. 264. Bielefeld. So the voice of the Brooklyn preacher has at last reached Germany. A member of the *Dom-Candidaten Stift* at Berlin herewith presents the German public with a judicious selection of passages out of "Summer in the Soul," "Life Thoughts," and "Royal Truths," neatly translated, and prefaced with a sketch of the author's life and character. May it have "a good run" among the sleepy, homily-making old domines of the "fatherland."

4. *Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegriffe der Kleineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien. Von Dr. Matthias Schneckenburger. Herausgegeben von Hundeshagen.* 8vo. pp. 250. Frankfort am Maine: 1863. As Dr. Schneckenburger died in 1848, these posthumous Lectures have rather an old savor; nevertheless we will give them for their author's sake a hearty welcome. Few readers of Dr. S.'s excellent "Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformirten Lehrbegriffs," are aware of the tribulation with which its editor and his friends possessed themselves of the manuscript, and thus rescued from long obscurity and probable destruction the only comparative dogmatic worthy of the name. A family catastrophe has but recently released the remaining manuscripts from the clutch of whimsical widow S., the lectures before us among the number. Arraigned for causing the death of a servant girl by her inhuman treatment, and released on bail, the eccentric lady, instead of appearing at court at the proper time, sought an asylum in America, leaving the long-guarded writings of her husband a prey to his still surviving friends.

The present collection of lectures possesses most of the excellences of the former work, only it was impossible for the author to enter into the real spirit and essence of the various systems described so fully as he did into that of Lutheranism and Calvinism. Furthermore, he had not so many different studies of the subject by other minds of which he could avail himself as in the former case. Still the lectures are valuable, and well worthy of reproduction by the press, even at this late day. The contents are: Introduction (pp. 1-4); I. Arminianism (pp. 5-26); II. Socinianism (pp. 27-68); III. Quakerism (pp. 69-102); IV. Methodism (pp. 103-151); V. Moravianism (pp. 152-218); VI. Swedenborgianism (pp. 221-249).

5. *Apologetische Beiträge. Von W. F. Gess und C. J. Riggenbach.* 8vo pp. 248. Basel: 1863. Six apologetical essays by well-known Swiss divines. The three by Gess are entitled "The Right of Doubt"; "Doubt and Conscience"; "The Witness of the Holy Spirit." The three by Riggenbach: "The Wrath of God"; "Original Sin"; and "The Unpardonable Sin." All of them are in the best style of modern German apology. As Riggenbach was himself originally a Rationalist, he understands the art of presenting the truth in its most effective form. The whole book may be regarded as a supplement to a work published two

years ago by the same house : "Zur Verantwortung des Christlichen Glaubens, zehn Vorträge." The first three are designed to help the sceptic to a belief in God and Christianity; the following three, to aid him in then surmounting the difficulties which threaten to overpower his infant faith.

6. *Hades. Exegetisch-dogmatische Abhandlung über den Zustand der Abgeschiedenen Seelen. Von J. R. Oertel.* 8vo. pp. 183. Leipzig: 1863. Eschatological subjects are now the favorite studies all over Germany. Within a very short time we have had new and valuable works in this department from Güder, Luthardt, Rinck, Rudloff, Laacke (formerly a Lutheran, now Catholic priest), and many others. Some of our readers may think Parson Oertel runs the doctrine into the ground, when we inform them that he locates the land of the departed in the interior of the earth; but such a view is by no means uncommon here in Germany. We believe it has enjoyed even in England the support of no less authority than bishop Horsley. Though not a Restorationist, our author believes, with a large number of the German theologians, in the continuance of the day of grace till the day of judgment. Like many of his learned countrymen, he seems to conceive of the "middle state" as a grand missionary field; though we do not find that he goes so far as Weitbrecht, who accounts for the "*premature* (!) death of so many competent and useful ministers and teachers" on the supposition that they are needed in the carrying on of the work of evangelizing the shadowy hosts of Hades! Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the essay is the logical manner in which he applies the idea of probation to both classes. If the unsaved can yet rise, so can the saved still fall. This we have never seen so fairly and forcibly carried out as in the present treatise. His collective results are well summed up by himself in the following words: "We have found as the New Testament view of the middle state, that the abode of the departed is, for the most part, to be sought under the earth (§ 9); that this abode is divided into two separate localities, one for the relatively blessed, the other for the relatively miserable (§§ 10, 11); that the intermediate state is only a temporary one (§ 12); that all departed souls enter the intermediate state, either under the earth or in heaven (§§ 13, 14); that the departed are bodiless (§ 16); that they possess self-consciousness, memory, the ability to perceive and receive impressions, to have intercourse with one another (§§ 17, 18), to grow in knowledge and make progress in the career commenced in this life (§ 19), and retain even the possibility of changing the course commenced here, either to salvation (§§ 28, 29) or to destruction (§ 30)." A concluding chapter discusses the relation of this *scripture* view to the established Lutheran doctrine.

7. *Christliche Glaubenslehre nach protestantischen Grundsätzen dargestellt. Von Dr. Alex. Schweizer.* Band I. pp. 394. Leipzig: 1863. Dr. Schweizer is well known to all who interest themselves in the earlier Calvinistic the-

ology, as the author of an excellent "History of the Central Dogmas of the Reformed Church," and of a "Dogmatik of the Reformed Church, reproduced from the Sources." Though an ecclesiastical councillor of the Canton of Zurich, Professor in the University, and Pastor of the Cathedral Church in the same city, he has found time to commence the elaboration of an entirely new treatise, covering the whole field of systematic divinity, in which he aims to set forth the doctrines of the Christian faith, as apprehended by the evangelical church of to-day. The task will be seen to be no light one, when we remember the dissonant schools and philosophies and types of doctrine prevailing in the churches which he has more immediately in view; but our author enters upon it courageously, and if he succeeds in presenting a well-compacted system, may be hailed by thousands as having given exact expression to their faith, when in fact he first gave them something which they in consistency with their principles and prejudices could believe. The present volume contains the first part, and presents not a few features worthy of notice. For instance, we have never found the just distinction between *Dogmatik* as "*Kirkensatzungen-Wissenschaft*" and *Glaubenslehre*, as the scientific reproduction and setting forth of the contents of the Christian faith, so beautifully and thoroughly illustrated as here. He takes the point of view of the "Union" as that essentially attained by the whole evangelical church of Germany. As he is the first theologian of strictly Calvinistic antecedents who has undertaken an original exposition of the "Union Theology," we are entitled to look for an essential complementation of the type set forth by Twisten, Nitzsch, etc. Judging from the volume before us, we should pronounce Dr. Schweizer the truest disciple of Schleiermacher who has yet appeared in this field. Though no servile imitation, the work is, in form, method, spirit, and style, through and through, Schleiermacherian. Perhaps none of his positions will excite more discussion, than the one that "das göttliche Wirken auf die Naturwesen der Bethätigung seiner Naturordnung, das Wirken auf die sittlichen Wesen der seiner sittlichen Weltordnung, und das Wirken auf die Erlösten oder Kinder Gottes der Bethätigung seiner Reichsordnung durchaus gleich gestellt wird." The bearing of this view on the question of miracles and on the doctrine of the Divine concursus is at once apparent. Lack of space forbids the presentation of his novel method.

8. Miscellaneous: — Messrs. Schwetsche and Son having completed their magnificent edition of Melancthon's Works in twenty-seven quarto volumes, have now commenced upon Calvin's. The first volume (Tom. XXVIII. of the *Corpus Reformatorum* (pp. 1151) contains the *Institutes* in the original and two later modified editions. It is unquestionably the finest and most critical edition extant. Price, 4 thaler. A similar republication of Gerhard's "*Loci*" has just been commenced. — Part IV. of Philippi's *Kirchliche Dogmatik* is out; it embraces "*das Werk Christi*." — Part III. of J. J. van Oosterzee's Dutch Christology has just been published in Hamburg, under the title "*Christi Bild nach der Schrift*."

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ARTICLE I.

FREE COMMUNION.

BY REV. SERENO D. CLARK, SUNDERLAND, MASS.

THIS subject has long been involved in debate. The combatants in this country are mainly the Baptists and Pedobaptists, and those who hold to free and those who defend restricted communion among the former. It is variance on a vital point of Christian fellowship between those who freely acknowledge each other to be in fellowship with Christ. Its continuance inflicts a wound on the Saviour's cause. Can it not be healed? Is there no possibility of reconciling those contending in the name of the King of Peace on grounds of scriptural truth and charity? Christian unity, based on oneness of mind and feeling, so that it is at once rational and cordial, possessing the purity and loveliness of the gospel, is a beautiful thought. It will be fully realized in the better land. May there not be some approximation towards it on earth? It will doubtless be one of the prominent characteristics of the millennial church. We would fain hasten the anticipated consummation; and this our Baptist brethren desire as devoutly as ourselves. May both parties, by free and fraternal discussion of the scriptural principles on which the controversy turns, contribute their share towards the adjustment of the differences.

We have admitted into our pages the able argument of Dr. Hovey for restricted communion. Without intending a particular reply to him, we now propose to discuss the subject of free communion with all who give credible evidence of love to the Saviour.

To start intelligently in our inquiries, we need definite views of the exact point or points in controversy. For this we need to know precisely in what we and our opponents agree, and in what we differ, relative to fellowship in the communion service.

We agree with our Baptist brethren that faith, *decided Christian experience*, full sympathy with the spirit and teachings of Christ, are essential to fellowship in the symbols of the sacramental supper. Hence, that the qualified communicant must give evidence of renewal by the Holy Ghost; have settled convictions of the fundamental truths of Christianity; especially of those which the Spirit writes on the soul of the Christian, impressing them on his deepest consciousness in bringing him to the Saviour's feet and holding him there: such as, just views of God's character and his immutable government; the utterly lost condition of man; the necessity of his being born again; the doctrine of justification through the blood of Christ alone; the absolute Godship of the Redeemer; the office and work of the Holy Spirit; the sovereignty of grace, and the duty of unconditional submission and obedience; in a word, that he must hold the Head and all that a saving faith in him implies. Hence we agree that there are errors relative to the gospel which as surely kill the soul as the sword kills the body; that even slight errors touching vital points imperil or damage the Christian life; and that, consequently, those misapprehensions of the fundamental teachings of God's word which, taking into consideration the knowledge and training of him who embraces them, forfeit our confidence in his Christian character, fully justify us in excluding him from the table of Christ, because they indicate that he has no sympathy with gospel truth, and therefore no fellowship with its holy Author.

We agree in the belief that the duty of a public profession of faith in Christ, or of entering into visible covenant with God and his people, is binding on all Christians. In the nature of things, before one can enjoy in another the confidence necessary to Christian communion the latter must give the former satisfactory evidence of piety. For the same reason, before one can enjoy communion with the church he must give the members adequate evidence of oneness with Christ and with themselves. We agree in accepting the same free scriptural form of church polity — congregationalism — a system of which evangelical love and individual rights of conscience are the centre and circumference. We agree that baptism and the Lord's supper are sacraments — outward signs of the indwelling sentiments and feelings implied in regeneration and in union to Christ — to be observed to the end of time; and that it is fitting, in all ordinary cases, that the administration of the former precede the administration of the latter. We agree in the duty of church discipline, of Christians exercising watch and care over the brethren; and of proceeding to excommunication, not less in cases of gross violation of Christ's rules of holy living than of fatal error.

We also agree, or should agree, in the charitable conviction that, as denominations, we are equally anxious to ascertain the will of God; that we study the scriptures with the same earnestness, and with equal freedom from prejudice; in a word, that we are equally conscientious in entertaining our different doctrinal sentiments and in adopting our different ritual practices; otherwise, we can have little hope of success in promoting Christian harmony by friendly discussions on mutual differences. We believe a want of confidence in each other's conscientiousness and sincerity has greatly retarded, in the past, the progress of truth — certainly the progress of Christian friendliness — by means of controversies between evangelical denominations; and in none more than in discussions on the present subject. A great point would be gained, not only to the cause before us,

but to all debatable topics in the religious sphere, could we persuade ourselves that we are mutually conscientious, and mutually acting for the highest interest of the Redeemer's kingdom. Indeed, consistency demands that Baptists and Pedobaptists be thus persuaded, or decline longer to receive and hold communion with each other as Christians.

We are now prepared to understand the exact point of difference between us. It is summarily a difference of belief and practice respecting baptism; mainly, touching the mode of administering the rite and the order of administering it. The Baptists believe that immersion is the only scriptural mode of baptism, and that as Christ has enjoined baptism as a prerequisite to the eucharist, they must exclude from its reception all unbaptized persons. Consequently the Pedobaptists, who consider sprinkling or pouring baptism equally with immersion, must be included among the unbaptized, and deemed unqualified to participate in the communion service. This is the central point around which all their arguments for restricted communion revolve.

True, they allege another ground of difference: the vindication of believers' baptism, and the consequent denial of infant baptism. But the denial of infant baptism does not materially change, though it may enlarge, the ground of difference between us. It is still a difference of mode in a broader sense. The Pedobaptists as earnestly maintain that faith is the only scriptural ground of baptism as do the Baptists. The difference is simply this. The Baptist believes that his personal faith gives warrant for his personal baptism only; the Pedobaptist, that it gives warrant for his baptism and for that of his children also; while he maintains, most decidedly, that the privilege of baptizing children is exclusively confined to believing parents; and that baptized children have the privilege of being admitted to full communion of the church only after personally believing and recognizing as their own the parental act of dedication performed in their behalf, binding their infancy to the altar of God before they were qualified to do it for themselves.

We are aware that some Baptists disavow any dispute between themselves and us concerning the mode of baptism, affirming that immersion is "the thing itself, and alone the thing required." But this is little more than a *petitio principii*. The whole history of the controversy, and the present attitude of the parties demonstrate, that there is a dispute about the mode of baptism; certainly, whether only one mode or several modes are allowable. If they insist that the rite is modal, and we deny it, is there not a difference respecting mode? But we have no disposition to contend on this point. What we mean by a different mode of baptism, in its broader sense, is substantially what they mean by different views of baptism; and we shall use these phrases interchangeably in this discussion.

There are one or two other supposed differences, but which, when analyzed, will be found only differences in manner or process.

Our Baptist brethren allege that their doctrine of a pure church, composed only of believers, is a point of difference between us; averring that we introduce infants into the church by baptism, and consequently that our churches are, in part, composed of members without personal faith. But on this point there is no real difference between us. However loosely some Pedobaptists may express themselves respecting infant church membership, we neither practically nor theoretically maintain that the gospel church, as a communicating body, may contain unbelievers. The profession of personal faith we deem indispensable to full membership. One can commune with Christ only by being united to him, and the sinner is united to him only by faith. We by no means regard baptized children as members of the church in such a sense as to entitle them to commune at the Lord's table. Such come into church relations proper only by a personal profession of faith, by personally entering into covenant, and personally recognizing the baptismal act of parents in their behalf as their own. The precise relation which baptized children sustain to the church is a matter

which alone concerns ourselves, not at all our opponents, so far as it relates to intercommunion. We may be in error, but the error affects not the grand element of a pure church. We being as stringent advocates as themselves of the doctrine that none but evangelical believers, nor any who recognize not the law of baptism as a token of faith, should be received into full communion with Christ's visible body, our churches contain none who are not professedly baptized believers. Hence, should our opponents commune with us, they would commune with none who dissent from their own principles respecting the character of the church; nor, should they invite us to commune with them, would they invite any who profess not to believe and to have been baptized. All that divides us, therefore, is a difference of manner in professing our personal faith by baptism. Our churches are composed, equally with theirs, of believing members.

Our opponents pretend another difference, alleging that we do not comprehend the gracious affections signified by baptism as they do; we administering it to unconscious babes; they maintaining that the gospel, as a spiritual system, requires the rite to be a personal act, expressive of personal faith. But this is fundamentally identical with the last-named difference, and like it may be resolved into a difference of manner or process. We essentially agree with them concerning the spiritual affections which baptism implies. As a rule, we receive no one to the full communion of the church who submits not professedly to baptism, either through his parents or by his own act, and as a sign of personal faith. The real difference, therefore, between us on this point is only a difference in the manner or process by which baptism becomes expressive of personal faith or dedication.

Our opponents admit that mistakes concerning the mode of any other external act or rite destroy not its validity or its acceptableness to God; not mistakes even concerning the most precious of all Christian rites — communion with Christ in the commemorative emblems of his death. The form of

administering this, they deem of little consequence. But the mode of baptism occupies a very different place in their consideration. This they single out from all other rites and ceremonies, or forms of worship, and insist that it must be administered in the *precise manner* which they believe the scriptures demand, viz. *immersion*. Not only so, but they make the mode of its administration the foundation of their distinctive church organization, and, planting themselves on this narrow platform, logically unchurch all other Christians. On the other hand, we do not believe that *form* is more essential to baptism than to any other ordinance.

More than this: they concede that indulgence should be given to many differences of opinion respecting the doctrines of grace; and, notwithstanding these differences, they freely receive those who entertain them to the communion; but they claim that to different opinions and practices touching baptism there should be shown no forbearance, no tolerance. The great Head of the church has made this rite so essential a qualification for the eucharist, and defined its mode so clearly by the verb *baptizo*, that no indulgence should be shown those who consider anything baptism aside from immersion, or give it any other position than at the entrance to the church, however conscientious they may be. We, on the other hand, do not believe that charity is to be thus restricted in her benign workings. We behold her wearing a countenance radiant with a nobler and more impartial benevolence, and spreading her mantle not less freely over misconceptions of outward observances than over errors touching vital truths. While, therefore, our opponents *practically* maintain that errors concerning an outward rite are more important than errors respecting the doctrines of grace within the limits of credible piety, and are more efficient to debar from the Lord's supper; we maintain that errors respecting a rite are no more offensive to God than errors touching doctrines directly bearing on the spiritual affections, and have, therefore, no more efficacy to obstruct the way to the communion board. Indeed, we believe the former errors

are far less displeasing to God than the latter, and have far less power to prevent sacramental recognition.

This leads to a fundamental difference between us. They maintain that mistakes or misapprehensions in ordinances which do not prevent the immediate communion of the soul with God, disqualify for communion with Christ; while we maintain that no mistake or misapprehension which prevents not immediate communion with God can prevent acceptable communion with him in an ordinance symbolical of that communion. This, to our minds, is self-evident. He whose soul is in sympathy with God, is not only qualified for communion with him here, but also in heaven. To deny, therefore, that sympathy of soul with God, and fitness for communion with him here and in heaven, are qualifications for an ordinance, is to require higher qualification for communion at Christ's table than for eternal fellowship with him above. This is a position so uncongenial to every dictate of the Christian heart, that nothing but the unequivocal declaration of the great Lawgiver himself can persuade us to accept it.

We do not, therefore, acknowledge the truthfulness of the assertion of Dr. Hovey, that "the principles which require Baptist churches to limit their invitation to the Lord's supper to Christians of their own faith and order, are identical with those which determine the action of other evangelical churches in this matter." Nor do we concede the truthfulness of the position frequently taken by Pedobaptists, that "if we adopted the views of the Baptists respecting baptism, we should adopt their views respecting communion." This is by no means a scriptural inference. The Bible lifts us to a far higher point of view from which to survey this subject.

This brings us to a difference of fundamental importance to our argument, and should be distinctly understood at its opening. It is a difference in the primary element—the starting-point—of our respective processes of reasoning. The Baptists ground their argument, as we have said, on

baptism — its mode and position. Hence they make the celebration of one rite a qualification for the celebration of another; and thus, in part, convert the gospel into a ritual system like that of Moses, partaking of its main element, ceremonial holiness. Their whole argument is built on this ritual basis, and conducted throughout on the principle that the law of gospel ordinances is as rigid and uncompromising as were the Levitical institutes.

The starting-point or basis of our argument is *totally different* — the *spirituality* of the gospel church, the essential element of which is union to Christ — holy love or charity, binding all believers into one living body, whose development must ever be the growth and free workings of individual graces. Fellowship in it is not, therefore, a matter of constraint, yielding obedience to certain prescribed forms, which may be congealed into a mere dictum of the conscience. It is the warm, free outgushing of Christlike affections. Our argument thus starts from a different point, and lies along a different track from theirs. It is not at all affected by their cogent logic based on the *modus* of baptism. Consequently it will not be necessary to answer, in every case, their positions. By establishing ours, theirs will be undermined and fall from beneath them.

Allowing the Baptists, therefore, to be correct in their views of the mode and subjects of the rite, there remains a further question: Do different views of baptism, or of its mode of administration, conscientiously entertained by a portion of the professed followers of Christ, justify our Baptist brethren in excluding them from church communion? In other words: Are there two classes of Christians, who are equally conscientious and devout, who equally believe themselves to be in covenant with God, and to have been baptized as the scriptures direct, the one entitled to the privileges of the Lord's supper, and the other not?

The exact import and full force of the position which we maintain, and the strength of the position of the Baptists which we oppose, will be best understood by estimating the

strength of their position from their own point of view. We shall do this by gaining accurate views of the significance which they attach to baptism; and thus its importance as a prerequisite for the communion compared with other qualifications. They regard baptism as merely a *sign* of the radical change in the affections and will implied in regeneration — a sign of repentance of sin and faith in the Lord Jesus. These affections and purposes existing, the baptismal water is applied in the name of the holy Trinity, as an emblem of inward purification and dedication to Christ. Andrew Fuller observes: "The immersion of the body in *water*, which is a purifying element, contains a profession of our faith in Christ, through the shedding of whose blood we are cleansed from all sin. Hence, baptism in the name of Christ is said to be *for the remission of sins*. Not that there is any such virtue in the element, whatever be the quantity, nor in the ceremony, though of divine appointment; but it contains a *sign* of the way in which we must be saved. Sin is washed away in baptism, in the same sense as Christ's flesh is eaten and his blood drank in the Lord's supper: the sign, when rightly used, leads to the thing signified."

Our opponents are careful to denominate baptism a sign in distinction from a seal. We can see no very decided difference between a public sign expressive of inward feelings, which can be regarded in no other light than as a public pledge, and a confirmatory token of such feelings, which is a seal. But we are willing to accept their definition in the present case; for it weakens, rather than strengthens, their position. Baptism then, in their view, is important only as a public recognition of one's union to Christ and to the brotherhood, and a token of obedience.

We are now prepared to estimate its comparative importance in connection with the other prerequisites. God looks at the heart. His communion is with the spirit; an outward act, in itself, neither facilitates nor obstructs it. Baptism, in itself considered, neither increases the fitness of the

candidate for the communion, nor diminishes it, it being a mere positive precept; and a positive precept, enjoining an outward rite having no moral element, has no moral power in itself. All its moral power lies in its accidents or implications. The power of baptism, as an initiatory rite to the church, to weaken or intensify the moral affections, lies in the felt obligation to obey a command of Jesus: the conscientious purpose to obey, or the consciousness that it is obeyed; or more particularly, perhaps, the idea of consecration to God in covenant; and thus the thought of the Triune Jehovah as a participant in the transaction. Aside from these it has no power to move the moral affections. The writer has baptized by immersion, and administered the rite to infants; and he has felt as deeply solemn and awed by a sense of the Divine presence in the latter case as in the former; indeed, more tender and tearful, for the subject is more fitted to move the finer sensibilities; the affecting idea in both cases being the thought of dedicating an immortal spirit to Jehovah, and binding it to his altar forever.

Let it be borne in mind that we are seeking qualifications for the communion of spirit with spirit, of heart with heart. Now with all these spiritual qualifications possessed, the soul in full sympathy with Christ; the public profession made; the union to God's covenant people effected; the law of baptism admitted and acted upon according to present light, but misapprehended in its precise form — the question is: Does *this misapprehension alone* justify an exclusion from the table of Christ? This the Baptists affirm; we deny. We see, then, just the strength of our position in opposition to theirs. They plant themselves on the shell of the gospel, and draw their arguments from its surface; we plant ourselves within its very heart, and draw our arguments from its essence.

The thesis, then, which we shall endeavor to substantiate in the ensuing discussion, formally stated, is this: *we are to receive to the sacramental board all whom, as a church, we have satisfactory evidence that Christ receives*, according to the

direction of Paul: "Wherefore receive ye one another, as Christ also received us, to the glory of God." This evidence must, of course, be scriptural, decided, such as would convince an intelligent Christian mind, and given in a way fitted to satisfy the body of believers with whom the fellowship is enjoyed.

We are anxious that this ground-principle of our argument and its legitimate bearings be definitely understood, that we may avoid all just occasion for the deduction of unwarrantable inferences, especially for the pretext that it tends to break down the order and discipline of the churches.

The sacramental supper is a symbol both of communion with Christ and with the saints. This last is too often overlooked. True, it is the table of the Lord, and not ours; but it is his table where those united to him commune, not less with each other than with himself. The true idea of it is communion with the Head and with all the members, to his honor who spread it. The brethren, therefore, need confidence in the piety of those with whom they commune; otherwise there can be no communion in spirit. Confidence is based on evidence. Communicants, therefore, must give to each other testimony of their mutual union to Christ. This demands, of course, some *public expression* or *form of profession*. Hence, there may be exceptions in the application of our principle.

1. There may be reasons determining that one fully believed to be a Christian by individuals should not be received to the table, because he either has not had the opportunity to give the church the appropriate evidence of his faith, or has been unwilling to do it. Hence, we do not believe that the administrator has a right to give the emblems to one whom he may regard as a Christian, while the brotherhood have not had the opportunity of gaining equivalent evidence. Nor has an individual the right to come to the table on the ground that he believes himself to have evidence of faith before he has given the membership a recital of the evidence. Hence we do not believe that the

administrator has any right to give out the general invitation : " All who love our Lord Jesus Christ are invited to partake with us of this feast." It is an infringement of the rights of the brotherhood.

True, we invite to occasional communion members of other sister churches, of whose piety we have no further testimony than the fact of their membership. We also receive members to permanent communion by virtue of letters of dismission and recommendation. But the ground of such action is the presumption that the church of which the invited are, or of which the transferred were, members, have been faithful in the discharge of their covenant duties. While a church is supposed to be a living body, sound in faith, and evangelical in practice, the members in regular standing are considered participants of her vitality. This, confidence in a sister church demands. True, all sister churches may have unworthy members. So may the church to which we ourselves belong. This is an evil incident to the church militant; and is a matter which concerns close not less than free communionists.

On the other hand, when a church has become corrupt in doctrine and loses her vitality, her corruption is supposed, in like manner, to adhere to all her members. If we invite any of them to our sacramental board, they are exceptional cases. The ground of judging of qualifications is now changed. Instead of determining their fitness by the character of the church to which they belong, we determine the fitness of each one on his own merits. If convinced by personal acquaintance that one in covenant with the corrupt church has not partaken of her corruptions, but is holding on to Christ by a vital faith, even though his vision is somewhat obscured by the murky atmosphere in which he has lived, we may and ought to welcome him to our communion table.

2. The church may be justified in withholding fellowship from one whom, as a body, they consider a Christian, on the ground of his having imbibed some error or errors which evangelical denominations generally regard as destructive to

vital godliness, — such as the errors of Universalism, Unitarianism, or Catholicism. True, one intellectually involved in either of these delusions may be so little influenced and moulded by it, owing to some peculiarity in his mental conformation or educational modes of thought, that he may, notwithstanding, be deemed a Christian by those best acquainted with him, and the church with whom he worships may be willing to receive him as one whom Christ receives; yet it may not be expedient, for two reasons : 1. It would be welcoming an error which the sister churches have agreed to discard from their communion, and, not knowing the facts in the case, they might justly be grieved. It would be a betrayal of Christian confidence. 2. It might be regarded as sanctioning an error which, in most minds, becomes fatal to the inception or growth of true piety, and might tend ultimately, owing to the encouragement thereby given to the error, to the eternal destruction of multitudes. And thus, by bringing such with us when coming around the sacramental board to honor Christ, we might entail great dishonor on his precious name. Such cases may be exceptional to our ground-principle, and by stating them we show its scope and bearing.

It is for our opponents to prove that Pedobaptist errors respecting the mode and subjects of baptism are attended with similar results, alike destructive to souls and dishonorable to Christ. But this their own professions respecting the piety and Christian zeal of Pedobaptist churches unequivocally deny.

There is a passage in Dr. Hovey's argument for close communion demanding some reply. We will give it in this connection as further explicative of the measures and bounds of our principle. " But if churches observing the Lord's supper may invite to this ordinance only those who give to them satisfactory evidence of piety, it is plain that Baptists cannot welcome the members of Episcopal, Lutheran, Unitarian, or Universalist churches, as such, to the communion. For it is well known that persons are freely received into churches of

all these denominations who do not profess to have experienced a change of heart. It is known that persons christened in infancy are presumed by many Episcopalians and Lutherans to have been regenerated thereby, and are therefore, at a suitable age, admitted by confirmation to full membership in the church. It is known that views of depravity and regeneration are entertained by Unitarians and Universalists quite unlike those of evangelical Christians, and accordingly that many are received into their fellowship who cannot, in the judgment of charity, be esteemed pious. Hence Christians who believe in the new birth and reject the doctrine of baptismal regeneration are unable to regard membership in any of these churches as suitable evidence of piety. They are ready to acknowledge that large numbers of true believers may be found in the four denominations just mentioned, but they cannot look upon the terms of admission to church fellowship in either of them as being suitable tests of piety, nor can they presume that men are real Christians merely because they have borne such tests. The consequences are obvious. It is impossible for Baptists, with their present views of faith in Christ as prerequisite to the Lord's supper, and of the proper fruits and evidences of faith, to invite members of the denominations named above to this ordinance."

This, in its position, has some appearance of argument, but appearance is all. 1. The fact that we cannot fellowship those churches who deny the eternal destruction of the wicked and the supreme divinity of Christ, and those who believe in baptismal regeneration, is no reason for refusing fellowship to Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Dutch Reformed, Methodists, etc. — churches who maintain the essential doctrines of the gospel, and discard the notion of baptismal regeneration. Besides, might not Dr. Hovey find those in churches of his own denomination who maintain some of these identical errors, or errors equally pernicious? And would not the very reason he assigns for not fellowshipping the churches above named, lead him, in consistency, to re-

fuse sacramental recognition to some of his own sister churches?

2. He turns the mind of the reader from the main point in debate. The point in debate is, whether we shall exclude from the Lord's table those who have mistaken views concerning an *external rite*. But the reason for not fellowshiping the churches specified, is their wrong views of fundamental gospel doctrines, and consequent want of faith — matters not at all in dispute between us. Deficiency of faith or piety is a reason which should lead us, not less than the Baptists, to reject them. Thus, whatever of argument the paragraph contains is based entirely on our own principles. Besides, by refusing fellowship for the want of evidence of union to Christ, Dr. Hovey justifies the implication that he would commune with them provided they gave sufficient evidence of such union. In this manner he confounds himself by confounding differences. Indeed, we could never see why this paragraph was introduced into an argument for withholding sacramental communion from Pedobaptist churches of the Calvinistic faith; errors respecting baptism having nothing to do with the assumed reasons for the exclusion.

3. There is only one point of difference, as stated in the paragraph, between us. He seems to have decided that the Episcopal and Lutheran churches are no longer to be classed among the evangelical; we have not yet so decided. Each church doubtless has the right to determine what churches she will regard as evangelical, and what not. If the Baptists have decided that the Episcopal and Lutheran churches are no longer living bodies, it is their right to assume the responsibility of withdrawing fellowship from them. We have no dispute with them on this point. But in that case, and if the want of faith is the determinative reason for the exclusion of these churches, then, on the principle of fellowship among the churches above considered, all individual members of them who give decided evidence of being actuated by the vital truths of the gospel

should be received irrespective of the mode of their baptism ; otherwise the paragraph has no force in an argument for restricting sacramental recognition to those who practise immersion.

Dr. Hovey lays down four principles of the Baptists which form a sort of sub-foundation on which he proposes to build his argument for strict communion. They are these: 1. "The New Testament is our ultimate authority in respect to church order and action." 2. "The constitution and work of the Christian churches are definitely fixed by the New Testament." 3. "Churches observing the Lord's supper must determine what are the scriptural qualifications for admission to it." 4. "Baptists ought to follow out their doctrine of baptism, if correct, to its legitimate results. If they are right in holding that nothing but the immersion of a believer into the name of the Trinity is Christian baptism, they may fearlessly accept all the consequences of this belief."

In adducing these as the under-ground supports of his argument, he indicates that restricted communion strikes its roots deeper into the heart of the gospel than we have allowed. In this respect they convey a wrong impression. We most cheerfully admit the three first, so far as they bear on the present controversy. They have no determinative force. They are equally consonant with our position as with his. In substantiating our views we rely no less on the New Testament than do our opponents in refuting them. Indeed, we can but think if they could loose themselves from certain influences imbibed from the study of the Mosaic economy, they would receive our principles with more favor. The fourth we reject, because it overlooks one main principle of church communion taught by the apostles.

We wish the fact distinctly in mind at the outset of our argument, and kept steadily there during its progress, that the Baptists do not argue the duty of withholding fellowship from us on the ground of errors in doctrinal belief or of defective evidence of faith and Christian fidelity ; but solely on the ground of supposed misapprehensions respecting

baptism. It will be our aim to show that such misapprehensions, while subsisting with soundness of doctrinal belief and manifestations of the Christian life, are not justifiable reasons for withholding sacramental communion. What Dr. Hovey says touching faith as a prerequisite has no relevancy to the question in debate.

This point covers all we design to substantiate. It is not our object to disprove the distinctive sentiments of the Baptists, nor to vindicate our own; nor is it to persuade either party to surrender their peculiar ecclesiastical organizations; but, while defending each his own doctrinal views and ritual observances, to extend to the other sacramental fellowship. We do not propose to advocate so much *mixed* communion as *free* communion.

From the above discussion it is manifest that our principle has, logically, no disorganizing tendencies in respect to the formation, the discipline, or government of the churches. It most decidedly maintains the importance of visibly covenanting with God and with his people, and of making some public profession of faith, satisfying the Christian judgment of the brotherhood. It only denies, with the exceptions on grounds alluded to above, that the *precise form* of making the profession, provided it be done in a prayerful and conscientious manner, is a justifiable occasion for refusing church fellowship.

This ground-principle of church fellowship is no innovation. It has been generally admitted by Protestants, especially by the Puritans, in all ages since their organization as sects. We will record the testimony of a few leading minds.

The language of the Bohemic Confession is this: "As to the differences which may obtain among the churches in external rites or ceremonies, we think it of no importance, for these greatly vary among Christians, according to variety of place and nation. Ceremonies change; but faith, Christ, the word, change not." The Belgic Confession — a confession approved by the continental divines at the Synod

of Dort, waving all minor differences, contends for the church's unity, on the ground of the common faith of Christians, and insists that it is the duty of every one who loves the Lord Jesus to hold communion with her, "through the medium of any one of her branches to which he may have access in any part of the world." The Helvetic Confession: "It is to be observed that we diligently teach in what the truth and unity of the church principally consist, that we may not rashly excite and cherish schisms in the church. It consists not in ceremonies and external rites, but rather in the truth and unity of the catholic faith." Melancthon writes: "Since we agree in the principal articles of Christian doctrine, let us embrace each other with mutual love. Nor ought dissimilitude and variety of rites and ceremonies to sever our affections." Even John Calvin, that stern man, whose life was thought, and who gazed on the immutable principles which proceed from the heart of Jehovah and support his moral dominions with a steady and unblinking eye; and who is generally regarded as the inflexible advocate of doctrinal consistency and of rigid discipline, with scarcely a vein of Christian kindness in his nature, maintained substantially the same free sentiments respecting communion. "Our assertion that the pure ministry of the word and the pure celebration of the sacraments [immersion, we know, did not enter into his idea of the pure celebration of baptism] is a sufficient pledge and earnest of our safety in embracing, as a church, the society in which they shall both be found, goes so far as this, that she is never to be renounced so long as she shall persevere in them, although in other respects she may abound in faults. Even in the administration of doctrine or sacraments some defect may possibly creep in, which yet ought not to alienate us from her communion." "Since no man is perfectly free from the clouds of ignorance, we either shall leave no church at all, or we must forgive mistakes in those things where ignorance may prevail without violating the substance of religion, or hazarding the loss of salvation." The Westminster Confession: "All saints that

are united to Jesus Christ their head, by his Spirit and by faith, have fellowship with him in his graces, sufferings, death, resurrection, and glory. Saints by profession are bound to maintain an holy fellowship and communion in the worship of God, which communion, as God offereth opportunity, is to be extended unto all those who, in every place, call upon the name of the Lord Jesus." The Cambridge Platform: "The weakest measure of faith is to be accepted in those that desire to be admitted into the church, because weak Christians, if sincere, have the substance of that faith, repentance, and holiness which is required in church members. Such charity and tenderness is to be used, as the weakest Christian, if sincere, may not be excluded nor discouraged." Cotton Mather: "The churches of New England make only vital piety the terms of communion among them." John Howe: "I will adventure to offer these things to serious consideration. 1. Whether for any party of Christians to make unto itself other limits of communion than Christ hath made, and hedge up itself within those limits, excluding those whom Christ would admit, and admitting those whom he would exclude, be not in itself a real sin?—I would ask: Whose is this table? Is it the table of this or that man, or party of men, or is it the Lord's table? Then, certainly, it ought to be free to his guests, and appropriate to them. And who would dare to invite others, or forbid these? 2. If it be a sin, is it not a heinous one? This will best be understood by considering what his limits are. Nothing seems plainer than that it was his mind Christianity itself should measure the communion of Christians as such." Stillingfleet: "What charter hath Christ given the church to bind men up to, more than himself hath done, or to exclude those from her society who may be admitted into heaven? Will Christ ever thank men, at the great day, for keeping such out from communion with his church whom he will vouchsafe crowns of glory to?" Jonathan Edwards, that profound theologian and earnest advocate of doctrinal soundness and church discipline, drew up the

following form of a public profession which he stood ready to accept from candidates for church communion : " I hope I truly find in my heart a willingness to comply with all the commandments of God, which require me to give up myself wholly to him, and to serve him with my body and my spirit. And do accordingly now promise to walk in a way of obedience to all the commandments of God, as long as I live." He also affirms that his opposers at Northampton, and Rev. Mr. Clark of Salem, with whom they corresponded, substantially agreed with him in maintaining "that it is visible saintship, or, in other words, a credible profession of faith and repentance, a solemn consent to the gospel covenant, joined with a good conversation and competent measure of Christian knowledge, is what gives a gospel right to all sacred ordinances."

Dr. Dwight drew up a form of confession for the church in Yale College, which "only exacted of its communicants an assent to such articles as lie at the foundation of Christian experience." Dr. Samuel Worcester drafted a confession of faith and covenant for the church in Fitchburg, in 1798, of which he says : "It was intended, indeed, that the new form should be used in the future admission of members. Still it was not considered as an absolutely indispensable term of admission that the candidates should consent to every article in the doctrine of faith. For it was never designed to exclude any from our communion who appear to be the real subjects of experimental religion." On the authority of Dr. Duffield, "The Presbyterian church, while in the ordination of its ministry it pledges them to its confession of faith," as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy scriptures, "has never prescribed any doctrinal test or form to be applied and used in the admission of members into its communion."

Such is our fundamental principle, demanding alike order and freedom ; such are its able and numerous vouchers. We will now proceed to show its application to the controversy before us.

We shall divide our argument into three general divisions: I. The Nature and Genius of Christianity; II. The Specific Principles and Canons of Scripture prescribing and regulating Church Fellowship; III. The Indispensable Precedence of Baptism to the Lord's Supper incapable of Proof; The Nature of John's Baptism; The Argument from History, etc.

PART I.—THE ARGUMENT DRAWN FROM THE NATURE AND GENIUS OF CHRISTIANITY.

The genius of the gospel is breathed forth in the song of the angels: "Glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, good will to men." It is the utterance of love, mercy, free forgiveness to enemies reconciled through the great Mediator. This furnishes the key with which we penetrate the heart of gospel ordinances, unfold their deepest import, and show their harmony.

I. From the spirituality of the gospel dispensation in distinction from a dispensation of rites and ceremonies as media of religious service and worship. This distinction is well expressed by Dr. Hovey: "Surely it will be admitted that the Mosaic economy differed greatly from the Christian. The former had a national organization, a national temple, a national atonement; the latter has none of these. The former had an extensive and burdensome ritual, sacrifices, oblations, purifications, to be made by those who served unto the shadow of heavenly things; the latter has almost no ritual at all. No ordinance of the earlier economy is preserved without change in the later. No rule as to meats and drinks, divers washings, and carnal ordinances, imposed until the time of reformation, is taken up by the new economy and laid on the necks of believers for all time. The handwriting of ordinances that was against us has been blotted out. Jesus said to the woman of Samaria: 'The hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship him. God is a spirit; and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth.'"

The worship of the gospel is worship of the heart. It is contra-distinguished from worship through ritual sacrifices and external services. It is the direct communion of the individual spirit with the great Spirit. The reason assigned is, "God is a spirit." As he is immaterial, he cannot commune reciprocally with materiality; a mere external act cannot answer the sympathies and desires of the Eternal Mind. The spirit of the worshipper, that which is like in nature, or homogeneous with himself, can alone satisfy these. The naked soul, as in the upper sanctuary, where seraphs bow without any media,—except, as some suppose, the great Mediator,—is to come directly up before its Creator and Sovereign, holding affectionate intercourse, and breathing forth the reverential adoration becoming the children of the Highest. Under the gospel, the only sacrifice accepted on the altar is a burning heart, blending its flame with the Heart of the universe.

The same distinction between the old and new dispensation, in this respect, is brought out repeatedly in the Epistles. Paul, in dissuading the Galatians from Jewish formalities, tells them that under the old dispensation mankind were under tutors and governors—in bondage under the elements of the world, to rites weak and beggarly; but under the new dispensation they enjoy the freedom and familiarity of sons; and that Jerusalem, which is the spiritual or gospel church, is free from all burdensome rites or cumbersome ceremonials intervening between the soul and God. Hence he exhorts them: "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage"; affirming that "in Jesus Christ neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith, which worketh by love." Thus the essentiality in the church of the new dispensation is faith in Christ, or a regenerated spirit in harmony with himself. "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."

It is, then, the glory of the gospel, as distinguished from

the legal institutes of Moses, that the religion which it teaches is purely spiritual. It is religion seated in a heart spontaneously rising to its Creator and Lord, glowing with love, sinking in humility, bowed in submission, animated with faith and hope, awed with reverence before the dazzling glories of the throne, and yet soothed and sweetly melted in communion with him who sits thereon, through the intercessions of the only Mediator. There is no prescribed ritual constituting ceremonial holiness which must be rigorously performed before the soul can go forth on its free excursions of hallowed worship and cheerful service. Adoration is acceptable in any place, in any circumstances, in any posture, which the renewed heart dictates. True, external acts are commanded — public worship and prayer. But these are nothing in God's sight without the heart; they are, indeed, only its outward expression. Two sacramental rites are instituted. But their import and designed tendencies are entirely spiritual. Baptism with water but intensifies our conscious need of purification; and the bread and wine of the sacramental table but vivify the scene of Calvary and our sense of the preciousness of the blood there spilt. The intended use of gospel ordinances is to assist, not obstruct, our spiritual apprehensions; to intensify, not abate, our spiritual enjoyments; to quicken, not deaden, the sympathies of the soul with God.

Now is it reasonable to suppose that in this purely spiritual system God would appoint an external rite so vital to the constitution of his church that her very existence should depend on its right administration; that even the conscientious misapprehension of its nature or mode by a portion of Christ's disciples would be a justifiable ground of excluding them from a service of the highest fellowship with himself and his people; especially when they who labor under the misapprehension are apparently just as desirous of pleasing the great Head of the church as are they who exclude them? Would not the fellowship of true Christians, on such grounds, render the gospel rather a ritual than a spiritual

system? In its nature, how would it differ from the Mosaic economy, which demanded the excision of all neglectors of circumcision and other outward institutes from God's people?

No class of Christians are more established than the Baptists in the conviction that the New Testament contains a dispensation of grace different from that contained in the Old; so different that they can find no foreshadowing of church government or order in it, maintaining most earnestly that "we are remitted to Christ and his apostles for light on all questions of church order and action." But in what does the New dispensation differ more from the Old, than in its spirituality and freedom from bondage to ritual service? This they admit. And yet, with a strange inconsistency, they make the mode of administering an ordinance the ground on which to erect an exclusive church organization. Do they not transfer the spirit of the Old Testament, in its rigid attachment and servitude to rites, into the New? How is the power of one rite to place a flaming sword in the entrance to another consistent with emancipation from ritual thralldom?

Corollary: The ordinances of the gospel should be spiritually interpreted, in harmony with its spiritual nature. The rites which the gospel institutes and enjoins must be, in their nature, like itself. As it is spiritual, they must be spiritual. They cannot consist in mode. If so, the gospel contains within itself an incongruous element. We should look mainly, therefore, at the spirit of them. The feelings, intention, design, with which they are administered, should be deemed determinative, and not their particular form, as under the Mosaic dispensation. The Sinaitic ritual was modal throughout. Mode was essential to all its observances. He who failed in this, failed altogether. On the contrary, the spirit of gospel ordinances constitutes their essentiality. This is clearly brought to view by our Saviour in his conversation with the woman of Samaria. Place and form of worship, so essential under the Old dispensation, are of no consequence under the New. He who

worships in spirit, whatever the outward expression, is accepted. This principle, transferred to the rites, renders their precise form of minor consideration. Is the ordinance, whatever its mode, performed with right feelings and motives? Is the intent of the rite answered? This constitutes its essentiality, and is sufficient. The reverse of this thought will exhibit it more clearly. Modal rites, exactness in their order and relations, one being indispensable to another, prove a church ritual. The character of the rites, in this respect, always determines the character of the church. Hence, the quality of one being given, the other is known. Modal rites prove a church ritual; a spiritual church proves its rites spiritual. In perfect agreement with this principle, the Baptists, not less than ourselves, reject the idea of modality from every other church institute or act of worship. Why make baptism an exception? Why is not the spirit of the ordinance — the right feelings and motives in the use of water administered in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, sufficient to constitute baptism? It is not enough to say that baptism enters into the very constitution of the visible church; for so does the Lord's supper. There are the same reasons for making the latter modal, as the former. The truth is, to make either of them modal is contrary to the spirit of the gospel church. This Andrew Fuller virtually admits: "We should endeavor to ascertain on what principles the apostles proceeded in forming and organizing Christian churches — positive or moral. If the former, they must have been furnished with an exact model or pattern, like that which was given to Moses in the mount, and have done all things according to it; but if the latter, they would only be furnished with general principles, comprehending, but not specifying, a great variety of particulars." "There is scarcely a precept on the subject of church discipline but what may, in substance, be found in the Proverbs of Solomon."

This principle extended to the rites of the church, as consistency with the above extract demands, would give

them a spiritual interpretation. Such interpretation is given to one—the Lord's supper—by the Baptists themselves. Why is it withheld from the other? Is it because it would undermine the tenet of close communion?

II. From the nature and character of divine love manifested specifically to believers. This contains several elements:

1. It is the same in kind as that which the Father bears towards his co-eternal Son. We can never fully comprehend the strength and endearment of God's love to his people, except by seeing it in the light of this paternal love of the Godhead.

a. This love is specific in character, distinct from that which God feels originally for any other being. He loves the spirits he has made, as possessing an intrinsic value surpassing the comprehension of the human mind. But he values and loves his Son as a being whose nature is too transcendently excellent to be created. It is love felt for the uncreated, as contrasted with that felt for the created. Rational love must ever be proportioned to the excellence of its object. As self-existence is immeasurably superior to created existence, God's love for his Son must be inconceivably more intense than what he feels for any finite existence; indeed, than for all finite existences combined.

b. It is love which the Father feels for his only-begotten Son—a Son partaking of his essence, to whom he discloses the whole depth of his being and of his counsels. John represents him as “the only-begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father”; signifying, according to Chrysostom, and approved by Alford and Bengel, “community of being,” represented under the form of the tenderest parental love. It is this parental love eternally enjoyed—a love which (to speak according to the law of all finite affection) has been strengthening by communion the most blissful through eternal years. He was “brought up with him, and was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him.” This is love of transcendent excellence. It is, indeed, of a nature so exalted that, while cumbered with flesh and sin, we may be scarcely

capable of catching a glimpse of its glory. But it is a wealth of affection revealed in scripture, which will be forever unfolding to the redeemed, and will be contemplated with increasing delight and rapture.

It was a part of the divine plan in redeeming mankind through the incarnation and death of the only-begotten Son, to make those who believe one with him. Hence Christ's disciples "are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," constituting his "fulness." They are elevated into the embrace of the same love in which he himself dwells, so that the Father feels for them the same tenderness and endearment which he feels for his well-beloved Son. Heirs and joint-heirs with him, the Father has given them, with him, an inheritance at his right hand, "far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come." This "exceeding weight of glory," reserved for Christ's disciples, will be a perpetual testimony of the Father's affection for them as one with his Son, proving them to be more esteemed than all the rest of his dominions. True, he rejoices, as only Jehovah can rejoice, in those enraptured beings, which compose the cherubic and seraphic throngs about his throne. He delights unutterably in the glorious anthems poured forth from the myriad harps of those who have never sinned. But he values them all combined not as he values his Son; and consequently not as he values those who are made a part of him in such an endeared sense that they constitute "his fulness." "The riches of the glory of his inheritance in his saints" can indeed be no more estimated than can be the preciousness of the Son to the Father.

2. It is self-sacrificing love. The sacrifice of the Father in giving up his Son to the death of the cross was proportioned to the love he bore him. As that love is inconceivable, so the greatness of the sacrifice is inconceivable. The Son must have been dearer to him than all created beings united. Consequently, the sacrifice must have been greater

than would have been the destruction of them all. Speaking *more hominum*, he could more easily have annihilated all those worlds which lie scattered through immensity, displaying so brightly his wisdom and power; could more cheerfully have hushed in unbroken silence the anthems of his glorified throng; stilled every throbbing heart of the myriads of intelligences in all worlds, than have dismissed his own dear Son from his bosom, to become the object of scorn and derision to his enemies, the victim of ignominy and death for our sakes. But this sacrifice, unutterable as it was, he cheerfully made, to secure our deliverance from suffering and sin.

3. It is eternal, electing, and consequently forgiving love. The divine love which embraces the church being the same as that which the Father feels for his Son, it must be co-existent with him, eternal, and immutable. There is, of course, an additional element—the desire or purpose to provide a ransom for sinners. This element is forgiving love. The Father could not feel this towards his Son; but he must have eternally felt it towards rebels whom he determined to make one with that Son. Hence the eternal purpose to save sinners is called “the purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord.” Thus electing or forgiving love lies at the foundation of the gospel scheme. This wonderful scheme originated, but it originated in love which had no origin. This the apostle declares: “Who [God] hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.” See also Eph. i. 9; iii. 11; Matt. xxv. 34. In harmony with this, God says: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.” Thus mercy, compassion for sinners, love choosing enemies, was the moving element in the mind of God determining him to erect a church out of the ruins of the apostasy.

Nothing demonstrates the magnitude and intensity of divine love to sinners, its exhaustless depths, its inconceivable purity, and unconquerable power, like its eternity. It is

greater, purer, stronger, than aught that begins to be ; co-eval with the Divine mind itself, it is as pure and immutable. Before the foundation of the world it existed in all the ineffable excellence of self-existence ; and moved alone by this, God chose the saints in Christ. His eye was upon them when "shapen in iniquity." After their moral powers were developed, he saw them contending with him, even despising his offers of pardon ; but his purpose, through the atonement and power of the Holy Ghost, to make them one with the Mediator, and thus participants in divine holiness, to the praise of the glory of his grace, moved steadily on. It would not be stayed in its course. Their inward pollution and actual transgressions were no impediment. Sin had no power to check the eternal flow of redeeming love. It comes to the elect in despite of sin, renewing and sealing them with the Holy Spirit of promise. This unconquerable compassion, forgiving love, constitutes the very genius of the gospel. It lies underneath it, giving it subsistence and life. Its permeating power gives character to all its developments. It is the richest glory of the church here, and will be its richest glory forever.

4. It is justifying love. It not only seeks to pardon the guilty, but has actually justified all who believe in Jesus. "Whom [Christ] God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, that he might be the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." "And by him all that believe are justified from all things." Hence, those who have received Christ are entitled to all the blessings and privileges vouchsafed in the scheme of grace. Justified freely, all their sins are forgiven. If all their wilful acts of disobedience are forgiven, then all their errors and mistakes, certainly all conscientious mistakes, are forgiven ; and of course their mistakes relative to baptism. Consequently the believer stands acquitted before God of all sins, or of involuntary mistakes relative to principle or practice.

Such is the nature and intensity of Jehovah's love to Christ's disciples, binding them indissolubly to his heart ;

from whom he will be forever as unwilling to be separated as from the Son of his bosom.

Two or three questions arise: 1. Is it reasonable to suppose that God would, for any cause consistent with evidence of vitality, reject a part of this loved body from a feast spread as a symbol of his common love to them all; thereby giving occasion for his enemies to say that he loves not one portion as he loves the other, contrary to fact? 2. Does it seem possible that God would sanction the reign of a divisive spirit in this body, made indissolubly one in his Son, sundering it in twain? 3. Is it rational to believe that God would actually command one portion of a purely spiritual church to exclude another portion of it, even to set up a distinctive church organization, thereby creating a schism in the body, for the sake of preserving the exact form of an external rite? The following considerations will aid us in solving these questions:

1. The intention of the sacramental table is to bring the believer peculiarly near his Lord. It is an actual feeding on Christ the sacrifice. It is not only a memorial, but a means of spiritual vitalization; designed both to qualify for heaven, and to give foretastes of heaven. It is one of the richest privileges of the Christian.

To debar Christ's disciples from this table implies two things: (a) God's rejection of them from the service betokening the most intimate communion with himself, which is a virtual rejection from all communion; for it is an absurdity to suppose that God communes tenderly with those in private, whom he refuses to acknowledge in public as his own people. (b) God's requiring a portion of those whom his ineffable love has made one body with his Son to stand sentinel at the door of gospel ordinances, and to exclude another portion, as spiritually worthy as themselves, from an ordinance implying the holiest and sweetest communion on earth, and emblematic of the eternal union of them all in heaven.

To suppose that God would reject from his table of

tenderest communion with himself those whom he loves with an endearment beyond the power of language to express, because they have mistaken sprinkling for immersion, is to our minds an absurdity ; indeed, not far from a contradiction. They are one in spirit, and yet may not be one visibly, neither making practical uses of their oneness, nor availing themselves of the mutual benefits accruing therefrom. They are linked to Christ and to one another in closest bonds, and yet may not show forth together his death of love which makes them one ; because, forsooth, while all have submitted to the baptism of water in the name of the holy Trinity, a part have not used water enough in its administration, or, in making the dedication implied in the rite, have not gone through the exact process which some may deem scriptural.

2. There is congruity in all divine institutions. God is infinite reason as well as infinite love. The productions of Infinite Reason subsist in perfect order and symmetry. God's perception and appreciation of agreement, suitability, harmony, beauty, congruity, are also perfect. The spirit of any institution from his hand is of course one ; every single part is in agreement with every other part. This is true of the Mosaic church. The divine reason and appreciation of symmetry and beauty being one with love in design, unite equally in requiring the gospel church to be perfectly congruous in its several parts and relations.

Now there is no congruity between God's determining in eternity to exalt all Christ's disciples into the same incomprehensible and immutable love as that with which he loves his Son,—to cherish them forever in the bosom of his forgiving mercy, suffering no enormity of their sins to check its onward flow till its consummation in glory, and his requiring a separation between them, even after Christ is made unto them, all alike, "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption," on the ground of conscientious misconceptions touching a bare rite. There is no congruity between Jehovah's forgiving every fault and error of Christ's

disciples, even requiring us, in imitation of himself, to overlook all their errors in doctrine and all their mistakes in practice, *except one*, and that one having no immediate bearing on the affections or character.

3. To human reason there is no consistency in God's separating those whom he loves so intensely and immutably for so slight a cause as our opponents assign. We are aware of danger in rejecting a professedly scriptural position on the ground of its apparent inconsistency with the decisions of our reason; but the danger lies in founding the inconsistency on partial views of God's character, of his providences, and institutions; while it is pre-eminently a sound position when founded on enlarged and impartial views of the divine perfections and ways. God constituted our minds to perceive the order and symmetry of his plans and their developments; he even calls upon us to judge of the equity of his laws and ordinances. In occupying, therefore, the position afforded by the broadest and profoundest views of God, of his scheme of pardon, and its unfoldings in social organizations, it is to our minds inexpressibly inconsistent for him to separate a portion of those exalted into such endearing relations to himself, because they have made a prayerful and conscientious mistake concerning any duty. But when the rejection is predicated on conscientious misconceptions touching a bare rite of the gospel church, the apparent inconsistency is greatly aggravated. It is inconsistent alike with the divine reason, holiness, compassion, and love of congruity, and all their manifestations in evangelical institutions; and the profounder and broader views we take of the foundation and workings of the redemptive scheme, and of its forgiving Author, the greater will the inconsistency appear. It is, indeed, impossible for us, constituted as we are, to see any consistency in establishing a spiritual church on a ritual foundation, or in making the peculiar mode of a rite the determinative test of admission to it; thereby excluding as well believers as unbelievers from God's covenant love, in direct opposition to the dictates of that love in eter-

nity and at every moment of time. Our opponents may say that baptism is a positive institute, and its propriety or impropriety is not to be judged of by its apparent consistency or inconsistency with the spirit of the gospel. True, it is a positive institute; but still our reason will question the consistency of giving a mere external rite, in a spiritual church, the power of admitting or excluding from its most precious ordinance. This inconsistency the mind will feel. It is felt by our Baptist brethren. Rev. Andrew Fuller remarked to Robert Hall: "When mixed communion is placed on that footing [vital union to Christ], I never yet ventured to attack it."

4. This inconsistency, to our apprehension, is enhanced by the fact that all believers are, through justifying faith, alike treated as if they had never fallen into error or sin.

Now with what propriety can he who is thus fully justified be excluded from the rite which is the special symbol of fellowship with Christ and his followers through his pardoning blood? If he gives his brethren fair evidence that he is accepted of God through faith, and has entered into covenant with him, can he not claim communion with them, even in the highest form, on the plea that his Lord communes with him? When Christ says: "There is now no condemnation to him," does not he who excludes him from the table commemorative of justifying love, say: "I condemn him"? Is it maintained that he is excluded in obedience to a positive precept? If so, then God requires us to exclude from the feast designed as a symbol of pardon and reconciliation those whom he has freely acquitted of every condemnatory sentence and restored to full communion with himself,—the very persons, indeed, whom he has invited to it. It is saying: While I justify them, you may not justify them; while I release them from all obnoxiousness to my displeasure, you must show them my displeasure by forbidding them a privilege given all my acknowledged disciples. If this be not a contradiction, it cannot be easily discriminated.

When, therefore, this eternal purpose of forgiving love,

springing from the lowest depths of divine compassion, both forming the foundation and pervading every part of the gospel scheme, is so far carried into execution as to bind his chosen to Christ in holy sympathy, so that they dwell in him and he in them; when the dispensation of types and shadows has passed, and the dispensation of spiritual worship, in which heart blends with heart in adoring praise, has taken its place; when the rites which he has instituted in it partake of its own spiritual character, designed only to intensify our spiritual apprehensions and enjoyments; when he has commanded his disciples, without exception, "Do this in remembrance of me," thus instituting a tender memorial of himself and of their union to him as their common Source of life,—we cannot conceive it possible that he would divide this body thus tenderly loved,—would even exclude a part from the board spread by the same love which qualified them all, in heart and soul, to partake of it acceptably, for the simple reason that they conscientiously misconceive the mode of another rite, or the order of its administration. We see in the act no indication of that love, the strongest, tenderest, purest in earth or heaven. We see in it no congruity with the free spirit of the gospel, which receives into communion all who worship "in spirit and in truth." We see in it no consistency with what God has so richly promised to all who are in his Son. Such action might be supposable under the rigid ritualism of the Mosaic economy; but has it any place under the purely spiritual economy of the gospel, where "neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith which worketh by love"?

III. From the nature and development of Christian or brotherly love. This is the love of Christ, our elder brother, transfused into the soul. Shed abroad by the Holy Ghost, it dwells in every heart in which the gospel dwells, and is therefore called Christian love, because homogeneous with that of Christ. This is the essence and measure of brotherly love. Our Saviour said to his disciples: "As I have loved you, ye ought also to love one another."

a. It is love the tenderest and most enduring of all earthly affections. As we are to love Christ better than all other objects or beings, so there is a peculiar tenderness and strength of attachment towards those who evince a resemblance to him. The soul of the believer warms at once towards even a stranger who bears his Saviour's image. True, it is often smothered by the remains of depravity smouldering within; yet it will break out as surely as the pent up fire finds vent. No animosities can utterly suppress it. When supposed injuries, which for a time may have crushed it down, are removed, it rises with more than its former vigor. A life divinely inspired, it may be buried, but never die. The Christian friend is the dearest of all friends; and when this noblest affection is consummated in heaven, it will be seen invested with a lustre and charm of which we have at present no conception.

b. It is the nature of love to attract the soul of him who possesses it towards its object. He feels kindness, tenderness, compassion towards him. He desires to impart to him the best he has to bestow; enjoys not an immunity or privilege which he would not gladly share with him. This is specially true of the tenderest and strongest of all human affections. Every saint pre-eminently desires to share every benefaction with his brother saint. There is no exclusiveness in the holy fraternity. Communion in the supper of the Lord being the most precious of public privileges, every believer will desire every other believer to share it, if possible, with him. The exclusion of the beloved in the Lord will always be a self-denial. We do not, therefore, understand how a body of believers, knit together in this sweetest and purest affection on earth, can have the heart, by a judicial act or standing rule, which they meet as often as they come to the communion board, to exclude brethren whom they tenderly love, and whom they believe the Saviour tenderly loves, from the touching memorials of that death on which they all depend for acceptance with God. Can the exclusion be the dictate of the yearning heart of Jesus over his erring disciples?

c. Love is an excusing spirit. It is ever seeking some palliation for the defects of its object. How natural for the parent to excuse a wayward child, even though guilty of very grave offences. True affection is always thus excusing. No more satisfactory reason can be assigned for looking over the defects of a friend than the fact that God has forgiven him. Every right-minded parent would fly to press to his bosom an erring child whom he believed Christ had received to his. Genuine Christian love is, in like manner, pre-eminently an excusing disposition. It prompts one to apologize, to find some palliation, for a brother's fault. He who possesses it cannot well retain estrangement of feeling towards one whom he is thus seeking to excuse, when convinced that Christ has received him, and is giving him the earnest of his everlasting inheritance. What better warrant do the strict communionists desire for looking over the faults of their Pedobaptist brethren, than the ever-accumulating evidence that Christ forgives and owns them?

d. Besides, Christian love derives its character from that eternal purpose of love in which the scheme of salvation had its origin. It is the love of forbearance, of long-suffering, of forgiveness; love to the frail, to the erring, to all in Christ. It is love not only to those doing us good, but to those doing us evil. "Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you; bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you." "Be merciful as your Father also is merciful." This is Christ's spirit, and they who belong to him have, in some degree, imbibed the same. Obedience to the command, "Love one another," is the spontaneous growth of the renovated soul. The forgiveness of a brother's faults is the natural outgushing of the Christian's heart. It is one of his richest pleasures.

Such being the nature and developments of Christian love, we cannot conceive it possible that a system of church organizations and ordinances so richly pervaded by it, should contain the principle of restricted communion. We see not the least consistency between its dictates and excluding

from fellowship, in the ordinance so peculiarly expressive of brotherly love and forgiveness, any who have given satisfactory testimony of their Christian vitality by a public profession, and received what they conscientiously believe to be scriptural baptism, for no other reason than that they have misapprehended the nature of the rite. We know that our Baptist brethren profess to exercise the required "fervent charity" towards those whom they admit to be in fellowship with their common Head, and on their way to heaven, where they expect to praise Christ forever with them, while they feel bound to reject them from the sacramental board. We have no disposition to deny their sincerity. But it is very difficult for those thus excluded, while conscious of love to Christ and to all who are in him, to conceive that the excluding act is the dictate of evangelical love—compassion to the erring.

The following facts and considerations to our minds greatly increase this apparent inconsistency :

1. The prayer of Christ for his disciples : "That they all may be one ; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us ; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the joy which thou gavest me, I have given them ; that they may be one, even as we are one ; I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." None will question that this prayer embraces all believers, and implies a most endearing connection—a connection which will authorize him to acknowledge them as part of himself before the assembled universe, and to exalt them above all the orders of heaven, as sharers in his own peculiar glory and blessedness. They may not all have the same degree of moral excellence ; yet they are one with Christ, and equally accepted as his own. Consequently, they are alike recipients of whatever his pardoning love secures to those that are his. The answer to this prayer constitutes the vital element of associated Christianity and its highest glory. It forms a union entirely spiritual in its nature, and nothing but what is purely spiritual, what first

separates from Christ, can sunder it. But exclusive communion boldly sunders this most precious union for which Christ prayed, and over which the Godhead rejoices; and sunders it professedly for the sake of pleasing him who prayed the division might never be.

This bears marked inconsistency on the very face of it; and it is not apparently diminished, but increased by meditation. Indeed, the more fully we comprehend the depth, extent, and preciousness of the prayer, "that they may be one as we are one," the greater appears the inconsistency of dividing them for a mere external rite. How much more compatible with its import the affirmation of a bold reprove of error, and yet a man of catholic feelings, who, in reply to some friends soliciting him to separate from Christian brethren because they were not precisely of his way of thinking, nobly said: "*I will be one with all who are one with Christ.*"

2. The oneness or union of the church is its grand element of power over the affections and the consciences of men. This constitutes her greatest efficiency in subduing the nations to Christ. Never are mankind so powerfully moved by Christianity as when it can be said of its professors: "Behold, how these brethren love one another." Division in her ranks is always weakness. The spirit of the world is the opposite of this — selfishness and contention. The design of the redemptive scheme is to destroy it, and in its place to diffuse peace and good will. One chief design of Christ in organizing a church was that his disciples, filled with holy love and zeal, might present one solid front to the armies of sin. Now would Christ order the separation of his disciples, and thus diminish their power to do his work, for the sake of establishing immersion as the only mode of baptism? Would not this be dividing his kingdom against itself? Or will our brethren, in opposition, aver that there is more spiritual power in immersion, over sprinkling, than in the consolidation and visible union of Christ's disciples?

3. If the principle of close communionists is correct, Christ, by shedding abroad his love in our hearts, kindles a desire

like his own, the full exercise of which he restrains. He commands us to love our brethren as we love him, and still forbids the highest manifestation of it. He requires us to forgive their faults and errors, and then forbids us to forgive, or overlook even, the substitution of sprinkling for immersion,—an error that has no perceptible bearing on his spiritual kingdom.

4. This holy, forgiving love, like his own, demands as free a flow in his disciples as in himself. It craves as wide a scope, and embraces as wide a range of objects. It would forgive all whom Christ forgives; would receive all whom Christ receives; would commune with all with whom Christ communes. Said a Baptist clergyman to the writer: "It is my principle that we commune at the sacramental table with all the saints on earth. This is a precious thought to me, a very grand thought, and becomes more and more so." A fact demonstrating that free communion is the outflow of the Christian heart.

5. Do our opponents justify their rejection of us on the ground that we have not received scriptural baptism? Admitting that we are in error on this point, Christ has forgiven us, owned and blessed us. This they freely concede. What, then, is their position? "We acknowledge that Christ has forgiven you, putting no difference between us in the bestowment of spiritual blessings, but we may not tolerate you." Is this the spirit of that church whose foundation-stone is forgiving mercy?

6. Personal obedience to the gospel is the personal exercise of the same forgiving love in which the wonderful scheme originated. This spirit enters into every precept of the gospel. Can, then, the act of dividing his body be obedience to Christ?

IV. From the holiness in which both the love of God to his children and the love of his children to each other are grounded, and which constitutes the primary element of all evangelical fellowship. Holiness is the only ground of God's complacency in his own character or in the character

of his creatures. The fallen can be elevated into communion with God only by restoration to holiness. In this element originates all the complacency felt between holy beings, and in this complacency is founded all the fellowship which subsists in the spiritual universe. This principle is implanted by regeneration in every soul united to Christ.

Hence, there is a reciprocal attachment between the followers of Christ, a cleaving to each other, as inevitable as the laws of their being. The moment a Christian sees in another this cleaving to Christ, he is himself conscious of a cleaving of soul to him as to a brother beloved. Consequently, on this reciprocal complacency there is an indivisible fellowship among all true Christians. It is based on a law of moral existence. Two holy beings cannot help feeling this mutual sympathy. Every angel feels it; every saint on earth or in heaven is under the power of its attraction. This element of fellowship, holiness in the soul, is a simple feeling. It cannot be halved or quartered. It either exists, or does not exist. One is either regenerate, or he is not. Consequently, any degree of fellowship on this ground implies every degree. Christ is given to the renovated or justified, and with him God freely gives all things—all privileges. If we may fellowship such in prayer, in worship, in the interchange of all other Christian courtesies, we are warranted in communing with them in the highest symbol of sacramental recognition, in accordance with the injunction, "Receive ye one another as Christ also received us"; unless the Master of the feast has forbidden. Certainly a holy soul can refuse fellowship with one whose holiness draws the divine complacency, only by being schooled by the disciplinary process of a prohibition.

We may have dwelt longer on this first Part of our discussion than some may deem desirable. But so important, in our estimation, is this argument, that we regard it as virtually deciding the question in debate. It in fact does decide it with the great majority of uneducated Christians among the

Pedobaptists. For the spirit of the gospel reveals to us the feelings and dispositions, the desires and purposes, which govern Christ as lawgiver in his church. It also shows us the spirit of the Christian into whose heart the spirit of his Master has been transfused. Hence, this argument proves that the Christian who rejects a brother from the highest token of fellowship does violence alike to his own feelings and the feelings of his Saviour. Consequently, many logical minds, even in their holiest moods of thought, are fully convinced that Christ could never have made the observance of a mere ceremony the indispensable entrance into his spiritual church. Such a necessary regulation, it is felt, would be incongruous to the whole spirit and tenor of the gospel. It would be like binding oaken leaves to the silken petals of the lily, pretending their oneness with it to enhance its delicate beauty. To prove that the gospel contains such an incongruity demands evidence the most unmistakable and decisive.

Such are some of the fundamental principles and facts of the gospel: its spirituality; its origin in electing or forgiving love; its genius, as partaking of the spirit of its origin; its nature as a scheme of pardon for rebels, through Jesus Christ; in connection with the precious truth that all who are united to him by faith are forever one with him in affections and destination. In view of them, the mind forms at once the following judgments concerning the relations of Christians to each other:

1. That they are brethren, equally dear to their Head, and enjoying equal rights and privileges.
2. That as imperfect and erring beings, needing daily to repent and to ask forgiveness of God themselves, they should exercise mutual forbearance and forgiveness towards each other.
3. That the great law of charity should govern them relative to their intercourse and to their mutual enjoyment of common rights and privileges; should especially govern their conduct in relation to those who are involved in con-

scientious or involuntary mistakes respecting outward rites which are mere signs of inward feelings ; not the essence of spiritual life, but the instituted forms in which that life expresses itself.

Hence, the further discussion of this subject must proceed on two or three admissions :

1. As the presumption is in favor of unrestricted communion, the burden of proof lies on those who deny it. Its opposers are required to demonstrate the ground they assume, while its advocates have only to disprove their positions or the conclusiveness of their reasoning.

2. When the scriptures leave the establishment of a rite, its relations, or its order in uncertainty, we are to interpret its import according to the genius of the gospel ; for we cannot believe that Christ would institute an ordinance at variance with this.

3. We are not to look for evidence of the distinct inculcation of these fundamental principles of Christian fellowship, founded in the nature and genius of the gospel, but for evidence of their express denial. For, so clear and unanswerable are they to the intelligent Christian mind, that we come irresistibly to the conclusion, that if Christ intended to introduce into his church other principles of fellowship, he would have given us decisive precepts enjoining them.

We admit that if Christ has promulgated any positive precept to the contrary, or has given any decisive instruction concerning baptism, exceptional to the foregoing fundamental gospel principles, legally making it a necessary prerequisite for the Lord's supper, or made the precise form of administering it essential to its validity ; and therefore a failure in its mode, in its relation, or order of administration a bar to the Lord's supper, the above reasonings and conclusions fall to the ground.

For the complete establishment of this part of our argument, our next inquiry therefore is, can such a positive precept, so utterly incompatible with the spirit of the gospel scheme, be found ?

The New Testament contains no decisive announcement that there can be but one form of baptism, or that the priority of the rite to the eucharist is fixed by an immutable law; certainly, none determining that they who conscientiously misconceive the nature or mode of the former rite should be debarred admission to the latter. The law in the Mosaic ritual, prescribing the priority of circumcision to the Passover, was so definitely stated that no one could misunderstand it. If Christ intended baptism to precede the eucharist by a rule as fixed and undeviating, it is reasonable to suppose it would have been as distinctly announced. Especially is this the only reasonable supposition on the ground assumed by our opponents, who maintain that the gospel church is, in the absolute sense, a new institution, having a new covenant, and new laws of order and discipline, sustaining no organic relation whatever to the Mosaic economy. Consequently, no inference can be legitimately drawn from the established precedence of circumcision to the Passover, proving the same order and relation to subsist between baptism and the sacramental supper; one of their leading principles of reasoning on the subject under discussion, propounded by Dr. Hovey, being "that the New Testament is our ultimate authority in respect to church order and action." Hence, he adds, "we are unable to discover in them [the Old Testament scriptures] any proper model or account of a Christian church." If, then, baptism is to precede the eucharist as invariably as circumcision preceded the Passover, we have a right to expect in the New Testament a rule prescribing it, as intelligible and definite. But we have no such rule. This Baptist writers concede. Says Dr. Arnold: "We must ascertain what the will of the Lord is in this matter as well as we can from particular examples, from general principles, and from incidental allusions contained in scripture." "It seems very plain to us Baptists, that the scriptural terms of admission to baptism are repentance and faith; and yet we do not find anywhere in scripture the express words, 'Let every penitent believer be

baptized, and let none but penitent believers be baptized ;' nor even precisely that form of verbal warrant which we sometimes hear quoted as scripture, 'Repent, believe, and be baptized.' I do not say that the proper qualifications for admission to the Lord's supper are equally clear from the scriptures ; but I say that they are to be ascertained and proved by the same kind of evidence." This, then, is "the kind of evidence" on which alone this able writer relies to prove the necessary antecedence of baptism to the Lord's supper ; freely admitting that there is no direct command establishing the order of the rites. Dr. Hovey virtually makes the same admission ; for, while affirming that an "orderly observance of these rites is a solemn duty," he makes no pretension to the discovery of an express rule prescribing the order ; but establishes his position entirely by general reasonings. The nature and force of this argument from precedent we propose to discuss in our ^{Third} Part. All we wish in this connection is to show that what, from the genius of the gospel we had a right to expect, the institution of a canon giving invariable precedence of baptism to the Lord's supper, and thus restricting church fellowship alone to those who submit to the rite, we do not find. This omission, on our own principles, is matter of astonishment. But on the ground of the Baptists, that the gospel church is an original institution, entirely disconnected with the former dispensation, it is utterly unaccountable.

The above argument, therefore, deduced from the nature and genius of the gospel, remains in its full force, furnishing substantial basis for all our ensuing arguments, imparting to them decisiveness and strength.

Should our opponents aver, by way of objection, that while their arguments are admitted to be inferential, ours are virtually so, and that consequently our position is as feeble and uncertain as theirs ; we reply, granting the averment in a sense true, it carries not with it the force the objection intends. An inferential position, entirely agreeing with the spirit of the gospel, demands not the same accuracy

in data, nor the same invincible logic in the deductions to render it authoritative, as does an inferential position at utter variance with that spirit. Our position may contain only a higher probability of truth than theirs, and still be enough to warrant correspondent action. While such is the inconsistency of their position with the whole tenor of the New Testament, and so contradictory is it to some of its plainest precepts, that unless the deductions by which it is reached have all the distinctness and force of a definite precept, it will not afford justifiable ground of disfellowship; a distinction this which we wish our readers to bear in mind in pursuing the arguments which are to follow.

There is one thought in this connection which is deserving of the momentary consideration of our opponents. The "*kind* of evidence," the mode of reasoning, on which they so satisfactorily rely to establish the antecedence of baptism to the sacramental supper, is precisely that on which we rely for the vindication of infant baptism, and in part for disproving the modality of the rite; though, as we consider the gospel church essentially the same as the Sinaitic, standing on the same covenant, based on the same great principles of grace, the arguments for our conclusions are far more satisfactory on our point of view than theirs can be on their point of view. Hence, while essaying to strengthen their works on one side, they are compelled to adopt a mode of reasoning which incalculably weakens them on the other. For, only prove that infant baptism is evangelical and that the initiatory rite to the church is not modal, and our alleged wrong views of baptism are refuted. The ground of strict communion is removed. Their fortifications are demolished by their own guns.

ARTICLE II.

AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH.

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(Continued from Vol. XX. p. 865.)

AUTHORSHIP is a matter of testimony. Resemblance in style and thought, and apparent conformity of circumstances, though they may confirm the testimony, can never take its place as evidence. The presence of certain qualities in the composition cannot dispense with actual testimony; because those qualities admit of skilful imitation. Nor can the absence of those qualities, unless in extreme degree, outweigh the force of testimony; because the same writer, in different moods and at distant intervals, sometimes greatly differs from himself. Abundant instances show the facility with which acute judges may be misled when they rely merely on their critical powers; while the frequent conflicting decisions of the most dogmatic of literary critics ought to be a standing admonition to all such arrogance. Men like Hume, Lord Kames, and Robertson, fully deceived at first by the poems of "Ossian," and some of them never undeceived; Sheridan and many other literary men of London accepting the "Vortigern" of the boy Ireland as a relic of the myriad-minded Shakspeare; Sir Walter Scott commenting on the "Raid of Featherstonehaugh" as a genuine ancient ballad; Gesenius, Hamaker, and Rochette imposed upon by spurious Greek and Phœnician inscriptions from Malta; German scholars (including Tübingen Reviewers) maintaining the antiquity of the "Amber Witch," till the author found it hard to prove his authorship; the enigma of "Junius," baffling Europe for half a century;—cases like these are memorable and instructive. Questions of authorship are to be settled chiefly by testimony.

We bring testimony, positive and various, to sustain the received opinion that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch.

First, it has been shown that this position is entirely credible by the known circumstances of the case: The art of writing was in abundant use around the Israelites at that period; the requisite impulse — a great national and religious epoch — had arrived; the occasion for *such* a composition now existed in the fixed establishment of a nation's institutions and religion; the requisite person had also appeared, in the remarkable man who is admitted, not only to have delivered the nation, but to have founded their civil and religious institutions, and in whom, legislating for the present and the future, it would have been the height of folly to dispense with written records. *Secondly*, it has been shown that there is positive, abundant, and uncontradicted testimony to sustain the position: This testimony is found, first, in the volume itself, which ascribes to Moses, and to him alone, a direct agency in its production. None deny that most of Deuteronomy, and portions of Exodus and Numbers are therein referred to Moses; no other author is hinted at; the specifications in those cases exclude no other portions, but virtually include them, and the more especially as the reasons for a record in other instances were still more urgent; distinct indications are given that these passages were but parts of a larger whole; special provision was also made, on the one hand, for a record of all God's utterances to Moses, and a claim was set up, on the other, to be that exact record; and meanwhile the portions admitted to claim a Mosaic authorship rehearse and authenticate the essential features of the whole Pentateuch. Again, the later books of the Old Testament often refer to the Pentateuch, in whole or in part, frequently ascribing it to Moses, and never, either in whole or in part, to any other author. Still further, it was the undisputed belief of the Jewish nation at and before the time of Christ, known to be handed reverentially down from the past, — a testimony so well known that its echoes are to be found even in heathen

writers. Furthermore, the Saviour and his apostles reasserted the received opinion, clearly committing themselves, by positive statements, to that view. In addition to all this, there is an entire absence of any other claimant, either affirmed or hinted at in the course of history. *Thirdly*, it has been shown how this testimony is confirmed by other indications: The manner of the volume accords with the notion of a record made in the time of the main transactions recorded; most of the other books of the Old Testament contain traces of its previous existence; various archaisms are found in it; fresh marks of a residence in Egypt appear upon it;¹ traces of the wilderness are not wanting; no later period can be suggested whose characteristics would have given rise to such a book; and finally, those who deny that Moses was the author cannot present, much less maintain, a plausible substitute, there being among them no agreement as to the number or the date of the alleged writers.

A more remarkable instance of testimony lying entirely on one side of a question cannot be found. Nor is it easy to mention any legitimate kind of evidence which is wanting. An additional sweeping declaration in the Pentateuch, that the volume as a whole was written by the great lawgiver, would not have helped the case; not only because of possible questions as to changes made subsequent to the declaration, but also by reason of the entire nonchalance with which the masters of the "higher criticism" summarily set aside such testimony. Thus all these critics, De Wette, Knobel, Davidson, and the like, freely admit that the whole

¹ In addition to the correspondences of Hebrew and old Egyptian names of familiar objects, mentioned in a former Article (Bib. Sacra, Vol. XX. p 845), we may give the following from Seyffarth: שופר, Egyptian *s'pr*, trumpet; אֶצְבַּע, *tb*, finger; זָרַח, *hrt*, span; טָפַח, *s'p*, palm; גִּזְא, papyrus, *km*, represented by a picture of the plant, and forming the symbol of lower Egypt; נָבֵל, harp, Egyptian *nfr*, represented by the outline of a harp, though having the derivative sense of "good;" and several other words, of which the connection is in most instances very clearly traceable through the Coptic. — Seyffarth's Theologische Schriften der Alter Aegypter, p. 117.

book of Deuteronomy (except the beginning and the ending) claims to be the exact utterance of Moses. But the statement goes for nothing with them. Says De Wette:¹ "The author of Deuteronomy, as it appears, would have us regard his whole book as the work of Moses; but," adds this judicial personage, "the obscurity and unfitness of these claims deprive them of all value as proofs." After the same manner, Dr. Davidson proceeds in his latest work:² "A late writer," he says, "represents the whole of Deuteronomy, or at least chaps. iv. — xxx., as proceeding from Moses's hand (ch. xxxi). This was a bold step for the unknown author; and had not this been a time of some literary activity, the thing could scarcely have suggested itself to his mind, or been successfully executed." He thinks "the deception was an innocent one," and proceeds to deal both with the moral question and with the extraordinary phenomenon he has conjured up, of such a forgery palmed off upon Moses in "*a time of some literary activity*," in the following mode: "The *sentiments* conveyed by the Deuteronomist are essentially those of Moses. In this manner we reduce the fiction of the writer to a very harmless thing. Nor is it without example in the range of the national history of the Jews; for the book of Ecclesiastes presents a parallel. Why it was not challenged we are unable to say [!]; but there were comparatively few persons in the nation at the time who had a knowledge of literature, — some Levites and prophets being the learned class. And it is possible that at the particular time and among the people of the Jews the work would not be regarded as reprehensible simply on account of its envelope. The temper of the times was favorable to the reception of the work, even though it may have been recognized in its true character, since it is unreasonable to look for a high standard of Christian morality in a period of Jewish degeneracy. Comparatively innocent as the fiction was, we cannot blame the age for accepting it

¹ De Wette's Introduction (Parker's Translation), Vol. II. p. 159.

² Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. pp. 375, 376.

without hesitation; though it may have been aware of the dress chosen by the author for his work. But perhaps not many knew the real case; the learned class being small."

We do not pause to analyze this notable piece of reasoning, and point out either its lofty standard, its consistency with itself and the writer's connected statements, the distinctness of its solutions, the certainty of its assumptions, or the firmness and cloudlessness of its whole theory. We only wish to show the estimation in which an author's own deliberate testimony is held by such writers.

Of course, this whole class of writers, from De Wette to Davidson, make no account whatever of any assertion of Christ and his apostles on this subject. "Such a prejudice should have no weight at all in criticism," says De Wette;¹ and Davidson echoes: "the higher criticism must decide the question independently" of the New Testament;² Dr. Davidson admits that Christ and the apostles not merely assume but affirm that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch or principal portions of it;³ but, with some show of hesitancy, he finally subsides to the same level with Colenso, that the Saviour was mistaken: "considering therefore the human limitations to which the Son of God was subjected on earth, we are not irreverent in supposing that he shared the common views of the Jews of his day in regard to points ethically or doctrinally unimportant."⁴

The external evidence in the case is certainly all, perhaps more than all, that could be looked for on a question of ancient authorship. In its amount and unanimity it is, for that class of cases, quite extraordinary. The opposers of the Mosaic authorship clearly show that their view is not influenced in the slightest degree by the amount or kind of testimony. To individuals who can so easily despatch the express statements of Deuteronomy as a "harmless fiction," it would of course make no difference if similar statements

¹ De Wette's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 160.

² Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 126.

³ Ibid., p. 125.

⁴ Ibid., p. 128

had recurred in every chapter from the first of Genesis. Men who can not only dispose of the reverential belief of the whole Jewish nation, coming down unbroken, uncontradicted, and entwined with the very institutions which they confessedly received from Moses, but can also blur over a grand problem of stupendous imposture in the unconscious slipshod method of Dr. Davidson, could find no weighty evidence in the past. The position taken is really that of abrogating all historic testimony in a case of literary history, and substituting the supposed acuteness of a modern critic. We proceed, therefore, to our fourth proposition.

IV. The concurrent evidence that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch is exposed to no decisive or even formidable objection.

It is not necessary to deny that there are points requiring explanation, and difficulties needing solution. How could we, for a moment, suppose it to be otherwise? Who could be so simple as to expect that a volume of such immense antiquity, ranging so far back of all contemporaneous and explanatory writings, should present no perplexing questions as to its form and history? The absence of all such matters would be really suspicious and indicative of artifice. Many of the alleged difficulties may appear to be imaginary, others more or less real, but all of them capable of a fair solution — such a solution as, with a similar weight of evidence on the other side, would be admitted at once in the gravest judicial investigations as sufficient. We shall endeavor to touch upon all that require attention; and for this purpose shall have in mind prominently, though not exclusively, the collection of objections industriously arranged by Dr. Davidson in his recent Introduction to the Old Testament. We fix upon this as the latest, as well as one of the most deliberate and laborious, presentations of the case against the claims of Moses.

Now in reply to the varied and positive testimony to the fact of authorship, it was competent to the objectors to take one or all of three courses: first, they might, if possible,

have introduced conflicting testimony; secondly, they might show, if they could, that the present testimony is worthless, and might point out why it is not to be received as other similar but far weaker testimony is received; or, thirdly, they might destroy its force by finding in the contents of the volume inseparable portions which *could not* have come from the alleged author; such as misstatements of facts that he must have known, or facts betraying a later date or a different residence. In the last case, however, it is not enough to point out a supposed improbability, but a real incompatibility. It is also necessary to the validity of the objection to show that all theories of occasional emendation or interpolation are absolutely inadmissible. Nothing less will satisfy the course of a judicial investigation.

Of these three possible courses, the first and simplest is not even attempted. Unfortunately for the objectors, the whole sweep of testimony points only to Moses. Not the slightest hint can be ferreted out from any quarter, in the course of ages, implying that any other person than Moses was responsible for our present Pentateuch as a whole.

The second course has been almost equally given up. Supercilious and contemptuous dismissals of the claims of these witnesses are abundant enough; but a calm and manly examination and refutation of these claims in comparison with such testimony as that on which the writings of Josephus, Tacitus, or Thucydides are received as genuine,—where is it to be found? Nowhere. Nothing would better disclose the unfairness of the objections than the attempt.

The actual argument is reduced chiefly to the third method. It is the application of what is called “the higher criticism” to the contents of the volume. It comprises a considerable variety of material, collected with an industry that is out of all proportion to the logic, and presented with an air of assurance which lacks only a valid basis to be truly formidable. As matter of fact it comprises much that is unsupported, considerable that is irrelevant, and some things which, though bearing on the point, are entirely indecisive.

None of them, as we shall endeavor to show, are insuperable objections to the view received on testimony.

The objections may be classed as positive, negative, and irrelevant.

1. Positive objections. Statements and allusions in the Pentateuch alleged to be incompatible with its having been written by Moses.

(i.) Here belongs the attempt once made to show that the Pentateuch contained numerous palpable errors in its statement of Egyptian customs. This effort, of which Von Bohlen was the leading exponent (in his work published in 1835, *Die Genesis erläutert*), now deserves mentioning only for completeness of enumeration. Had that ill-fated author made good his attempt, it certainly would have been a valid disproof of the composition of the Pentateuch by Moses; inasmuch as such glaring errors would have been incompatible with the knowledge which Moses, as a resident of Egypt, must have had of that country. As matter of fact, the attack was so completely demolished in every particular as to result in a remarkable proof of the minute accuracy of the sacred volume, and to become strongly corroborative of the received view. Hengstenberg's reply is too well known to require mention.

(ii.) It has been alleged that there are "certain arithmetical errors in the narrative," which are unquestionably inconsistent with the ascription of the whole Pentateuch to a contemporaneous author.¹ In view of the abundant replies which have been made to this class of objections, we shall deal with them but briefly now, and only as they affect the question of the contemporaneousness of the composition.²

To the chief of these objections — that a nation of 600,000 warriors, implying more than 2,000,000 souls, could not have

¹ Such is even Canon Stanley's inconsiderate assent to the computations of Colenso. Stanley's *History of the Jewish Church* (Am. ed.), p. 567.

² For a fuller statement of our views (though still brief) we refer to a criticism on Colenso, in Vol. XX. of this Periodical, pp. 660-670. Dr. A. Benisch has written on the whole the most satisfactory of the more extended replies to Colenso which have fallen under our notice. There are points of his argument which admit of improvement.

sprung from the alleged ancestry — the Bible furnishes its own sufficient answer when it specifies ten generations (1 Chron. vii. 23–27) from Joseph to Joshua, and seven from Judah to Bezaleel. This fact alone removes all impossibility from the case. But other suggestions are at hand: Jacob certainly, before the descent to Egypt, had, like his father and grandfather, a large retinue of servants (Gen. xxx. 43; xxxii. 5, 7, 10), two of whom were the mothers of four of his sons. That the sons had servants of their own is not only probable from the universal custom, but seems necessitated by the statement that Simeon and Levi (xxxiv. 25–29) captured the city of Sichem. That they must have been accompanied on that occasion by their servants (as was Abraham by his three hundred and eighteen, xiv. 4), is so obvious that Knobel does not hesitate to speak of it as done by “Simeon and Levi and their domestics” (mit ihren Leuten). But when Jacob and his family went down into Egypt, they went with “their flocks and their herds and *all that they have*” (Gen. xlvii. 1; xlv. 10). The omission of these in the enumeration of the “seventy souls” (Ex. i. 5), was in accordance with the writer’s evident principle to specify only the pure original stock of Jacob; a principle so rigidly adhered to that the sons’ wives are not included in the list. This retinue and their offspring becoming identified with the fortunes of Israel in Egypt, must, from the necessity of the case, have been fully incorporated with them. Besides, we know incidentally that there were intermarriages with Egyptians. Joseph had married the daughter of Potiphar. Moses himself had an Ethiopian or Cushite wife (Num. xii. 1), supposed by the majority of commentators to be a different person from Zipporah. We are told (Lev. xxiv. 10) of “the son of an Israelitish woman, whose father was an Egyptian.” And we find even that there was a “mixed multitude” (Ex. xii. 38. Num. xi. 4), which went up from Egypt with the children of Israel. And moreover there was a special provision in the fundamental law of the nation for incorporating the circumcised stranger with the chosen peo-

ple (Ex. xii. 48, 49 ; Lev. xix. 33, 34 ; Num. xv. 14–16 ; Deut. xxix. 11). All these considerations together leave no difficulty whatever in accounting for the alleged numbers.

In close connection with this point, it has been asserted that the assembling and departure of this multitude of people is related to have been done in a manner incompatible with a personal knowledge ; that it is too hurried. But the objection overlooks the real facts of the case. The narrative has furnished all the necessary elements to form a satisfactory and consistent account. First, and chiefly, there is a leader, who, judged by whatever standard, must have been a great and competent commander. Secondly, the scheme of rescue, even to some of its details, — such as the consultation with the elders, the series of miracles, and the provision of money, jewelry, and raiment, — was laid before him before he went from Midian to Egypt (Ex. iii.). Next is related the actual consultation with the elders (ch. iv.) on his arrival, with a full statement of the grand scheme. Next begin the interviews with Pharaoh (ch. v.), the intent of which was from the first made known to the whole people by bitter experience (v. 8, 20, etc.), and was again distinctly stated to them by Moses, before the commencement of the miracles. Then follow the series of chastisements, which, from the indications of time connected with them, must have occupied at least several weeks, perhaps months. At length comes the destruction of the first-born, which, as Moses was forewarned (xi. 1–8), was to be the signal of departure. The exodus was to take place on the 14th ; and the final order of preparation was given at some time previous to the 10th day of the same month (xii. 3), — an order including the arrangements for *sudden* departure on the night of the 14th of Nisan (xii. 11). These are the distinct statements of the narrative ; and the attempt of Dr. Colenso to bring all this preparation within “twelve hours” on the strength of our English version “this night” (for “the same night”) in Ex. xii. 12, simply exhibits an ignorance of the Hebrew idiom in the use of לַיְלָה, which a consultation of Gesenius’s Hebrew

Lexicon would at once have dispelled.¹ It is not at all inconsistent with human nature or the well-known traits of this people, that, when at the last moment they were hurriedly driven out of Egypt, especially from the capital where Pharaoh dwelt, their bread should have been unleavened and their food not prepared. The final hurry would have been more urgent at the capital. There is no reason, however, to understand that they were all congregated at Rameses. Various circumstances in the narrative as well as repeated statements that they were driven out of "Egypt," imply that they were widely dispersed over the country. That they went out in various consolidated bodies is somewhat clearly stated in Ex. xii. 41, 51; of which bands the principal one, including Moses and the elders, and therefore termed pre-eminently "the children of Israel," would have departed directly from the capital. So ample is the time allowed for the subsequent march that we find (comp. Num. xxxiii. 3 and Ex. xvi. 1) a whole month to have elapsed between the departure from Rameses and that from Elim, a distance probably not much more than a hundred miles.²

A testimony to the completeness of preparation is undoubtedly found in the very word הֶחָיִים (Ex. xiii. 18, Eng. version "harnessed"), on which an attempt has been made to raise an objection. Modern commentators are nearly unanimous here in rejecting the specific meaning "armed;" and, though with some diversity in detail, agreed in finding the declaration of a somewhat thorough preparation for the march. The clue to its meaning, as Rosenmüller suggests, is found in its interchangeable use with וְהָיִים, of which the

¹ In defining the word הַיּוֹם the Lexicon says: "in historical narrative, that which has just been mentioned is regarded as present." Examples given are Gen. vii. 11; Ex. xix. 1, both past periods. Instances of its future reference are Lev. xxiii. 14, 21, where it is joined with וְהָיִים, and in verse 6th of the same chapter where it stands alone; meaning in all these cases simply "the same."

² In illustration of this great event Stanley alludes to "the sudden retreat of a whole nomadic people — 400,000 Tartars — under cover of a single night, from the confines of Russia into their native deserts, as late as the close of the last century." — *History of the Jewish Church*, p. 137.

known meaning is "girt about the loins," and thus in a state of readiness for some effort; thus compare Num. xxxii. 32 with Josh. i. 14, and Josh. iv. 12 with iv. 13. The Septuagint translates the word *εὐζωνοι* in Josh. i. 14, and *διεσκευασμένοι* in Josh. iv. 12. And though the Vulgate invariably translates *armati*, supported by Aquila and Symmachus and many of the Fathers, the somewhat general consent of modern scholars is expressed by the broader terms "equipped, gerüstet, parati."¹

We shall but allude, for completeness of statement, to certain other objections of the same nature, which have been already sufficiently answered elsewhere: alleged oversights or incompatibilities, which it is asserted imply a later fabrication. We would add that if the supposed oversights are real, this pseudo-Moses was certainly a very sorry bungler in the art of fabrication, and he found a still sorrier set of dupes in the whole nation who elevated him to Moses's seat, and for hundreds of years reverentially received his foolish utterances. But in truth nearly all the arithmetical difficulties raised by Dr. Colenso are not contradictions, impossibilities, or incompatibilities; they are simply unexplained or incomplete statements, in which no difficulty at all might have been seen if the writer had furnished one wanting link, and from which now all difficulty vanishes when some *admissible* supposition is supplied. The statements that Moses addressed all Israel, and that the congregation assembled within the court of the tabernacle, are relieved from being the most stupid of fictions by the simplest of explanations, viz. that as Israel was organized as thoroughly as any modern army, Moses in addressing them had only to proceed as does any modern general, and communicate through his inferior officers (as indicated Deut. xxvii. 1, 9, 14); and that the congregation could be, and often was assembled representatively,—a fact proved by

¹ Gesenius gives, "*acres, strenui, alacres ad pugnandum*," which Keil adopts. Fürst very widely, "*accincti, parati, instructi, armati*." Knobel, "in organized bands." Ewald revives an old view of Theodotion, "in five divisions," as from *הַיָּמִין*, *five*, or a supposed *הַיָּמִין*.

instances in which "*the elders*" are identified with the congregation and "the children of Israel" (Ex. xii. 3, 21, 28; xix. 7, 8; Deut. v. 1, 2, 3; Lev. ix. 1, 5, 23, 24).¹ The supposed impossible duty of the priest "to carry" the offal and ashes of the sacrifice without the camp (Lev. iv. 11, 12), becomes perfectly feasible by merely understanding the word הוציא in its legitimate sense "remove," or "cause to go forth." Besides, the encampment consisted of five distinct camps (Num. i., ii., x.), one of which comprised the Levites alone. The specific direction for cleanliness in the camp (Deut. xxiii. 12-14), which has been cited as requiring an impossibility, is shown by the context to refer to the military camp of a future warfare in the promised land, where a much smaller number of persons was to be concerned; while the sanitary arrangements of the wilderness, in this respect, are not preserved in the narrative, but must of course have met the emergency. The method, very likely, was the same, except in the distance traversed: such is now the common custom of Asiatics. The Punjab Sanitary Report for 1862, says, that "In our jails all our refuse is *buried in the garden*, and being rapidly decomposed no inconvenience is experienced"; and the writer specifies the general custom as being conformed to the supposed custom of the Israelites.²

The objection that lambs enough for the passover could not have been procured in the wilderness is sufficiently answered by the facts, first, that the law was enacted primarily for permanent observance in *the settled home*, and irrespective of that protracted wandering; that we do not know whether it was observed in the wilderness after the sojourn at Sinai, or was superseded, like circumcision; and that, if it was kept, in an emergency a single lamb might suffice for a large number of persons, simply for a memorial observance. God never exacted impossibilities, and in some cases even then, waived ceremonial regulations, as when

¹ It is not asserted that this is always the case. The word צֶהָה, like קָהָל, very commonly designates the people as a body. The context must determine.

² Cited by G. S. Drew in his reply to Colenso, p. 91.

(Lev. x. 4) the Levites entered the sanctuary to remove the corpses of Nadab and Abihu, and as in the marked case of circumcision. And whereas from the nature of the case we infer (and Colenso admits, Part I. p. 91) that such of the observances as hinged upon harvest gatherings must have lain in abeyance, we find also, in Deut. xii. 8, 9, and Amos v. 25, 26, intimations that there was, in practice, a large deviation from the law of sacrifices.

This, too, is a sufficient answer to the question how the small number of the priests in the wilderness could sprinkle the blood of so many paschal lambs, and how it could be done in the court of the tabernacle. If at any time the number of priests was then inadequate to their work, what difficulty in supposing an arrangement similar to what was admitted and commended in the time of Hezekiah, when the priests being "too few," were aided in their functions by "their brethren the Levites" (2 Chron. xxix. 34), and the course of Solomon, who finding the one altar inadequate to his sacrifice, consecrated and used another (2 Chron. vii. 7). These suppositions are perfectly admissible, being suggested by the sacred volume itself, and in full analogy with its spirit and method.

Several other peculiarities of number, which have been cited as objections, are disposed of by easy suppositions. The *exact* correspondence of the numbers of the poll-tax (Ex. xxxviii. 25, 26) and that of the census or military muster within six months following (Num. i. 1-46), taken in connection with the proximity of time, points conclusively to the *identity* of the reckoning; and may be explained either that the poll-tax registry was used for the military census so soon following, or (with Benisch) that the *free-will offerings* of the people (Ex. xxxv. 5-9, 20-29), being even more than was needed for the tabernacle (xxxvi. 5-7), were made to take the place of the poll-tax, which was destined for the same purpose (xxx. 16), the product of the poll-tax being (as matter of fact) identified with "the offering" (ch. xxxviii. 24, 29).¹

¹ Dr. Benisch supposes that from the superabundant offering enough was

It is objected that the number of the first census must be fictitious, from the great disproportion of families, e.g. Dan's descendants numbering 62,000 (Num. ii. 26), though but one son is mentioned at the descent to Egypt, and the descendants of Levi's three sons numbering but 22,000. To which we reply that the simple *disproportion* between the families is of no account; as great a disproportion as one to three, or to nine, may continually be found, for example, among the descendants of the first settlers of New England. The only question is, are the individual numbers impossible? The small number of Levi's descendants requires no explanation, even if it had been far smaller. The large number of Dan's descendants would be fully explained if the narrative had stated that Dan had other sons afterwards born in Egypt and reckoned in the family of Hushim (as was sometimes done, 1 Chron. xxviii. 11), and blessed with large families, or that he had a large retinue of servants to include in his tribe, or that he had daughters whose offspring were reckoned in the family of Hushim. We add in passing, that however regular the movement of population on a large scale under the same influences, nothing is more capricious in limited sections and in exceptional circumstances; and there can be no better evidence that the numbers in the Pentateuch are not "fixed up," than the diversity of the amounts given.

A remaining arithmetical question is: How could the number of first-born sons (Num. iii. 43) be but 22,273, when the fighting men amounted to 603,550,—a proportion of but one in forty-two, and requiring, at first sight, the supposition that every mother had forty-two sons? The peculiar disproportion at once suggests to a fair mind some limitations not here expressed; just as a foreigner who should read the United States conscription law and then observe the meagre results of the draft in many, or even all, sections

taken (and made into hooks) to bring the amount of silver to the exact amount which the prescribed poll-tax would have produced; the sums thus agreeing, because they were made to agree.

of the country, before declaring the latter to be fictitious, would do well to consider whether there might not be certain principles of limitation followed by the medical inspectors which are not found in the letter of the law. In this instance the difficulty is to decide what is the principle. "All the first-born males" may be fairly understood, with reference to the avowed object of the census, to mean all who were subject to the law of redemption, or possibly (with Benisch) all who would be liable to the tabernacle service. Two circumstances in the narrative point somewhat clearly to the belief that this could have been but part of the whole number: (1) The origin of the scheme — God having appropriated the first-born of Israel when he destroyed the first-born of Egypt; but the slain first-born of Egypt evidently did not include those who were themselves heads of families, but only the first-born *in* the several families (Ex. xii. 29, 30). (2) The redemption-money actually paid for the excess of the first-born over the number of the Levites (Num. iii. 46, 47), was that which was previously required (Lev. xxvii. 6) for the redemption of persons *under six years old*. This last fact has given rise to the theory of Baumgarten, that only those of five years and under were included, reinforced by Bunsen's suggestion that children of that age were by surrounding tribes devoted to destruction. The other fact gives rise to a limitation of Kurtz, which certainly seems warranted, that in the census of the first-born those were not included who had families of their own. Kurtz argues that, oriental marriages taking place on the average as early as the fifteenth or sixteenth year,¹ this would give to a population of 600,000 males over twenty years of age some 200,000 under fifteen; and the 22,273 first-born would be about one in nine of this number, — a proportion not incredible in itself, but possibly already reduced by rejecting the various deformed and blemished ones, who being incapacitated for the sacred office, therefore could not require a substitute or a redemption. These suppositions, consistent

¹ So also Bunsen, *Bibelwerk*, Vol. I. p. 161.

with the narrative, and even suggested by it, are sufficient to explain the smallness of the number. Any man who should take the general terms of the United States Conscription Act, and compare with it the results of the first draft, without taking into account the previous million volunteers, or knowing the manifold grounds of medical exemption, might make the facts sadly unhistorical by the "higher criticism."¹

None of the alleged arithmetical difficulties carry with them more than a superficial force. An objection which, at its highest point, only inquires *how* can this be, is annihilated by the suggestion of *any* possible mode.

(iii.) It is affirmed that the narrative contains grave errors in its representations and implications concerning the "wilderness," and therefore could not have been written by Moses.

This class of objections, like the previous one, is only an appeal to our ignorance of the facts. It is a blow in the dark. It is no counter-proof, squarely meeting the place and *time*; but an inference from the state of the country more than three thousand years later, and that exaggerated in the description.

The recklessness with which these allegations are made by some writers, is well illustrated by the statement of Colenso, that the law prescribing an offering of turtle-doves or young pigeons "could not have been written by Moses, but must have been composed at a later age," in Canaan, because "in the desert it would have been equally impossible for rich or poor to procure them."² To omit all other reply,

¹ Dr. Benisch's explanation that it includes only those fit for tabernacle service (viz. between the ages of thirty and fifty years) seems hardly consistent with the statement of Num. iii. 39, 43, "from one month old;" and the limitation of Baumgarten and Bunsen to five years of age, hardly compatible with the phrase "from one month old *and upwards*," as it appears in other instances throughout the chapter, though it *might* be taken as a brief designation of one of four classes enumerated in Lev. xxvii. 3-7. Bunsen reasons that such a limitation would be understood from a knowledge of the surrounding heathen custom of offering young children to Moloch.

² Colenso on the Pentateuch, Part I. pp. 188, 189.

it is not only true that the pigeon is a cosmopolite, and is found in the countries on both sides of the wilderness (in Egypt, Asia Minor, and Palestine), but travellers distinctly mention its occurrence in this very region. In the heart of the Peninsula, before reaching Sinai, Miss Martineau "saw a good many pigeons;"¹ Mr. Drew saw "a flight of birds, thousands in number," on the day of crossing el-Tih;"² and Robinson found the ruins of Abdeh (Eboda) "the resort of a multitude of pigeons, which flew out in a cloud."³

On this subject, however, objectors usually deal in vague and general denials. They broadly assert the physical features of the wilderness to be such as must have rendered it impossible to lead so great a company through it to Palestine.

In considering the objection drawn from the condition of the wilderness, two preliminary considerations are to be borne in mind: first, the journey through the wilderness, led by Moses, is one of the settled historic facts. It took place somehow, and with a large body of people. It is to be explained, not denied. Secondly, the event may be fairly classed, on the lowest view, with the great and difficult achievements, like Hannibal's entrance into Italy, or the grand military combinations of Napoleon. It is useless to conceal difficulties, which the narrative itself makes so prominent and memorable. With these preliminary words, we proceed to show that the objection limps on every foot.

(1). Nothing can be made of the term "wilderness," which is in scripture applied to this whole region. The Hebrew מִדְבָּר signifies a "pasture land," not a region of sand. As matter of fact, in the supposed track of the Israelites, sand deserts without vegetation are the exception.⁴ This will be more fully shown presently.

(2). It is an unfounded opinion that the scriptures them-

¹ Miss Martineau's Journal, quoted in G. S. Drew's reply to Colenso, p. 66.

² Drew's Reply, p. 66.

³ Robinson's Researches, Vol. I. p. 285.

⁴ See Drew's Treatise, p. 58.

selves describe this *whole region* as utterly desolate. In the last resort Dr. Colenso repeatedly falls back on allusions to "the great and terrible wilderness," "where there was no water" (Deut. viii. 15; Num. xx. 4, 5; Jer. ii. 6).¹ But the Bible applies these statements to limited portions of the way. It is said of one place only before reaching Sinai (the uncertain place Rephidim, Ex. xvii. 1), "there was no water there." The desert which is described in Deut. i. 19 as great and terrible, we are told in the same verse, was after leaving Horeb by way of the mountain of the Amorites, as they came to Kadesh Barnea. The "evil place," where there was no water to drink (Num. xx. 4, 5), was (vs. 1) at this same Kadesh, in the desert of Zin. So in Deut. viii. 19 the writer makes the place distinct, by describing it as the place of the fiery serpents — the same general region again (Num. xxi. 4, 5) encountered after leaving Hor to compass Edom by the Red Sea, that is, as they returned upon their track. The description in Jer. ii. 6 is a graphic singling out of the worst horrors of the way, without a definite statement of localities; although, as Benisch maintains, the use of the technical word זֶרְקָה may be a specification of this same *Ghor*. So far from describing the whole region traversed as being so utterly desolate, the scriptures abundantly indicate the contrary. There is mention of a brook with running water at Sinai (Deut. ix. 21; Ex. xxxii. 20); a natural supply of water in "the wilderness of Moab" (Num. xxi. 13–18); wells at Elim (Ex. xv. 27); bitter water at Marah (Ex. xv. 1); special arrangements with two tribes on the way for water and food (Deut. ii. 28, 29); and the same proposal made to a third; a similar proposal afterward rejected by the Amorites and Moabites (xxiii. 5), showing the careful consideration of the whole subject. The same foresight appears in the proposal of Moses to Hobab to accompany them (Num. x. 29–32) in their future encampments, that "thou mayest be to us instead of eyes," i.e. as Rosenmüller suggests, that he may guide them to places where there

¹ Colenso, Part I. pp. 120, 128, 132, 134.

were pasturage and fountains. The immediate exercise of that care is shown in the same chapter (vs. 33), when the ark preceded them "to search out a resting-place for them."

Furthermore, all the incidental allusions to this region imply that it was not the Sahara that we are asked to believe. Abraham was able to pass from Palestine to Egypt (probably through the northern portion), and to return with all his riches of servants and sheep and oxen and asses and camels (Gen. xii. 16). Jacob made the same journey with all his flocks and herds (xli. 6; xlvii. 1). Moses pastured Jethro's flocks in the region around Sinai, and there first met his wife by a well (Ex. ii. 16). We find Abraham in the eastern part of the peninsula, dwelling between Kadesh and Shur (Gen. xx. 1), among the Philistines — a people with a king, court, and army. In the same region Isaac found an abode when there was a famine in Palestine (xxvi. 1), and dwelt there with flocks and herds (vs. 14), finding a productive soil (vs. 12) and wells of water (vs. 18–22). Amraphel carried his conquests, and therefore his army, to Paran and to Kadesh (xiv. 6, 7), stations of the Israelites (Num. xiii. 26). The same wilderness of Paran became the home of Ishmael (Gen. xxi. 21). While at Kadesh (Ex. xiii. 26), Moses speaks of "the inhabitants of the land," evidently of the surrounding region. The Amalekites, whose home was on the border of Canaan, fell on *the rear* of Israel at Rephidim (Ex. xvii. 8; Deut. xxv. 18) in the neighborhood of Sinai. The force was evidently large, and must have crossed the worst portion of the desert. Pharaoh evidently viewed the journey of Israel as possible; for he refused permission to go three days' march into the wilderness, unless they left their women and children (Ex. x. 10, 12), or at least their flocks (vs. 24) behind. Moses also mentions "how we passed in the midst of the nations which ye passed by" (Deut. xxix. 16). The Bible nowhere describes this region in terms inconsistent with its own narrative.

(3). It is a gross exaggeration to describe the whole Sinaitic peninsula at the present day as a scene of utter deso-

lation, destitute of the means of subsistence for animals and men. In the eagerness to carry a point, certain intense statements of travellers concerning particular localities (and often in unfavorable seasons) have been sweepingly applied to the whole country. A careful inspection of its geography *in connection with the daily journal* of some accurate traveller, like Robinson, will at once dispel these broad assertions. The desolation, though great, is not total — nothing like it.

The present caravan route to Mecca, over which five thousand pilgrims annually pass in a body, lies directly through the whole length of the most desert portion of the peninsula.¹ Stanley, whose general statements have been quoted with much effect to prove the utter desolation of the desert, also informs us that “bare as the surface of the desert is, yet the thin clothing of vegetation is seldom entirely withdrawn, especially the aromatic shrubs on the hill-sides”; and that “springs, whose sources are for the most part high up in the mountain clefts, occasionally sending down into the wady’s rills of water,” and surrounded by tracts of vegetation, “occur at such frequent intervals that, after leaving Suez, there is at least one such spot in each successive day’s journey.”² Ruppell notices four perennial brooks : at Wady el-Ain, Salaka, Hibran, Feiran.³ Mr. Drew, a recent and careful observer, remarks : “ ‘Bare and barren plains,’ ‘entire desolation,’ etc., are descriptions ridiculously unsuitable to immense portions of the 18,000 square miles which are comprised in the surface of this country, and especially to that portion in which thirty-eight of the forty years of the wanderings were passed. In the configuration and levels of its surfaces, and indeed in all its physical characteristics, the peninsula includes regions of the most varied character. In some parts no waste places can exceed its arid and dreary barrenness; in others, it is fertile, abundantly watered, and romantic in the beauty and

¹ Stanley gives this number. — Sinai and Palestine, p. 26. Mr. Stephens gives the number that left Cairo in the caravan which he saw, at 30,000. — Travels in Egypt, Vol. I. p. 171.

² Sinai and Palestine, pp. 23, 19.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

even magnificence of its prospects.”¹ He instances especially as of the latter description the Paran highlands, which probably may have been occupied for many years by the Israelites; and he sustains his general statement by ample quotations from his own journal and that of Miss Martineau. The latter traveller informs us that “there is abundant rain in the peninsula, usually in December and January.”² Mr. Stephens, who visited Sinai apparently as late as March, tells us that there was rain there twice during his brief stay, and on leaving he was, the same night, overtaken by a rain-storm that fell in perfect torrents during the evening and night.³ Dr. Robinson was assured by the Arab guides that “in those years when there is plenty of rain, *grass springs up* over the whole face of the desert.”⁴

As the proof of general statements is found in details, let us follow the general track of the Israelites, with brief notices from the careful Robinson, mostly in his own language: At Ayoun Mousa (the Wells of Moses), opposite Suez, he found seven fountains of brackish water, and ruins of a former village; next day, a small quantity of sweet water at Abu Suweirah; the same day, the fountain Hawarah (Marah), a basin six or eight feet in diameter and two feet deep, flowing with bitter, brackish water—and the “cup of Sudr” lying off the route. (In the first half of this distance, between Ayoun Mousa and Wady Sudr, a space still swept by sand storms, Drew mentions two miles of mounds covered with rich green tufts, and a large flock of gazelles seen through the sand-storm.) Half an hour further is a small fertile plain, with a rich loam and abundant vegetation, cultivated by the modern Arabs; two hours further, wady Ghurundel (Elim, probably), with numerous shrubs, straggling acacias, tamarisks, and small palm-trees, with fountains of water and a running brook near by;⁵ the following

¹ Drew's Examination of Colenso, p. 66.

² Ibid.

³ Stephens's Egypt, etc., Vol. I. p. 240; II. p. 10. Stanley also encountered a “sharp rain-storm” in wady Sayal. — Sinai, p. 79.

⁴ Researches. Vol. I. p. 172.

⁵ Other travellers speak much more enthusiastically of this valley; “a mile

day, wady Useit, with a few palm-trees and a little water standing in holes; wady Thal, with shrubs, acacias, a few palm-trees, holes of brackish water, and two gazelles in sight; wady Taiyibeh, a fine valley with many trees and a little water, and near it a large plain with many shrubs, a bitter fountain (el Murkhah), and a reservoir of rain-water not far distant; wady Humr, with fresh herbs and shrubs, and traces of recent running water; and later yet, "an extensive plain with many shrubs," of at least six different kinds, and good pasturage for the camels. In this vicinity is the almost undoubted encampment by the Red Sea (Ras Selimeh); the plain, shut in by a wall of rocks, stretches out three or four miles in length and three-fourths of a mile in width along the shore.¹ From wady Taiyibeh however, Robinson deviated from the probable track of the Israelites to visit the old Egyptian ruins and inscriptions of Surabit el-Khadim, finding as he proceeded excellent water in a side valley (while wady Humr spread out into a broad plain sprinkled over with herbs), seeing a flock of sheep and goats pastured in wady Suwuk, and a wild goat on the rocks above. The next day he entered a wide valley (Khumileh), with many shrubs on each side and abundant inscriptions; he soon came to an open space and another valley, both containing an unusual number of Seyal trees; then to a side valley (Ibn Sukr) with good water; at about noon, to "a great sloping plain, several miles in breadth, covered with tufts of herbs, furnishing abundant pasturage in seasons when rain falls," where a part of the Tawarah Arabs were encamped; at three o'clock, to still another plain, with many shrubs; and at evening he procured good water at a spring near the encampment. From that point during the remainder of the approach to Sinai, he found no necessity to make any special provision for water, although it had

broad and full of trees," Burckhardt; "a glorious oasis" where "we reposed in grass as tall as ourselves," Tischendorf. — Kurtz's History of Old Covenant Vol. III. p. 189.

¹ Kurtz's History of the Old Covenant, Vol. III. p. 19.

been for two years a season of great drought in the peninsula.¹

Returning to the probable course of the Israelites, from the Encampment by the Red Sea, a shadeless march of twelve miles across the plain of Murkhah (the supposed "wilderness of Sin"), and most likely the exhaustion of their supplies would give rise to complaints and to the despondency which God thenceforth relieved by the supply of manna (Ex. xvi). The further stations on the way to Sinai are uncertain. If Dophkah be Seetzen's el-Tabbakkha in wady Mokatteb, and Alush be, as Bunsen thinks, wady Feiran,²—both which valleys invited their steps,—these marches were, for many miles, through a comparatively fertile region. The wady Feiran, especially, is a delightful region, according to the testimony of all travellers. It has a fertile soil, a perennial brook, abundance of trees, shrubs, and even flowers. Robinson says: "It is well watered, and has gardens of fruit and palm trees."³ Lepsius mentions it as "a fertile oasis, abounding in wood and water," where "we walked on soft black earth, obliged to defend ourselves with our arms from the overhanging leafy branches, and we heard singing birds warbling in the thick foliage."⁴ The wady es-Sheikh, the longest and broadest valley of the peninsula,—connected with a multitude of side valleys,—well watered for a considerable portion of the year, and containing many tracts of meadow land and a large number of tarfah-trees⁵ would then bring them to the plain of er-Rahah at the very foot of mount Sinai. Rephidim cannot be identified, but might have been some point in es-Sheikh. The plain of er-Raha, two and a half miles long, joined at right angles by the great wady es-Sheikh, and by numerous smaller valleys, lies directly in sight of Sinai, on the north, and so close to its abrupt wall that one can "touch" the mountain as he

¹ Researches, Vol. I pp. 120, 124.

² The name Alush is perhaps preserved in Wady Ösch, somewhat to the north.

³ Researches, Vol. I. p. 126.

⁴ Letters from Egypt, etc. (Bohn), p. 297.

⁵ Kurtz's History of the Old Covenant, Vol. III. p. 69

stands at its foot.¹ The whole situation so remarkably conforms to the requirements of the narrative, in regard to the encampment of Israel, as to be, in Stanley's view, a "strong argument, not merely of its identity with the scene, but of the scene itself having been described by an eye-witness."² The same impression was made on Robinson and Smith.³ The whole western side of mount St. Catherine "is covered, like the wadys, with tufts of herbs and shrubs, furnishing abundant pasturage for the flocks of Bedawin, as well as for the troops of gazelles and mountain goats which haunt these wild retreats."⁴ On the mountain sides and in the multitude of valleys, to any needful distance from the central encampment (like the modern Bedawin, see this *Journal*, Vol. XX. p. 661), the Israelites could find pasturage during their stay of several months. Here they could find acacia (shittim) wood for the tabernacle. By a three days' journey they could, if need be, hold communication with the mining region, while they had silver and gold, besides their flocks, with which to purchase whatever they could not have transported from Egypt.

It was on leaving Sinai that Moses requested Hobab to be their guide; a precaution justified by the present condition of the region, since this two or three days' travel is found by travellers the most toilsome and discouraging part of their journey.⁵ After crossing wady Murrah among the hills of drift-sand, it required all the skill of Robinson's guide to keep the road, while Burckhardt's lost the way.⁶ Hence the murmuring for more substantial food, and the "graves of lust" at Kibroth Hattaavah. Kadesh Barnea is perhaps not

¹ Robinson's *Researches*, Vol. I. pp. 131, 141. The peak es-Sufsafch. Kurtz, following Laborde, Tischendorf, and even Ritter, still contends for the traditional Jebel Musa as the place of law-giving, and the Wady Sebaych as the place of assemblage. But Stanley, with the arguments before him, on the spot, rejects it.

² *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 42.

³ *Researches*, Vol. I. pp. 130, 141.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁵ We admit at present Robinson's identification of Hazeroth with Huderah. If it be at el-Ain in Wady Salakah, the statement is equally true.

⁶ Robinson's *Researches*, Vol. I. 222.

to be sought, with Robinson, at Ain el-Weibeh, but, according to recent discoveries, in wady Muweilah (Moillahi), where the Arab name still remains,¹ and a copious spring gushes from the rocks. The immediate plain around is nine or ten miles long, by five or six miles wide. In the intermediate region Robinson enumerates seven springs of living water, known to run from the western mountain range into the valley el-Arabah;² and though crossing it *in a very dry season*, he constantly mentions the occurrence of dry water-courses, sometimes "full of herbs," and of trees, shrubs, grass, herbs, or vegetation in some form;³ besides learning from the Arabs that in rainy seasons grass springs up all over the desert. He learned the names of some ten Arab tribes now inhabiting the great western desert.⁴ Mr. Drew, who crossed the desert from a different direction (northwest from Nukhl) to the same point, gives a similar though stronger representation. He mentions successively, in his daily journal, "continuous vegetation"; "extensive spaces covered with vegetation"; "some acres under cultivation"; "a wady as fruitful and picturesque as Feiran, with grain growing on it, and birds singing"; "patches of ground under cultivation, and growing barley and oats"; and, further along, "extensive field enclosures." And of the whole region just north of where we incline to find Kadesh Barnea, he says, "the whole country was at one time evidently under cultivation."⁵

This last-mentioned region, it should be remembered, was the northern point of the Israelites' residence during the chief part of their exile — some thirty-eight years. Here, most likely, they spread themselves over the land, cultivating the soil and making the most of their situation. Their southern terminus was the head of the Arabian Gulf, where were

¹ So Knobel, Bunsen, Kurtz.

² Researches, p. 268.

³ Ibid., pp. 260, 261, 265 twice, 266, 267, 271, 274. He found the "desert" to cease many miles south of Kudes.

⁴ Ibid., p. 268.

⁵ Reply to Colenso, pp. 58, 59.

once the important cities Elath and Ezion-geber. Eastward, across the Arabah (Ghor), were the comparatively fertile lands of Edom and Moab. The whole northeastern portion of the wilderness rises from the general plateau into an elevated and even mountainous region, not only capable of cultivation, and in patches still cultivated by the Arabs, but exhibiting marks of still more extensive former cultivation, with ruins of habitations and even of cities. Did our limits permit, we could sustain this statement at large by extracts from Robinson's journal. But we must dismiss the subject in few words. Commencing at a point some fifty miles south of Beersheba, we find such entries as this: "our tent was pitched near a shallow watercourse, running off to wady el-Mayein, "full of herbs and shrubs, *like most of the wadys* we had passed, and affording fine pasture for camels." Three miles further, on a broad plain (wady Lussan) "were a few remains of rude walls and foundations, which we regarded at the time as marking only the site of a former Arab encampment. But from the many similar remains which we saw along the road, I am now inclined to suppose that they may have belonged to the substructions of Lysa." Then came an undulating, hilly country, and, some three miles from Lussan, the broad basin el-Muzeireah, which was full of herbs and vegetation, and seemed capable of tillage. Indeed, in several spots we saw traces of rude ploughing." Thence he ascended to the top of another long sloping ridge, where "vegetation continued quite to the summit," and camels were at pasture on the left. Then follow, during the same day, in rapid succession, "three broad and shallow watercourses, full of the shrub *retem*"; the Jaifeh very broad and full of pasture, with many spots in it tilled and sown; wady Retemat, a wide plain with shrubs and *retem*; another wady with many herbs, and at some distance beyond the eastern mountain, a large fountain with sweet running water (el-Ain); the well el-Birein, a little to the right of the way; the top of the pass (beyond wady Retemat) everywhere sprinkled with herbage, and opening on a large, gray-

elly plain thickly covered, in many parts, with shrubs and coarse herbage; after twenty minutes' travel on this plain, several pits of bluish, brackish water, dug a few feet in a bed of blue clay, surrounded by an abundance of coarse bulrushes and rank vegetation; a wide gravelly plain, thinly covered with shrubs and herbage, divided by the deep gully wady el-Ain, which was bordered with grass, daisies, and other small flowers; after crossing the watercourse, a broad tract of tolerably fertile soil, capable of tillage and apparently once tilled, and across the whole tract were "the remains of long ranges of stone walls, which probably once served as the division of cultivated fields, and which obviously were not constructed by the present race of inhabitants."¹ The next day the aspect of the country continued to improve rapidly. Many patches of wheat and barley were passed during the day; grass increased in the valleys, and herbs were sprinkled over the hills; the songs of many birds were heard; the country became more open, "with broad, arable valleys, separated by low, swelling hills"; and at length the view opened on "a boundless plain, or slightly undulating tract, towards the East, often sandy, but everywhere sprinkled with shrubs and herbs like a wady." A little further along, Robinson found the ruins of the ancient city Eboda, with its foundations of houses, hewn stones, limestone quarry, columns, entablatures, and remains of a fortress. Around these are abundant remains of walls, enclosing fields once cultivated; some of them evidently designed to regulate the distribution of water, being built of masonry, six or eight feet thick. Here, as Robinson remarks, was once a numerous population; "but the desert has reassumed its rights, the hand of cultivation has been driven back; the race that dwelt here have perished, and their works now look abroad, in loneliness and silence, over the mighty

¹ It is proper to add that Robinson calls this region on the whole "barren and desolate in the extreme," yet superior to what he had previously passed, and that there had been recent rains to start the vegetation. Still "long ranges of low stone walls" speak for themselves.

waste.”¹ This place is some twenty-five miles southwest of Beersheba; and the country beyond continues to improve in character.

Now this whole region must form part of the territory occupied by the Israelites during the chief part of the forty years. The sweeping charges of utter desolation are dissipated before a detail of facts. It thus appears that the wilderness might be traversed, and, in parts, made habitable by large bodies of men.

(4). It is a grave error to assume that the present condition of this region is a fair index of its capacity or its former productiveness. Men who know the difference between the Egypt, Nubia, Sogdiana, Greece, Palestine of ancient and of modern times, should require no admonition against such a rash assumption. One who has witnessed the drying of fountains produced by a diminution of the forests in any mountainous country, or who has seen how deeply the drifting sands of Egypt buried Memphis for centuries, out of sight and out of knowledge, will be slow to assert that the present condition of this peninsula indicates its state three thousand years ago; especially if we know that among the mountains there has actually been a great destruction of the forests, and that drifting sand-storms are perpetually blowing across the eastern and the western portions of the peninsula.

In the present instance, we have facts to sustain a reasonable supposition. Very considerable changes are known to have taken place throughout this whole region. There is, for example, no doubt that the gulf of Suez extended much further north; Dr. Robinson observed evident marks of a gradual filling up of this portion of the Red Sea.² Indeed, there are reasons, both historic and scientific, for believing that the gulf of Suez once extended north-west to the Bitter Lakes.³ Dr. Beke, of the Geographical Society, testifies to a

¹ The above statements are found in Robinson's *Researches*, Vol. I. pp. 272 - 284.

² *Researches*, Vol. I. p. 71.

³ Kurtz's *History of the Old Covenant*, Vol. II. p. 366. Stanley's *Sinai*, p. 66.

gradual change of the shore-line of the Red Sea, both on the African and the Arabian coast, and to the fact that the Persian Gulf is known to be becoming shallower and more limited in extent; and he believes that the geological changes of the region will be hereafter considered sufficient to affect materially the physical condition of the region.¹ The ancient harbor of Klysmā, near Suez, is now buried in sand. There was once a flourishing port, with large business connections at Abu Selimeh, on the eastern coast of the Red Sea, not far from the Israelites' second encampment; an important position, says Lepsius, long before the time of Moses.² At Surabit el-Khadim, twenty-five miles east of this point, in the interior, there are ruins of an ancient Egyptian colony, including a temple, excavations in the rock, blocks of stone covered with hieroglyphics, among which are the names of several Egyptian kings; while the region around contains remains of ancient mining operations and traces of smelting furnaces.³ Further along to the south-east, the wady Mokatteb is covered with thousands of ancient inscriptions; and its excavations, mine-shafts, and ruins also contain the names of Egyptian kings.⁴ These things, says Stanley, imply a degree of intercourse between Egypt and the peninsula, of which all other traces have long ceased.⁵ Similar inscriptions are found in a multitude of valleys between Suez and Sinai, extending to the very base of Sinai and covering the summit of Serbal. It is well known that from the fourth century for a considerable time there was an episcopal see in the region of Sinai, and the seat of the bishop was in the city of Pharan, in the present wady Feiran. Robinson recognizes it as an unquestionable fact that during that time a very considerable Christian population existed in the peninsula, and at the same time a

¹ Quoted in Dr. Cummings's "Moses Right," p. 135.

² Letters from Egypt, p. 305.

³ Ritter's *Erdkunde*, Vol. XIV. p. 793. Robinson's *Researches*, Vol. I. p. 113. Lepsius's *Letters*, pp. 301-302.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Stanley's *Sinai*, p. 289.

body of Saracens or Ishmaelites, numerous enough at length to overpower and expel them.¹ Meanwhile there is positive evidence that the acacia trees on the mountains have been, to a considerable extent, destroyed not only by natural influences, but by the charcoal trade of the peninsula.² Ritter reasonably maintains that there must have been a greater abundance of vegetation then.³ Indeed, we can trace, from time to time, minor changes, apparently for the worse. The palm-trees in wady Ghurundel have diminished between the visits of Laborde and of Stanley.⁴ At Ayoun Mousa Robinson found but seven wells (some of them lately recovered by digging in the sand) where, in 1810, Seetzen found seventeen, and there had formerly been twenty.⁵

When we pass beyond Sinai, we find that at the head of the gulf of Akaba, now desolate, once lay the port of Ezion-geber, with a commerce to Ophir; and Elath, which in Roman times was an emporium of trade to India, and for some centuries the seat of a Christian church with a bishop. In the northern part of the eastern end of the wilderness, Robinson found the ruins of some four ancient cities, stretching over a space some fifty miles south of Beersheba, viz. Lysa, an unknown city near wady Rubaibeh, Elusa, and Eboda,—the last three, cities of some considerable size and pretensions.⁶ At the same time the ruined cities of Edom, in the mountains east of the Arabah, and the remains and history of Petra (in the words of Stanley), “indicate a traffic and a population in these remote regions which now seems to us almost inconceivable.”⁷ Such are some of the indications which lead the great geographer Ritter to agree with Ewald that this peninsula “could support far more people than it

¹ Researches, Vol. I. pp. 188, 185.

² Stanley's Sinai, p. 27. So the “cedars of Lebanon,” which once covered that mountain, are now found only in one small hollow.

³ Erdkunde, Vol. XIV. p. 926.

⁴ Stanley, p. 29.

⁵ Kurtz, Vol. III. p. 16.

⁶ Robinson thinks that the ruins of Elusa might indicate a city of fifteen or twenty thousand. But a city of that size implies a surrounding population.

⁷ Stanley's Sinai, p. 28.

now does," and to assert that "from the small number of its present negligent population no certain conclusion can be drawn as to its former condition."¹

Such, on the one hand, are some of the unfounded assumptions, and such, on the other, are some of the facts concerning this region. It would be a pleasant task to follow the scripture narrative, and trace, so far as we can, its general conformity to the geographical situation of the whole region. But we must forbear.

It is important, however, to say a word of the conditions under which this march was performed. Those conditions, considered merely from a human point of view, were the most favorable that could be devised. The leader—the man who could frame in that age such a code of laws, and could devise means so profoundly to impress his institutions for ages on that Hebrew people—must have been a wonderful man. For forty years (Acts vii. 23) he acquired all the wisdom of a residence in the heart of the most organized nation of the old world. Then he became, by long residence, thoroughly familiar with the region of the march. It was previously settled, while he was living in the vicinity of Sinai, that he was to lead the nation by that very route (Ex. iii. 12). He was even there instructed as to some of the details of the plan (Ex. iii. 16–20), including the provision of certain costly articles of small bulk (gold, silver, and apparel, vs. 22) with which purchases could be made, if needful, on the way. In Egypt a definite point of departure was fixed; warning given of the final result, many weeks, perhaps months, beforehand, and the mind of the whole nation kept in anxious expectation, by a protracted struggle with the Egyptian power. All Israel was put in readiness for departure on a given night, by a solemn religious festival, previously arranged for, and including preparation for, instant departure; then on that night they went forth in orderly procession by their "hosts" (Ex. xii. 41, 51). They pursued, after leaving Egypt, the route over which Moses must twice

¹ *Erdkunde*, Vol. XIV. p. 927.

have travelled — once with this very expedition in his mind. The people themselves had been trained, in Egypt, to labor and hardship. As they neared Sinai, where they were to spend about a year, they were approaching a region where their leader had spent perhaps near forty years of his life (compare Acts vii. 23; Ex. vii. 7), — a region with an indefinite extent of pasturage in its valleys and on its mountain sides. Here was not only the needful time for legislation, but leisure for future arrangements. And when we actually find the great leader securing a guide from that point onward, sending forward the ark and its attendants to fix the place of encampment (Num. x.), sending spies from the wilderness of Paran as far as Hebron (Num. xiii. 22), making arrangements to buy food and drink of two different nations (Deut. ii. 29) and proposing the same thing to others (vs. 28), — we have no more reason to doubt the far-reaching foresight of his plans than of those of Hannibal or Napoleon.¹ We are also not to conceive of the people as traversing the peninsula in one compact body. But while Moses went with the tabernacle surrounded by the elders and formed a central encampment or head-quarters, the cattle with their attendants may have widely dispersed in search of pasturage, like a modern Arab tribe.² This view is sustained by the statements that the ark preceded the people to find a resting-place for them (Num. x. 33), that Amalek fell on the rear of the people (Deut. xxv. 18), and perhaps by the statement (Num. xi. 31) that the quails fell about the camp a day's journey each way. That the journey after leaving Sinai must have been for a time oppressive and discouraging, would appear from the aspect of the the country, and is distinctly declared in the narrative. Twice the people complained bitterly — at Taberah and

¹ Benisch argues that the pits (שִׁחָה) of Jer. ii. 6. were water reservoirs such as the Nabatheans dug in the desert (see Kalisch on Gen. xxv. 13), such as are occasionally found now in rocks, and such as seem to be more than once alluded to even in Palestine. We can only refer to his discussion (Colenso's Objections examined), p. 51.

² This is the view of Robinson, Kurtz, J. L. Porter, Dr. Benisch, Mr. Drew.

Kibroth Hattaavah — and only the terrific judgments of God quelled their murmurings. But when they reached the north-eastern portion of the wilderness, it may be safely assumed that they would spread over the comparatively arable country, and would, with the supernatural aid still continued to them, find a tolerable subsistence.

Now it has been truly remarked by Mr. Drew, that “we find a correspondence absolutely perfect between the details of the narrative and the respective localities of the peninsula to which they are assigned. Those stages of the journey where the people are represented as suffering and exhausted in their enterprise, and consequently as desirous to abandon it, are even now recognized as just the distressing stages in a route which, through a considerable portion of it, would not entail upon them excessive fatigue, or involve them in unbearable privations. When the history alludes to supernatural help, it represents the people as being then in a position where such helps would evidently be required for such a multitude.”¹

In view of this accuracy of the narrative, so far as it can be traced; of all the testimony to be gathered from the Bible concerning the occupancy of that region; of the known and established facts relating to its present and former condition, taken in connection with similar changes in other once fertile countries; and of the circumstances of the journey *as represented in the narrative*, — including the Divine superintendence, — we have no hesitation in declaring the objection to be unsustained.

We cannot better close this branch of the subject than with the words of Bunsen, who, while boldly rejecting all the supernatural from the narrative, is therefore the more likely to be heard when he, with equal boldness, declares the objection to be null and void. He grants that in the present condition of the peninsula the transaction would be an impossibility. “But wherefore? Because for thousands of years nature has pursued the work of destruction unhin-

¹ Drew's Examination, p. 47.

dered, washing away the productive soil by great torrents of rain, and filling up the rivulets with earth and sand; while a careful husbandry might, by easy methods, create a paradise almost everywhere in this land. Terraces protect cultivated places on the declivities; canals prevent the formation of bogs; artificial ponds, in high enclosed valleys, secure the means of artificial irrigation. In this manner was Fayoum a paradise; so South Arabia, in the old kingdom of Himjar. Both are now desolate. Is therefore the history of Lake Moeris and the description by Strabo and Herodotus of the inexpressible prosperity of that Egyptian tract a fable; or the account of the blooming kingdom of Lokman in Arabia a fiction? Certainly not for our time, in which the remains of both establishments have been brought to light. But the Sinaitic peninsula contained Egyptian colonies already, fifteen hundred years before Moses; he found there comfort and civilization. Nor must we forget the antiquity of commerce on the water and by caravans. Abu Selimeh on the Red Sea was an excellent harbor; Lepsius has set forth the importance of this place in connexion with the journey of the Israelites. Ezion-geber, also, was a half-way station for caravans and for the naval trade for the Arabian world. There was easy intercourse with the opposite coast of Arabia on the Aelanitic Gulf. The Israelites went out not poor, as is shown by many allusions to the jewels they carried. Moreover their herds were an inexhaustible treasure, both for sustenance and for traffic. Finally, we forget that a nation so vigorous, so accustomed to heat and toil, knew how to help themselves. They cannot create water where it is not, but they can make pure well-water out of a boggy pool. In short, we have only to free ourselves from the unthinking habits of the common belief in miracles, in order to grasp with our hands *the groundlessness of the objections of a shallow criticism.*"¹

(iv.) It is asserted that the Pentateuch contains "notices

¹ Bunsen's Bibelwerk, II. Abtheilung, I. Theil, p. 163.

historical, geographical, archaeological, and explanatory, implying a post-Mosaic time and writer."

On this portion of the subject three things are noteworthy: first, the exceedingly small number of passages that can be forced into the service; second, the singular and inconsistent pertinacity with which the objectors refuse to make any allowance for possible changes, in the course of centuries, by accidental corruption or intentional revision; and, third, the slight occasion which is found by the advocates of Moses to suppose a change of text,—the Rabbins admitting some eighteen interpolations; Jahn, ten or twelve; Witsius, four; Hengstenberg, apparently none.

In our judgment, the strenuousness with which Hengstenberg rejects the idea of solving any difficulty on the ground of a possible or probable change of text is uncalled for; and the resistance made to it by such writers as Davidson and Colenso is inconsistent alike with all the antecedent probabilities of the case and with well-known facts in the history of the New Testament text. In the case of the New Testament, the recovery of early manuscripts enables us to *prove* these things; while in the Old Testament, unfortunately, we cannot to any great extent go back of the Masoretic recension. Such minor additions and alterations in the lapse of time are intrinsically probable. They might take place by the error of transcribers, or by the incorporation of a marginal note into the text.¹ Even the critics are sometimes obliged to assume such changes in order to sustain their objections; as when Thenius would arbitrarily change רָצַח (2 Sam. xxiv. 6 דָּבַח רָצַח) into לָרֵשׁ, and Gesenius and others, on the sole guidance of the Vulgate, into רָצַח. They might be intentionally introduced by authorized persons, as changes required for understanding the text, or for the completeness of the narrative. One such addition is the account of Mo-

¹ Thus Davidson supposes such a process in Isa. vii. 17 (Bib. Criticism, Vol. I. p. 68), while in the New Testament, e.g. John v. 4 and part of 3 are generally regarded, on manuscript grounds, as interpolations. See a discussion of the subject of changes of text in Davidson's work just cited.

ses's death. That such completions of the narrative should have been made is an entirely admissible supposition, in view of the facts : (1) that writings so ancient would require it; (2) that there continued to exist till the close of the canon, a class of men like Samuel and Ezra, claiming and admitted to stand on the same plane of inspired authority with the original writer. It is rendered a *probable* supposition, *first* by actual statements in the scriptures concerning Ezra and his work. He is pointedly described as not only "the scribe" (Neh. viii. 1, 4; xii. 26); he is "the scribe, even the scribe of the words of the commandments of the Lord and of his statutes to Israel" (Ez. vii. 11), "a scribe of the law of the God of heaven" (vs. 12, 21), "a ready scribe in the law of Moses" (vs. 6); he "had prepared his heart to seek the law of the Lord and to do it, and to teach in Israel statutes and judgments" (vs. 10); the royal decree recognized his function "to teach the laws of his God to them that know them not" (vs. 25); and he most diligently read *and explained* to the people "the book of the law of Moses," day after day (Neh. viii. 1-5, 8, 18). These are weighty as well as trustworthy statements.¹ Concurrent with these statements, *secondly*, is the Rabbinic tradition (invested, as usual, with marvellous circumstances), declaring his eminent services in furnishing a corrected edition of the scriptures.² While we cannot, with the great body of the Christian Fathers, accept all the embellishments, neither are we called upon to doubt the historic foundation, of the tradition. Even Dr. Davidson could say, in 1853, "nor is the historic basis of the view that Ezra bore a leading part in collecting and revising the sacred books shaken by the fabulous circumstances in the writings of the early Fathers, in passages of the Talmud, and in later Jewish authors."³ Winer also declares it to be "entirely supposable that such a man performed many services for

¹ See Lord Herve's Article on Ezra in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible.

² See references in Winer's Realwörterbuch.

³ Davidson's Biblical Criticism, Vol. I. p. 103.

religious restoration and civil regulation, of which the written tradition gives no account.”¹ And Stuart well says, in speaking of him and his associates: “All Rabbinic antiquity takes for granted that in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah there was a select body of men in Judea who were named the Great Synagogue, and who had much to do with arranging the Jewish scriptures, making provision for their circulation, and furnishing the best text to be had.”²

While therefore we shall have but slight occasion to resort to the supposition of any changes of the text, we will not, in every instance, be debarred from availing ourselves of a supposed occurrence, which is not only probable in the nature of the case, but almost inevitable in fact, which is authorized by the general statements of scripture, and by the special deliverances of antiquity, and which finds reasonable support in the individual instances.

Here, however, let us insist upon a right apprehension of the issue and the argument. Our position is simply this: an *attested* fact of authorship being encountered by certain difficulties, we meet those difficulties with an explanation warranted both by general principles and by special grounds. This being the case, it is entirely unworthy in Dr. Davidson to say of such an explanation, “it is a mere hypothesis framed to evade the difficulty lying in the way of an assumed authorship.”³ The authorship is not “assumed,” but sustained by testimony, all on one side; the mode of explanation is not “*mere* hypothesis,” but is countenanced by general probabilities and justified in individual applications. The method of reasoning is strictly judicial.

We proceed to the passages alleged in proof of a later composition. Gen. xii. 6: “And the Canaanite was then in the land”; xiii. 7: “And the Canaanite and the Perizzite then dwelled in the land.” These words, says Davidson, obviously imply that when the writer lived they had

¹ Winer's Realwörterbuch, I. p. 349.

² Stuart on the Old Testament, p. 82.

³ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 6.

been expelled. But (1), as Kalisch shows, they never were entirely extirpated, and therefore no Hebrew writer could, at any period of the commonwealth, speak of their occupancy as a by-gone epoch (see 1 Kings ix. 20, 21; Ez. ix. 1). (2). Even if we lay a special emphasis on the word *then*, it does not necessitate supplying the ellipsis "though not now"; it may equally well imply "though not at some previous date," or "though it was not to continue," or, simply and absolutely, it may chronicle a fact which gave significance to the faith of Abraham. (3). We have before us three explanations, either of which removes all difficulty from Gen. xii. 6: (a) Knobel's,—that not the whole Canaanitish people, but the single tribe of that name, which in the time of Moses dwelt by the sea and on the Jordan, in the time of Abraham *still* dwelt in the land, in its very interior, at Sichem; (b) Kalisch's,—that the Canaanites *already* dwelt there, having migrated from the south; (c) Dēlitzsch's,—that the "then" contains no reference to the time of the narrator, but to a subsequent change involved in the promise (vs. 7) now made to Abraham. Substantially this last is Turner's view (so Gerlach, after Chrysostom), that the remark illustrates Abraham's faith, who believed that God would give that land to his posterity although the Canaanite was then (at that very time) in the land. This is, in our apprehension, the simple and correct explanation. In the other instance (Gen. xiii. 7), the remark is necessary to explain the full state of the case in the strife between the herdsmen of Lot and Abraham,—the insufficiency of pasturage, or (as some would say) the dangers of strife enhanced by the fact that then, at this same time, the Canaanite and Perizzite were still in the land. The simple, absolute emphasis is sufficient; though, if we must find a relative emphasis, we are as much at liberty to understand it *already* as *still*, which is virtually Davidson's interpretation. The passages must be given up.

"In Kirjath Arba; the same is Hebron" (Gen. xxiii. 2; xxxv, 27). The name Hebron is pronounced to be poste-

rior to Moses. "The place did not obtain it till Caleb, having got it into his possession after the division of the land, called it Hebron, after one of his sons."¹ The statement is wholly destitute of foundation. It nowhere appears that Caleb had a son Hebron² (see his children, 1 Chron. iv. 15). But we are referred to Josh. xiv. 15: "The name of Hebron before was Kirjath Arba; which Arba was a great man among the Anakims." We answer: Kirjath Arba was the name immediately, and perhaps for a long time, before, but not originally. Clearly it was not the name in Abraham's time, for the place was *not then occupied by the Anakim*, but by the Hittites, and is frequently designated by the name of its then occupant, — Mamre, the contemporary and ally of Abraham (Gen. xxiii. 19; xxxv. 27; comp. xiv. 13, 28). The name "Mamre," then, was older than Kirjath Arba, but itself not the original name, since we have no reason to understand that the place was first occupied by Abraham's contemporary, it being an old place, "built seven years before Zoan in Egypt" (Num. xiii. 12). The view of Hengstenberg is therefore highly probable and tenable. The ancient name of the city was Hebron. It was displaced partially or wholly by its Hittite lord, Mamre, and afterwards by the still more famous Arba, then deliberately and finally replaced at the conquest; hence, whenever the more recent names are given, the older and permanent one is added.³ Corroborative of this view is the fact that when

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 2.

² Dr. Davidson probably confounded Caleb the son of Hezron and brother of Jerahmeel with Caleb the son of Jephunneh. But Caleb the brother of Jerahmeel was the great-grandfather of Bezaleel, the builder of the tabernacle at Sinai. See 1 Chron. ii. 19, 20 and Ex. xxxi. 2. This, of course, settles the point, notwithstanding each Caleb had a daughter Achsa. Dr. Davidson also perhaps confounds Caleb the name of a place (1 Chron. ii. 42, 43) with a personal name. See Bertheau on this passage, who shows that the names in these verses (42–49) are of places, as in verse 21, 24, Gilead and Tekoa. Hebron, as a man's name, was at least one generation older than Moses (Ex. vi. 18).

³ Delitzsch remarks that since Caleb found the Anakim there, but in Abraham's time the Hittites, a branch of the Phenicians, were owners of the state, it must often have changed lords and names. Die Genesis, p. 424.

the place is first named (Gen. xiii. 18), and whenever in other places only one name is used (e. g. Num. xiii. 22), it is simply Hebron; but when either or both of the other names are employed, we have the explanatory addition, "the same is Hebron," — the unsettled and fluctuating appellations being referred to the fixed and true one. But says Dr. Davidson, the older name is not usually appended to the later, but the reverse. The remark is wholly superficial. It will depend on the object of the writer. If he, in designating a place, finds it necessary to employ the name by which it is now and has long been popularly known, but chooses also to remind his readers of the older and more suitable name, nothing is more natural. This objection fails in every particular.

The name Hormah (Num. xiv. 45) is alleged to be an anachronism. The place is again mentioned, ch. xxi. 1–3, and afterwards, Josh. xii. 44 and Judg. i. 17. It is claimed that the last passage narrates the first conquest and naming of the city Hormah, "doomed." But no fair-minded reader can fail to see that the first conquest and giving of the name are related in Num. xxi. 1–3. It was natural enough for the same writer in narrating the earlier encounter and defeat of Israel at that place to mention it by the significant and permanent name which it soon after earned and received. But, it is objected, a conquest is described in Judg. i. 17 (Davidson admits that the conquest of the *king*, Josh. xii. 14 is not a difficulty). The case is simple. Hormah lies in a mountainous and difficult region. The Israelites first attack (ch. xiv.) and are defeated. But on reaching Kadesh they overthrow it and name it Hormah. They afterwards leave the region, and a land so difficult to hold reverts to the surrounding tribes. Still later, Joshua smote the king (Josh. xii. 14) in his sweeping march from Kadesh to Gaza (Josh. x. 40–43). But the final, permanent occupancy was achieved by the tribes of Judah and Simeon after Joshua's death (Judg. i. 17), and the name Hormah, which *practically* had not displaced the old name Zephath, now became its settled appellation.

Gen. xxxvi. 31. "And these are the kings that reigned in the land of Edom before there reigned any king over Israel." This, it is said, could not have been written till after there had been a king in Israel. Certainly not, if there had been neither kings nor the firm and prominent *expectation of a great line of kings*. But this was the repeated promise to Abraham (Gen. xvii. 5, 6, 16) and Israel (xxxv. 11); and the promise is reiterated in the narrative, only eighteen verses before this enumeration of Edomitish kings. Now since the blessing of Jacob included his ascendancy over Esau and his posterity (ch. xxvii. 29, 40), what is there impossible or unnatural in the writer's calling attention to this striking development of Edom while Israel was still in his pupilage. "Wherefore," says Delitzsch, "can the writer not speak from the point of view of the promise which he has previously repeated (xxxv. 11)? That Israel was to be a kingdom under kings of its own race, was a hope handed down to the time of Moses, which the Egyptian sojourn was well fitted to nourish. How striking that Edom had become a monarchy earlier than Israel, that the outcast shoot should have attained its maturity, independence, and consistency earlier than the promised seed If we will scrutinize the remark a little, such are the thoughts that rise in the heart of the narrator." So Michaelis and others. Kalisch admits that if this idea was in the plan and composition of the writer, the words would cause no embarrassment, nor point to a time later than Moses. His admission is the more important, since he pronounces such a statement in a simple, historical style, "not only preposterous but impossible." The reader meanwhile is at liberty to judge for himself, whether — since that is the only difficulty — Moses was such a man as to make it "impossible" that he should have or record such a sentiment. The difficulty is but superficial, and disappears on a profounder appreciation; it has force only in proportion as we insist on the necessary shallowness of the writer and his book.¹

¹ It is proper to add that LeClerc, Kennicott, Graves, regard the whole passage, from verse 31 to verse 40, as an interpolation from 1 Chron. i. 43 – 54.

Gen. xl. 15. "For indeed I was taken away out of the land of the Hebrews." Says Davidson: the phrase "land of the Hebrews" presupposes its occupation by the Israelites; the expression is not "land of Canaan," as elsewhere. The objection skims only the surface again. The question is not what names are properly used under wholly different circumstances; but what appellation belongs in Joseph's mouth when speaking to an Egyptian. And this term is perfectly in keeping. The Egyptians do not appear to have known specially of the Canaanitish tribes, or of a common name for their land. But they had seen the man who was known as "Abram the Hebrew" (Gen. xiv. 13), "a mighty prince" in that land (xxiii. 6), a man who had been entertained and dismissed with honor by the Egyptian monarch, and who, with his posterity, occupied a powerful position in that land. They knew this people as "Hebrews" (Gen. xxix. 14; xli. 12, etc.), — a term which indeed Gesenius specifies as the name under which they were commonly known to foreign nations. In Joseph's mouth it was perfectly natural, if not inevitable, to call that land the land of the Hebrews.

Deut. xviii. 28. "That the land spue not you out also when ye defile it, as it spued out the nations which were before you." This language, it is said, presupposes the expulsion of the Canaanites as past. But neither a plain English reader nor a moderate Hebraist will have the slightest difficulty with it. The common reader knows that in such expressions as, "I will write a letter when I have taken a nap," the past tense, "have taken" is but a relative past and refers to an actual future," i.e. "shall have taken." The Hebraist knows that the Hebrew *has no other mode* of expressing a future perfect than by a simple preterite, which is explained by its being in a dependent clause. Thus in Isa. iv. 4, "shall have washed," is, in Hebrew, "have washed," or rather, "washed." So in this passage. Four verses previous God speaks of the nations "which I cast out [am to cast out] before you;" and then warns Israel against such conduct that the land shall spue thee out "as it spued,"

or more exactly, "will have spued out the nations before you." Occurring, as the language does, in an utterance expressly concerning the future, the objection scarcely calls for a reply.

In Ex. vi. 26, 27, the expression, "these are that Moses and Aaron to whom the Lord said," etc., is alleged to be such as would be used by a writer only concerning men who lived long before his time. But Kalisch has well shown the inherent fitness of the language: "With these words the narrative returns easily to vs. 13, where it was interrupted for the insertion of the genealogy of the legislator and his brother, the first pontifical dignitary. This is naturally done with a certain emphasis — these are that Moses and Aaron, etc. It is strange to observe that this passage and especially the pronouns *הם* and *הוא*, have been made to serve as proofs against the authenticity of the Pentateuch. But we need scarcely remind our readers that our text naturally points with some stress to Moses and Aaron, on whose account alone the genealogy had been inserted; and those words mean simply : this is the descent of Moses and Aaron who were now sent to Pharaoh ; and *they correspond precisely* with vs. 13 and 14, thus returning to the commencement of the parenthetical list, and indicating its conclusion."¹

Ex. xi. 3. "Moreover the man Moses was very great in the land of Egypt, in the eyes of Pharaoh's servants, and in the eyes of the people." This is said to be unsuitable in the mouth of Moses. How so? It is part of the actual historic reasons why the Egyptians freely imparted their jewels to the Israelites. The first reason was that "the Lord gave them favor in the eyes of the Egyptians," i.e. kindly disposed the latter; the second follows: "moreover, the man Moses was very great," etc., i.e. the Egyptians were impressed with a profound awe for the great leader. It was a reason that required to be given, because the grand *visible* reason. "With historical faithfulness and unaffected simplicity," says Kalisch, "Moses makes these remarks about his own

¹ Kalisch on Exodus, *in loco*.

person; they are historical facts; and he relates them with the same objective impartiality with which Xenophon speaks of himself in the *Anabasis*, or Caesar in his *Commentaries*.”¹

Num. xii. 3. “Now the man Moses was very meek, above all the men which were upon the face of the whole earth.” Such commendation of himself is pronounced impossible to have come from Moses. Two methods of reply have been adopted.² The first (of Calvin, Hengstenberg, Gerlach), that the statement of fact was important in the connection, as showing how God was self-moved to vindicate this meekest of men; and that a truly good man who had grace to record frankly his own defects, might by the same grace be enabled, without either Phariseeism or false modesty, to record also this trait of his character; as John calls himself the disciple whom Jesus loved, and as Paul holds up his own example to the Philippians (Phil. iii. 17), and calls the Thessalonians to witness to his blameless life (1 Thess. ii. 10). None but a Pharisee will deny the possibility. Other writers (Jahn, Rosenmüller, Kurtz), though admitting the possibility of the explanation, yet incline to view the statement as the comment of a later hand, because, (1) the connection is complete and even closer if the verse is omitted; (2) the declaration appears disproportionate to the occasion; (3) it has no close counterpart except Deut. xxxiv. 10, confessedly by a later hand; (4) the statement seems *more* natural and probable as the admiring comment of another person, especially in its sweeping extent: “meek above all the men which were upon the face of the earth.” We have no serious objection to this latter view.

The frequent formula, “unto this day,” is cited as indi-

¹ Dr. Davidson reasons in the following very peculiar mode. “It is the *recording* of the fact that Moses was a great man in Egypt which is unsuitable; not the fact itself. . . . So far from Moses’s greatness being an *additional* reason, it detracts from and irreverently spoils the one just given. Surely the fact that God gave the Israelites favor in the sight of their enemies renders any other reason at once unnecessary and derogatory to God Almighty.” [11]

² We set aside the translation “afflicted” for מַכָּה. The word invariably carries with it the idea of meekness, though also commonly implying affliction.

cating a lapse of time too great for the life-time of Moses. But the phrase is entirely indefinite and is applied even to a very brief period, as (Gen. xlviii. 15) to a portion of Jacob's life-time, and (Josh. vi. 25) to a still more limited portion of Rahab's life-time. Dr. Davidson says that the test must be applied with discrimination, and ventures to cite but one instance (Deut. iii. 14), a verse to which on other grounds, as will appear, we incline to concede a later origin. In other words, he admits that the phrase does not carry in itself proof of a late composition.

By a singular process of reasoning Dr. Davidson quotes the passages of which the writing is expressly ascribed to Moses (Ex. xxiv. 4; xxxiv. 27; xvii. 14), and in general the allusions "to Moses *as a writer*," to prove that not Moses but some "later person who used documents," composed the Pentateuch. In like manner the express statement, so frequent in the last of Exodus, "as God commanded Moses," is declared to show a time posterior to Moses for at least *the form* of those laws. But as these passages, and nearly every portion of Leviticus, are given in minute detail and exact phraseology as the very utterances which "the Lord spake unto Moses," it is impossible to stop here. If the testimony of the witness is good for anything, it is good to show that the whole book of Leviticus, for example, is an *exact* record of what was uttered to Moses, and therefore must by him have been recorded.

The capricious extent to which these arbitrary objections are carried, is seen in the statement that designations of Joshua as the minister of Moses (Ex. xxiv. 13), and as "his servant Joshua, the son of Nun, a young man," are not such as would have been written by Moses himself.¹

Two or three passages, however, offer objections of more weight. In Gen. xiv. 14 mention is made of a place named Dan. But the town Laish did not receive the name Dan till taken by the Danites (Josh. xix. 47; Judg. xviii. 29), after the death of Moses. Two replies are offered. Jahn, Hä-

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 12.

vernick, Keil, and Kalisch reply that there were two places of the name, and that this is the older place, bearing its name from a much earlier period. For this view it is urged: (1) That another Dan is expressly mentioned (Dan-Jaan) 2 Sam. xxiv. 7, a fact not to be set aside without changing the text. Hitzig here *cuts* the knot by arbitrarily changing דַּן to לַיִשׁ, and reading Dan Laish. Gesenius, Winer, and others would change דַּן to דָּנִי. The latter change has no support except the Vulgate rendering, "in Dana sylvestria;" and the designation is found nowhere else. Dr. Davidson conveniently takes no notice of the reading. (2) The other names of the chapter are very old names (some of them obsolete in the time of Moses), Bela, En-Mishpat, Siddim, Salem, Hazezon Tamar. (3) The chapter is remarkable for giving the older name and appending the modern, when there was a modern one, — Bela which is Zoar; Siddim which is the Salt Sea; En-Mishpat which is Kadesh; Shaveh which is the valley of the king; consequently his style would have been "Laish which is Dan," had he intended that place. Other considerations of less weight are adduced by Hävernick.¹ The other reply is, that, though there was but one city called Dan, its later and more famous name was substituted for the earlier and obscurer, either by the incorporation of a marginal reading, or by design. Various indications point to this conclusion: (1) The chapter itself, as a whole, with its ancient names and minute designation of persons and localities, bears marks of the highest antiquity — of having come down from a time when the facts were recent.² (2) The occurrence of this one modern name unexplained, in the midst of a narrative dealing so exclusively with ancient, and in part obsolete, names, while pointing somewhat clearly

¹ Hävernick's Introduction to the Pentateuch, p. 148 (Clark).

² Thus Ewald reckons it (Geschichte, i. 353) a relic of 'Patriarchal times. Tuch says, that but for this one word Dan "we might well-nigh believe we were dealing with a writer of the period previous to the Israelitish invasion" (Commentar *in loco*). Knobel (*in loco*) admits that the Jehovist must have drawn the account "from an older writing," and he assigns to it the first place in his so-called "war-book."

to the well-known Dan, is a phenomenon pointing also to another hand than that of the original writer; the more especially as *his* method was, in case of two names for the same place, to mention first the older and annex the later.¹

(3) Strong proof that some uncertainty or confusion must have existed as to this name in the manuscripts, is found in the fact that both the Samaritan Pentateuch and the Arabic version contain the reading "Banias" for Dan. (4) Add to this the facility with which a name that became so famous as the northern boundary ("from Dan to Beersheba") would supersede a name wholly obscure; and we reach a conclusion which apparently solves all the phenomena of the case, that the text originally contained an obscure and older name, perhaps Laish, and that after the name was superseded, the new and noted name took its place in the manuscripts. This is the view of Ewald.² We assent to it. We certainly cannot be reproached for assuming a change of text by the men who, on much slenderer foundation, in order to make good their own objection are obliged to assume a change of text in 2 Sam. xxiv. 7.

Ex. xvi. 35, 36. "And the children of Israel did eat manna forty years, until they came to a land inhabited; they did eat manna until they came into the borders of the land of Canaan. Now an omer is the tenth part of an ephah." As Moses was dead before the manna ceased, it is argued that he did not write the first of these verses; and that the explanation in the second corresponds to the idea of a later origin. Hengstenberg replies, that the evident intention is not to mark the time of the cessation, which fact is stated in Josh. v. 11, 12, but the length of its continuance. It was not a transient benefit to meet a sudden emergency, but was continued during the whole exile, from the first to the fortieth year, when they reached the borders of their future inherit-

¹ If with Tuch we take these explanatory additions as the glosses of a later hand, we are still forced to the position that the original writing which used the old names, Bela, etc., *only*, could not have contained the name Dan.

² Ewald's Geschichte, Vol. I. p. 73.

ance. The reply has force. And yet (1) the very definite specification of coming into the borders of Canaan, (2) the appended definition of an omer, and (3) the distinct parenthetical character of the verses, together with the anticipatory nature of the first, make us willing to view them as additional statements by a later hand, such as in the New Testament we find in John v. 4, and part of vs. 3.

Similar passages occur in Deut. ii. and iii. In ch. ii. 12, after relating how the Edomites expelled the Horims and occupied their land, the speaker adds, "as Israel did unto the land of his possession." Rosenmüller maintains truly that the passage may be translated "as Israel does," i. e. is in process of doing, and that we need not suppose a later hand than Moses. But we find (1) that this passage is omitted in one Hebrew manuscript and in the Samaritan version; (2) that vs. 10–12 interrupt a direct speech, by a circuitous and apparently unnecessary detail of *outside* history, and (3) that they change in style from the first to the third person. Therefore we incline, with Jahn and many others, to regard them as an explanatory addition by a later hand. For the same reasons (except the first), and in part for additional considerations, we regard certain similar explanations in the same discourse (viz. ii. 20–23; iii. 9–11 and perhaps 14) as later explanations, though Hengstenberg argues vigorously to the contrary. Dr. Davidson inadvertently helps us with the true remark that "they are parentheses, which break the continuity of the composition."

To the above objections may be added certain others brought forward by Dr. Colenso, not always of his origination.

The bishop of Natal demurs to the possibility of Moses's knowing and describing so well the location of mounts Ebal and Gerizim (Deut. xi. 29, 30). But, to take no higher view, the monuments of Egypt exhibit abundant warlike intercourse of Egypt with Syria and other countries of Asia;¹ the history of Abraham and of Jacob and his family shows that peaceful

¹ Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*, Vol. I. p. 394 seq.

communication was easy; and the narrative (Gen. xxxvii. 25 seq.) reveals apparently a regular traffic from Gilead to Egypt, passing not far from Shechem (xxxvii. 14, 17, 28), consequently in the neighborhood of these very mountains.

Dr. Colenso objects that the name Gilgal, in the same passage (Deut. xi. 29, 30), was not given till the people had been circumcised after entering the land. An instance of unpardonable recklessness. Almost any recent authority would have informed him that besides the "Gilgal" near Jericho (named as he describes), there was one and probably two other places of that name in Palestine: one at the modern Jiljuleh near the ancient Antipatris,¹ and another at Jiljilia, some twelve miles south of these mountains, probably the one here intended.² The mistake is the more inexcusable, that the locality described in the passage contradicts it.

Colenso alleges as anachronisms the expression "shekel of the sanctuary" (שֶׁקֶל הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, Ex. xxx. 13; xxxviii. 24, 25, 26). "This," he says, "is before there was any sanctuary; the story, therefore, could not have been written by Moses, or by one of his age. This is clearly an oversight."³ It was clearly an oversight in the bishop not to look into Gesenius's Thesaurus, and find the phrase there translated "sacred shekel," in accordance with the predominant use of the word שֶׁקֶל. The phrase, so understood, might be used either (1) to distinguish some special kind of currency (an undepreciated from a depreciated is Benisch's suggestion, sustained, as he conjectures, by Gen. xxiii. 16), at the same time defining the shekel as twenty gerahs; or (2) more probably, since the tabernacle service was now about to be established (ch. xl.), this is simply the institution and settlement of the sacred shekel for the tabernacle tax, defining it as twenty gerahs.

¹ Robinson's Researches, Vol. III. 47; Winer's Realwörterbuch, and Kitto's Cyclop., Article Gilgal; Knobel *in loco*; Gesenius's Thesaurus, Supplement, p. 79; Keil on Josh. ix. 6.

² Winer's Realwörterbuch, p. 430. Keil on 2 Kings, ii. 1. Knobel supposes it to be Jiljuleh.

³ Colenso on the Pentateuch, Part II. pp. 86, 87.

The frequent occurrence of the word נָבִיא (prophet) in the Pentateuch, is alleged against the early origin of the book, on the strength of the statement 1 Sam. ix. 9. "Beforetime in Israel, when a man went to inquire of God, thus he spake, Come and let us go to the seer; for he that is now called a prophet (נָבִיא) was beforetime called a seer (רֹאֶה)." It is proper to remark in passing, that the passage in Samuel is itself viewed as evidently a marginal note or later addition. See Thenius on the passage. Accepting it, however, as a correct statement of fact, it is fully explained by Le Clerc's suggestion: The word was used in the time of Moses, went into disuse in the time of the judges, then was revived again. The word "beforetime" has ample range in the time of the judges preceding Samuel, and the state of the case is fully set forth in 1 Sam. iii. 1, "The word of the Lord was precious in those days, there was no open vision." Hence, as the fact of full prophecy, so the proper word prophet, had gone into disuse, being for the time displaced by the more limited term seer.

Num. xv. 32. "And while the children of Israel were in the wilderness, they found a man that gathered sticks on the Sabbath-day." This, says Colenso, would seem to have been written when they were no longer in the wilderness. Very likely. They reached the wilderness (of Paran, xii. 16; xiv. 16) only after leaving Hazeroth (xii. 16), and certainly had left it when they entered the borders of Edom (xxxiii. 37), if not before.

These passages comprise, we believe, all, or nearly all, the alleged anachronisms. The reader will probably be surprised to find so great pretences dwindling into so slight performances. Some of these allegations are gross oversights in the objectors; others, pertinacious refusals to admit a natural and familiar principle of interpretation, or to allow scope or depth to the writer; some half-a-dozen — it is surprising that they are so few in a volume of such antiquity¹

¹ Some amount of change in texts transmitted by copying must be considered as unavoidable. The changes that the most valued individual manuscripts may

—are best (though not necessarily) explained by supposing some slight variations of the text, which are indicated by the connected circumstances. We apprehend that no respectable judicial body, in full possession of the facts, would allow these allegations a moment's weight against the clear testimony.

(v.) There are said to be indications in the *Pentateuch* that the writer lived in Palestine. The instances cited are few and feeble. The term "westward" (מִמָּזְרִית, literally, "seaward"), often occurring (Gen. xii. 8; xxviii. 14, etc.), could have been used, it is said, only by a writer in Palestine, where the Mediterranean Sea was west. But Gesenius lays it down as a settled fact that the *home* of the Hebrew was Canaan. "It was substantially the language spoken by the Canaanitish or Phenician races, who inhabited Palestine before the immigration of Abraham and his descendants, by whom it was transplanted into Egypt and again brought back with them to Canaan."¹ The word, therefore, was simply the old, settled term of the Hebrew language, retaining its conventional meaning wherever the speaker lived, just as a multitude of words in all languages retain their settled force when all the circumstances of their origin have passed away.

The same is true, very likely, of the word קָדְרִים, east-wind, spoken of (Gen. xli. 6) as a blasting wind. This wind, it is said, though a parching wind in Palestine, is not so in Egypt. Kalisch, however, declares that a burning east wind, likely to blast the corn about Heliopolis, blows from the desert of Shur and the desert of Paran, and that it causes all vegetables to wither. Or the term may have a secondary meaning, designating a blasting wind from any quarter. Dr. Robinson says that the Arabs called the terrible wind which he encountered south of Beersheba an "east-wind" (shurkiyeh), though it blew from the south.²

undergo are seen in the manifold corrections and alterations of the Alexandrian and Vatican manuscripts. Let us remember the fate of Shakspeare.

¹ Hebrew Grammar, Introduction, § 2, 2.

² *Researches*, Vol. I. p. 305, compare 287. The Septuagint renders νότος in Gen. xli. 6.

The expression "within thy gates" (Ex. xx. 10; Deut. v. 14), is said by Davidson to be inapplicable in the desert. But in both instances the expression occurs in the decalogue, or permanent fundamental law of the people, and is a phrase of conventional meaning. The word is broad enough to apply to city, temple, palace, or *camp* (Ex. xxxii. 26, 27), though not employed of individual houses or tents.¹

Deut. xix. 14. "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's landmark, which they of old time have set in thine inheritance which thou shalt inherit in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." It is asserted that the allusion to the old landmark presupposes a long abode in the promised land. But is anything more simple? The lawgiver is legislating for the long future. He takes his point of view by anticipation, as the last part of the verse shows ("in thine inheritance which thou shalt inherit"), in the land they were to enter, and prohibits the removal of the landmarks which the fathers of the nation would have set for the whole course of the nation's history. The criticism which would preclude him from speaking thus of the old landmarks which they of old time had set, because it was not yet done, should go further, and preclude him from speaking of any landmarks at all, for none had yet been placed for Israel.

Ex. xxii. 29. "Thou shalt not delay to offer the first of thy ripe fruits." Dr. Davidson, emphasizing the word "delay," says, that as this is the first recorded legislation on the subject, and is merely an injunction not to delay it, the command supposes the offering to be in existence, and hence was written after the settlement in the land. This is small criticism. The expression evidently means "promptly offer thy first ripe fruits,"—i. e. at once on their ripening. It is possible that the form of the command is modified by the fact that the Israelites were already familiar with the idea of offering the *first* to God in case of the offspring of animals and men (xiii. 2); indeed, they may have been familiar with the idea of offering first-fruits; for, as Winer shows, the practice is

¹ Gesenius's Thesaurus, מִצְעָר.

well known among heathen nations, and existed in ancient Egypt.¹

It is objected by the same writer that the command (Ex. xxiii. 19), "The first-fruits of thy land thou shalt bring into the house of the Lord thy God," presupposes the existence of the Tabernacle in Palestine. How can a writer make such a declaration, when he finds the command embedded in the summary directions for the permanent establishment of the three great festivals, when the way is prepared for it by the direction just before (vs. 17), that three times a year all males shall appear before the Lord, and when the immediate sequel (ch. xxv.) contains detailed directions for the structure of the very tabernacle here briefly alluded to?

The same author quotes Leviticus xxvi. 34, 35, 43, in which it is said concerning the sabbatical years and the captivity: "then shall the land rest and enjoy her sabbaths because it did not rest when ye dwelt upon it." This, it is said, must have been written after actual disregard of the sabbatical and jubilee years. But the most careless reader will observe that it is the sequel of a full and stringent legislation on the whole subject (ch. xxv.), establishing the institution; and is part of a long and solemn injunction to observe these ordinances and "keep my sabbaths" (xxvi. 2). The lawgiver first sets forth the blessed rewards of obedience, then draws out in detail the punishments which shall follow the consequence of *future* disobedience, or, as he phrases it, because the land did not rest [will not have rested] in your sabbaths, when ye dwelt [will have dwelt] upon it. This is the whole case, and it hardly calls for notice, except to show what straws men will throw into the scale. Every passage in the Hebrew Bible that contains an utterance concerning the future and the relative past of that future, can be treated in the same manner.

To these passages of Dr. Davidson the bishop of Natal adds the phrase "beyond Jordan," as used in Gen. i. 11;

¹ Diodorus Siculus, I. 14. See fuller references in Winer's Realwörterbuch, Article "Erstlinge."

Deut. i. 1, 5. He alleges that as Moses was approaching the Jordan from the west, the phrase in his mouth should designate the western side of the river, and not the eastern; hence Moses did not write it. The sufficient reply is found in his quotation from Bleek containing the objection,—“that the above formula was a *standing* designation for the country east of the Jordan, which might be used in this sense without regard to the position of the writer. So it is often employed in later times.” It is like Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul. So Gesenius. Bleek, however, would abate the force of the admission by saying that most probably the phrase first formed itself among the Hebrews after the settlement in Canaan. But the land was occupied, its modes of speech settled, and this great landmark there before the time of Abraham. Something more than a conjecture or supposed probability, therefore, is necessary to give any weight to the objection.¹

The attempts to find evidence that the Pentateuch was composed in Palestine, certainly make a very feeble show.

(vi.) It is further asserted that certain “legendary and traditional elements” of the narrative, “involving insuperable difficulties and inconsistencies,” show that Moses could not have been the author of it. Here we meet, mainly in the form of quotation from Professor Norton,² the statements, which Dr. Colenso has repeated at third hand, concerning the mustering and marching of two millions of people, “in a single night,” and the difficulties of life in the wilderness.

But Dr. Davidson’s closing remarks on this head are

¹ A fuller statement of the case would add that the phrase is sometimes used from a writer’s position and that the same writer (especially Joshua) fluctuates. In Joshua its prevailing usage is as a geographical term, east of the Jordan (i. 14, 15; ix. 10; xiv. 3; xvii. 5) in the first of which cases he appends “eastward,” as if to define the true meaning of the phrase. In three instances he uses it from his point of view to designate the western side (v. 1; xii. 7; xxii. 7), but avoids misapprehension in each case by adding *יַמְּוָה*, westward; so that the settled geographical meaning, when used without explanation in Joshua, is, from the outset, east of Jordan.

² Davidson’s Introduction, Vol. I. p. 100.

deeply significant, as showing his fundamental objection to any record of the supernatural. "Indeed, it is only necessary to examine the history, as it lies before us, to find in it a mythological, traditional, and exaggerated element, forbidding the literal acceptance of the whole. The character of Pharaoh under the circumstances detailed; the ten miraculous plagues, which spared the Israelites while they fell upon the Egyptians; the dogmatic mode in which it is narrated how Moses and Aaron presented themselves before Pharaoh; and the crowd of extraordinary interpositions of Jehovah on behalf of the people as they journeyed through the wilderness, show the influence of the later traditions on the narrative in dressing it out with fabulous traits. The laws of nature are unchangeable. God does not directly and suddenly interfere with them on behalf of his creatures; neither does he so palpably or constantly intermeddle with men's little concerns. The entire history is cast in the mould of a post-Mosaic age, unconscious of critical consistency, and investing ancestral times with undue importance."

Here we have, perhaps, the gist of the whole difficulty. Evidence can weigh little with one who determines that "*the laws of nature are unchangeable*," and that "God does not directly and suddenly interfere with them on behalf of his creatures." The remark cuts wide and deep; it sweeps alike the time of Moses and of Christ.

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE III.

THE AUTHOR OF THE APOCALYPSE.

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(Continued from No. 82, page 347.)

II. INTERNAL ARGUMENT.

1. *Proof that John the Apostle was the Author of the Apocalypse from Declarations in the Book itself.*

The author of the book repeatedly indicates that his name is *John* (i. 1, 4, 9; xxii. 8).

This has been adduced as an objection to the authorship of John the evangelist, since he nowhere gives his name in the Gospel and Epistles. But there was in them no occasion to name himself specifically. The authors of neither of the Gospels deem it necessary to make themselves conspicuous. But if a vision is seen or a revelation made, the one to whom the revelation is made or by whom the vision is seen is naturally designated. So it was with the Hebrew prophets: "The vision of Isaiah the son of Amoz"; "the word that Isaiah the son of Amoz saw"; "the word that came unto Jeremiah from the Lord"; "a vision appeared unto me, even unto me, Daniel"; and so times almost without number, in the different prophets. Here the designation is, "to his servant John," merely indicating his relation to the Saviour in his exaltation, just as in the Gospel he calls himself, in relation to his intercourse with the Saviour on earth, "the disciple whom Jesus loved," the one "who leaned on Jesus's bosom." The immediate designation in the first verse is, as Hengstenberg well says, not of John as apostle, but as prophet, and yet "we are conducted indirectly to the apostleship, since revelations of such high importance as those contained here were not given beyond the limits of the apostleship, and could not have been given, without shaking the foundation of the apostolic dignity."¹

¹ Hengstenberg's Commentary, I. 1, xviii. 20, and Vol. II. 391.

The fact that no other designation is given with the name John, both in verse first and fourth, is a strong argument in favor of the apostolic authorship. There may have been others in the region who had the same name with the apostle; but there certainly was no one who was generally known. That "shadow of a man," called John the presbyter or elder, is plainly cast from the designation of "elder," given by John to himself in his second and third epistles, and deepened and endued with life by the wrong interpretation of a passage of Papias by Eusebius,¹ and an obscure tradition hunted up by Dionysius to give some consistency to his denial of apostolical authority to the Revelation. It is little less than absurd to suppose that a man who should be chosen as a depository of such revelations as are given in the Apocalypse, or was capable of composing a work so elevated and unique in its character, and who intended to be known and to speak with authority, should leave no trace of his existence which subsequent ages could with the minutest examination lay hold of. We can see no alternative, from the manner in which the name "John" is employed, between supposing John the evangelist to be the author, and some impostor who wished to give the sanction of the apostle to his own work.

It was, as Hengstenberg says, directly in the region of the seven churches, "that the apostle John had a diocese," and "he seems to be writing as to his seven churches," beginning with Ephesus, where, according to tradition, "he had his seat."² Thus Neander says: "All the ancient traditions, which may be traced back to his [John's] immediate disciples, agree in stating that Lesser Asia was the scene of his labors to the end of the first century, and Ephesus its central point."³ How, then, could another in honesty designate himself as John, simply, when he must have been aware that he would be confounded with the well-known John, the apostle? If

¹ See Hengstenberg's Commentary, Vol. II. 403 sq.

² Comm., Vol. II. 390, 391.

³ Planting and Training of the Christian Church, Bk. V., where many particulars illustrating his influence there are given.

we should find a classical work prefaced by "*I, Cicero*, thus write," we should not doubt whether the words of the great Roman orator, or those of his brother Quintus, or his son Marcus,¹ were intended to be designated. In the case before us, there must be a far greater difference between the apostle and any other John of the time, than between Cicero and his brother or son; so that some more specific designation would unavoidably be necessary to prevent confusion.

Verse ninth of ch. i. also points directly to the apostle as author: "I John, who also am your brother and companion in tribulation was in the isle that is called Patmos, for the word of God, and for the testimony of Jesus Christ." The incidental information here that the author of the Apocalypse was in banishment to Patmos on account of persecution for his faithfulness in his Christian labors, applies most naturally to the apostle. "According to a widely spread ancient tradition, the apostle John was banished to the island of Patmos, in the Aegean sea, by one of the emperors who was hostile to the Christians, but which of them is not ascertained."² And again, Neander says: "Certainly we cannot refuse to believe the unanimous tradition of the Asiatic churches in the second century, that the apostle John, as a teacher of these churches had to suffer on account of the faith; for which reason he is distinguished as a martyr in the epistle of Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus." The circumstance that the church at Ephesus was first addressed, too, is most natural when we consider the relation of John to it, as the centre of his circle of influence. And the whole superscription of these epistles, and indeed their contents, indicate so plainly definite knowledge of the peculiarities and circumstances of each, and confidence in the writer's per-

¹ Thus Twells, in *Vindic. Apoc.*, says: "So that Cicero did this or that, or declared so and so to his readers, it is manifest who would be meant. We should at once understand that it was the oration of that well-known Cicero, and not Quintus Cicero his brother, or Marcus his son."

² Neander's *Planting and Training*, Bk. V. See also Tertull. *Praescript.*, c. 36; Clemens, c. 42; Orig. I. xvi. in Matt. § 6; Irenaeus, V. 30.

sonal influence, that while they fall pertinently and gracefully from the lips of John, the bishop of the region, they could scarcely belong to any other.

The name "John" seems to be repeated near the close of the Revelation (xxii. 8), from the feeling that there was a strangeness and importance in these communications which required the special confirmation of a witness of known character. The influence of the things seen and heard are also here given, to show that they are not a human device, but such as caused the author of the book to fall down and worship before the feet of the angel who made the revelation. Thus "a trustworthy man, a tried organ of divine communications, John, whom Jesus loved, expressly assures us that he has not spoken of his own, but only what he has heard and received."¹ So Bengel says: "John had placed his name in the title of his book, in the superscription to the seven churches, and at the beginning of his narrative. And now at the close, he names himself still again, so that we might perfectly know that he, namely the apostle John, had written this credible testimony of the future coming of Jesus Christ."

The similarity of this passage with the subscription near the end of the Gospel of John should not escape notice. In John xxi. 24, after designating himself as the disciple whom Jesus loved, and referring to the same remarks of our Lord concerning him, the author says: "This is the disciple which testifieth of these things, and wrote these things [*οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μαθητὴς ὁ μαρτυρῶν περὶ τούτων καὶ γράψας ταῦτα*], and we know that his testimony is true." The words in the Apocalypse differ only so far as the nature of the two works require difference: *καὶ γὰρ Ἰωάννης ὁ ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων ταῦτα*. The witnessing (*μαρτυρῶν*) properly belongs to the Gospel, while the hearing (*ἀκούων*) and seeing (*βλέπων*) characterize the revelations and visions of the Apocalypse.

While some find an argument against the Apocalypse from the mentioning the name of the writer, others claim that he should have added the designation of "apostle." If

¹ Hengstenberg, Comm. on xxii. 8.

any other person had written this book and wished to pass it off as the work of the apostle, he would perhaps have blundered into such a designation. But it would not, in all probability, occur to John, known as he was in the whole region for which his book was immediately intended, that he could be mistaken for another. There is in the omission of any descriptive appellation, a decided indication that the author could be no obscure person, whose name alone would have carried no weight with it to his readers. "*The John of Asia Minor* was the only man of that day and that region who was honestly entitled to write in this manner." It is scarcely necessary to add, in the words of another: "History knows of no other John, of that time and district, who held an important position in the church; nor could any one possibly exist, who did not stand far below the apostle, and who would not have reckoned it necessary to designate himself more particularly, to prevent his being confounded with the other."

Chapter xviii. 20, "Rejoice over her Heaven, and ye saints and apostles," etc., is sometimes referred to as implying that John could not be the writer, since the apostles are spoken of as being already in heaven. But it is plain that the apostles are spoken of as a class, just as saints and prophets are; and there is no more reason for supposing that this implies that the apostles had all gone to their rest, than that the saints all had. Besides, in the opinion of these objectors, the Apocalypse must have been written before John's death, and those words, if inapposite in the mouth of the apostle, would have been equally so in that of another.

Chapter xxi. 14 has also been referred to by Ewald and others as inconsistent with the modesty of John. It is only necessary in confutation to refer to such passages as Ephes. ii. 20: "Built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner stone," and Matt. xix. 28, "where the twelve apostles appear as the heads of the church in regeneration, which is all one with the new Jerusalem." It would certainly indicate a self-consciousness, which we should not expect in the Apostle

John, to hesitate in giving utterance to that part of the vision which pertained to the apostolic labors and influence in the establishment of the church, based, as it was, upon previous utterances of inspired men.

The Alleged Difference in the General Characteristics of the Apocalypse and other Writings of John.

We have seen that the authority of the early Fathers is almost entirely in favor of the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse, and that the declarations in the book itself most naturally and indisputably point to John the evangelist as author. It would seem that we need not delay long upon the more direct internal argument, for nothing that was not distinct and palpable could annul that derived from these two sources of proof. Upon no part of the sacred volume, not even upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, has so much been written which is irrelevant and utterly without foundation as upon the Apocalypse. The Gospel of John, with perhaps his first Epistle, is taken by many as the representative of his whole being, culture, and development. Anything in the Apocalypse which falls without this is taken as proof of diversity of authorship. The author of the tranquil, loving, thoughtful, simple record of the character, life, and sayings of the Master on whose bosom he was wont to recline, is not capable of portraying the more general and objective relations of that Master, as "Prince of peace," and in subduing the world to himself, casting the arch-deceiver with his minions into the lake of fire and brimstone, and preparing for all the faithful a city which has no need of the sun or the moon to shine in it, for the glory of God and the Lamb is the light thereof! The writer who in a time of peace sits down under the secret guidance of the Holy Spirit to the composition of a simple narrative, where the selection of materials and their arrangement is left, in a measure at least, to his individual choice, will, forsooth, write in the same tone and spirit as when, in the midst of a fiery persecution, in banishment he is selected

as the medium of communication from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ, of the most important events that relate to the struggles, conflicts, and final victory of Christianity on this earth. It is nothing, that the heaven and the bottomless pit are opened to his vision; that he is brought into the presence of him who sat upon that throne in heaven out of which proceeded lightnings and thunders, and in the midst of which and the beasts and the elders that surrounded it, stood the Lamb, as having been slain; that he hears the voice of many angels round about the throne, whose number is "ten thousand times ten thousand and thousands of thousands, saying with a loud voice, 'Worthy is the Lamb that was slain'"; that he sees the stars of heaven fall to the earth, and the heavens depart, as a scroll when it is rolled together, and every mountain and island moved out of their places. It is nothing, that, in the midst of these exciting scenes, which no other eye has seen and lived, being in the spirit, he was told that he must disclose these visions and "prophecy before many peoples and nations and tongues and kings." Because in such circumstances he adopts a higher strain, and speaks what is given him to say in more confident tones; because instead of the style of simple, unpretending narrative he adopts that fitted to prophecy, and even imitates in some measure those Hebrew prophets who preceded him and wrote on somewhat similar themes, — the author of the Apocalypse cannot forsooth be the author of the fourth Gospel. A man is not himself, but another, because he adapts himself to his position; because God chose him, and qualified him by large measures of his Spirit, and by mysterious communications, and revelations of his plans for all the future ages of man. Not so are we accustomed to limit the powers of the gifted of our race; not so should we circumscribe the power of the Most High.

We cannot deem it of importance to dwell long upon the differences between the Apocalypse and Gospel and Epistles of John, which are of a general character, and which naturally, if not necessarily, result from the different themes

treated of, and the different objects to be attained. It is objected by Baur, Lücke, and others, for example, that the Apocalypse is *external* in its character, while the Gospel is *internal*.¹ How could it be otherwise? The object of the Apocalypse, as is now generally acknowledged, is to portray the struggles and final triumph of the kingdom of Christ on the earth, and its consummation in future blessedness. For the attainment of this great general object in a space that could well be incorporated with, and form the completion of, the sacred oracles, certain symbols or pictures were employed, by which whole series of events, extending through many years and over many lands, were characterized. These symbols were mainly objects addressed to the external

¹ We cannot deem it a matter of much importance, as far as the authorship of the Apocalypse is concerned, that it is more artificial in its structure than the Gospel of John; and yet it may not be amiss to give Hengstenberg's remarks upon this point: "The actual plan of the Apocalypse agrees so exactly with that of the Gospel, that we are thereby alone led to think of the identity of the author. The Gospel, like the Apocalypse, consists of an introduction (ch. i. 1-18), a main body, the close of which at the end of chap. xx., has often been mistaken for the end of the whole, and the conclusion (ch. xxi.). The main body in the Gospel, as in the Apocalypse, has two chief parts, the second beginning with chap. xiii. 1, as in the Apocalypse with ch. xii. 'The main body, further, in the Gospel, as in the Apocalypse, falls into a series of groups, the existence of which is generally recognized, though the firm establishment of them has not been attended to by expositors as it should have been. It is found on close examination that the seven number of the groups in the Apocalypse returns also here, divided by the four and three, as there by the three and the four. These divisions also in the Apocalypse alternate with each other. Of the four groups of the first part of the main body, the first, in chap. i. 19 - ii. 11, contains the beginning of Christ's ministry in Perea and Galilee, according to the order intimated in the prophecy of Isa. viii. 23, 'the region of the sea beyond Jordan, Galilee of the Gentiles,' which Matthew takes for his starting-point, and which required John also to lay the commencement of our Lord's operations in the same region. The second, chap. ii. 12 - iv. 54, begins at Capernaum and closes also there; the third, in chap. v. 1 - vi. 71, the fourth, in chap. vii. 1 - xii. 50, contain the three festal visits of Jesus to Jerusalem and what was connected with them. Of the three groups of the second part, the first, chap. xiii. 1 - xvii. 26, represents how Jesus loved his own to the end; the second chap. xviii. 19, describes the sufferings, death, and burial of Jesus; the third or seventh of the whole, chap. xx., gives an account of the resurrection. Artless simplicity — that is here, as in the Apocalypse, the character of the arrangement." Vol. II. 458, 459.

senses, and were representatives of events and persons in objective relations. The representation here begins at a time subsequent to the occurrence of the events recorded in the Gospel. The subjective relation of the life, teachings, and death of Christ to the individual soul naturally is made somewhat prominent in the Gospel; but in the Apocalypse Christ has ascended the mediatorial throne, and hence, although, in reference to his atoning sacrifice, he is repeatedly represented as the Lamb that was slain, his theocratic dominion is made prominent. He rides forth in his conquering chariot, with the name King of kings and Lord of lords upon his vesture, subduing his enemies, thwarting the designs of the adversaries of his kingdom, comforting and encouraging his faithful followers, by giving them a place around his throne, where "they shall live and reign with him," where "they shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more, neither shall the sun light on them nor^d any heat. For the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes."

Although, from the object of the Apocalypse, the representation is external or objective, and while there is much that is internal and subjective in the Gospel and Epistles, yet it is surprising how many points of contact there are between them, even in this particular. The appearing of Christ in the Gospel is often in a spiritual sense, as in xiv. 18: "I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you;" and in vs. 23: "If a man love me, my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." So in the Apocalypse, iii. 20: "If any man hear my voice, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me." "I come," has been called the "watchword of the Revelation." In ii. 5: "Repent, else I will come quickly;" verse 25: "Hold fast till I come;" iii. 11: "I come quickly," also xxii. 7, 12, 20. This external coming has its parallels in the Gospel. In John xxi. 22

Christ replies to the question of Peter in reference to John : " If I will that he tarry *till I come*, what is that to thee ? " etc. Even Lücke says upon this passage : " In what sense Jesus said, ' Till I come,' we can best learn from Rev. ii. 5, 16 ; iii. 11 ; xxii. 7 ; etc. In xiv. 3, it is said also : " If I go away and prepare a place for you, *I will come* again, and receive you unto myself," etc. Compare also 1 John ii. 28.

The external victories of Christ and the church are very prominent in the Apocalypse. It could not be otherwise. It was written in a time of persecution from outward enemies, and for the consolation of those who in all ages should be subject to peril and suffering from hostile secular powers. Still, there is something of the same kind in the Gospel. John xvi. 33 : " In the world ye shall have tribulation ; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world," contains the fundamental idea that is developed at length and in detail in the Apocalypse.¹ In the first Epistle, ii. 18 : " Little children, it is the last time ; and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists ; whereby we know that it is the last time ; " external enemies are plainly brought into account.

In the Gospel, spiritual enemies are the conspicuous objects in the foreground. In the Apocalypse, too (chap. xiv. 1 - 5), the hundred and forty-four thousand are represented as having overcome spiritual enemies. In xxi. 8, 27, it is those who are subject to evil passions and habits that are excluded from the New Jerusalem, and are the subjects of the second death. Compare also xxii. 15, and the epistles to the seven churches throughout.

As external enemies, so a visible recompense comes specially into the account in the Apocalypse. In this it agrees with the whole tenor both of the Old and New Testament. John's Gospel is not an exception here, although nothing called forth a special development of this doctrine. In v. 14, disease is represented as coming in consequence

¹ See Hengstenberg, Vol. II. 468, 469.

of sin: "Sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee," i.e. worse than the impotence of which he had been cured. So death is the result of sin. For in viii. 21, 24, "Ye shall die in your sins," implies "that the sins which lead into death are, at the same time, to be regarded as the *cause* of death," as "appears from a comparison of the Old Testament phraseology that lies at the foundation."

The Apocalypse is distinguished from all the other books of the New Testament by its symbolic, dark, and mystical character. But the Gospel and Epistles of John have more of these same characteristics than any other of these books except the Apocalypse. The dipping of the sop and giving it to Judas (xiii. 26); the symbolical character of the act of healing the blind man, as announced by Jesus himself (ix. 39); the washing of the disciples' feet (xiii. 5); the occasional complaint made, according to the relations of John, that the sayings of Christ were dark (vi. 60); the frequent misunderstanding of them (viii. 27; x. 6; xiv. 5; xvi. 18); the designations of Christ as "the light of the world," the "bread of life," "the water of life," "the good shepherd," "the wine," etc., are examples of these peculiarities.

It has been objected to the Johannean authorship of the Apocalypse that there is an air of severity and sharpness in it that is not found in the Gospel and Epistles of John. There is not the same affectionateness in the mode of address of the seven Epistles as in the acknowledged Epistles of John. Such designations as "My children," and "Beloved," are entirely wanting. Those who make this objection seem to forget that John is not only "in the Spirit," but that these Epistles contain not his own words, strictly speaking, but those of him at the view of whose glory and majesty the seer falls as dead (i. 17). Could we expect that he who is "the first and the last;" "who holdeth the seven stars in his right hand;" "who hath the sharp sword with two edges;" "eyes like a flame of fire;" and "the seven spirits of God," would adopt a familiar and commonplace form of address, or a tender and brotherly strain of

exhortation or rebuke ? In such a number of Epistles, designed merely as introduction to what was to follow, what reason or propriety would there be in "a circular sort of movement," or a repetition or expression of any fundamental thought ? We should expect (whoever penned these epistles) that the admonition in them would be pointed and authoritative ; the rebukes decided and without softening epithets ; the encouragement dignified and with something of majesty in it ; the whole style of expression vivid, direct, without circumlocution, strong, sharp, and almost bald, as we find it to be. Is there anything in the acknowledged writings of John, or in his character, inconsistent with this ? Those who contend that there is, must forget or have overlooked the "fiery, enegetic, decided" temperament of that apostle, who wished to call down fire from heaven upon a village of the Samaritans because they did not pay suitable respect to his Master (Luke xix. 52).

Do not the same characteristics also appear in the Gospel ? Schultze says : "We cannot fail also, from the polemical spirit that appears in nearly all the discourses of Jesus preserved in John's Gospel, and from the reproaches which Jesus continually casts on the Jews, to draw unfavorable conclusions regarding the weakness of the historian, especially as in John, other persons speak in similarly bitter and polemical tone."¹ Kaestlin also says : "The contrast in which John places Christianity to the two other religions of his day is much sharper and more decided than in the other writers of the New Testament. With him Christianity alone is 'the truth,' as opposed to 'lies ;' it is 'the life,' out of which there is nothing but 'death ;' 'the light,' which is surrounded on every hand with 'darkness.' Everything with John falls into two opposite spheres : the one of which contains whatever is divine, the other whatever is the reverse."² The very nature and design of the Apocalypse would naturally bring out more sharply and sternly the

¹ Der Schriftst. des Joh., p. 328.

² Schultze, p. 40 ; quoted by Hengstenberg, Vol. II. 480.

contrasts between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of Satan ; and yet in the second Epistle, verse 10, it is easy to recognize the same spirit, where it is said : “ If there come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed.” So that Hengstenberg is not wrong when he affirms that “ the decision which is shown in rejecting everything which does not carry on its front the seal of Christ, and sets itself up against him, is a bond that unites most clearly the Gospel and Epistles of John to the Apocalypse.”¹ This very appearance of severity is a result of the strong attachment of John to the Saviour, and his cause which he had so heartily adopted.

The Manner of quoting from the Old Testament in the Apocalypse.

The manner of quoting from other authors may, in some cases, be a proof of identity or diversity of authorship. In the Apocalypse and acknowledged works of John there is nothing absolutely decisive on this point,—nothing, certainly, which is at variance with the supposition that they are from the same hand. We are aware that it has been confidently asserted that in the omission of ὅτι before quotations from the Old Testament, the author of the Apocalypse differs from John. But a close examination shows that this objection cannot be relied upon. In the first place, although the allusions to the Old Testament are very frequent, so much so as to give a Hebraic tinge to the style, yet a direct, *formal* quotation is never made. And then, when the words of the Old Testament are introduced, they appear to come from a mind fully imbued with those writings, and seem not to be sought after, but to be introduced from the suggestion of the occasion. Indeed the whole idea of the book, as composed from the dictation, if we may so say, of Christ, and under the excitement of such unusual and soul-stirring inspiration, is opposed to formal quotation. Only a bungling counter-

¹ Comm., Vol II. 481.

feiter would introduce anything of the kind, to any extent, in a writing of the character of the Apocalypse.

But this is not all. The citations are so manifestly from memory, that commentators cannot determine whether the Septuagint¹ or the Hebrew text is the basis of the quotations; and yet the Apocalypse, with all its peculiarities, scarcely differs more than the Epistle of John, in the manner of quotation, from the fourth Gospel. Furthermore, there are very few cases (not more than ten or twelve, Stuart says) where the *ὅτι* could have been introduced appropriately, and John's Gospel has a large number of instances of its omission.²

There is, however, one passage quoted in the Apocalypse and John's Gospel quite indicative of the same hand. John alone (in Gos. xix. 34-37) gives an account of the piercing of our Saviour's side with a spear, and quotes from Zech. xii. 10: "They shall look on him *whom they pierced*." The author of the Apocalypse quotes from the same passage (i. 7): "Every eye shall see him, and *they also who pierced him*." What is specially noticeable here is, that both in the Gospel and Apocalypse the same word is employed (Gos. εἰς ὃν ἐξεκέντησαν; Apoc., αὐτὸν ἐξεκέντησαν), while the Septuagint translators, probably from a mistake in a letter of the Hebrew word, use the verb *κατωχρήσαντο*.

Peculiarities of Style in the Apocalypse.

In no part of the argument have the opposers of the authenticity of the Apocalypse exerted themselves so much as in that which relates to the style of the work. Here so much is uncertain, so much depends upon the taste or mental peculiarities of the writer, so much upon previously formed opinions, that there is much room for discussion. And yet a suitable regard for the peculiarities of the circumstances of the writer, the object to be attained by the book,

¹ Davidson says that he usually follows the Septuagint version. "But," he says, "the writer has not always adopted its very words. He departs from it, or changes it, after the manner of John in the Gospel and of other New Testament writers."

² See Stuart, Vol I. § 21, p. 339.

and the manner of the presentation of the different points of the revelation to the writer, independently of any forethought or plan on his part, cast entirely out of the account, with a candid critic, a large share of what has been so confidently brought forward under this head.

1. The irregularity of style, the *anacolutha*, the abruptness, the want of accurate finish in the Apocalypse, about which so much has been written, are easily and naturally to be accounted for from the exciting, varied, changing, irresistibly moving scenes through which the writer passed: now in heaven, now on the earth, now in the world of torment; at one time on the land, in the wilderness, in the great city, and at another in view of the sea and death and hell giving up their dead; amidst war, pestilence, famine; before the throne of God and the Lamb, and dazzled by the splendors of the New Jerusalem, which had no need of sun or moon to give it light, since God and the Lamb were the light of it. How could a writer amid such scenes, and with the destinies of the myriads of all future time before him, write in a calm, regular, correct style? Ought we not to expect abrupt transitions, irregular and broken constructions, and at the same time a fervor, a glow, even a sublimity of style, which would be inappropriate in a calm narrative, or in a letter written in the moments of repose and quiet. Poetry, not in form perhaps, but in substance, must be the result of such circumstances as those in which the author of the Apocalypse wrote, especially if he had the keen susceptibilities of the apostle John.

All the irregularities of poetry too, except those that result from measure and rhythm, are to be expected in such a composition. It assumes a higher tone, makes use of rare words, and those of a concrete rather than abstract nature; loves sonorous but short sentences, which seem to burst out, rather than flow, from the overcharged breast. We should not expect personal peculiarities to appear conspicuously. While in some respects the circumstances would give peculiar activity of mind, yet there is truth in the remark

that "his mind was passive rather than active. It *received* impressions." "Ideas were presented to him in a peculiar manner, and he had little more to do than record them as they were presented. He heard words, and he had to write them." It would be manifestly unjust to apply rigidly the ordinary rules of composition to anything written as the Apocalypse was.

The mind of John, we should suppose, was reflective, rather than highly imaginative. Still no one would doubt that it "would be wrought up to the highest pitch of enthusiastic excitement by the awful grandeur of the visions he was privileged to behold. Besides, who can doubt that the Spirit of God exerted an overmastering influence on the instrument it had chosen for its revelations? The author's "own reflection shrank back into its feebleness, oppressed by the greatness of the task. Overawed by the sublimity of the scenes to be delineated it withdrew, giving place to the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. Hence an abruptness and a vehemence are observable in the manner. Brevity and energy are strongly impressed upon the diction. The circumstances and time allowed no room for rounded periods or polished sentences. The dramatic action proceeds with rapid fervor, and the mind of the writer in high excitement is hurried along by the progress of events, hastening towards a catastrophe. The heavenly beings introduced as speaking, have no space for long dialogue, while the coming of Christ is at hand."¹

Still there is a basis in the writings of John for just such a style as that of the Apocalypse, influenced by the attending circumstances. There is nothing of the dialectic, conservative, logical connection of argumentation, so common in the writings of Paul; but simplicity and *vividness* strongly characterize it. So Steinhofer says of the first Epistle: "We find in this epistle clear, full words (*voces fragmentes*), since each word not only contains the whole matter in itself, but also suits the manifold circumstances that may occur in

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. III. 588.

connection with it. As, for example, when it is said: He that is of God abides in God. They are sayings of such a kind as immediately awaken suitable feelings, and produce a living impression and spiritual sense of the matter,"¹ etc. "In this connection," says Hengstenberg, "let us only think of 'the Lamb;' of 'the Lion of the tribe of Judah;' of 'the Word;' 'but I have somewhat against thee, that thou hast left thy first love;' of the Laodiceans being neither cold nor hot, but lukewarm; of the charge: 'Hold fast what thou hast, that no man take thy crown;' or of his standing before the door and knocking, and supping with those who let him in."

2. The Hebraistic character of the style of the Apocalypse has been adduced as an objection to the authorship of John. In the first place, many of the peculiarities which have been charged to the imitation of the Hebrew, both by the advocates and opponents of the Johannean origin, are purely rhetorical, and are accounted for by the remarks under the preceding head of irregularities of construction. Then the Gospel of John is not entirely free from Hebraisms. Thus Hengstenberg says, that "in the Gospel of John there are not wanting points of contact with the Hebraistic character of the Apocalypse." "The Evangelist's predilection for the Hebrew language is indicated by his using so many Hebrew words with an appended interpretation."² Thiersch also says: "It is not to be overlooked that in the Gospel of John, the introduction, especially in its earlier part, exhibits with perfect clearness, in the structure of the sentences, in the parallelism of the members, and the position of the words, the rhythm of the Old Testament hymns."³ There is, indeed, enough of Hebrew coloring to occasion some to pronounce it strongly Hebraic, and to suppose that it was written in Aramaic, the Hebrew of that age. Still there is plainly no good ground for this supposition; and we cannot, if we would, deny that

¹ Quoted by Hengstenberg, Vol. II. 479.

² Apoc., Vol. II. 445.

³ Newtestam. Krit., p. 72.

the Apocalypse is more allied in style to Hebrew, and more nearly related in contents to the Hebrew prophets, than any other book of the New Testament.

What produces this Hebrew coloring? In the first place, it is a book of prophecy, and the only one of the New Testament. This would naturally, of itself, give it some similarity in style. Then the native language of John was the Aramaic; his education was in that language, and his early religion that of the Hebrews; and it is by no means certain that he learned Greek before he went to Ephesus, where that language was much spoken. Then, tradition as well as other reasons, make the fourth Gospel of a later date than the Apocalypse; and John, from his longer residence in Asia Minor, would here necessarily have obtained a more easy and flowing style.

John, too, would doubtless be far more familiar with the Hebrew poetic style than with the Greek; and when he was brought into circumstances which required a poetic diction, he would naturally fall somewhat into that with which he was most familiar, although writing in another language.

But another circumstance seems to me to have had far more influence in giving a Hebrew tinge to the style, since the author indicates, in various expressions, that he does not use a Hebraic style from ignorance of Greek or inability to write correctly in that language.¹ It was a time of the persecution of Christians, and John was in banishment for his adherence to the Christian faith (i. 9). He would naturally, in such circumstances, turn his attention to the promises of the Old Testament in reference to the oppressions of the people of God and the hope of deliverance. This led him, doubtless, to a close study of the later prophets, such as

¹ Lücke, p. 363, says that the author of the Apocalypse "shows himself very dexterous in his way, and perfectly free from the rawness of a beginner"; and Winer maintains that the solecisms of the Apocalypse should be explained by the critics, as they can be, and not attributed to the ignorance of the author, who, "in other and much more difficult turns, shows that he knew well enough the rules of grammar."

Daniel, Ezekiel, and Zechariah; and it is not unnatural to suppose that this study was a part of the preliminary training that rendered him a fit medium for the revelation which God wished to make to the children of men. This would, it seems to us, be a sufficient explanation of the Hebraistic style of the Apocalypse, if there were no other. And this, taken with the preceding considerations, seems to warrant the strong language which Hengstenberg uses, when he says: "It is difficult to understand how any one can still argue from them [the Hebraisms of the Apocalypse] that the author of it must have been different from the author of the Gospel. No one can do this in good faith, excepting he who makes his own mental weakness, incompetence, and monotony the measure for others."¹

Words found in the other Writings of John and not in the Apocalypse, and the reverse.

Some words found in John's other writings do not appear in the Apocalypse; and, on the other hand, some words in the Apocalypse are wanting in the Gospel and Epistles. It may be said of many of those enumerated, that they are not specially characteristic of the style of John, and are used in other books of the New Testament. An author cannot, of course, expect to use all the same words in a simple narrative and in a prophetic writing, where works in another language are in some degree imitated, and where the style is highly poetic. Besides, "the range of the Gospel and Epistles is wider than that of the Apocalypse." There is a far greater variety of ideas in them, while in the Apocalypse the ideas were peculiar, especially as compared with the rest of the New Testament. Hence we should expect different words and phrases.

¹ We could hardly, however, put the stress that Hengstenberg does upon the fact that the writer is said to be "in the Spirit," as if the Hebraisms were directly inspired, "a necessary result of the author's being in the Spirit." He says also, "A pure Greek gospel, a pure Greek apostolical epistle, is inconceivable. The canonical and the Hebrew are most intimately connected." Comm., Vol. II. 443, 444.

It is said by Ewald and others that the particles *πάντοτε*, *πώποτε*, *οὐδέποτε*, *οὐδέπω*, are not found in the Apocalypse, although they appear in the other writings of John. We should not expect so many connective particles or so much variety in them in a work consisting of separate visions, communicated often in disconnected sentences. But, furthermore, these particles can none of them be considered as in any way characteristic of John's writings. *Πάντοτε* is oftener used by Paul than John, who indeed never uses it in his Epistles, and but six or seven times in the Gospel. He had no occasion to use it in the Apocalypse, and it accordingly does not appear there. Of *πώποτε* it is sufficient to say that it is used but once in the Epistles of John, and four times in the Gospel, and that the Apocalypse does not deal in negative clauses like those in which this particle is found. *Οὐδέποτε* is used just once by John in Gospel vii. 46. *Οὐδέπω* is used three times only by John, and he had no further occasion for it.

Καθώς is frequent in the Gospel and Epistles, but not found in the Apocalypse. So it is frequent in the Romans and in the Corinthians, and not found at all, or rarely, in several of Paul's other epistles. Besides, we should expect the shorter form *ὥς* in the concise, *abrupt* style appropriate to the Apocalypse.

ὥς, as a particle of time, is not found in the Apocalypse, but often in the Gospel. It is not, however, in the Epistles of John, and is found in some of Paul's epistles, and not in others.

The particles of reasoning and consecutive narrative, such as *οὖν*, *ἄρα*, *μέν*, *τέ*, *γάρ*, *ἀλλὰ*, *ἵνα*, are naturally either sparingly used, or not used at all, in the Apocalypse. The simple connective *καί* is frequent when little attention would be given, in the excitement of the inspiration, to niceties and unnecessary discrimination in the use of connecting words. Besides, in respect to many of these words, "the peculiarity is only a higher degree of that which is also met with in the other writings of John."

Some difference is found in the use of *verbs of sight*, in John's Gospel and Epistles and in the Apocalypse; but no more than we might expect the same writer to exhibit in so different kinds of writing. The verb βλέπω is found sixteen times in the Gospel, about the same number of times in the Apocalypse, but not at all in the first Epistle. Ὀράω is quite frequently used in the Gospel, but almost always (once ἑώραν) in the Perfect, ἑώρακα, while it is used but three times in the Apocalypse. It need hardly be suggested how inappropriate the form in the Gospel would be to designate things seen in vision, where the objects pass before the eyes and are gone. The Aorist εἶδον is the exactly appropriate word, and is found far oftener than any other verb of sight in all the writings of John. But it is said, "that θεάομαι and θεώρεω are favorite words with John," while the former is not found in the Apocalypse, and the latter but twice. θεάομαι occurs ⁸ten times (not often enough to prove it a very favorite word), and θεώρεω nearly twice as often. But the meaning of these words, especially the former, as used elsewhere by John, — to look at carefully, to inspect, — would not find place in the Apocalypse.

Πιστεύειν is very frequent in the Gospel, used about one hundred times, but never in the Apocalypse; for the simple reason that the plan of the Apocalypse did not include a discussion of subjective faith, as a means of attaining to eternal life, so often brought to view in the Gospel. On the other hand, faith (πίστις), as denoting a more objective or general relation, is found, naturally, four times in the Apocalypse, and never in the Gospel. We cannot accede to the view of Hengstenberg, that the word πιστεύειν is avoided in the Apocalypse because it is so often used by John in the Gospel, and by other writers of the New Testament, in order, in a prophetic work, "to shun the characteristic peculiarities of his own customary dialect," or the current phraseology of the age. We do not believe the Apocalypse was composed with any such nice balancings of what

was befitting the character of the book ; but that such language was employed as was suggested by the peculiar character of the book and the circumstances of the author.

It has been objected that composite words are less used in the Apocalypse than in John ; but Professor Stuart, after a careful examination, finds that the preponderance is rather in favor of the Apocalypse than the Gospel.¹

Οικουμένη is used in the Apocalypse, but not in the other writings of John. So it is used in the Epistle to the Romans, and not elsewhere in Paul's writings, except the Hebrews. Is that Epistle therefore spurious ? In the three places where it is found, it seems more appropriate than the common *κόσμος*, found so often in the Gospel and twice in the Apocalypse. In iii. 10 and xii. 9 it is put for the inhabitants of the earth, and from its derivation is naturally used ; and in xvi. 14, with *ὅλης*, it is more apposite than *κόσμος*. Besides, it is the usual word in the LXX. for עֲוֵלָה, and hence might naturally be employed in the Hebraistic style of the Apocalypse.²

Παντοκράτωρ is used eight or nine times in the Apocalypse, and only once besides (in 2 Corinthians) in the New Testament, and always with *ὁ Θεός* or *κύριος ὁ Θεός*. It is parallel with the Hebrew אֱלֹהֵי עֲצָמוֹת, or אֱלֹהֵי שִׁדְיֵי, but not probably an imitation. The strongest word was required to express the power and majesty of God, and none more suitable could be found. With a similar desire for emphatic, full-toned designations, characteristic of prophetic style, Christ is designated as " Prince of the kings of the earth," the " Beginning of the creation of God," etc.

ὑπομονή occurs several times in the Apocalypse, but not in the other writings of John. The simple reason is, that *endurance*, *patience* under suffering, is prominent in the Apocalypse, but not in the Gospel and Epistles of John. The word is used several times by Paul, when he has occasion to give expression to the same idea. For the same

¹ See words enumerated in his Commentary, Vol. I. 385.

² See Stuart and Davidson.

reason we find ἔχειν τὴν μαρτυρίαν (vi. 9; xii. 17; xix. 10) in the Apocalypse, and not elsewhere in John.

There are words that occur with unusual frequency in the Apocalypse; for example, μέγας is used about eighty times in the Apocalypse and five times in the Gospel. The reason is obvious to even a superficial reader. The subject-matter, the objects brought to view, and the desire to give the importance which belonged to them to these objects, and the high tone which is suited to poetic and prophetic writings, are sufficient to account for this frequent use. The accumulation of words to designate the dignity or majesty of the object described; as, εὐλογία, τιμή, δόξα and κράτος; and the use of "full-toned words as μεσουράνημα and ποταμοφόρητος, or longer forms of particles, as ἰδού for ἴδε, are to be explained in the same way.¹

Several other words and phrases have been referred to, as occurring either in the fourth Gospel and first Epistle and not in the Apocalypse, or the reverse; but they are so manifestly a casual use that is perfectly natural, or one that is suggested by the objects before the mind of the writer at the moment, that it is a waste of time to enumerate them. The argument from this source, it seems to us, if not decisive in its favor, is certainly not against, the Johannean authorship of the Apocalypse. The course taken by the opposers of the genuineness of this book, as far as this argument goes, would deprive Paul of several of his Epistles; and indeed any other author of works as different in their character as the fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse could be shown not to have written but one of the works in question. But, further, we proceed to give

Proof of Identity of Authorship from the Use or Omission of the Same Words and Phrases in the Apocalypse and other Writings of John.

Μαρτυρία and μαρτυρέω are favorite words in the Gospel and Apocalypse. Gospel, i. 7, (twice) 8, 15, 19, 32,

¹ Hengstenberg's Commentary, Vol. II. 441, 442.

34; ii. 25; iii. 11 (twice), 26, 28, 32, 33; iv. 39, 44; v. 31 (twice), 32 (three times), 33, 34, 36 (twice), 37, 39; vii. 7; viii. 13 (twice), 14 (twice), 17, 18 (twice); x. 25; xii. 17; xiii. 21; xv. 26, 27; xviii. 23, 37; xix. 35 (twice), xxi. 24 (twice). Apocalypse, i. 2 (twice), 9; vi. 9; xi. 7; xii. 11, 17; xix. 10; xx. 4. These are also very frequent in the first Epistle of John i. 2; iv. 14; v. 6, 7, 8, 9 (four times), 10 (three times), 11; and it occurs five times in the third Epistle vs. 3, 6, 12 (three times). *Μαρτυρία* is rarely used elsewhere in the New Testament, while *μαρτυρέω* occurs a few times in Acts and Hebrews, but is infrequent in the other books. In the Gospel we find such phrases as *τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἡμῶν*; *Μαρτυρῶ περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ*; *Ἡ μαρτυρία μου*; *Μαρτυρῶν περὶ ἐμοῦ*, where Christ speaks of himself; and where others, as the Pharisees, speak to him, *Σὺ περὶ σεαυτοῦ μαρτυρεῖς*; *Ἡ μαρτυρία σου*. Cf. iii. 10; v. 31, 32; viii. 13, 14, et al. In the Apocalypse, *τὴν μαρτυρίαν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (i. 2, 9), and kindred phrases are frequent. No one can mistake the identity in the meaning of the words.

The use of *ἀληθινός* is rare, except in the writings of John, and especially as applied to God is found elsewhere only in 1 Thess. i. 9. Gospel i. 9; iv. 23, 37; vi. 32; vii. 28; xv. 1; xvii. 3; xix. 35. 1 John ii. 8; v. 20 (three times), Rev. iii. 7, 14; vi. 10; xv. 3; xvi. 7; xix. 9, 11; xxi. 5, xxii. 6.

Μετὰ ταῦτα as a formula of transition, in its frequency, is peculiar to the writings of John, Apocalypse i. 19; iv. 1; vii. 1, 9; ix. 12; xv. 5; xviii. 1; xix. 1; xx. 3. Gospel iii. 22; v. 1, 14; vi. 1; vii. 1; xix. 38; xxi. 1.

The use of the verb *νικᾶν*, especially in the present participle *ὁ νικῶν*, in the acknowledged writings of John and the Apocalypse are strikingly indicative of identity of authorship, as the peculiar usage is not only not found in the New Testament, except in Rom. xii. 21, but is not in other authors. See Apocalypse ii. 7, 11, 17, 26; iii. 5, 12, 21 (twice); (v. 5; vi. 2; xi. 7; xii. 11; xiii. 7; xv. 2; xvii. 14); xxi. 7; Gospel xvi. 33; first Epistle ii. 13, 14; iv. 4;

v. 4 (twice), 5. It should not escape notice that the peculiar use of *overcoming the world* or the *evil*, is almost confined to the first Epistle and the epistles to the churches, where, in accordance with the brief, apothegmatical character of the writing, the simple participle is used without the object in the accusative.

"*Ὁψις* used in Gospel vii. 24; xi. 44, and Apocalypse i. 16, and not elsewhere in the New Testament.

Βροντή is very frequent in the Apocalypse, as iv. 5; vi. 1; viii. 5; x. 3, 4 (twice), xi. 19, et al, and is used in the same sense in the Gospel, and nowhere else in the New Testament, except once in Mark, who calls James and John *sons of thunder* (*βροντῆς*)

Ἐβραϊστί is not found in any other of the sacred writings except John's Gospel and Apocalypse; Gospel v. 2; xix. 13, 17, 20, and Apocalypse ix. 11; xvi. 16.

It is certainly strange that so peculiar an appellation as *the word*, *ὁ λόγος*, is applied to Christ in the Gospel (i. 1, 14), First Epistle (i. 1; v. 7), and Apocalypse (xix. 13), and nowhere else in the New Testament, if these are not all from the same hand.

Ἐκκεντέω, only found in Rev. i. 7, and Gospel xix. 37.

Σφάττειν is employed in Rev. v. 6; ix. 12; vi. 4, 9; xiii. 3, 8; xviii. 24, and First Epistle iii. 12 (twice), and not elsewhere.

Σκηνοῦν also is used in Apocalypse vii. 15; xii. 12; xiii. 6; xxi. 3, and Gospel i. 14, and only in those passages.

The phrase *ἔχειν μέρος*, with the meaning, *to have part in* or *with*, is found only in John's Gospel xiii. 8, and Apocalypse xx. 6.

Περιπατεῖν μετὰ τινος, *to walk with, associate with*. Gospel vi. 66; Apocalypse iii. 4.

Δαλεῖν μετὰ (τινος), *to talk with*, Rev. i. 12; iv. 1; x. 8; xvii. 1; xxi. 9, 15; Gospel iv. 27; ix. 37; xiv. 30; and not elsewhere, except Mark vi. 50.

Τηρεῖν τὸν λόγον belongs only to John. See Gospel viii. 51, 52, 55; xiv. 23, 24 (*τοὺς λόγους*); xv. 20; xvii. 6;

Rev. iii. 8, 10. So *τηρεῖν ἐκ* (τινος) Rev. iii. 10; Gospel xvii. 15.

Κύριε, σὺ οἶδας, three times in Gospel xxi. 15–17, and Rev. vii. 13; not elsewhere.

Compare also the phrase *γίνου πιστός* (Gospel xx. 7; Rev. ii. 10); *καταβαίνειν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, (Gospel vi. 33, 38, 41, 42, 50; Apocalypse iii. 12; x. 1; xiii. 13; xvi. 21; xviii. 1; xx. et al.); *ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν* (Gospel iii. 13; Apocalypse xi. 12; xix. 3); *ὄνομα αὐτῷ* (Gospel i. 26; iii. 1; Rev. vi. 8; ix. 11); *ἀπεκρίθη λέγων* (Gospel i. 26; x. 33; Rev. vii. 13).

In both the Gospel and Apocalypse it is usual to explain Hebrew by Greek words, Apoc. iii. 14; ix. 11; xii. 9; xx. 2; xxii. 20; Gospel i. 39, 42, 43; ix. 7; xix. 13, 17, a usage rare in the other New Testament writers.

A sort of parallelism made by a positive and negative expression is found in the writings of John. Gospel i. 3, 7, 20, 48; iii. 15, 17, 20; v. 19, 24; viii. 35, 45; x. 4, 5, 28; xv. 5–7; First Epistle ii. 27; Apocalypse ii. 2, 8, 13; iii. 8, 17, 21, et al. A peculiar joining together of the present and future tenses is found in the Gospel xiv. 3, *πάλιν ἔρχομαι, καὶ παραλήψομαι ὑμᾶς, κ. τ. λ.*; Apocalypse ii. 5, *ἔρχομαί σοι ταχὺ, καὶ κινήσω τὴν λυχνίαν σου, κ. τ. λ.*

The Apocalypse says of Satan (xii. 9), that “he was cast to the earth,” *ἐβλήθη εἰς τὴν γῆν*; the Gospel (xii. 31), that “the prince of this world shall be cast out”; *ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου ἐκβληθήσεται ἔξω.*¹

The omission of certain words and phrases common in other writers of the New Testament is noticeable in the writings of John, including the Apocalypse; as *μετανοία, γέεννα, θησαυρός, θησαυρίζω*; compounds of *δυσ*; certain conjunctions as *διό, διότι, ἕως ἄν*; prepositions in connection with forms of *γίνομαι*, as *ἐν τῷ γενέσθαι, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι, πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι, μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι,*² etc.

¹ For other words and phrases similar to the above, see Davidson's Introduction, Vol. III. 552 seq.; Stuart's Commentary, Vol. I. § 17.

² See Davidson's Introduction, Vol. III. 556, 557.

Similarity of Imagery in the Apocalypse and Gospel of John.

The imagery in the Apocalypse and the Gospel and Epistles of John is drawn from the same sources, and is frequently expressed in a similar manner. Christ is the bridegroom of the church :

Gos. iii. 29: 'Ο ἔχων τὴν νύμφην, νυμφίος ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ φίλος τοῦ νυμφίου, ὁ ἐστηκὼς καὶ ἀκούων αὐτοῦ, χαρᾷ χαίρει διὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ νυμφίου.

Apoc. xix. 7: Χαίρωμεν καὶ ἀγαλλιώμεθα, καὶ δώμεν τὴν δόξαν αὐτῷ· ὅτι ἦλθεν ὁ γάμος τοῦ ἀρνίου, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἡτοίμασεν ἑαυτήν.

Apoc. xxi. 2: Καὶ ἐγὼ Ἰωάννης εἶδον τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἁγίαν ἡτοιμασμένην ὡς νύμφην κεκοσμημένην τῷ ἀνδρὶ αὐτῆς.

Apoc. xxii. 17: Καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ νύμφη λέγουσιν, κ. τ. λ.

So Christ is the *shepherd* and his followers the *sheep* :

Gos. x. 1–5: ὁ ποιμὴν ἐστὶ τῶν προβάτων καὶ τὰ πρόβατα αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ, κ. τ. λ.

Apoc. vii. 17: τὸ ἀρνίον ποιμανεῖ αὐτοὺς, καὶ ὁδηγήσει, κ. τ. λ.

Gos. x. 1: 'Ο μὴ εἰσερχόμενος διὰ τῆς θύρας εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τῶν προβάτων, κ. τ. λ.

Gos. x. 7, 9: 'Εγὼ εἰμι ἡ θύρα τῶν προβάτων.

Apoc. iii. 20: 'Ιδοὺ, ἐστηκε ἐπὶ τὴν θύραν, καὶ κρούω· ἐάν τις ἀνοίξῃ τὴν θύραν.

The *voice* and *hearing* are used similarly, in a figurative sense :

Apoc. iii. 20: 'Εάν τις ἀκούσῃ τῆς φωνῆς μου.

Gos. x. 3: Τὰ πρόβατα τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ ἀκούει.

Gos. x. 4: Τὰ πρόβατα οἶδασι τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ.

Gos. x. 5: Οὐκ οἶδασι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τὴν φωνήν.

Gos. x. 16: τῆς φωνῆς μου ἀκούσουσι.

So *hunger* and *thirst*, and the *water of life* :

Apoc. xxii. 17: 'Ο διψῶν ἐλθέτω, ὁ θέλων λαμβανέτω ὕδωρ ζωῆς δωρεάν.

Gos. vii. 37: 'Εάν τις διψᾷ ἐρχέσθω πρὸς με, καὶ πινέτω.

Apoc. xxi. 6 : Ἐγὼ τῷ διψῶντι δώσω ἐκ τῆς πηγῆς τοῦ ὕδατος τῆς ζωῆς δωρεάν.

Gos. iv. 10 : Ἔδωκεν ἄν σοι ὕδωρ ζῶν.

Apoc. xxii. 1 : Ποταμὸν ὕδατος ζωῆς.

Gos. iv. 14 : Πηγὴ ὕδατος ἀλλομένου εἰς ζῶν αἰώνιον.

Apoc. vii. 16 : Οὐ πεινάσουσιν ἔτι, οὐδὲ διψήσουσιν ἔτι.

Gos. vi. 35 : Ὁ ἐρχόμενος πρὸς με, οὐ μὴ πεινάσῃ· καὶ ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ, οὐ μὴ διψήσῃ πώποτε.

Many more examples of a like kind might be adduced ; but we will merely refer to the figurative use of such words as φωτίζω, δόξα, φαίνω, and the use of lamb as a designation of Christ, which is found twenty-five times in the Apocalypse, and in John's Gospel i. 29, 36, and not elsewhere in the New Testament, except in Acts viii. 32, and 1 Pet. i. 19, where Isa. liii. 7 is quoted. It is worthy of remark that ὁ ἀμνός is used in the Gospel, while ἀρνίον is the word employed in the Apocalypse. "But," says Davidson, "τὸ ἀρνίον in the Apocalypse is chosen as a term descriptive of Messiah, not only with reference to his sacrificial death, an idea common to it and ἀμνός, but chiefly because the τὸ ἀρνίον of the Apocalypse is put in antithesis to θηρίον."¹

Similarity of Doctrine and Sentiment in the Apocalypse and Acknowledged Writings of John.

That different sentiments and doctrines, and different phases of the same doctrine, are presented in two pieces of writing, is no objection to identity of authorship. There must be a contrariety that cannot be reconciled. But instead of that, in comparing the fourth Gospel and Apocalypse, we find amidst a variety, and even diversity, which we should expect, some points of union ; as many, indeed, as we ought to look for in works composed in so different circumstances, upon so different a plan, and for so different an end.

In reference to the names given to Christ, such as λόγος

¹ Introduction, Vol. III. 578.

and ἀρνίον we have already spoken. But there are other representations which are worthy of notice. *The propitiatory sacrifice* of Christ is spoken of much in the same way. Apocalypse i. 5; "Unto him that washed us from our sins in his own blood." 1 Epistle i. 7; "The blood of Jesus Christ his son cleanseth us from all sin." See also Apocalypse v. 9; vii. 14; xii. 11; xiv. 4; 1 Epistle ii. 2; iv. 10; Gospel i. 29, 36; x. 15, 18, et al.

The *salvation* procured by Christ is for all. This is from the nature of the Apocalypse expressed with more fulness; See Apocalypse v. 9; vii. 9; xxi. 25, 26; xxii. 2; First Epistle ii. 2; iv. 14; Gospel iii. 16; x. 16; xi. 51 seq.; xii. 32.

The same *power* is accorded to Christ and the same *praise* ascribed to him, and in many cases it is like that which belongs to God the Father. Rev. i. 5 seq.; iii. 21; v. 6, 8-13; vii. 17; xi. 15; xiv. 1; xix. 10-13; xxi. 23; xxii. 13-16; Gospel i. 1 seq.; v. 20 seq.; vi. 62; viii. 54 seq.; x. 28 seq.; xii. 41; xvii. 1 seq.

Omniscience is also ascribed to him. Apocalypse ii. 23: "I am he who searches the reins and the hearts;" and the introductions to the Epistles ii. 2, 9, 13, 19; iii. 1, 8, 15, and Gospel ii. 23: "He knew all men," and 24: "He knew what was in man." There are also many other passages of the like nature.

Still he is represented as *dependent* upon the Father, especially in reference to what he teaches. Apocalypse i. 1: "*The revelation* of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him, to show unto his servants." So in Gospel xvii. 8 Jesus says of his followers: "I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me;" and ii. 27: "Even as I received of my Father"; and ii. 49: "I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, gave me a commandment what I should say." See also v. 19, 20; vii. 16; viii. 28; xv. 15.

On the other hand, Christ's followers are made participants in what he receives from the Father. In addition to the verses quoted in the preceding paragraph, which relate especially to the instruction given, see, in reference to power

and honor, Apocalypse iii. 21 : " To him that overcometh I will grant *to sit with me on my throne*," etc. Gospel xii. 26 : "*Where I am, there shall also my servant be* ; and Apocalypse ii. 26 ; xiv. 2 ; xvii. 26, etc.

The stress laid upon works, and the necessity of exhibiting Christian principle in the life, is evident throughout the writings of John. Apocalypse ii. 23 ; iii. 1 ; xiv. 4, 5, 12, 13 et al ; 1 Epistle ii. 3 seq. ; iii. 10, 17. In regard to the Gospel, Lücke says : " As he represents the implantation and advancement of saving faith as the more immediate design of writing his Gospel, so also in his whole exhibition of doctrine and history he seems to indicate that the ground and centre of the Christian life is loving, active, obedient faith (see especially xiv. — xvii.), not a mere knowing and apprehending." ¹ It should not escape notice, that it is not particular duties and obligations, such as Paul and Peter often inculcate, that John lays stress upon, but works in general — the life.

The *invisible* and *spiritual agency* is necessarily different in the Apocalypse from that in the other writings of John, and indeed from that in the other New Testament books. There is little occasion to refer to angels and demons in the Gospel, while in the Apocalypse, " angels are the companions and interpreters of the seer throughout his visions. Their interposition is announced in the inscription to the book, and declared near its close (xxii. 16). They are everywhere brought forward to our view, either as the executioners of divine justice, or as fulfilling the will of God and the Redeemer, by becoming instruments in protecting the church, and making it victorious over all its enemies and persecutors." ² No objection in respect to authorship can properly be made from this employment of angelic agency by the Almighty in the revelations which he made by his servant, unless it should appear from his other writings that John discarded unseen spiritual agents. In that case we might

¹ Lücke, p. 215 ; quoted by Hengstenberg, Vol. II. 488.

² Stuart's Apocalypse, Vol. II. Exc. ; I. 397.

suppose that God would select another for the execution of his designs. But instead of any such evidence appearing in John, we find expressions in reference to angelic agency in the fourth Gospel which might naturally fall from the pen of the author of the Revelation. E. g. i. 51: "Hear-after ye *shall* see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the son of man"; v. 4: "For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool" (compare with this Apocalypse i. 4 seq.); xii. 29: "An angel spake to him"; xx. 12: "And seeth two angels sitting," etc. If it be objected to the Apocalypse that *so much* use is made of angelic agency, we will merely say, as it does not properly pertain to our present inquiry, that such agency is frequent in the Old Testament, especially in Daniel and Zechariah; and that in the prophecies in reference to our Saviour, it is said that angels shall have guardianship over him, to keep him from evil in his human capacity (Ps. xci. 11, 12), and that in actual life they ministered to him (Matt. iv. 11), and that twelve legions of angels were at his command, if he desired them, to sustain him in his conflict with his enemies (Matt. xxvi. 53).¹

It has been objected to the Apocalypse, that antichrist is different in the Epistles and Apocalypse, since in the former prophets are thus designated, and a temporal ruler in the latter. In the first place it may be said, that the word is not found in the Apocalypse or in John's Gospel; and it can certainly be no objection to the Apocalypse that a different class of errorists are there brought into notice. Besides, as Hengstenberg says: "The antichrist of the Epistles recurs substantially in the Revelation." That the enigmatical Old Testament names of the Nicolaitans (ii. 6), of those who followed the doctrine of Balaam (ii. 14), of the woman Jezebel (ii. 20), are more suited to the character of the Apocalypse needs no proof. There is, besides, an apparent allusion to the name in chapter ii. 13."²

¹ See Hengstenberg's Commentary, Vol. II. 478.

² Commentary, Vol. II. 474, 475.

The doctrine of a *double resurrection* it is said is peculiar to the Apocalypse. Whether this is so or not, in the first place, depends upon the interpretation given to some passages in the Apocalypse and some of the other books of the New Testament, about which there is much difference of opinion among scholars, and which can not be discussed here. Hengstenberg finds a plain allusion to a double resurrection in John v. 21–29: “The first and the second resurrection in the Apocalypse denote the same two stages of salvation which are also mentioned in the Gospel of John.”¹ The only difference is, as Hengstenberg supposes, that “the word ‘resurrection’ is used in a figurative sense” also in the first stage, and that only the righteous are designated in the Revelation, while in the Gospel the wicked are also included. But whether Hengstenberg is right or not, it makes little difference, as far as the authorship of the Apocalypse is concerned. That book was designed as a revelation of what should be in the future; and is it strange that something more, or more definite, is made known concerning the resurrection, which is but so lightly touched upon in the Gospel? It seems to us, that only the strong desire to accumulate proof for a preconceived opinion would have had recourse to this as an argument.

Recapitulation.

The testimony from the Fathers for John as the author of the Apocalypse is decided, full, varied, continuous, and almost unbroken in the early centuries. All the opposition that can be found to its apostolic origin is so manifestly the result of a perversion of its contents, and a desire to counteract the hurtful influence which had arisen from the supposed corroboration in it of millenarian views, that it can have very little weight in a critical argument (see p. 347, above).

The declarations in the book itself would seem, too, to leave little doubt who was its author. There can have

¹ See Commentary, chap. xx. 5, and Vol. II. 476.

been no other John who could have honestly designated himself as *John* simply in writing to the churches over which John the apostle had the oversight, and who, in connection with the name, would naturally characterize his work in a manner so similar to that found in John's Gospel xxi. 24 (see pp. 348 seq., above).

The general characteristics of the Apocalypse, from the origin, nature, and design of the work, are very different from those of the other writings of John, and indeed from all of the books of the New Testament; but still there is not only not anything in it which is contradictory to the other writings of John, but there are many points of union with them; as many, at least, as we should expect to find in writings so diverse in their general inception and object.

The manner of quoting from the Old Testament is not such in general as to throw much light upon the question of authorship; but in one passage at least (i. 7, compared with Gospel xix. 34 seq.) there are indications of the same hand that penned the fourth Gospel.

There are words and phrases in the Apocalypse that are not found in the Gospel and Epistles of John, and others in the latter productions which do not appear in the former. They are, however, not characteristic uses of words, or are easily accounted for from different topics treated of, or the different circumstances of the writer; while, on the other hand, there is a similarity in the use or omission of words and imagery that is peculiar, and certainly such as might be expected from the same author.

The sentiments and doctrines of the Apocalypse are many of them unique, but not contradictory to those of the acknowledged writings of John, and indeed are often such that one is strikingly reminded of the disciple whom Jesus loved.

ARTICLE IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD'S PROVIDENCE, IN ITSELF,
AND IN ITS RELATIONS AND USES.

BY DR. BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, NEW YORK CITY

SOCIETY is ever slowly oscillating in matters of public opinion and of public feeling from one extreme to another. In reference to principles of state polity, it vibrates to and fro, continually, from authority to liberty. In religious doctrine, the orthodox evangelical portion of it rests quite habitually in a fixed, strongly declared, outward estimate of the fact of God's sovereignty, standing by itself alone; while yet a few earnest minds make always an equally imperative demand for a full recognition, at the same time, of the unimpaired, inherent freedom of the human will in harmonious connection with it. It is natural to glorify power. Brahma, or Force personified, under whatever softer name, has ever been the god of the heathen, ancient and modern; and to quite too many minds in Christendom, also, does power seem to be the highest of the divine attributes.

Although the movements of the human heart, in the gross, are so little directed towards God, that it would be an overwrought statement to describe it as oscillating at different periods from scepticism to credulity, or better, if it might be so said, to faith itself, yet there have been at different times marked tendencies to great theological reaction from the plain gospel standard of doctrine and feeling among the educated classes. Such a strong reactionary tendency is very manifest now throughout the civilized world. On no one theme does it need to be met and baffled more fully than on the great doctrine of God's providence. Says Westcott well: "The belief in providence is the necessary supplement to the belief in inspiration."

The highest culmination of right religious thought and

feeling of any individual mind appears in its full, habitual, all-controlling realization of God's direct personal providence. A present God is the one great want of our natures ; and the constantly quickening and inspiring consciousness of that Presence, in all its untold riches of power, wisdom, love and grace, is the greatest attainment of sanctified humanity, here or in heaven. "Let him that glorieth," saith God, "glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me." In no respect is the piety of modern Christians more weak than in the habitual possession of a serene, uplifting sense of an ever-felt, though unseen, God, waiting to bestow himself, with his gifts, and infinitely beyond them, upon all his creatures. How much, in this relation, did the religious development of David and of the prophets and apostles, so long ago, transcend the type of spiritual strength and joy prevailing now, under the brighter light of the "New Covenant."

The imagination exerts its highest power, and so has its grandest function and value, not, as is so generally conceived, in idealizing to itself or to the thoughts of others more perfect combinations of the elements of individual or related forms than are found represented in nature, or in giving to any of the great generalizations or abstractions of the human mind the force of corresponding concrete realities in any heart expanding with welcome effort to receive them ; but in the capability and the disposition to bring home to the inmost consciousness of the soul, with ever new vitalizing energy upon all its springs of action, the invisible and immortal objects of revealed faith. God is the true and only proper object of the imagination, as of reason, faith, and love. Differences of natural or acquired power of conception and realization will determine wonderful degrees of variation in the scope, strength, and style of true religious sentiment and of fervid religious feeling in different minds, which are yet all baptized from above, although with different measures of grace, into Christ. The highest ministries of the imagination are ministries to faith, to elevation of moral feeling, and

to the conscious ardor of a purified heart to rise ever upwards, in inward life and feeling, more and more towards God. Next to its power of drawing eternal things into full, overshadowing vision by the soul, and making the great invisibilities of eternity clear and palpable to the inward sight of faith, before which angels stand, eye to eye, gazing with undiminished wonder and joy forever, is its power of revealing God to the awakened and adoring heart of the believer, as present in the actual world around and within him,—present, indeed, as a Creator and Administrator of his universal affairs, but much more also, as a Father and a Friend,—executing great, ever-varied and ever-unfolding plans of love for his children in this world, and that as all preparatory to a grander display of his infinite affection towards them, beyond and above. Thus is the human mind beautifully constructed for the practice of virtue, in all its apparatus of sensibilities and of functional activities—as, in its luminousness of reason, its grasp of faith, its ardor of hope, its power of will, its airy freedom of imagination—and, when fully bent and strained to right action, all its accordant ministries of mutually dependent and harmonious graces. The true and only authorized use of the imagination, as of the reason, is religious; and they are both designed to be employed, when in their constant legitimate exercise, in generating and sustaining ever fresh and ever beautiful exercises of faith in the heart and life. So manifestly is the human mind correlated with God in all its many quick susceptibilities of influence from him, as also in its many qualifications for outward effort and co-operation with him. Man, each man, was made directly for his God, for his gratification, company, smile, and aid forever. All our powers were skilfully contrived by him to open into right action towards him, by our own conscious consent and purpose at first, and afterwards with a sweet spontaneity of their own, acquired by the long habit of right action; and with all the force of not only deep inward preparedness for his overflowing fulness of approach to us, but of ever growing consciousness, also, of its blessed necessity.

God is thus declared, in the mechanism of our being itself, to be its great necessary counterpart. 'The finite demands, by the very terms of its nature, the infinite for its completion. With unceasing consciousness of their absolute need of him who is "the Desire of all nations," our natures are ever groping, however weakly or blindly, and with whatever indistinct cognizance of the causes of our constant inward pain without him, yet groping really, and often sadly without effect, because with no true moral energy, for his manifestation of himself to the soul. "God alone is great"; and we are great only and so far as we draw near to him, and as we feel, in consequence, that he draws near to us; for, "draw nigh," he saith, "unto me, and I will draw nigh unto you." Thorough absorption in his work on earth; felt unity of aspiration, plan, and labor with him; the full, purposed, happy marriage of the heart with his — these are the simple but high terms of all true and grand human attainment. Without him no one can be his proper self, since we were not made for any independent existence from him, but only to be united in him, with all other finite beings, into one harmonious, eternal society, vital in every part with love, with ever new, accumulative demonstrations of interest on his part in us, and ever enlarging appreciation and improvement of them on our part to our good, and so to his glory.

Our capabilities for realizing great divine truths, and appropriating them to our own manly strength and moral growth, and diffusing them in their fulness of power and value among others, we cannot divine, until we come into complete and constant contact of heart, in all our modes of daily living and acting, with God: "committing our way unto him," in all things, "doing whatsoever we do, heartily, as unto the Lord," and literally "casting every care and burden upon him." "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for those that love him; but God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit." The unconverted man, the declaration of this passage is, has no conception of

the festive fulness of feeling with which God dwells in the heart of him, here on earth, who says to his soul, as he stands at the door and knocks (Rev. iii. 20) for entrance: "lift up your heads ye everlasting gates, that the King of Glory may come in."

True indeed is the maxim, rightly understood, which some of the mockers of evangelism would use in quite another sense: "pectus est quod theologum facit." "He that doeth the will of God," saith Christ, "shall know the doctrine, whether it be of God." As is any one's idea of God, in himself and in all his plans and actions, such are life and death, time and eternity, duty and pleasure, to him; and such is he likewise to all who know him.

The following synopsis presents the leading points of this Article :

- I. The fact of God's providence among men.
 - II. Its characteristic external features.
 - III. The interior principles of its administration.
 - IV. Its connection with other things.
 - V. Its great generic forms of manifestation.
 - VI. The power of true views of it on the life and character.
- I. The fact of God's providence.

The sentiment of this great, delightful truth is the very aroma of every page of the Bible. No other doctrine exhales its sweetness so unfailingly, from every part of it, to the gladdened sense of him who is "the friend of God." Deeply did the Hebrew prophets feel its power; and in their clear, responsive, joyous appreciation of its truth lay no small part of their inward anointing from on high for the prophetic office. In their many and specific foretokenings of wrath from Heaven upon the cities of the old world, in such terrific succession, when at the height of their power, the key is furnished us to the otherwise strange overthrow of so many of the great kingdoms of antiquity. It was God, they teach us, that toppled down their towers of pride, and opened their two-leaved gates of brass to his appointed ministers of wrath. The pages of prophecy were thus but pages in

advance, from the hand of God himself, of the volume of ancient history; given for the purpose of teaching all nations that "he puts down one and sets up another, as seemeth to him good." This great truth is presented in the scriptures in every variety of form, general and particular, didactic and anecdotal, in proverbs and in psalms, in threatenings and in promises, in history and in prophecy.

But there is strong positive testimony from human experience, as well as from revelation, to the reality of God's providence among men. The stunning sense of absolute, all-ordering Fate, and the wide-spread fear of an avenging Nemesis, ever on the watch to chastise evil doers, which pervaded the minds of the ancient Greeks and Romans, as the idea of fate broods now so darkly everywhere over the thoughts of the heathen and Mohammedan world, are striking proofs of the universality of this conviction, in all ages and countries, that a higher hand than man's strikes, as it wills, the chords of human weal and wo. No theological doctrine receives, so uniformly, in Christendom such abounding consent to its truth, as that of God's supreme, all-disposing sovereignty. Men will become theological martyrs quicker for this one idea than for any other; and so welcome is it to the hearts of mankind generally, that the tendency to overstatement, and to false and injurious conceptions of the real scope of this doctrine, so grand and delightful when understood in its actual relations, is exceedingly strong. How successfully has God thus impressed the human race, in all countries and ages, with the actuality of his busy, determinative agency in all their affairs!

Christianity is also, now, as the full-volumed expression of God's providence over the race, for its spiritual good and growth, — an impressive Historical Manifestation, in all its features, of the Divine heart and hand. How complete is the testimony furnished, in its ever-during and ever-advancing strength and beauty, to the divine origination and management of the present order of things for the promotion of human virtue and of human happiness! The lessons

of history, which are endlessly repeated, are ever the same, although so slowly learned, and resolve themselves, in their moral aspects, into this one great and precious maxim of all true state policy: "Blessed is that people whose God is the Lord." A scale of the nations, arranged according to their manifest regard for God's word and their observance of his sabbaths, would be, in equal degrees, a scale of their relative order in national advancement.

When looking at God's providence, at any one angle of observation, in whatever age or country, we see it, at best, in but an incomplete and partially self-interpreting condition; but that providence, like everything else of his ordering, contains within itself its own determinate elements and processes of progressive development. It has, in different parts of its course, its swellings and subsidences of tidal energy, and its times and modes of collecting as well as of expending its strength, as well as its varied beginnings, crises, periods, and issues; and when "the fulness of times" shall have come, everything dark in it will be enlightened, everything crooked made straight; and every voice in the universe will unite, either with spontaneous gladness or with necessitated obedience to the irresistible demands of an intensely vitalized conscience, in declaring of him who is King of kings and Lord of lords: "Righteous art thou altogether, O Lord God of hosts!" His providence, rightly viewed, includes in it these threefold subjects of reflection, in one broad, united expanse of moral beauty,—his modes and forms of action, at any time, in man's behalf; his system of direct personal treatment of him; and his modes of personal self-manifestation to him on earth. We often speak, justly, of "the ways of God's providence." There are too many disturbing influences in every man's own bosom, as well as in the world around him, that the current of any one's experience should not be full of changes and surprises, and crises. Although it be not at all true that "the course of true love never runs smooth," it is altogether so that the course of manly duty and of godly action never long runs so upon earth.

In the distribution of profit and pleasure through all orders of the animate creation, and of innumerable sources and facilities for their procurement, throughout the inanimate; in the interlinking of all things together in bonds of mutual dependence and serviceableness, so that nothing lives or dies for itself alone; and in the manifest subordination of all things to man, and the grand harmonization of their many uses and benefits in him—we have so many clear and ample testimonies to the fact of God's providential government, and of the moral ends and bearings of that government.

The natural sciences, also, are wonderfully demonstrative of the fact of God's universal providence. Natural philosophy shows that the facts and forces of the physical universe have been fashioned in themselves, and adjusted to each other, according to the most exact mechanical principles. By chemistry we are taught that the forms of matter are all mixed, as if "weighed in a balance," in definite atomic proportions and their multiples. Geology testifies, with marvellous clearness and fulness of evidence, not only to the fact of God's creative hand, but also to his large and careful provision for men's wants in every age and country, in earth's successive strata of stones, minerals, metals, coal, salt, lime and marl. These varied materials and means, and others like them, of human civilization and comfort, how has he not only spread with singular equableness over every land, but also tilted those otherwise out of man's reach, by their low primordial position, to the very surface of the earth's crust. Astronomy shows us that not only centripetal and centrifugal forces of inconceivable power and scope are blended together in the sidereal heavens, under the law that every particle of matter attracts every other directly as its bulk and inversely as the square of its distance, but also that every perturbation, great and small, is both accommodated to the universal harmony, and necessary to its existence. Physiology reveals the most varied and complicated adaptations and combinations of inward structure and of out-

ward function in vegetable and animal structures, wonders of skilful and loving design for the best state and mutual serviceableness of each one of the myriad specimens of material organism. Everywhere contrivance reveals the great Contriver. The philosophy, poetry, and art of nature are all equally divine and human — divine in their origin and human in their uses and issues.

II. The characteristic external features of God's providence.

1st. Its origination in the infinite humanity of his heart. For man, all for man, — this is the explanation, as tender as it is true, of everything done upon earth by God, or that he will yet do, from the first foundation-stone of its structure, in the furthest geologic period of the past, to the last moral top-stone that shall be set, with shoutings, in the remotest ages, by the Angel of the Covenant, to the praise of God, upon the finished temple of the world's history. As our glory consists in the divinity of our aims and temper, so his glory consists, to human eyes at least, if not also to the whole intelligent universe besides, in his ineffable humanity. He made each one of us in order to love us, and to be loved by us. Each newly-created moral agent is directly ushered by him into being, because of the exuberant delight of his heart in making ever-new channels for the infinitely eager bestowal of his love; just as any true artist, poet, or orator declares himself to others from an inward compulsion of his nature too sweet to be resisted. This is the moral meaning of the perpetual multiplication by the divine hand of new worlds in space, in all the ages of a past eternity, for the inhabitation of new hosts and orders of happy intelligences, and of the introduction of successive generations of human beings into this world. While God takes inconceivably great pleasure in all his own acts, as being perfectly right and true and best in themselves, and only good in all their own proper influences and issues; there are none in which he takes such exceeding delight as in those which are most directly and fully paternal in form and effect towards his

dependent, and at the same time loving, children. He delights inconceivably more in giving than we can in receiving, and in forgiving, than we can in being forgiven. How tenderly touching are the terms chosen by himself to express his infinite sympathy with us, if only really turning at heart to our duty and to him, with whatever manifest weakness at the time, or with whatever previous waywardness! He is "the God of patience and of consolation," full of "long-suffering," "tender compassion," "tender mercies," "loving-kindness," and "the riches of his forbearance." "He knoweth those that are his"; "he taketh pleasure in his people"; "his delight is with the sons of men."

The great, central, *inward*, divine fact of all true theology, — inward, because resting in the bosom of God himself, — and the source and inspiration of all his plans and provisions for man's good, is the fact of *his own infinite humanity*, his indescribable tenderness of personal interest in every human being as his child. The great corresponding *outward* fact of all true theology is the sublime expression of the humanity of the divine heart in the incarnation and atonement of Christ, as governmental expedients, both needful in themselves, and generously offered by God for man's possible restoration to his forgiveness and favor. These two grand ideas, inward and outward, in their mutual bearings, are beautifully blended to our view in that most moving of all scriptural declarations: "God *so* loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but might have everlasting life."

2d. The vast comprehensiveness of the plan of his providence. It embraces all space and all time, all worlds and all their inhabitants. The universe is a unity, a harmony, yea, rather a divine organism. Each part in it is related, directly or remotely, by various complications, however subtle in themselves or occasional in their action, to every other. Nothing is isolated in the conditions of its existence. Not only have all things upon earth the momentum, like the freight

of a moving vessel, of God's continually advancing plans for man's complete historic development; but all are needful, formative parts, whether humble or sublime, and whether in sight or hidden from view, of one unique, divinely-fashioned, moral structure, contrived for the greatest good of each one, on the presupposition of perpetual right action on his part, of all his intelligent creatures. Jesus Christ himself is the chief corner-stone of both the separate and combined systems of creation, providence, and redemption: "in whom all the building, fitly framed together, groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord." He is not only the actual, efficient "upholder of all things, by the word of his power"; but the direct, potential worker, also, in all; as he will be to the end of his mediatorial reign, when he will lay down all authority and power, and the "Son himself shall be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all." The dynamics of nature are all interior, spiritual, and divine. Could any one make a darker or sadder picture for his imagination than that of humanity without a providence, and man without a God?

The divine providence on earth may be defined to be *God in action, in all the power of his nature, and in the full splendor of his moral excellence, as well as of his personal kindness, among men and for them.* It is, in its vast and varied unfoldings, a many-leaved, gorgeous commentary upon his character, as well as upon his own express declarations concerning himself, and his wishes, plans, and purposes; although he never tarries anywhere for our appreciation, or even for our comprehension of him or of his counsels.

How do the illimitable correlations of each man's existence and destiny with those of all other moral beings intensify the value of his right condition and conduct to the whole assemblage of finite intelligences in all worlds, and give magnitude and majesty to what might otherwise be deemed the trivial circumstances of his mortal life.

3d. The government of the world by general laws. This is one of the most marked, as it is one of the most benevo-

lent, and at the same time most needful, of the great, characteristic features of his providence; and yet the very regularity of the seasons, and the uniformity of the modes and processes of atomic, chemical, mechanical, meteorological, and vital agencies are perverted by many minds to an utter dismissal from their thoughts of all sense of the handiwork, and even of the very existence, of that Infinite Mechanician who contrived them, and that not merely as necessary parts of a perfect system of world-making, but also as the expression of an infinite personal interest in each one of our race, for whom, alike individually and in the aggregate, he built the world. In the fixed order of inanimate things, and the steady sequences along the lines of cause and effect that pervade their various relations one to the other, as likewise in the sure action of the laws of reproductive life throughout the vegetable and animal kingdoms of nature, and their complete subjection to the ordination of human choice, a full and strong basis is laid for definite, rewardable, human calculation; and God thus puts the times and seasons of the world, which in themselves are his, into our hands, to stimulate and guide our forms of personal industry, as well as the reactive processes of our own manly and godly development, while engaged in them. He who can fail to see a great designing hand, exhibiting wondrous fertility of resources, amazing energy of action, and, at the same time, most tender and ever-wakeful interest in the usefulness and happiness of all his dependent creatures, cannot claim, in self-defence, any want of needful opportunities or faculties of observation, but voluntarily smothers the light of his own divinely-endowed reason in the choke-damp of sceptical speculation. Everything has received from him its own definite substance, form, and nature; and whatever has life possesses from his hand its own specific and beautiful conditions of germination, growth, dissemination, and perpetuation. God's constructive providence embraces an inconceivably wide array of marvellous details of prospective wisdom, in respect to indi-

vidual life, the perpetuation of the human species, the general, social development of the world unto the end, and the triumph of the Redeemer's kingdom over all the earth. The planning and working, alike, of so vast and ramified a system of providence gives him endless occasions for ever-new combinations of infinite skill, forethought, care, patience, and love. By the general laws and principles of his providential administration God presents to mankind at large, in lavish abundance, a vast average sum of good, to which each one who will skilfully, diligently, prayerfully, and believingly seek for it has complete and divinely welcome access. Wonderful, indeed, are the compensations and equalizations of his providence among men. Every employment has its advantages and its drawbacks; the former always seen beforehand, and the latter as uniformly found and felt afterwards. "God hath put the day of adversity over against the day of prosperity, to the end that man may find nothing after him." "The like afflictions are accomplished in our brethren that are in the world." God's providence provides inevitably, indeed, in whatever form or stage of society for a favored class. Most must toil among material things; the many must go on their own feet wherever they move; few can travel, to see the wonders of nature or the beauties of art; few can possess books, cheap as they are, to any considerable extent; and only an elect few can secure a high education, or range at will through upper spheres of thought and feeling. But the continual evolution, by many and complicated social forces, of this specially favored class has been contrived by the great Maker of all, not merely as a matter of distinguishing mercy to them, but also as such to all those less favored beneath them, as a divinely prepared foundation for a system of privileged co-operation on their part with him, in the effort to elevate the mass of mankind to true and high habits of moral thoughtfulness and aspiration. Fearful indeed are the responsibilities, as ordained of God, of the wise, the powerful, and the rich to all less favored than themselves.

And then, again, how often is it forgotten that the great common pleasures of the heart (common because offered to all, although realized by but few, since not possessing hearts purified by grace and filled with God) are not only open to each one's attainment, but, with infinite kindness and earnestness combined, pressed upon it; compared with which treasures all others are the merest trifles. As God, moreover, made man at the outset in his own image, that he might become by his own choice his free and happy child forever, he has fashioned the elements both of nature and of human life to the presupposition of an active use of the intelligence and virtue in each one which it is his desire to develop in the end to full perfection. While the special ends of God's providence are often manifestly quite various, at one time aiming at individual good, and at another at some larger social result, now immediate and then remote in their bearings, here aiding and developing a given style of action and there disciplining and educating the minds of men to a newer and better one, — its great obvious drift in all ages has been towards the promotion of human virtue, human happiness, and human advancement.

4th. His positive subsidizing of all things to the successful issue, in the end, of his scheme of universal providence.

The system of redemption is the grandest demonstration made by God of himself to the universe; and this not for man's sake alone; but "to the intent, also, that unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known, through the church, the manifold wisdom of God." Here, veiled in mortal flesh, lived, for more than thirty years, the Son of God as man's Pattern, and died in the end as man's Atonement. Here, the angels, those "hosts" denoted in Jehovah's title, "the Lord of hosts," are "all" of them employed as "ministering spirits, sent forth to minister unto the heirs of salvation." Small as is the island-universe in the sidereal heavens to which we belong, compared with many others slowly moving with it around the central "Pleiades," with their "sweet influences," and little especially

as is this world alone in it, still all the lines of historic and prophetic interest and progress in the whole vast circumference of created things are represented in the scriptures as unitedly and intensely converging here. On the brief periods of probation allotted to separate human lives on earth, following each other like summer clouds, in such rapid succession, they gather together their strength of light and interest.

How natural and how unanswerable the argument to one who knows how to estimate Christ at his true significance : "He who spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all, how will he not with him freely give us all things"! But to his children God directly declares : "All things are yours." They own the universe in fee simple, by direct investiture and charter from above. Better than that, they own God himself, the glory of the universe, not only within it everywhere, but also everywhere without it, and above it, and greater than it, however vast, by the same term that he is greater than man himself, "the lord of this lower world," of whom it is said, that "before Him all nations are as nothing, and less than nothing." As vast, therefore, as are the combined resources of the whole creation, in all its physical, intellectual, and moral wealth, and as vast as are the unfathomable riches of God's nature, of which all that yet is presents but a petty image of what he can and will ordain to appear hereafter, in ever-new successions of created good, and on continually higher planes of his own ever expanding but never terminating self-manifestation to finite beings, for their greater happiness and glory,—so absolute is the certainty that none of his plans will lack their needful succors, or fail to answer their expected ends.

5th. His own inexorable withdrawment from human view in the management of his providence.

The discipline of this life is inevitably, to each one of the race, from first to last, a discipline of faith. We can, if we will, neglect or refuse to see the many convincing proofs of his busy presence with us, or we may distress ourselves

with a sense of the many mysteries of our brief being here, and of the but partially uncurtained future beyond; and still he maintains a voiceless silence, as he stands, unseen, at our very side. The heart that loves him most, and eagerly longs for the vision of his Father and his God, face to face, in the upper glory, must content itself without any manifest divine approach, in this world, to its senses. So imperturbably calm is he, amid earth's fiercest tumults of thought and feeling, that he seems, perchance, to multitudes almost or quite unimpressible alike to human want and wo, as well as to all their fearful causes and occasions. By nothing else so baffling to human thought and feeling is the fact of his perpetual, purposed invisibility to human eyes paralleled, unless it be the utter impenetrability of that vast and solemn future towards which all things human are so irresistibly tending. Does not "the hiding" of his presence, at all points, from the human race seem in itself as awfully divine as, on any other scale of observation, appear the greatest wonders of his power and skill?

6th. His immeasurable patience in the execution of his purposes. The Infinite Mind is never in a hurry. "A thousand years are in his sight but as yesterday" is to us, "when it is past." But God not only waits for "the appointed hour" in his plans, however far off from human vision; he meets also with infinite ease the all but infinite difficulty of quiet and serene forbearance with human waywardness and wantonness over all the earth, in every moment of its history. But while, in the revelation of his justice towards the guilty, he is thus for a time persistently self-restrained, even to the utmost possible self-denial, he is patient, "with a will"; terrible is the method of his silence; and his wrath is only gathering all the more heat by its temporary inaction. "Fill ye up, then, the measure of your fathers," is the plain, practical sense of his jealous posture of waiting upon any man, or any generation of men, to complete the elements of their doom. Thus mockers at his falsely supposed indifference to their conduct are ever busy, with strange,

delirious zeal, in "heaping up wrath for themselves against the day of wrath." That forbearance with the wicked for a season, which they, with presumptuous haste, count his "slackness concerning his promise," is altogether moral in its source, and has, in its highest aspects, great redemptive ends in view, even the furtherance of his church on earth. Therefore says Paul (Rom. ix. 22) : "What if God, though willing to show his wrath and to make his power known, yet endured, with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, *even in order that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory.*" The summer heats and favoring showers, under which the tares grew to troublesome luxuriousness, were meant, not for them, but for "the plants of righteousness" that grew by their side.

There are two leading anthropomorphic conceptions of God's providence, and widely diverse one from the other, in themselves and in their influence : the one, and that most widely prevalent, frigid enough to suit a heart estranged from all divine ideas, — the conception of God as an infinite mechanician, who, after making the world with wonderful care and skill, thousands of years ago, passed it to a great degree out of his heart, if not out of his hands — as men relinquish to others' direction the working of machines, which they have made at the outset to work aright — contenting himself, after pronouncing his handiwork, in the first "days of creation," to have been "good," with looking on as an indifferent or idle, if critical, spectator of its subsequent history. The other conception, which is true in itself, and which exerts a deeply quickening influence upon any heart that holds it, and which is everywhere in the Bible imaged in full beauty to our thoughts, is that of an infinitely loving, all-watchful, and all-bestowing Householder, occupying every part of the universe with his active presence, power, skill, and affection ; tenderly yearning at all times after the immediate and lasting good of each one of his great family of intelligent creatures, and with inexhaustible generosity, edu-

cating them continually, in every way possible, for his own future company and communion forever. His providence is often spoken of as both general and special. It is general, in reference to the whole all-embracing plan, of which it is said in holy writ that he is the "All in all." It is special, not in reference so much, commonly, to his own acts or feelings in the case, as to the outward modes or objects of its demonstration in our eyes; his special providences being but specific forms of his general providence. "Every good gift and every perfect gift cometh down from the Father of lights"; those never seen or remembered, as well as those that are. "What hast thou," saith inspiration to each of us, "that thou hast not received"? His all-surrounding, ever-busy, all-pervading, and shining bounteousness of immeasurable good-will to each and every man is an unfailing exhibition, at all times, on the broadest scale possible, of the same personal interest, for kind, in the welfare of each one of us individually, which any occasional specialties of succor or favor, however remarkable, could be supposed to manifest. The constant care, the unceasing radiance of his happy presence among them, and his purposed and perpetual self-bestowals upon his household reveal the special love of any true and noble parent upon earth to his family far more than can any fugitive tokens of his remembrance and regard, with whatever observation they may be given or received.

III. The interior principles of its administration.

First, they are twofold in their form or style.

1st. That of direct divine agency.

2nd. That of simple divine permission.

1st. God's direct divine ordinations or decrees all belong to the sphere of his own separate, uncombined, absolute efficiency. They include all his direct personal acts, of whatever kind, to or for his creatures; their own acts they, of course, perform and ordain. The different classes of direct divine decrees are such as these:

§ 1. All acts of creation. These include all worlds and all the beings that people them, as well as whatever objects and

resources surrounding them are adapted to their use, enjoyment, improvement, and efficient influence.

§ 2. The constitutional bestowments and limitations, in any form, of free, moral agency. With these must be connected also the natural, probationary trials and tests of character, which are not of designed or undesigned origination, by other finite beings, and which compose the elements of our present mortal state, as ordered of the Lord; together with the appointed metes and bounds of human life.

§ 3. All governmental acts, statutes, rewards, and penalties on the part of God. Here cluster together all the forms of his declared will; all measures of redemptive wisdom, energy, and love; and all his own direct approaches of kindness to any and every one of the race, in whatever forms of admonition, or of beckoning invitation to his favor.

§ 4. All the ordained results of voluntary human agency. These are such as those of diligence and idleness, skill and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, in any part of our compound nature, physical, intellectual, and moral; and whether originating in our own persons, or coming upon us by the laws of descent or of social affiliation.

§ 5. All the contingent alternatives of human choice, presented to each individual moral agent upon earth. The forms of our personal agency, as also their times and directions, are often greatly modified, and even determined, by the acts and influence of others; but their inward moral essence is always ever the same, according to the answer to the question: God, or self? In appointing these supreme alternatives as one of them, according to our choice, the end and inspiration, exclusive of the other, of every action of whatever sort of each human being, from the first dawn of moral action in his soul, the liberty of the creature is in no way impeded or assailed at any time.

§ 6. The patient acceptance, in the gross, of the incidental evils entailed upon the intelligent universe from the abuse by so many, on earth and in hell, of the high endowment of free, moral agency. The occurrence of these evils

was fully foreseen by God from the first, but accepted by him, while infinitely disliked in themselves, rather than that he should not adopt the present moral system, with all its surpassing volume of good in the end. But for the creation of finite beings in his own image the whole universe must have been an utter and voiceless blank of space; and, though everywhere beaming, to God's eye, with the intense, all-diffused brightness of his own infinite being, yet, alas! manifest to the vision of no other. Men are "now," as truly as was Adam (James iii. 9), "made in the similitude of God": not, like matter, unreflecting and immobile, but capacitated for the highest style of action possible to any being, — to choose or refuse, at their own option, good or evil; while they are invited, and even commanded in love, and for his sake only as for theirs, to embrace and honor him, freely, fully, and forever, as their Father and their Friend. How empty and frigid and utterly unendurable, beyond all human appreciation of the fact, would be to the great Infinite heart of the universe, with its immeasurable fulness of social feeling and affection, a world full of forced, mechanical natures, seeming to love God, only because compelled to do so by his own resistless hand. One willing child's true, unbought, spontaneous, radiant, exulting love is worth more to an earthly parent than would be all the necessitated smiles of a myriad of overawed human beings, whose feelings and actions were determined by some irresistible force from without.

God's direct decrees are relatively of two sorts, not in themselves indeed, but in their application: those which are unconditional and absolute, as the creation of the world and of man as its inhabitant, and his endowment with all the elements of moral agency, which, like "the gifts and calling of God," universally, "are without repentance" in his heart; and those which are conditional, as all God's acts in conformity with the variable forms and elements of human conduct, which themselves are left, by the very terms of man's nature and of God's mode of governing him, to each one's own decision.

God's own future acts at any time were of course known to him from the beginning, from the infinite scope of his prescience; and so were all the variable acts of his creatures, both in their own contingent nature, and in the determinative force and issue of each of their own foreseen acts of choice. God's intuitive foresight of what men will actually do in each and every case, and which would be just the same if God did not foreknow it, affects in no way whatever the originally ordained, and still in all respects completely preserved, freedom of their moral action; since that foreknowledge is wholly objective and outward to them, and known to them only as a matter of formal revelation; and this not to modify their own agency at all, in either style or degree, but only to give them truer conceptions of God, as he really is. "Whatsoever the Lord hath pleased" (Ps. cxxxv. 6) "he hath done in heaven and in earth, in the sea and in all deep places." Yes, indeed, but it is equally true that he hath never pleased to contradict himself, in his word or in his works. After having purposely endowed man with full powers of free, moral agency, like his own, he never has annulled his own plan and work, and never will, by unmaking his nature, which he fashioned at the first as he desired and decreed that it should be forever.

2d. The forms and directions of God's permissive providence.

§ 1. He allows the devil and his angels unrestrained freedom of action upon earth for a season, as in hell, in direct antagonism to his cause and kingdom.

§ 2. He allows full scope to imperfect, mistaken, evil human action. He has not only endowed us with free-will, but given full range for its exercise; and wonderful is his forbearance towards the many varied forms of folly, caprice, waywardness, wantonness, and malice witnessed among men. But more than this, as Christ "came to his own, and his own received him not," so God pictures himself everywhere in his word, as a petitioner at the door of his

own world, as also at that of each man's own heart, at whose vestibule he stands and beseeches the recognition of his rights as a sovereign, and of his honor as a Father. "Am I a father," he saith, "and where is my honor"? "Behold," saith Christ, who is "one with the father," "Behold, I stand at the door and knock! If any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in and sup with him, and he with me." Urgent as is his desire, from his infinite compassionateness towards each human soul, to be its guest, he will never force the door, but enter it only as it is willingly opened to him. We ourselves carefully abstain from hearts and habitations where we are not welcomed. "Turn unto me," he saith, "and I will turn unto you," and "be ye reconciled to God." Are these seemingly earnest words of love but mere unfeeling taunts of our weakness, as poor, crippled beings who lost their original, constitutional faculties as men in Adam; and who, though bidden to open the door of their heart to God, cannot possibly rise to do it? Are they but bitter tantalizations to us, as we awake at any time to a sense of our lost estate, or are they rather the earnest, tender, winning words of an infinite friend, desirous of setting up within us, anew, the broken pillars of our immortal humanity? Can any one, not under the strange spell of some delusive theory, who reads with conscientious simplicity of heart the word of God, doubt that he utterly abominates any and every sin? And yet what uninterrupted license has sin ever had to ravage earth and despoil heaven!

§ 3. He allows men to sway, with absolute determinateness, the circumstances, relations, activities, characters, fortunes, and destinies of others. Parental, personal, didactic, social, governmental, administrative, and monetary forces and influences form, by their mutual interlacings, each with the other, the vital organisms of the family, the state, and the church. Potent for good in their true use, they are, when perverted, equally potent, each and all of them, for evil. The untoward issues that flow from their abuse are,

wherever they appear, like the moral blindness of the heathen, "without excuse."

How plastic and impressible is childhood made to external influences ; in whose brief period of necessarily unripe ideas and imperfect aims and efforts, at the best, all questions of personal character, industry, skill, power, efficiency, and usefulness in after life must be irreversibly determined. When we realize that the children of mankind, at large, are, each and all, his, both in fact and at heart, and only loaned in every case to their parents, to be trained for him, and that the highest degree of love possible on their part is not, compared with his, even as a drop to the ocean : — how strange seems it, that he resigns, on so large a scale, the casting of the die of their precious destiny to such unworthy hands. What lasting damage, and what immitigable sorrow, are drunken husbands and fathers allowed to entail upon their innocent, suffering, praying households. How do the victims of vice and crime wound society, even more than themselves. Men of passion and violence tear ruthlessly in pieces the cherished hopes and happiness of the good ; and weak and wicked rulers often impose upon their weary subjects tasks and burdens, utterly abhorrent not only to them but also to God. Thus fearfully is one man often in the power of another, who, purposely or negligently, crushes all the better instincts of his nature, breaks off wantonly all the budding hopes of his being, and tramples the germs of immortal joy and honor in his nature into utter ruin under his feet. In the general order of social relations, influences, and sequences, — skilfully established for the world's good, and sure to eventuate largely in it, both in general and in detail, if only each one of the great whole acts rightly his allotted part, — God "visits the iniquities of fathers upon their children to the third and fourth generation, but shows mercy unto thousands of those that love him and keep his commandments." It is wonderful that a system of perpetuated covenant blessings, so wide-reaching in its scope, and so energetic in its action, should, when perverted by human

misconduct, narrow-in its force for evil through all the forms and laws of personal inheritance of blood and bone, of home-education, and of the power of personal example and influence, from "thousands of generations," as it is to those who love God, to the contracted limits of "the third and fourth generation of those that hate him."

So, too, what immense injury has God suffered to be inflicted on society, in all ages and countries, by mistaken theories of religious truth, of social order, of governmental policy, and of individual duty. Conscientious visionaries, bigots, and fools have turned the world everywhere upside down. What an outflow and overflow of evils in all the earth would a little more logic or even good common sense have often saved to mankind.

§ 4. He has allowed vast negations of easily discoverable and attainable good to all preceding generations.

The ignorance and destitution of men in former days, in respect alike to matters of personal comfort and of social progress and prosperity, he suffered, with seemingly unheeding indifference, to remain undisturbed. The very word *invent* teaches us that mankind have, thus far, stumbled upon their forms of individual and social improvement; so, the word *discover* implies that a treasure which, though in plain view, had before remained untouched, had now, for the first time, revealed its riches to him who had lifted up its cover. Nature held forth to men thousands of years ago the same bounties and beauties, with open fulness of bestowment, so many of which have just been seized by the eager hand of science or of art. But how — as a savage walks unconsciously over a mine of gold, or though staring upon a printed page, full of words of light and love, sees naught but blank confusion there — have those of former days died unblessed, amid an abundance of the elements of human improvement and enjoyment surrounding them, and lying in near, delightful prospect to them, which yet they never touched, because never for a moment comprehending that they had any relation to their possibilities of better

action, growth, and usefulness. There is indeed a grand philosophical unity in the conception of the progressive development of the human mind, by the laws of its own self-active growth, in clearness of perception, force of reasoning, strength of purpose, objectiveness of aim, and elevation of sentiment, from absolute original ignorance and inexperience to the highest attainable excellence of the church and state combined, in the end ; but at what a fearful sacrifice of the means of personal and social advancement has the weary march of the ages hitherto been allowed to move so tardily, and with such slow and small accumulations of gain in all upward directions. When we think of the ease with which the divine hand could, at any time, point the eyes of men towards the before concealed treasures of his goodness, lovingly prepared by himself ages ago for their use, and set purposely at ready points of access before them ; or, how easily he could burst the light seals that held their contents out of human sight, — how strange, and even perchance unresolvable, seem to us the deliberate negations of his permissive providence, and the inactive reserve of his infinite good-will to the race ; the indulgence of which, on the broadest scale possible, is so manifest in the magnificent preparations of his providence for the ultimate perfectibility of the human species.

§ 5. He allows very great inequalities of condition in human experience. Some are born poor and others rich ; some weak and others strong ; some under the most kindly parental influence, and some to be driven about by misfortunes, like dry leaves before autumn winds, from the first hour of life to the last, with no helper but that divine Father whom they have never been taught to love or to seek or even to know. Who can guess what shall become of his children, however well provided for now, or of his property or his good name after he has left the land of the living ? Who can foresee what withering blast may suddenly, at any moment, like a simoom of the desert, dry up every green thing in his outward estate of good, or what overwhelming

ruin of all things else may unexpectedly leave him alone with himself and his God. The eventful history of others will make any thoughtful observer of it serious, although by grace serene, and modest in all his earthly expectations, however earnest in following them for the glory of God.

Secondly, The final end of God's providence, whether decretory or permissive, is, to promote the greatest good of the greatest number of his intelligent creatures.

The arithmetic of love in God's bosom is the arithmetic of the entire moral universe. His nature is no more unbounded than his heart: "his tender mercies are over all his works." From the very infinitude of his being, he can be satisfied with nothing partial or incomplete. Our natures aspire, in proportion as they are lofty in their bearing, to great generalizations of conception, and to grand, all-embracing sentiments and purposes of life; and so, not only the divine intuitions, but also the divine sensibilities and affections, turn, full-orbed and mighty in their action, towards all the works of his hands.

The great, manifest drift of God's providence, as well as all its secret undertow, is, in general, towards the vindication of universal justice; while, in particular, it flows full and strong towards each individual upon earth, in an almost unrestrained tide of mercy.

1st. The individual is never slighted or forgotten amid the magnificence of his thoughts or plans.

It is the glory of science, art, and administrative talent among men, to seize, combine, and use the minutest details with effect for great ends. To God nothing is great, since it came directly and wholly from his own hand; and to him, for the same reason, is nothing small. He acts for and upon each individual man, in order to promote his highest good, upon the following scale of principles:

§ 1. According to the mental, moral, and even physical elements of each one's separate personality, as well as according to the outward and social circumstances of his

earthly lot. Infinite adaptation and art does God employ in all his moral workmanship.

§ 2. So as, if unresisted, much more welcomed, to lead him, even amid the dim light of nature, directly and powerfully along the line of his largest development in the spirit of duty, and of true, courageous, persistent, buoyant faith in God. Wherever "day unto day utters speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge," in all the earth, "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, even his eternal power and Godhead," so that even the unrepentant heathen are "without excuse." The normal effect of God's providential treatment of each one, amid the blessings of Christianity, is the creation in his heart of a positive, eager, and continually intensified desire for spiritual attainments and pleasures. Thus "the goodness of God" ever legitimately "leadeth to repentance," or a new life; and "all things work together for good to those that love God."

§ 3. So as to bestow himself, in ever larger measures of joyous beneficence, upon each one, as his chosen friend and ally forever. The end of God's providence, as of creation itself, is the direct and full education of each one of his moral creatures for his own everlasting companionship.

2d. In all seeming outward change God himself is ever the same immutable being, in his elements of feeling and principles of action.

He is accordingly equally immutable in the maintenance and management of his great, unvarying, and, because absolutely perfect, invariable plan of all things. With him, "there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning"—which does not mean that his outward forms of demonstration and action towards his creatures are unvarying. The very immutability of his character necessitates ever-changing modes of treating them, according to the changes of their conduct. The same father that smiles upon his obedient child, frowns upon him, if of a right and true character himself, when he is disobedient. God is ever gloriously the same good, wise, perfect, all-loving, infinite being. Whatever he has been at

any time in the eternal past, and however he has manifested himself to any being in the universe heretofore, that same great, true, majestic, beauteous selfhood he maintains unaltered still. It is a cardinal idea among the many that must be blended in one, in the great composite conception of the true God of heaven and earth, as he really is, that "he is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever"; not only in the necessary elements of his self-existence, as God, but also in his own moral habitudes and purposes, affections, and actions. God therefore now "loves those that love him," as greatly as he ever loved any of the prophets or apostles of elder days for a similar reason; and Christ is as tender at heart in our days to any one of us, as he was to "the beloved disciple," if we lean in spirit as fondly as he upon Christ's bosom.

IV. The connection of God's providence with other things.
First, with the course of nature.

In the conceptions of many, the order of the outer world is altogether mechanical. Such an absolute organism does it seem to them to be that they even exclude, in their thoughts of it, the Maker and Contriver of all things from his own works. How do they forget that to make is immeasurably more than to manage; as also that, however skilfully made at the first, so ponderous a machine, as they deem universal nature to be, and of so many complicated parts and relations, could not, with safety to the unnumbered intelligent beings concerned in its right condition and action, be left to its own unguided movements.

1st. The course of nature was itself fore-ordained, as a part of God's providence.

The world, prepared at the outset as a vast storehouse of varied resources for man's great and ever-increasing wants, in every department of his compound being, is — in all its record of geologic facts and chemic agencies, in the range of its various philosophies, natural and supernatural, in the diversified forms of its physical history, and in the ever augmenting pomp of the seasons from winter to autumn —

a grand, harmonious display of sublime divine care for man's perpetual, inward, and outward welfare. Here we behold the fact and fulness of God's providence revealed in large, open, fixed type, for the reading of all eyes, to his praise; set up, indeed, in that far-off "beginning, when God created the heavens and the earth," and kept fresh and bright to the present hour.

2d. The course of nature is now vitalized everywhere with the present, immediate, active will of God.

"My Father worketh hitherto," said Christ, "and I work." The order of things, as we term the ever-recurring uniformities of state or relation or sequence in the objects that surround us, is, in its final analysis and description, but the steady unbroken flow of the divine will in the same perfect channels of desire and purpose concerning them. The uniformity of nature is therefore but the constant physical expression of the unceasingly perfect habitude of the divine mind towards the same things in the same relations. He can neither desire nor do anything, at any time, either mentally or morally, that is not exactly right and best in itself, and can never therefore improve in the smallest degree upon himself. The uniform steadiness of his hand in "upholding all things by the word of his power," as well as in moving them harmoniously onwards in their constituted connections and successions, is what men generally call "the course of nature." "Nature" seems, strangely, a more acceptable term, somehow, to the hearts of most men — poor, blind, inert nature, — than the name of the great living God of nature, and of all its contents.

3d. If men are free, amid the so-called "bands of nature," — parents and friends, the great and the mighty, — to give good things unto others; "how much more" is God free and able "to give good things to those that ask him." Nature is to his, not only indwelling but also everywhere outspreading, infinite spirit, a hinderance, in any of its elements or forms, to his free, full action, through it and with it, for the good of any or all of his creatures, inconceivably less

than our bodies now are, or our perfected, spiritual bodies will be, elastic and glowing in every fibre of their ethereal essence, to the execution of our highest and best purposes of good to others. If we conceive of God as inhabiting all parts of the material universe with his omnipresent being as we do our corporeal frames, we think of the mode of his universal existence in a figure, helpful indeed to our weak ideas of his greatness, but yet ineffably inferior to the great reality of his ubiquitous consciousness, energy, and authority.

4th. The supreme blessings of life are spiritual.

In the deep, secret well-springs of pleasure, within our inmost being, which none but God's hand can open; in felt contact of soul with him, and felt resemblance to him; and in that sweet, continual bliss, like his own, which God causes to abound unto those that love him, what a heritage of good does he that walks with God possess, compared with any of the gross things that we can "touch, taste, or handle," which are all, in the contrast, but mere husks and offals.

5th. God has many unseen ways and agencies, by which to confer good, without the use of what we term the outward visible course of nature at all.

He who can walk at will within the inner chambers of our consciousness, as in his own temple, and be cognizant of everything passing there without even any knowledge, at the time, on our part of his being there, can surely awake feelings within us, all our own, which but for his agency would remain dormant. Bright, kindling thoughts, which those who have them most so often describe as "coming to them," may flash from his hand in full flame, within the bounds of our witnessing presence; and whence they come who shall tell? The mind has a spontaneous, self-illuminating power of its own; or it may receive light within its palatial windows, as if from torches borne by angel-hands, in passing by; or from the great God himself, who made the tablets of the human heart on purpose to write on them, with welcome on our part, his thoughts of love; on which

he may kindly drop at any time the sweetest flowers from the paradise above.

How easily also can he, by silently opening or closing, at any time, by day or by night, the fountains of health in our bosoms, favor or check any of our cherished plans, and alter all the combinations in the elements of our earthly experience. How, by mere changes of the weather, can he, without any violation of nature, modify our movements, or those of others, and so use nature for the furtherance of his moral plans and purposes. And who shall describe the scope and force of angelic agencies, of whom it is said that they are "all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister unto the heirs of salvation"; and again: "He shall give his angels charge over thee, lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone"; and still again: "Take heed that ye offend not one of these little ones, for I say unto you that their angels do always behold the face of my Father, which is in heaven." Gratitude to the angels for deliverances and benefits unknown here as such, but thankfully recognized hereafter, will constitute a large element in the joy of the ransomed on high. But greater than all other divine gifts is the bestowal of his Spirit: that Spirit is man's appointed Comforter; his manifested presence is heaven in the soul. Through nature, as also without it, streams, like sunbeams from above, his quickening influence upon the heart.

Secondly, The connection of God's providence with free human agency. Its harmony with the constitution of the human mind is as complete as it is unique. The God of nature and providence is plainly the God of revelation. The evidences of the unity of his existence, attributes, and character are, like those of the unity of his purposes, plans, and laws, everywhere multitudinous and overwhelming. His modes of action do not anywhere tend to repress, in any way, the freedom of human agency, much less to revoke that high bestowment which he gave to us at the beginning, in the very making of our nature, in everlasting perpetuity.

The presupposition of a sovereign God, having all power

in heaven and on earth, is necessary to any just conceptions of the structure of the intellectual and moral universe. But God's sovereignty is never to be thought of as being, actively or passively, set against any man's true interests, but as being only and altogether for him; not as crushing or depressing his moral activity or force, but as inviting and urging the highest and best use of his faculties at all times.

There are but three possible ways of conceiving of what is, when rightly viewed, not only the grand but also the precious doctrine of divine sovereignty: as directly exclusive of man's freedom (a view which some audaciously hold, nor seem to be appalled by its fearful logical consequences); as probably consistent with the exercise of man's free-will, although the mode of it be unintelligible to us, since both doctrines are clearly revealed in the scriptures; or, last and best of all, as manifestly and beautifully harmonious with human freedom and directly stimulative and helpful to our right action in everything. God has established the order of the heavens by the mutual reaction of centripetal and centrifugal forces; the order of bodily health, by the right mingling of the acids and alkalies of the system; and the order of the state, by the natural blending of the conservative and progressive elements of society; but, in theology, the qualifying elements of thought, out of whose mingled interaction the stability and beauty of divine truth are to be realized in the thoughts and hearts of men, few seem to be capable of holding together in their mutual correlations.

The great Father of all has none of that desire to make an ostentatious display of the power of his wrath which many do him the high injustice to imagine. "Meekness," on our part "is an ornament of great price, in his sight"; and it is one that he himself possesses in his own great nature, in infinite beauty. "Learn of me," said the God-man, who himself declared "he that hath seen me, hath seen the Father also," — "learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart." It is his "gentleness, which hath made us great," each and all, in our privileges or prospects.

The practical connections of divine with human agency are threefold : *anticipative* (or preparatory, and so, stimulative, suggestive and beckoning in their influence) ; *concurrent* (and so helpful of right and successful human action at the time) ; or *retrospective* (bestowing added favor and success upon previous human effort, made with love to God and prayerfulness and waiting faith and hope).

1st. Grace is the constant, cherished form of his sovereign good-will to men.

§ 1. He delights in the widest possible exercise, as the form of his own greatest moral influence for good, of quickening and converting grace. It is his joy at all times to draw as many as possible of Adam's lost sons to himself, since " he will have all men come unto the knowledge of the truth."

§ 2. Restraining grace is another precious form of divine benefaction. The checks of divine providence to human ignorance and haste, and to human weakness and wantonness, are numberless ; and what deliverances, unknown to us, we have each had from physical danger, and from the power of the wicked, who can guess ? The sense of these many and great, but now invisible, helps and benefits from the divine hand will, like the perception here of seasonable escape from some impending danger, unrealized at the time, awaken in us, in the life beyond, mingled awe and thankfulness forever.

2d. The immediate design of God's providence is the formation and perfection of personal virtue in the heart of each one of his intelligent creatures.

" All things work together for good to those that love God" ; and they would work together for good everywhere else, if not resisted and perverted. " Godliness is" in itself and in all its constituted rewards, " profitable for the life that now is, as well as for that which is to come." The physical universe is, in every part and particle of it, for the behoof of the moral universe contained within its boundaries. Everything material is as positively under the law of attraction, by its moral uses, to the central throne and controlling will

of God, as it is also, more observably to the senses, under the law of perpetual tendency towards earth's centre of gravity. God has no ends of action, and from the infinite perfection of his nature and the absolute independence of his being, can have none, in whatever acts of creation, providence, or redemption, but those determined by the present and abiding welfare of each and all his creatures, who, instinctively if irrational, or of earnest, set purpose if intelligent, fill out the appointed measure of their being. How manifest is the mighty, ever-moving drift of God's providences towards nations, as towards individuals, in favor of right and justice, and of humanity and "the progress of the age."

3d. Man's powers of interpreting and appreciating the form and features of God's providence are small.

The common conviction concerning his providence is, that it is strangely mysterious. Many doubt, others fear, and some murmur; and there are those that even deride all divine interest in human affairs, and all supernatural agency concerning them.

§ 1. All such forget how inadequate and unworthy are the habits of moral appraisal, and even of moral survey, evinced by the best of men towards the things of God. A humble estimate of our own individual capacities and characters is one of the first essentials to all right mental, as well as moral, exercises and habitudes.

§ 2. They forget that however full, in reference to our previous ignorance, the disclosure made of God or of his ways to the soul may at any time, here or hereafter, be, there must be, by necessity, a vast remainder left of the unseen and the unintelligible in the Infinite to the eye of the finite.

§ 3. They forget the spirituality of God's providence, as of his law, and are continually looking for visible or material aspects and issues, instead of looking beyond and above them for higher and broader results that are moral and eternal. The discipline of life is often seemingly adverse, while in the end promotive of the highest results for good to

individuals and communities. "No affliction, for the present, seemeth to be joyous, but grievous : nevertheless, afterwards it yieldeth the peaceable fruits of righteousness to those that are exercised thereby." "He that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin." In no instance whatever is it the fault of the great Contriver of spiritual occasions, forces, and tendencies, that men do not get a larger and quicker product of good from them.

§ 4. They forget the fact of the needful composition of many forces in combination, to the production of given providential results. All the blessings of life, as health, strength, usefulness, success, enjoyment, or whatever else any one may covet, are, to a degree beyond which any hasty thinker could guess, compound in their origin. Any one of the combining elements, in the entire productive agency necessary to the final result may, by its absence or by a change of its order as to time or place, greatly qualify, and even wholly neutralize, the mingled efficiency of the rest. God's providence and human experience are full of mutually interlocked conditions and dependences.

§ 5. They forget the vast and universal bearings of God's providence. Partial ends, otherwise desirable, are often sacrificed by God, as by man, for general ones. Nothing in the government of God can be rightly understood out of its relations. Multiform indeed is often the plexus of complications, reaching from eternity to eternity, that God holds in his hand, and manages with infinite ease and effect to his glory, as the infinite well-wisher of the universe. Every part of the whole is managed for the whole ; and the proper action of any part, however minute, may find its designed result, in some far-reaching connection, out of sight to every one but him who knows the end of all things from the beginning. Petty indeed is the segment of the vast circumference of God's universal affairs that stretches at any time, from side to side, across the boundaries of our vision. "We are of yesterday and know nothing." The larger our area of observation, the more full our comprehension of universal

history and of universal experience, the better will be our means of rightly estimating the manifestations of God's work and will among all human things.

The tendency to perverted views of God's providence is, in weak minds, to superstitiousness ; and in those of mingled ardor with their weakness, to presumptuous fancies in favor of themselves or against their enemies. In intellects of a stronger mould, there is likewise a double tendency to perversion at the opposite poles of thought and temperament, — to scepticism, in those disliking the limitations to their own wills of even divine authority ; and in those of a conscientious and religious turn of mind, to a sense of all-constraining fate, which to some seems overshadowing and terrific, while others even declare their admiration of so hideous a conception of that God whose name is not infinite power but infinite love.

Great is the folly of undertaking to read God's providences in advance. In the bold effort to interpret the prophecies in detail, with a full scroll of personal names and dates and historical connections at hand — rushing forth with them, as a willing guide to others — how many have speedily signalized their manifest ignorance of the things that they have spoken. The scale of prophecy is too vast in itself, as well as too general, to be handled by any one with flippant freedom or hasty earnestness. And yet when considering the introductory salutation of "the book of Revelation" to its readers : "Blessed is he that readeth and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep those things which are written therein," — we cannot, like some others, decry the disposition and effort to pry eagerly into the wonders of church history, pictured in such gorgeous or startling symbols there.

Here belongs also, properly, a brief consideration of the function and value of miracles. These have always a specific moral use, as desirable and even necessary attests of a divine communication, through human hands, to mankind, which must be otherwise left unauthenticated, and so inope-

rative to the ends designed to be accomplished. The vaunted antagonism of reason to Christian faith is much paraded before the world by infidels ; but God ever appeals to human reason, in the most complete and earnest manner, in all his demands of obedience and trust. The logic of nature, as a witness for him, is to a true heart irresistible, as is also that of providence and of human experience. So is likewise the logic of miracles, which are vouchers from God himself that those who profess to speak in his name have actually come with a message from him.

Prophets, if not miracle-workers also, would have no claim, beyond that of their personal worth and good sense, to a respectful hearing at the time of their appearance ; while to those of subsequent ages their very prophecies themselves are, when realized in all their breadth of details over widely separated intervals of time and space, certificates from on high, of the same nature and value as miracles, of their divine delegation. As important as is the divine errand itself, on which any elect one of earth may at any time be commissioned to come to the race, is the adequate ascertainment of the fact ; as important as is God's loving approach to us, for our good, is the sure proof that he has in fact approached us. Miracles are therefore to be expected in all communications from God to man, and are not only authorized but necessitated by them. They are not simply expressions of generous pity for the feebleness of our sense of God's active presence at all times ; they are also direct testimonies to human reason, in its most critical exercise, of the reality of the word spoken from above.

Thirdly, The connection of God's providence with his own feelings concerning it.

"All things are and were created for his pleasure." At the end of each of the days of creation "he saw" his works, that "they were all very good." He was at the first infinitely joyous in planning the present system of things, as he is now, also, in managing it. As the style of a palatial mansion and of its furnishings reveals not only the taste, but

the heart also, of its builder; and the whole atmosphere of a festive occasion is full of the spirit of him who prepares it; and a picture shows the very soul of the artist, in its lights and shades,—so is it easy to see and to feel, wherever we look, that he who framed this world enjoyed his own work, and that the presence, with which he surrounds man in his sin and shame is a loving presence, joying in his joy. A warm hand is everywhere extended to man; a bright eye beams everywhere upon him; the world is garlanded and festooned with beauty; nature is in a universal frolic of gladness, around and over him.

1st. What a royal redundancy of life abounds everywhere! The real inhabitants of the world, for number beyond all number, are too small, even when aggregated in masses, for the human eye to discover. What elegance often in their microscopic forms, or what exquisite beauty of attire; all for the joy of art to the divine mind in their construction, although no other eye should behold the tracery of skill and kindness on their tiny forms and wings.

2d. What an unstinted supply of resources exists everywhere for all the wants of every creature. Every creature has its well-adapted food placed, in all needful abundance, where it can be readily obtained, with its feeble powers of appropriation and locomotion. “The eyes of all wait upon thee; and thou givest them their meat in due season. Thou openest thine hand and satisfiest the desire of every living thing.” For man, especially, how abundant the provision. The two hundred generations that have come and gone, in such swift succession hitherto, have but touched the outer surface of the abundant store of good, still in reserve for the full and ever-expanding use of as many generations more, if God shall indulge the human race with so protracted a term of existence.

If by the sweat of our brow we must each get our bread; that involves no more effort than is necessary to draw after it the mingled joy of action, aim, and attainment, as the brow is the first and easiest place of all to perspire. Who

is not glad, when he sees what perverted uses men generally make of the means that they gather, that the accumulation of gain has been made no easier. Surely he who fitted up the world with such infinite liberality for the inhabitation of his earthly children, took great pleasure in all the acts of his own bounteousness in their behalf, and felt also a deep interest in their prosperity and pleasure.

3d. How ever-present, and ever-pressing upon every open sense of our being, has he made the demonstration of his love of beauty.

Beauty of form and color, beauty in detail, and beauty in grouping, beauty of individual presentation, and beauty of natural association and of touching suggestion: beauty in various degrees, outer and inner, for all, from those most rude to those whose inner sense is full of the soft, sweet light of eternity, he has scattered with an unsparing wealth of good will, and with evidently equal inward satisfaction, over all the earth. True and tender, indeed, is the language of flowers; not that sickly, sentimental language which poetasters or foolish lovers are fond of ascribing to them; but language redolent of God. As we adorn our grounds and persons, our houses and festive halls, with them, and lay them, alike, in wreaths of unforgetful affection on the altar to which we lead our loved ones in marriage, and the bier, where we gaze for the last time on the forms of the dear departed, — so God places flowers by the wayside of life, to cheer us as we toil in the dust and heat of daily duty ever upwards towards himself. He bids us to “consider” them, as well as to get the passing good that we can from them; and this is the argument that we are to draw to ourselves, as we consider, that, if God so carefully etches and embroiders the leaf of a passing flower, and guards its tender life so securely through all successions of time and of outward circumstance and change, he will, much more, think of us and bless us with his bounty and himself, if our hearts only open their golden leaves to his heart shining upon them, as the flower lifts up its face towards his on high.

4th. Even thorns and briars, reptiles and vermin, have their moral uses, and bear a benediction in them.

In a depraved world, repellent influences from evil are as potent, and precious sometimes, as those which are attractive to good. Hope draws and fear drives; and they can be readily combined in unity of action and of issue. The same God that rewards diligence, scourges also laziness; and those who will not be of their own accord cleanly, must be driven, when other means fail, even by vermin, to decent self-treatment.

Many baneful, hideous, and disgusting objects in nature, that have no other palpable profit to our eyes, answer a high moral end, in their natural use for purposes of moral symbolism. Our feelings run much more in the channels of real or fancied analogies than we at first imagine; and as God communicated to the Jewish mind, and through it, in the end, to all mankind, by a long course of many and minute ceremonial observances the moral ideas which they imaged, and therefore "abolished" them when Christ came, as the result intended by their use had been gained,—so there is a grand moral use in many of the unsightly and fearful forms of nature, animate and inanimate, that help, by easy suggestion, both the imagination and the reason to a more quick and positive sense of the intrinsic odiousness of moral evil; and in positive aversion from sin is one of the strongest possible safeguards to virtue. But for serpents and dragons, how different would be the quality of our conceptions of "the serpent," the devil, whose "head the heel of the seed of the woman was to crush." But for devouring lions, how little would we appreciate the fury of his heart against mankind, who "goeth about, as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour." With no knowledge of a wolf, how feebly should we think of a hypocrite who had not harmed us, whom now we remember "as a wolf in sheep's clothing." The greatest Bible truths lie couched in figures, intended quite as much to sway the feelings of all men in right directions as to enlighten their conceptions of their significance.

But the noisome animals of the world, as we deem them, are, in actual fact, among its most special and needful benefactors. God has not only made nature full of mutual checks to over growth and over action, and so, by counterbalancing one thing with another, established a grand universal harmony of mutual antagonisms; but, by a general as well as most minutely ramified system of scavenger-action ever busily employed by myriads of animals of all sorts, and of animalculæ, keeps the world, with all its multitudinous forms of ever newly beginning decay, clean, bright, and beautiful, like a carefully swept palace. Although, therefore, countless hosts of creatures of every varied size, as well as vegetable products of all kinds, are everywhere dissolving back again into their elemental dust, nature seldom, even in her forest wilds, reeks with offensive odors. He who has been sickened by the pestilential vapors of a single narrow battlefield, notwithstanding the quick burial of the dead, can easily guess what a scene of general desolation and corruption the universal decay of nature would everywhere present, and what a vast charnel-house earth, now so "gay with life and eloquent with bliss," would become to the wearied heart of every one of its inhabitants. Flies, gnats, mosquitoes, wasps, ants, beetles, worms, snakes and scorpions, are all busy, happy, indispensable laborers for man. By the drainage wrought through hills and dales by bountiful showers from above, together with the purifying power of frost and lightning, and the ever busy industry of God's great host of appointed workers, large and small, for cleansing, by day and by night, the air, the earth, and the sea, in connection with the grand daily awakening of the world's agencies to action by the sun, as the mighty magnetic source of all its light and life, the physical world is kept, at all times, in a state as near like that of Eden as with man's depravity is possible for his good. The earth contains nothing which has not been placed in it by direct design for some specific end, tributary to the highest ultimate good of all: as we purposely put each article of furni-

ture into our houses, or each item of wearing apparel upon our persons. In the smallest or meanest specimens of vegetable or animal life there are more skill and adaptation of various parts and offices one to the other than in the most elaborate contrivances of human ingenuity. Everywhere is there perfection of workmanship, and everywhere beauty of inward structure as of outward aspect.

5th. Diseases too, of which many think only as unmitigated calamities, or even curses, are needful lessons to us of the evils of breaking or ignoring necessary laws. We are made, though finite, with faculties capable of boundless expansion. In order that we should achieve any purposed personal culture, we must not only think and intend and labor and pray, but we must also conform in our work to the nature of things and their legitimate tendencies, influences, and issues; we must follow rules, and be wise in the selection of our means and processes. And how does God educate us to this true sense of our real inward interests by the palpable and speedy visitation of physical evils upon us, from the transgression, whether heedlessly or designedly, by us of physical laws. His mode of training us, each and all, to right mental and moral action is as decisive and inexorable, as it is manifold. Our eyes could have been made to gaze, like the eagle's, unshrinking at the sun; our stomachs might have received swinish strength to digest food at all hours and of all kinds; our sensual appetites might have been fleshed with greater endurance, as well as desire, by indulgence; we might have been made capable of standing unharmed, like the beasts of the field, in midnight dews and winter rains;—but how then should we ever have learned to be cautious and thoughtful? how, ever have learned to live for ends out of sight? to adopt wise principles of action? to wait patiently for desired results, trustful in truth and time and God? How should we have ever come to feel that it is noble to sacrifice present to future good, and to struggle continually upwards, out of the physical into the spiritual,—“using this world as not abusing it”?

Diseases are also not only trainers of the character, in their legitimate influence, to true, moral, law-abiding dispositions, in every direction of interest and duty; they are likewise, when occurring in those who are dear to us, powerful awakeners of personal sympathy and kindness. Sickness is thus, at the same time, a part of the physical heritage of Adam's original transgression, and one of the necessary elements of the world's moral education and renovation. Maternal anticipations of danger, or realizations of anguish, are not the only preparatives, appointed from infinite desire for the child's highest good, in the end, with such severe kindness by God, in order that she who is to be specially honored with the responsibility of standing in God's place to the child, to train it for him, may be sure to feel the sacredness and solemnity of the great immortal trust committed to her care. 'The inherent feebleness and unavoidable exposures and constant sicknesses and frequent deaths of childhood are all so many new and powerful reminders to every thoughtful parent, that children are not household toys or mere pretty fondlings of earthly affection or of parental pride; but candidates for eternity, placed here, for a little while, to be better prepared for the company of the blessed. Parents must travail in spiritual birth, in the depths of their hearts, for the intellectual and moral development of their children, as does the mother physically for their emergence from embryonic into outward, open life; and the fact that so few parents ever thus struggle inwardly before God for their highest well-being, is the reason why so few children ever attain to any great mental or religious excellence. 'The most menial offices of love to children and invalids form a necessary part also of the world's outfit for men's highest moral training. Performed for moral reasons, and with gracious aims and affections, they may be made not only dignified, however humble in themselves, but also heroic; and the more distasteful they are in their own character, the more self-forgetful and beautiful be the spirit of him who cheerfully and constantly renders them. Was ever a lesson from God

to man taught to the race with more strange impressiveness than that of happy service to others, in whatever lowly way may be demanded or convenient, when the Maker and Saviour of the world washed the disciples' feet and said: "If I, your Lord and Master, wash your feet, ye ought also to wash one another's feet." Physical experiences form the greater part of the life of most men, and physical kindnesses are not only within the power of all men, but form also the chief opportunities of usefulness that most men possess.

6th. By what mighty forces, as "secondary causes," molecular, igneous, electric, magnetic, aerial, hydraulic, and meteorological, does he hold the physical elements of earth in quiet position and harmonious action for man's good.

How does he keep them, although like furious beasts in themselves, yet calm and meek-eyed in their leashes. The mild beauty of nature, who can fail to see and feel and admire. Even poor, apostatized, heathenish men have been ever constrained by its sweet influences, in all ages and countries, to bow in worship, if not to its great Creator, yet to itself, in their blindness, as his image. The sense of the universal "*Κόσμος*" (order) has had almost the force of a native instinct in the human heart, so irresistible are its appeals to the natural sensibilities of all men. The ocean he binds in its place with a rope of sand. The ever-moving air, of strength enough to hurl into atoms any structure that man can erect in the dust, and which he sometimes lets sufficiently loose from his hand to remind us of its all-conquering power, he softens habitually so much, as not to let it smite too roughly the cheek of a little child, or even to shake off from their tender stems the sweet ripe fruits of summer. When storms do come, as come they sometimes must, to purify the air, it is but to shake up its elements, as in a bottle, that they may be the better mixed for human respiration. "He rideth on the wings of the wind" and "ruleth the raging of the sea," all from love to man and all for man.

V. The great, generic forms of God's providence.

These should be viewed as they are, both at large and also specifically, in ever growing abundance of good to men; especially when joined, by their own choice, in close connection at heart with him.

1st. The direct, continued maintenance of the course of nature. This is but another name for the course of providence; the one denoting results, and the other, their living source in the will of God; the one describing appearances as such to man's eye, and the other, actual, determinate forms of immediate divine activity. So the doctrine of "the saints' perseverance," as it is generally called, when viewed in its subjective aspects, is often described, in a better form of statement, objectively, as that of the saints' divine preservation to the end.

2d. The establishment and maintenance of the great laws of social life, order, and development, and of the appointed results of human labor and character. The facts and forces of true, social philosophy are nearly or quite as marvellous, when gauged by the most thorough rules of scientific, Christian measurement, as those of outward nature itself. In society at large there is not only a stable order of things constructed, as in the sidereal heavens, out of very unstable elements, but one also perpetually and grandly progressive. Vast and complicated as is the real, although invisible, enginery of God's providence, it is yet all harmonious in its workings and issues. Its aims and objects are those that concern not only individuals, as such, in their constant activity and growth of power, feeling, and purpose, but society, likewise, as a vast vitalized organism of mutual agencies, influences, and issues, and more immediately and absolutely the church, as God's cherished and ultimate object of interest and effort among all things earthly.

3d. The "giving of our daily bread," and of "all those things that our heavenly Father knoweth that we have need of," and which "if we seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness," we may be sure "shall be added unto us."

In the constancy, variety, and superabundance of the provision thus made for each man, with proper toil, skill, prayer, and faith on his part, in combination, how has God shown not only wonderful forethought, and fore-love, for every individual of the race, but also immediate, ever-active, abounding interest in his present personal welfare.

In the very perishableness of human food, even beyond that of animals, there is not only a constant, designed provocative to industry, but also, as in the daily bestowal and daily perishableness of the manna in the desert, a perpetual repetition of the lesson of our unceasing dependence upon God for life and breath and all things. How may each of all earth's vast population say: "He loadeth me with benefits"; "my cup runneth over." "Every good gift and every perfect gift cometh down from above, from the Father of lights." "What hast thou, that thou hast not received"?

In what way does the father of a family show his worthiness of headship in the household, and his own deep personal love to each and all its members, as in the ever-flowing, all-pervading fulness of his personal zeal to supply, at all times, the wants of all, and of each one differently, according to their several degrees of strength and development, in ever new forms of love and taste and joyous generosity of feeling towards them? What are occasional presents, however magnificent in themselves, compared with the multitudinous kindnesses that are scattered at every moment, through all the year, from his heart and hand, like dew on summer flowers, on every inmate of his happy home? Such, for kind, but in infinitely greater wealth of bestowment, is God's daily bounty; which yet so few ever mention with exulting thankfulness to him, or even to their fellows concerning him, or, in fact, ever seem themselves to behold. How should such constant and surpassing bounteousness of personal good-will, in such widely ramified relations of desire and want, attainment and enjoyment, affect their hearts with ever fresh delight in God, as well as in his gifts,

far beyond any of those startling deliverances from evil, or pleasing surprises of benefaction, or of success, which, from their greatness or suddenness combined, convince them at any time powerfully of God's remembrance of them for good.

4th. Divine revelation, with its formal attests, and with the Spirit, not only in the word, but also, in answer to specific, earnest, persistent, believing prayer, in the heart of him who is not only willing but eager also to understand it in its true sense and spirit.

It is a necessary moral inference, from the style in which the world was made and stored for the intelligent beings that were to be placed within it, and from the high intellectual and moral structure of man's own nature, that God would communicate to mankind, in a clear, certified form, both his own will, and, with their acceptance of him in his true relations, his own self.

5th. The incarnation, which, in itself and in all its bearings, is the highest demonstration made by God of himself to man, and probably also to the moral universe at large, and the foundation of all man's means of recovery, or of his hopes of it, from without or from within. He is "the Way, the Truth, and the Life," to everything good on earth and to everything prepared in heaven for mortal man.

6th. The church, purposely and skilfully constructed of God, as the living body of Christ, "holding forth the word of life" for him in this dark world, executing his will, presenting his image to all mankind, and ever saying, with "the Spirit and the bride," to all men, "come,"—come to glory and to God.

7th. The perpetual dispensation of the Spirit, — called a dispensation, both because of the breadth of its bestowal on the world at large, and specially on the church as such; and also because of the continual renewal of its influences in every age to all mankind. "The Spirit of promise," man's appointed "Comforter," is ever lovingly busy, except when grieved away from any sinner by the wanton and continued rejection of his love, in pressing moral truth, in every possible

form, with all his own love and grace and skill, on the open and welcome acceptance of each one of the race.

8th. Time and opportunity to all; or probationary privileges and responsibilities of all kinds, including the preservation of life and of the mental faculties, scope for their use, personal trials and temptations, as tests and strengtheners of the character, and all the forms of each one's personal experience.

9th. The ever-enlarging, inward manifestation of God unto the soul that seeks and accepts him as its constant treasure and joy here, and as here so also by promise forever. "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them," saith Christ, "he it is that loveth me; and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him"; and again: "If a man love me he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him."

How much wider is the term, the providence of God, than the narrow, restricted sense in which it is so commonly used. It is the outward, full-orbed demonstration, and to angelic eyes the moving panorama, since it is ever in motion towards a grand and glorious finality, of the great scheme of redemption, through which all the precious benefits and influences of that scheme, temporal and eternal, are offered and secured to mankind.

Thoughtful men sometimes speak of themselves as "children of providence": so are we all, children of an ever-thoughtful, ever-kind, and ever-active Providence. Who does not feel, in a review of his life, that he has been led in a way that he knew not. "The heart of man," it is every one's experience, "deviseth his way; but the Lord directeth his steps." Some of our most favorite plans in life, and most favorite ideas of ourselves, have been perpetually crossed; and we are now greatly glad that it has been so ordered by One who knew us better and loved us more than we did ourselves. On what pivot-points, for minuteness, has our

destiny often turned,—the merest incidents by the wayside of life, and the most casual deeds, and even words, of others. Who would dare to leave such a freight of personal interests as he bears in his life and bosom to the unforeseen and unguided chances of earth's changeful experience?

If we may well draw stores of moral wisdom to ourselves from the revelation which God makes in "animated nature" of what is right and best, in the all but prophetic though unreasoning habits of many brute creatures, in various, sanitary, economical, and prudential directions; how much more, when we can actually see God presenting himself anywhere to view as a formal governor of mankind, should we at once learn directly from him, with eager haste, true views of national polity, honor, safety, and prosperity. In the facts and features of the Jewish theocracy we have such a privilege. In his loving and, for that reason, self-assumed management of the affairs of his chosen people, we behold a perfect system of social order and vitality, adjusted to the public preparedness of that day for it, and beautifully adapted to the fuller development of Christianity, in the end. The evident design of his direct administration of their affairs, next to blessing them unto the end with his own immediate guidance and favor, was to impress them, throughout all generations, with a deep, abiding sense of the reality and world-wide scope of his providence. In managing the national forces and destinies of the only nation upon earth whose manifest king he ever offered to be, and of whose gracious direction of their affairs they soon, to their shame, wearied, he aimed, in all his commands, promises, threatenings, and bestowment or withholdment of good from them, to create and fix in the hearts of all men a just appreciation of himself. Were he the formal, acknowledged king of any people now, he would seek, now as then, to impress the same great practical lesson upon its mass of living hearts; and we may justly expect the successive stages of growth in the religious development of the race, for which

alone it was created or is kept in being, to be made unto the end in the same way and by the same means. While the Bible might, from its divine many-sidedness, be justly designated by various descriptive names, as, the great spiritual book of the world; or the book of universal humanity; or the book of heaven's own statutes; or the book of divine love; or the book of life and death,—it may be, quite as aptly, entitled the book of God's universal providence. Its historical books are actual delineations of that providence. Job is a wonderful dramatic picture of its reality and temporary mysteriousness, but of the clear, ultimate triumph of justice and humanity in it; the Psalms are songs of the bounty and beauty of his providence, and of the joy of a deeply pious heart, revelling in it and in its author; the Proverbs are precepts of providence; and the Prophecies are foretokenings of its course of development, in clear vision, in the yet unopened future.

There is far too little earnest, eager, exulting effort in the pulpit of our day to bring God perpetually into view, as the Light of Life to each individual in everything and to every nation in all its affairs, great and small. He is the alpha and omega of the universe, and fills in heaven, to each enraptured heart, the whole horizon of delighted vision and of ever happy thought and feeling. The eye of the eldest and noblest seraph never tires in gazing there at the fulness of his splendor; the ear never wearies in hearing of the greatness of his being, or of the beauty of his character. There, praise is pastime; and the joy of eternity is joy forever in God. In that upper world they need no sun nor moon to enlighten them, for "the Lord God and the Lamb are the light thereof." If there, where the growth of thought and of conscious excellence and force is so rapid, perpetual, and vast, the riches of God's being never pall upon the ravished sense; no human heart on earth need feel afraid of any want of resource in the nature, character, ways, and works of God, for ever fresh and joyous thought, for itself or for others.

The doctrine of God's providence, as it is in itself, has thus far been under consideration. The developing power of true views of it upon the life and character, or the subjective relations and uses of this great doctrine, which is the necessary complement of its objective characteristics, as herein presented, is a branch of the subject reserved for a subsequent Article.

ARTICLE V.

WHEDON ON THE WILL.¹

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THE deepest and most fascinating problems of philosophy arise from the struggle, or rather the antithesis, between our moral and intellectual faculties. The loftiest and profoundest speculations of which human nature is capable, have been elicited, the highest powers of the very mightiest sons of men have been taxed to the utmost tension, to harmonize man's logical deductions with his moral intuitions. In fact, it is the instinctive effort for this harmony that has given rise to the whole fabric of metaphysical theology.

The work of Dr. Whedon is one more contribution towards the settlement of one form of this manifold problem, namely, "the reconciliation of the sense of responsibility with our intellectual conclusions concerning the nature of choice" (Preface). Although for many ages this problem has been slowly approximating solution, yet the sphinx still propounds her riddle, and devours the souls of men. Dr. Whedon does not step forth as the Oedipus that is to

¹ The Freedom of the Will, as a Basis of Human Responsibility and a Divine Government, elucidated and maintained in its issue with the Necessitarian Theories of Hobbes, Edwards, the Princeton Essayists, and other leading Advocates. By D. D. Whedon, D. D. 8vo. pp. 438. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1864.

silence the ancient sibyl forever, but expresses the modest belief that he has "brought the difficulty nearer to a solution."

Before discussing the views presented in the work before us, it may be well briefly to review modern philosophical opinion upon this subject. Perhaps the problem around which has raged this far-resounding conflict, may be most concisely stated in terms like these: "How can man's will be free, and yet his volitions be effects?" All who are interested in this discussion admitting not only human freedom, but also the axiom that every event must have its cause, and that volitions being events, must in some way come under this axiom, feel the necessity of so defining freedom on the one hand, or causation on the other, as to show an otherwise inevitable contradiction. Those who have taken their position on the intuition of freedom, and have endeavored to explain the axiom of causation from that point of view, we here designate Freedomists; while those who follow the reverse process, taking ground on the axiom of causation, and viewing the intuition of freedom from that point of view, we style Necessitarians. Of course this phraseology is not intended to assume the chief point in discussion, namely, that the latter party all deny, or that the former exclusively maintain, man's volitional liberty.

NECESSITARIANISM.

Hobbes, the philosopher of Malmesbury, who has been called the father of English psychology, leads the array of English necessitarians. Starting from the above-mentioned axiom of causation, he held that the will is inevitably decided by the strongest motive.¹ As to liberty, he affirmed that it cannot be predicated of will at all, and is applicable only to external actions, signifying their *necessary* connection with volitions.² More closely, he defines liberty as "the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent,"³

¹ Hobbes's Works (Bohn's ed., London: 1841), Vol. V. p. 344, etc.

² Ibid., Vol. V, *passim*.

³ Ibid., Vol. IV. p. 273.

e.g., as he afterwards illustrates, water is free to run down a river-channel when no impediments are placed across the stream. Concerning the theory of a self-determining will, he says that this supposes the will to be determined by a prior will, and that for the same reason by a will prior to that, and so on in infinite series. "If a man determine himself, the question will still remain: What determined him to determine himself in that manner"?¹ etc. He also held that "denying necessity destroyeth both the decrees and prescience of God Almighty."² As to man's moral intuitions, Hobbes, it is well known, made short work with them: "Fire is to be blamed for burning, and poison for killing, as much as are men for sinning."³ Hobbes, according to Priestley, was the inventor of the doctrine so well known as "philosophical necessity."

Locke, in like manner, denied that freedom can be properly predicated of will, and even ridiculed the great question before us as absurd. He says that the question "whether man's will be free or no is altogether improper, and it is as insignificant to ask whether man's will be free as to ask whether his sleep be swift or his virtue square."⁴ But it is well known that Locke fluctuated in his views of this subject. He elsewhere says explicitly: "Though I cannot have a clearer conception of anything than that I am free, yet I cannot make the freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, *though I see not the way of it.*"⁵

Collins, the contemporary of Locke, vindicates himself from the charges of immorality and atheism by defining liberty precisely as did Edwards after him. "Though I deny *liberty* in a certain meaning of that word, yet I contend for liberty as it signifies a power in man to do as he wills, or pleases. When I affirm *necessity*, I contend only for *moral*

¹ Hobbes's Works, Vol. V. p. 35.

² Ibid., Vol. IV. p. 278.

³ Ibid., Vol. V. p. 53.

⁴ Essay, Book II., Chap. XXI. Lect. 14.

⁵ As quoted by Stewart, Encycl. Brit., Vol. I. p. 143.

necessity, meaning thereby that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determined by his reason and senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which, for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute physical or mechanical necessity.”¹ He then proceeds to show that his theory of will (the same as that of Hobbes), so far from being inconsistent with moral desert, rewards, and punishments, is really their sole foundation. This theory of will and the doctrine of philosophical necessity have been defended by essentially the same arguments until the present time, — arguments best known to the world, however, as expanded and applied, with matchless logical power, by the elder Edwards.² The mystic piety of Bonnet, and the pure spiritual intuition of Edwards, saved them from pushing their theory to the pantheistic extreme of Spinoza on the one hand, and the fatalistic conclusions of Belsham and Diderot on the other.³

FREEDOMISM.

The freedomists, on the other hand, have, as above intimated, taken their stand firmly upon the intuition of liberty,

¹ Philosophical Inquiry, Preface.

² Yet Edwards never read Hobbes, and expressly repudiates his fatalism. See Inquiry, Part. IV., Sec. 6.

³ That this theory of Will is far older than Hobbes may be seen in Lucretius. First we have the causal axiom:

“*De nihilo quoniam fieri nil posse videmus.*”

Then he states the problem:

“Denique, si semper motus connectitur omnis,
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
Unde est haec (inquam) *fatis avolsa voluntas*,
Per quam progredimur, quo ducit quemque voluptas,” etc.

Then comes the testimony of consciousness:

“Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo
Nec regione loci certa, sed uti ipsa tulit mens.”

Cousin might have written the next lines, though with a deeper meaning:

“Nam, dubio procul, hiis rebus *sua quoique voluntas*
Principium dat; et hinc motus per membra rigantur.”

But the Roman's rigid materialism does not allow him to slip from the ada-

and attempted in various modes to adjust it to the causal axiom. The opponents of Hobbes and Collins, having much to say of "self-determining power," and of the "contingency" of volitions, stereotyped these phrases to such a degree in this controversy, that, in one meaning or another, they have ever since been regarded as embodying the doctrines of freedomism. The two great metaphysical difficulties of the freedomists have been so to frame the "self-determining" theory as to avoid the infinite-series argument, suggested by Hobbes,¹ and so skilfully elaborated by Edwards; and so to explain the doctrine of "contingency" as not to deny the axiom that every event must have its cause. The unfortunate efforts in this direction made by the Arian, or rather deistical, freedomist Chubb, have been immortalized by the merciless castigation that they received at the hands of Edwards. Kant affirmed the freedom of the will as a matter of *consciousness*, but avowed his inability to reconcile it with the "general law of natural necessity."² Stewart took the ground that an external motive could not properly be designated an efficient cause. As mind only can have *efficiency* and be a *cause*, in the sense of the axiom, "consequently it is absurd to ascribe the volitions of mind to the efficiency of causes foreign to itself."³ Reid and Hamilton both held that the will is free from external causation, and has "power over its own determinations," and that this constitutes liberty.⁴ Cousin, following M. de Biran,

mantine chain, and so, though abjuring necessity in *name*, he gives us a perfect picture of what was afterwards called the "Liberty of *spontaneity*," the liberty of Hobbes:

"Sed, ne mens ipsa necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agundis,
Et, devicta quasi, cogatur ferre, patique.
Id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum," etc.

Here we see the will *fatis avolsa*, yet fixed by a primordial *clinamen*. — De Rerum Natura (Edit. Delph, et var. Valpy, 1830), Lib. II. 251, etc.

¹ Hobbes's Works, Vol. V. p. 35 (see above).

² Critic of Pure Reason (Eng. ed. and trans., London: W. Pickering, 1838), p. 412, etc.

³ Stewart's Dissertation, Encycl. Brit., Vol. I. p. 266.

⁴ Hamilton's Discourses on Philosophy and Literature, App. I.

in considering will as the self, the personality, makes it a cause which has the power to produce volition directly.¹ Tappan advances from Cousin's position, and makes the important point that it is the special quality of this cause called will "to have the power to make the particular determination without being necessarily correlated to the object."² Hamilton, in reviewing Cousin's theory, insists on liberty of will, but declares that, as an absolute commencement is to him inconceivable, the mode of that liberty is incomprehensible.³ Bledsoe denies that volition is, properly speaking, an effect.⁴ He considers it a phenomenon by itself, and proposes to establish for it a distinct and separate metaphysical category. Cousin's category of cause and effect he proposes to subdivide into two, one giving the relation of cause and effect, and the other that between agent and action.⁵

DR. WHEDON'S WORK.

We are now prepared to indicate what has been accomplished by the work before us. Written confessedly from the freedomist point of view, it yet differs in essential particulars from all the works noticed above. Making new and vital distinctions in ideas hitherto blended under common terms, unfolding with precision and perspicuity thoughts after which others have often been groping in the haze of a cloudy phraseology, it not only gives, from the philosophical and theological points of view, the most thorough criticism of the necessitarian scheme that has yet appeared, but also presents the freedomist scheme as a harmonious and logically compact system. Promptly rejecting, as vague and unsatisfactory, Kant's illusory offer of a "*noumenal* liberty," analyzing the idea of cause more closely than Stewart, and availing himself of the happy thought of Tappan, avoiding the meshes of the infinite-series argument, which it is so

¹ Elements of Psychology (American ed.), Chap. IV.

² Review of Edwards's Inquiry, etc., p. 222.

³ Hamilton's Discourses on Philosophy and Literature (Harper's ed.), p. 587.

⁴ Bledsoe on the Will, sec. 7.

⁵ Bledsoe's Theodicy, p. 154.

hard to shun when we say, with Reid and Hamilton, that the will "has power over its own determinations," holding, with Cousin, that mind has been constituted a cause, and that this is its essential characteristic; and so analyzing the idea of "contingency" that, while holding to it in one sense, he can yet admit as fully as the most rigid necessitarian that volition is an effect, our author takes up his position by admitting, in full force, all that can be claimed by the intuition of freedom on the one side, and by the axiom of causation on the other.

Before proceeding to develop the main positions of the work, we remark that, as a whole, it has evidently been wrought with great care and deliberation, in the patient study and reflection of many years. All sides of the subject seem to have been carefully scrutinized, and whatever success the reader may judge the author to have had in meeting objections, or in maintaining his own position, he will at least, as we judge, award him the merit of candor in stating the objections of his celebrated opponents, of honest fearlessness and conscious power in grappling with all the difficulties of this mighty subject, and of a wise humility, as the vast theme inevitably brings him to the verge of those undiscovered and perhaps undiscoverable regions, whose walls our reason vainly seeks to scale or penetrate.

The work is in three Parts. Part I. states the issue between the freedomist and the necessitarian theory; Part II. reviews the necessitarian theory — mainly as it is stated by Edwards and the Princeton Essayists — under three heads, called respectively the causational, the psychological, and the theological argument; Part III. gives the positive argument for the author's view.

The issue may be stated thus: All admit that the operations of the intellect and of the sensibilities are necessitated. Thought and feeling arise in the mind, when the appropriate objects are presented, as inevitably as any physical effect follows its cause. Is volition, in this sense, dependent upon motive? The necessitarian says "Yes,"

and the freedomist says "No." Some necessitarians state the connection between volition and motive as "philosophical necessity"; others, as "secured certainty"; but it is our author's aim to show that the alleged distinctions between the different kinds of necessity cannot logically be maintained. This brings us at once to the author's reconciliation between the intuition of liberty and the axiom of causation. This is grounded upon

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE WILL.

Will is simply soul intentionally acting: the "power by which man becomes properly an AGENT in the world." It is carefully discriminated from *desire* by our author, under eight heads, which we need not recapitulate, as the distinction—though here defended by new arguments—is now so generally admitted among metaphysicians;¹ and we quote only the remark of Coleridge, endorsed by our author, that "we can conceive a being full of co-existing and contending desires and emotions, but without any power of volition, and so hemmed forever into a circle of passivities."

The act of willing is precisely defined as the *volitional* act, between the preceding intellection, emotion, etc. (called the *pre-volitional* conditions), and the subsequent acts of body and mind, which are *post-volitional* or *voluntary*. In every act, then, we have three distinct elements: first, the pre-volitional conditions; second, the volitional act; and, thirdly, the voluntary act. We note here, in passing, a distinction that solves some fallacies, that the act of willing, itself, is not *voluntary*, and so dependent upon a previous act of will; it is simply *volitional*. "In will, alone of all existences, there is an alternative power. Every species

¹ Plato makes this distinction, showing how desire may draw in one direction and yet will decide in another: e.g. a man may desire to drink, and yet determine not to drink. Cf. Rep. Lib. IV. 439, A. (ed. Stallb.). Aristotle has set it forth so distinctly, that it is surprising how any succeeding philosopher could have missed it. He shows how desire may oppose choice, and so argues a distinction between ἐπιθυμία and προαίρεσις. He says, προαίρεσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Cf. Eth. Nicomach., 40, 14 (ed. Bekker).

of existence has its own one and singular property. Matter alone has solidity; mind alone has intelligence; cause alone has efficiency; and will, alone of causes, has an alternative or pluri-efficient power. It is the existence or non-existence of this power in will which constitutes the dispute between the necessitarian and the freedomist" (p. 14). It is the nature of a physical cause that it is potent for one only effect, i.e. that it is "*unipotent*"; and as we argue concerning mental phenomena from material analogies, we are prone to carry this conception of "*unipotence*" in causes from the realm of matter into that of mind. But universal consciousness, or at least the universal convictions thence arising, correct this conception, and assert that whenever will chooses one of several objects presented, it had full power at that moment to have chosen either of the others *instead*. And, let it be noted, a psychological question like this is not to be settled by deceptive analogies drawn from observation of the outer world, but by a careful scrutiny of the internal phenomena. Because causes are "*unipotent*" in material nature (i.e. because every cause there is followed invariably, under the same conditions, by the same effect), and because, while philosophizing on material phenomena, we can infallibly predict a given effect when we see a given cause, or affirm that such must have been the cause when we see the effect, it by no means follows that we can carry the same principles of reasoning into the infinitely diverse realm of mind. Now the axiom that every event must have a cause, when urged against the freedomist theory of will, has no force, except from the involved assumption that "every cause is unipotent," — the very point in dispute. In fact, in this assumption *is* the whole system of necessitarianism.

Now, as a unipotent cause accounts fully for its one inviolable effect, so an alternative cause accounts as fully for either of its several alternative effects. Will is such an alternative cause, — the only one that we know. When, then, we are asked what caused a given volition, the true and sufficient answer is, "will." To ask still further, what caused

will to produce this volition, is as irrelevant as to ask what caused any other cause to produce its effect; that is, it is to ask "what causes causation?" Under given conditions of atmosphere, etc., the unipotent cause which we call electricity produces certain effects of light and heat; and, under given external and internal conditions of desire and motive, etc., the alternative cause called will produces either one of several volitions; and if we are asked to account for the uniform sequence in the one case, or the alternative sequence in the other, the answer in both cases is the same: "such is the nature of things"; or, "such is the nature of causation." No philosopher feels bound to explain causation.

Having exposed the necessitarian paralogism, and shown that an alternative cause, adequate for either one of several effects, is as truly within the limits of a legitimate causation as a physical or unipotent cause, he proceeds to answer the successive questions: "What causes will to act"? "What causes particular volition"? "Why not the contrary volition"? "What explanation for alternative diversity of results"? He here assumes to show that as a complete unipotent cause truly accounts for its one solely possible result, so a complete alternative cause is an adequate accounting for either one of several possible results. And as it is absurd to ask what causes a unipotent cause, in its proper conditions, to produce its one sole result, so it is absurd to ask in regard to an alternative cause, in its proper conditions, what caused it to put forth its alternative results. A complete cause, whether unipotent or alternative, accounts for its effect, "*for all complete cause puts forth its effect uncausedly.*" Nor is it any more difficult to explain how a free cause attains its alternative result, than how a unipotent cause is limited, circumscribed, and made to converge to its one sole possible effect. That is, free volitional causation is just as explicable as any causation whatever. The author then proceeds, in successive chapters, to refute and to retort the charge of atheistical consequences; to demon-

strate that freedom involves not chance, and that the power of contrary choice is liable to no charge of uselessness.

PLAN OF THE WORK.

At the start, our author takes the position (and this forms the hinge of his whole argument), that the power of counter-choice is indispensable to responsibility. The main body of the work, constituting Part II., considers the necessitarian objections against the existence of this power. Having removed these objections, freedomism may be deemed established by the sense of responsibility, of which it is an indispensable condition. Part II. assumes freedomism, and shows that it is not invalidated by the necessitarian arguments. Part III. proves it by positive argument.

As it is impossible, within these limits, to follow out with any degree of fulness the author's plan of treatment, we shall endeavor only to present his leading positions, following still a topical arrangement, which will bring out the fundamental points in controversy.

FREEDOM OF WILL.

The definition of liberty as given by Hobbes, "I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will,"¹ repeated by Collins, as quoted above, and endorsed by Edwards,² simply makes the freedom of will the same thing as freedom of external action. Now the question is not, whether the body can do what the mind wills; that is, not whether the body is under restraint or coaction in carrying out the commands of the will, but whether the will itself is necessarily limited to a sole volition. In other words, the freedom of which Hobbes speaks is not *volitional* but *voluntary* freedom.

Some necessitarian philosophers, especially the extreme school of Lock, who state explicitly that this liberty of *voluntary* action is all that man is capable of, and that liberty can in no sense be predicated of will, have at least the

¹ Hobbes's Works, Vol. IV. p. 240.

² Inquiry, Part I., Sect. 5.

merit of logical consistency; but there is no propriety in professing to prove freedom of *will*, and then proceeding at once to prove an external freedom to obey will; i. e. freedom of *external* or post-volitional *action*. Calvin saw this impropriety, and pointedly rebukes the absurdity of calling a man's will free because his voluntary action is not hindered. He says, it is very true that we may say a man possesses "free-will" because he acts voluntarily; but asks, "*what end could it answer to decorate a thing so diminutive with a title so superb?*" "Egregious liberty indeed!"¹ he ironically cries out. It is not generally realized that Edwards does not pretend that the will is free. He follows Locke in asserting that liberty cannot properly be predicated of will. "To talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense and nonsense by the original and proper signification of words."² He shows, on the other hand, in various ways, what could scarcely ever have been doubted, that his "philosophical necessity" does not hinder *voluntary* action, while the real objection to it is, that it effectually and necessitatively controls *volitional* action. One of the "prevailing notions concerning the freedom of the will" which he bent his giant energies to dissipate, was, that it is not to "speak good sense" to "talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself." Yet many imagine that his great work shows how the will can be free, while yet all its volitions are necessitated. But this last task he was too keen a logician to undertake.

Hobbes, as before mentioned, more precisely defines liberty thus: it is the "absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent."³ It is here that he gives the much-quoted illustration: "water is said to descend freely, or to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impedi-

¹ Inst. Christ. Relig., Lib. II., Cap. 2.

² Inquiry, Part I., Sect. 5.

³ Hobbes's Works, Vol. IV. p. 274.

ments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the *liberty* to ascend, but the *faculty* or *power*, because the impediment is in the nature of the water and *intrinsic*." So if man be free from *extrinsic* necessitation, though all his volitions be *intrinsically* necessitated, he is by the definition of Mr. Hobbes enjoying all the liberty of which he is capable. Let there be no external impediment in the way of the *manifestation* of the volition, and no matter how man comes by the volition, whether by adamantine causation crowding in upon the will from without, whether by creation, or fatalistic necessity; yet, by the theory of Hobbes, and of Edwards also, the man is not only free, but has all the liberty of which human nature is capable.

PROFESSOR HAVEN'S THEORY OF FREEDOM

The definition of liberty given by professor Haven, in his generally excellent Mental Philosophy, is essentially that of Hobbes, although his application of it is widely different. "Any faculty of the mind or organ of the body is free *when its own specific and proper action is not hindered.*"¹ Professor Haven, however, carefully discriminates between freedom of action and freedom of will, and in application of his definition makes it the "specific and proper action" of the will to put forth volitions according to the "inclination."² When there is no hinderance to our putting forth volitions "as we are inclined," the will is free. But this "inclination" is of course necessitated, for all the action of the sensibilities is necessitated. Circumstances fix the inclinations, the inclinations fix the choice, and the choice fixes the volition. Here, to use Dr. Whedon's illustration, are four ninepins in a row. No. 1 (representing circumstances) knocks down No. 2, No. 2 knocks down No. 3, and that No. 4, which is the volition. No. 4 is (by the theory) "free," in falling, but that freedom "consists in the absoluteness of its being knocked down by No. 3, as that is by its predecessors." The lengthening of the series only pushes the necessitation

¹ Mental Philosophy, p. 538.

² Ibid., p. 545.

further out of sight, but there it is, after all. But Professor Haven tells us that we may indirectly modify these "inclinations" by *shaping our character*.¹ But how can we shape our character except by volition, and is not that volition determined by previous "*inclinations*"? This theory, then, only gives us liberty in words; it makes a promise which it cannot fulfil.

AUTHOR'S DEFINITION OF FREEDOM.

Our author thus defines freedom of will: "Supposing a given volition to be in the agent's contemplation, it is the unrestricted power of putting forth, in the same unchanged circumstances, another volition *INSTEAD*" (p. 25). The last word in this definition is important, as showing the true meaning of the phrase "power of contrary choice." By this is *not* meant "ability to put forth two acts at the same time; choosing as one does, and as he does not,"² but ability to put forth another volition instead of the one actually put forth. This the author shows (as we judge) to be the freedom necessary as the foundation of moral obligation, the freedom assumed in all allegations of responsibility, in all expressions of praise and blame,—the freedom that makes God's moral government a possibility.

In defining freedom, our author also, in peculiar phraseology, marks a distinction, of which he makes great use throughout his work. He sets it forth thus: "Freedom is exemption. Either it is exemption from some impediment to the performance of some act, which is freedom *to* the act; or it is an exemption from a limitation, confinement, or compulsion to perform the act, and this is a freedom in direction *from* the act. To non-volitional objects there belongs only the first of these two freedoms. All mechanisms are free only *to* the sole mode of act or state in which they are, or are about to be. The clock that strikes is free not *from* but only *to* the stroke. The river that flows (and this remark meets precisely the illustration of Hobbes) is free

¹ Mental Philosophy, p. 548.

² Bib. Sacra, Vol. XX. p. 323.

only *to* the current, but not *from* An agent, exempt only from impediment, and so free only *to* the act, has not the proper freedom of a volitional agent, but of a machine. As the clock-hammer, in the given case, is free only *to* the stroke, so the agent, in the given case, is free *to* the given volition, and not also in direction *from* it. He has only the freedom of a mechanical object, not the freedom of a volitional agent" (pp. 23, 24). Now it will be found that no necessitarian scheme yet invented embraces both these kinds of freedom at the same time. When closely analyzed and logically run out, every such scheme proves to be simply the clock-hammer liberty, and no more.

THE INFINITE-SERIES OBJECTION.¹

It will be noticed that the distinction between "voluntary" and "volitional" avoids this objection entirely. Because our outward acts are always preceded by a volition, it by no means follows that the same thing is true of volitional acts. Yet this is the assumption on which the infinite-series objection is based, and from which comes all its force. The famous phrase, "self-determining power of the will" is, however, highly objectionable, from its manifold ambiguities, and is consequently discarded by our author, unless when carefully explained. Thus "self" may refer to "power," or to "will," or to the agent possessing both; and "will," in this phrase, sometimes means the faculty, and sometimes the act of the faculty. It is not wonderful that so skilful a logician as Edwards found the phrase to involve infinite absurdities.

Edwards proposes the question: "What determines the will?" yet really proceeds to discuss the question: "*What causes the particular volition?*"² Our author is the first, as far as we know, to point out that these two questions are really identical, — the same question in different words. Hence they are met with the same answer. The will, in its proper conditions, is a complete cause of its effect. When it

¹ See Edwards's Inquiry, Part II., Sect. 1.

² Ibid., Part I., Sect. 2.

is asked then, "What determines it to that effect?" i.e. "What causes it to cause that particular effect?" the answer is "NOTHING WHATEVER," for a complete cause needs nothing *to cause it to cause* its effect. A cause needs no subsidiary cause *to cause it to cause*. The will therefore, when in its proper causal conditions, requires no determiner; and thus "the tail of the infinite series is at once cut off."

Of the several "evasions" which Edwards invents and bestows upon Freedomists, Dr. Whedon accepts neither, since his answer differs from them all. If the will, in its conditions, is not determined at all, then it is unnecessary to tell how or by what it is determined.

NATURAL AND MORAL ABILITY.

It is a universal conviction of man's moral nature, that power must underlie obligation. If then, man ought to choose what he does not, he must have volitional power adequate to such choice. If volition always follows the strongest motive, then God always requires of the sinner a volition contrary to the strongest motive-force. What now is the basis of this requirement? By the hypothesis there is a volitional powerlessness, called by necessitarians "moral inability;" and is any basis for God's requirement of volition furnished by showing that the sinner has power to perform some outward act *after* he has willed? It is *volitional* act that God's law requires; and by the hypothesis there is no volitional power. And, be it noted, it is *volitional* rather than *voluntary* acts that all God's commands require. Every man who is punished for sin is punished for not resisting the strongest motive; a thing that, by the Edwardean theory, no man ever did or ever can do. The conclusion does seem inevitable, that, upon this theory, in every case of disobedience, God's command is disobeyed because he has so constituted things that it cannot be obeyed. The "ability" which Edwards makes the basis of human responsibility he himself shows to be as utterly out of man's reach, and therefore unavailable, as if it were in another world. To

command a human sinner to do a holy deed does seem, on this theory, as inconsistent as to command him to grind corn with a water-power on the planet Herschell.

Our author gives an extended and thorough criticism of the whole Edwardean doctrine of "natural and moral ability" (pp. 239-271). Edwards is shown, conclusively as it seems to us, to have made here a distinction illusory, if not sophistical; and first, to have demonstrated in behalf of the doctrine of necessity the non-existence of volitional power against the strongest motive force, which he calls "moral inability;" while secondly, in behalf of the demands of responsibility, he contradictorily maintains that this "inability" is properly no inability at all, for, as he says, the word cannot properly be applied to choice, but only to actions sequent upon choice. Our author shows that this so-called "moral cannot" has no basis in human language or literature; that the whole theory is metaphysically baseless, and leads to pulpit sophistry and equivocation.

POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.

"Contrary choice" is another objectionable phrase, giving rise to the plausibly sounding objection: "What is the use of a power that is never used?" The question might be retorted with some pertinence upon the advocates of a "natural ability" which is declared to be the basis of responsibility, and yet is ever utterly out of reach. But the force of the objection vanishes when it is seen that by "*contrary* choice" is meant simply *alternative* choice,—power to choose something else instead. But again, and this reply is unavailing for those who maintain the "invariable sequence theory," the objector presupposes that there is a certain class or kind of motives which is never used, while the fact is that no such class exists *previous* to volition. The unused class is constituted such by the very act of volition. The question then is irrelevant, for all motives are alike "used" in the volitional act. This leads us naturally to the

NATURE OF MOTIVE INFLUENCES.

Though such a criticism should be made with extreme caution, in examining the conclusions of so close a reasoner as Edwards, it yet seems difficult to extricate his fundamental argument from "the vicious circle." In answer to the question: "What determines the will?" he replies: "It is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is strongest."¹ And then, when he comes to define and settle the meaning of the phrase "strongest motive," he includes in it everything in the external world and in the mind itself which has "strength, tendency, or advantage to move or excite"² the will. Is not this saying simply this: "The will is determined by that which determines it?" And who would, who could, dispute this? Certainly it may, with great justice, be claimed that Edwards never has been and never can be answered, if his fundamental argument is an identical proposition.

Dr. Whedon does not, however, take any advantage of this fallacy of statement; but proceeds at once to give the necessitarian doctrine of motives the most critical and thorough review that can be found on record. At the outset he warns us against the danger of error from the abundant use of physical terms in this discussion, such as, "highest," "strongest," "weightiest," as applied to motives. Mathematics cannot be applied to quantities and weights of thought. This assumption of perfect commensurability of motives, and consequent power of accurate calculation of volitions, provided there be a perfect insight of motives, is altogether baseless. "The qualities of thought may be comparable without being commensurable."

"The comparability of motives may be supposably ascertained either from extra-volitional or from volitional sources. Thus we may compare the different degrees of excitement in an emotion, a moral feeling, a desire, a fear, a sense of obligation. Some we may know to be prevolitionally and

¹ Inquiry, Part II., Sect. 2.² Ibid.

intrinsically intenser than others. But prevolitional impressions are not so properly motives in themselves, but in their relation to the will. What is, in truth, meant by the highest or strongest motive must be derived from the will itself; and thence we have this definition, which is all-important to this discussion, that *the so-called strength of a motive is the comparative prevalence which the will assigns it in its own action.* Or, otherwise, it is *the nearness with which the will comes to acting according with or to it.* Volitionally considered (the only true mode of consideration), the so-called strength of a motive may be again defined the *degree of probability that the will will choose in accordance with or on account of it.* And it is most important to remark that the result is not always, nor in most cases necessarily, as the highest probability. The will may choose for the higher or the lower. And as the will may choose for a lower rather than for a higher probability, so it may choose on account of what is called antecedently a weaker over a stronger motive. . . . That result is not necessarily as the highest probability is shown in the doctrine of contingencies, or probabilities. The chance may be improbable, and yet may prove successful. So the volition calculably improbable may become the actual. On the contrary, there may be the highest probability and yet a failure. And this is equivalent to saying, that there may be the strongest motive and yet the will reject it. . . . Relatively to the prevolitional faculties the strongest motive often fails; relatively to the will the strongest motive is but another term for the accorded motive" (p. 129, etc.).

Estimating, then, the influence of motives upon the future decisions of a given human will is but a calculation of probabilities. The highest probability may fail, the lowest succeed. Here then we come upon the real meaning of the word "contingency" as applied to volitions. As thus applied it is to be carefully discriminated from "accident" and "chance." Viewed from without, volitions may be styled contingent, because to the observer it is uncertain which

way they will turn ; but, viewed from within, there is nothing accidental about them ; they are simply free. " While freedom is the intrinsic quality of the agent in volition, contingency is the exterior view of the same thing." We call events accidental because we are ignorant of their causes ; for even the upturning of a given face of a die depends on hidden causes, such as delicate muscular movements, etc., which, could they be repeated, would give the same result again. We call it " chance," because the cause is concealed from us ; but volitions are contingent because of the very alternative nature of the cause. " There is a phenomenal resemblance " between freedom in volitions and " chance," but it is only phenomenal, for "*the essential base is different.*" Edwards's objections to what he calls " Arminian contingency " (cf. Inquiry, Part II., Sect. 8) are thus completely obviated.

This explanation of the real meaning of " motive strength " lets in light on many obscurities, and dissipates many sophistries. Take for instance the problem of Sir William Hamilton :

" On the supposition that the sum of the influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to volition A is equal to 12, and the sum of counter-volition B equal to 8, can we conceive that the determination of volition A should not be necessary ? We can only conceive the volition B to be determined by supposing that the man creates (calls from non-existence into existence) a certain supplement of influences. But this creation, as actual, or in itself, is inconceivable, and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceivable act we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined to exert it. We thus in thought never escape determination and necessity. It will be observed that I do not consider this inability to volition any disproof of the fact of free-will."¹ Here is a problem that Hamilton deemed insoluble ; but in the light of the above explanation of the true meaning of " strength of motive," we

¹ Note to Reid, p. 611.

find this solution which we are confident must satisfy every mind.

“No creation or calling-power from nonexistence is, we reply, needed in the case. The numerals 8 and 12 are but representations of the different degrees of anterior probability that the will will decide in favor of A or B. It is a chance as two to three that the agent will decide for A; but this does not settle the question as in a counter-action of mechanical forces. The weaker probability may, in strict accordance with the doctrine of probabilities, receive the accord of the will, and B may, without any contradiction to any existing truth, be chosen. What is wanting is not creation of new power, but use of power already in existence” (p. 138).

The relative strength of motives, it will be seen, becomes from this point of view relative degree of probability that the will will choose thus or thus; and to ask as does Edwards: “What motive can there be to choose for the weaker motive?” is to ask: “What probability is there in favor of the lesser probability?” Edwards’s questions, whether there can be choice without motive, and against superior motive (as in the supposed case of the man with two different kinds of food before him, for one of which he has a superior appetite), his argument by approximation (if invincible inducements destroy liberty, half as strong inducements half destroy it; etc.), and his argument that if motives do not necessitate volition exhortations are in vain, all find satisfactory answer here. The commensurability of motives is then amply discussed, wherein it is shown that while the necessitarian theory supposes an accurate balance and measurement of conflicting motives to be possible, yet a cold intellection and a warm emotion, a sense of duty and a sentiment of taste, a moral obligation and a physical appetite, are as incomparable and as incommensurable with each other as, “a pound and a rod,” or as “the weight of a rock and the honor of a gentleman.” Under this head it is also shown that the will is not always as the “greatest ap-

parent good." Having settled these principles the author then proceeds to refute the main arguments on which Edwards depends to prove that motives necessitate volition. Here are met the assumptions that for the will to act *in accordance* with a motive, and for it to *be caused* to act by the motive, are the same; that "if the acts of the will are excited by motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited," and "necessary causes" also. Edwards's argument from a series of equivalent terms, or pseudo-synonymes, in reply to Mr. Chubb, his objections that if the will be not causatively necessitated, then it is insanely loose from all reason, and that freedomism involves a "heap of inconsistencies," are thoroughly discussed, and, as we judge, fairly refuted. Still further, we have chapters on uniformities of volition, and on double volition; and Edwards's elaborate and finely spun argument concerning the necessity of the Divine volitions (Inquiry, Part IV. Sect 8) crumbles utterly away, as it is shown to confound *similarity* and *identity*.

Will is the real cause of volitions; motives, the normal conditions. The motive may exist, and yet there is full power in the will to put forth or to withhold the volition. But if the motive influence be solely on one side, and no alternative present to the mind, then there are not the requisite conditions for counter-choice. Here there is, in the given case, an objective limit to freedom. That is, on this supposition, freedom and responsibility vanish together. But, it is important to add, if the absence of these conditions indispensable to a right volition is itself the result of the agent's free action, then is he justly held responsible for depriving himself of the power of right doing.

The Edwardean (i.e. the Hobbesian) theory of the causal character of motives naturally leads us to the subject of

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

Sir William Hamilton has said (what all will admit) that "the assertion of absolute necessity is virtually the negative of a moral universe, consequently of the moral governor of

a moral universe ; in a word [it is the assertion] of atheism. Fatalism and atheism are, indeed, convertible terms. The only valid arguments for the existence of a God and for the immortality of the soul rest on the ground of man's moral nature ; consequently, if that moral nature be annihilated, which in any scheme of necessity it is, every conclusion established on such a nature is annihilated also."¹ Now as Hobbes, Belsham, Diderot, Hume, and Comte make this identical theory of strongest motive force to involve "absolute necessity," it is a most interesting question how Edwards, whose whole religious nature repudiated such a consequence, could yet logically avoid it. He calls his doctrine "philosophical necessity," which he tells us is properly no "necessity," but only "certainty." But is not this a distinction in name and not in nature ? What is this "philosophical necessity" ? He gives us, as illustrations of it, things "necessary in their own nature," as the attributes of God and mathematical axioms ; things that have already happened, historical events ; things "surely and firmly connected with something else that is necessary" in one of these respects.² In regard to foreknown volitions, he tells us that it is "impossible" but that they should come to pass, "as impossible that they should fail of existence as if they had already existed."³ With still greater decisiveness, if possible, he states that the difference between natural and moral necessity "lies not so much in the NATURE of the connection as in the two terms connected."⁴ Can necessity be conceived more absolute than this ? In fact, does not the last quotation admit that *all* necessity, by whatever adjectives qualified, is in *nature* one ? With what propriety, then, is it asserted that this is "improperly" designated necessity ? If volitions are as necessary as the attributes of God, or as the equality of the radii of a circle, as necessary in *nature* as any physical events whatever, could any fatal-

¹ Lectures on Metaphysics (Gould and Lincoln's ed.), Lect. XL. p. 556.

² Inquiry, Part I., Sect. 3.

³ Ibid., Part II., Sect. 12.

⁴ Ibid., Part I., Sect. 4.

ism make them more so? Whether this be "properly called" necessity or not, is a comparatively trivial question of lexicography; but we are now concerned with the infinitely graver question: Have we not here the *fact* which men usually express by the words "absolute necessity"? Hence Dr. Chalmers tells us that Hume, Kames, and the fatalists of that day "triumphed in the book of Edwards, as that which set a conclusive seal on their principles."¹ Edwards, of course, expressly disclaims fatalism;² but if the foregoing quotations are set by the side of this disclaimer, they only show, as it seems to us, that he attempted to hold both sides of a logical contradiction. The fact is, that Edwards disclaims only the belief in any restraint or coercion upon man's *external action*. He objects to the words "necessity," "impossible," etc., because they seem to imply a resistance of the will,³ while *his* necessity goes deeper than this, and controls the will itself. He says, speaking of the Stoics, "whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a fate as is repugnant to any liberty *consisting in our doing as we please*, I utterly deny such a fate."⁴ We know of no fatalist on record, at least in modern times, who did not believe in as much freedom as this. The very gist of fatalism is, that there is an external power fastened, *not* upon the bodily machinery, which carries out volitions, but upon *the will itself*. Thus, for example, writes Diderot, in which quotation it will be noted that unconstrained *voluntary action* is granted, while yet freedom is utterly denied:

"There are not, and cannot be, free beings We can no more conceive a being acting without motive, than we can one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit which we catch at our birth, of confounding the VOLUNTARY and the FREE." And Diderot's conclusion from this is, "if

¹ Inst. of Theol., Vol. II., Chap. II

² Inquiry, Part IV., Sect. 6.

³ Ibid., Part I., Sect. 3.

⁴ Ibid., Part IV., Sect. 6.

there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom. Besides this, all is prejudice and false philosophy.”¹

And still more; Edwards asserts, with great emphasis, liberty of external action, while insisting with equal emphasis on necessitated volitions. Which is worse, to fasten fetters on the body or the soul? And if the value of the soul above the body can be estimated, that will show precisely how much worse is the necessity that he teaches, than the fatalism that he so earnestly repudiates.

NECESSITARIAN EVASIONS.

As already shown, Dr. Whedon's fundamental position is, that necessity is utterly incompatible with responsibility. In Part II., Sect. ii., ch. 11, he reviews at length various attempts to harmonize these contradictions. Dr. Emmons took the high, bold position that we are responsible for evil volitions, even though they were created and put into us. In this chapter our author shows that this view is as agreeable to the reason and moral sense as are any modern attempts at reconciliation between necessity and responsibility. The scheme which maintains responsibility for a necessitated *nature*, or that which, rejecting this, locates it in necessitated *action*; the theory of responsibility for a *spontaneous* necessity to put forth a given volition without any counter power; and that of spontaneous necessity by reason of *invariable non-usance* of counter power, — all are shown to exclude responsibility with equal effectiveness. No matter what the *source* of this necessitation, God or second causes; no matter what the *mode*, by creation, secondary causation, or insertion; the *point* on which it is imposed, body, mind, intellect, sensibilities, or will, or the *result* necessitated to exist, volition, nature, state, or action, — in every case it equally and totally excludes responsibility.

¹ Quoted from Stewart's Works, Vol. VI. p. 379.

INVARIABLE SEQUENCES. SECURED CERTAINTY.

Our author devotes a chapter (p. 214) to Hume's theory of causation, as applied by himself, Mill, Comte, and the materialists generally to the phenomena of will, and also partially adopted by some Christian philosophers, who admit real causation in physics, but substitute therefor "invariable sequence," when they come to treat of volitional effects. Mr. Hume supposed that his removal of the idea of power from causation, and resolving it into the simple sequence of antecedent and consequent, would settle forever the controversy upon necessity. This is also Mr. Mill's plan of escape from the perplexities of this question. When we realize, he tells us, that this necessity in actions is but "uniformity in the order" with which they follow motives, and that there is no "mystical tie" binding the action to the motive, that is, no causational power in the motive, no one's feelings will object to the necessity of volitions. This idea of causational power, it is, he tells us, that "conflicts with our consciousness and revolts our feelings. We are certain that, in the case of our volitions, there is not this mysterious constraint. . . . But neither is any such mysterious compulsion now supposed, by the best authorities, to be exercised by *any* cause over its effect. Those who think that causes draw their effects after them by a mystical tie, are right in believing that the relation between volitions and their antecedents is of another nature. But they should go further, and admit that this is also true of all other effects and their antecedents. If such a tie be considered to be involved in the word "necessity," the doctrine is not true of human actions, but neither is it true of inanimate objects. It would be more correct to say that matter is *not* bound by necessity, than that matter *is* so."¹

On this theory, then, the will is no more necessitated to put forth a given volition than is the leaf to fall, or the stream to run down an inclined plane; but it is just as

¹ Mill's *System of Logic* (Harper's ed.), p. 522.

much so. Mr. Mill objects strongly to the word "necessity"; but yet admits, yea claims, that it is just as applicable to volitions as to any other effects. Certainly, to average mankind, this will furnish little relief.

We now briefly present our author's view upon this theory, that volitions alone, of all effects, are subject to the law of invariable sequence, and that the will possesses power for counter volition, but 'never uses it. The theory is, that an agent always *can* but never *will* choose otherwise. This is held to be the true *certainty* :

"All volitional certainty thereby presupposes a one particular kind of condition, namely, strongest antecedent motive force, and a particular kind of result, namely, obedience to the strongest motivity under a particular law, namely, invariable succession upon major force. Any event or futurity not under such condition or law is absurd chance or lawless uncertainty. Such law of uniformity or spontaneity of obedient action under condition of superior force is seen to be absolute, not merely in all experienced cases, so as to be an induction, but in all possible cases, so as to be seen super-experimentally and intuitively true, and therefore it is self-evident and axiomatic. It would be intuitively true, as the contradictory of lawless chance, upon an infinite number of repetitions of an infinite number of cases ; so that it is a strictly absolute and true universality. As the sole exemption from a self-contradictory chance, it is apodictical, and (so we infer) a necessity. But by them it is named *certainty*, and held to be the only true certainty, as distinguished from necessity on one side and chance on the other" (p. 220, etc.).

Our author makes seven points against this theory, which it would be injustice to him to merely recapitulate, and our limits will not allow us to give them with any degree of fullness. It will probably be more satisfactory to the reader to see one or two of them developed somewhat in detail.

The first point is, that the advocates of this theory must unite with the Arminians in refuting the main body of

Edwards on the Will. Edwards maintains, not the *non-usance* but the *non-existence* of counter-power. "At start, he excludes 'power of choosing otherwise in a given case' as an unthinkability.¹ His argument of the infinite-series boastfully reduces the *conception* of diverse power to infinities of infinities of contradictions.² His causational argument knows only inalterative cause, and the effect of any other sort of cause is (to him) a causeless effect.³ He identifies the necessity of a past event and of a future event as one.⁴ His reduction of free-will to atheism proves, if anything, that the supposition of the existence of a power of counter-choice logically supposes the non-existence of God. His identification of will with desire excludes the possibility of a counter-volition as truly as of a counter-sensation.⁵ His argument against liberty of indifference excludes all power for will to flow but in a certain channel.⁶ All activity is, with him, a passivity.⁷ All causality is exhausted in the result.⁸ Withdraw these arguments and what is left of Edwards? A valueless shell from which the kernel has been completely extracted. To deny that Edwards taught pure necessity as distinct from certainty, non-existence as distinct from non-usance [of counter-power], is as absurd as to deny that Euclid taught geometry" (p. 221, etc). It will, then, be seen that the theologians who teach non-usance in distinction from the non-existence of counter-power, must first unite with the Arminians in refuting Edwards, and then their issue with Edwards will be succeeded by an issue with the Arminians also.

Again: "It is also said to be true that *nobody does as well as he can*; and so there is a *can be* which never *will be*. Distributively or individually that is not true. People often do as well as they can. Our Lord testified of one that "she hath done what she could." People sometimes, but not usually, do as bad as they can in the given case. But

¹ Whedon, p. 29.

² Ibid., p. 122.

³ Ibid., p. 157.

⁴ Ibid., p. 63.

⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

⁶ Ibid., p. 184.

⁷ Ibid., p. 180.

⁸ Ibid. p. 97.

the maxim may mean, collectively, *nobody through his whole life does as well as he can*. It may be true distributively (cf. p. 132) that an agent is able to choose, in each and every single instance, for the rightest and best, without being able to choose *always* rightest and best. This high collective *can*, therefore, is not true" (p. 225).

On the doctrine of "secured certainty" we simply extract a few sentences. "Pure certainty, as in the proper place we define the word, and as distinct from necessity, is not predicable of, nor to be identified with, invariable sequence, or with the relation between the antecedent and consequent of such a relation. This, our pure certainty, is the simple futuration of an event which is possible to be otherwise. To add that such a certainty is limited to a sole condition of strongest antecedent force, and is ruled and fixed by a law of sequence, and to a sole result, furnishes new elements not belonging to the idea of a pure futuration. This becomes a certainty of a special class of the entire genus, which is really no certainty at all. For if the so-called certain act is formulated by a previous fixed universal law, selecting a particular set or sort of facts, then to this law it *must* conform, and this is necessity. To secure a thing, truly and absolutely, is to make an opposite thing impossible. The securing the previous certainty of the event can be done only by *securing the event itself* in the future by which such certainty is caused or shaped, and to secure the event is to destroy the power of contrariety, and transform the whole into necessity" (p. 227). On this scheme of invariability, "all guilt has this excuse and justification, that there is no being in the universe, high or low, finite or infinite, that in the same category, namely of strongest motive, would not commit the same guilty act" (p. 235).

FOREKNOWLEDGE.

We can but allude to the "theological argument," constituting the third section of Part II. The necessitarian argument from foreknowledge is first examined through four

strong chapters, in which, while the author admits, as fully as the most rigid predestinarian, that God has entire and definite prescience of all human volitions, actual and possible, he yet insists that it is possible, in each case, for man to put forth a different volition. God having implanted in man this alternative power of will, knows in every given case that the agent willing a certain way has full power to will another way instead. His knowing, infallibly, which way the agent will choose, does not negative his knowing that the agent has full power for diverse choice. The whole question, then, becomes one concerning the nature of man, rather than the necessity of events. It is removed from metaphysics to psychology. If the alternative power of will be proved, and thus the psychological question settled, the metaphysical question will take care of itself. The question: "Can God foreknow volitions?" changes to this: "Can God make a being with alternative will?" We think that consciousness and the sense of moral obligation reply that he can. The whole necessitarian argument from foreknowledge goes on two assumptions: first, that God can know future events only as we do, by seeing them wrapped up in their causes, or, as our author expresses it, that God can know the future only by travelling thither "over the bridge of causation"; and second, that God is the real cause, mediately or immediately, of all that transpires. "He can know only what he has determined to do," is the gist of the argument.

NECESSITATED SIN AND VIRTUE.

We have also a chapter on the free moral agency of our Saviour, in reply to the argument of Edwards, that his character furnishes a decisive example of necessitated virtue.¹ Other chapters follow on the freedom of the divine will, the responsibility of obdurates, and the "equation of probational advantages." Whatever the reader may judge the author's success to have been, it is obvious that he has overlooked

¹ Inquiry, Part III., Sect. 2.

none of the difficulties of the subject. He has not rashly rushed among these awful themes; they have been the topics of his careful thought through studious and prayerful years. We can but glance at the

POSITIVE ARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION.

Here, in the first place, comes the argument from consciousness. It is objected that mind can cognize only its actual operations, and so cannot be conscious of volitions never put forth. But the claim is, that mind is conscious, not of these non-existent operations, but of *power* to put them forth; and of this it is certainly conscious, if conscious of any power whatever. Before putting forth any volition, mind is always conscious of this alternative power. We have, then, a positive argument from the possibility of the divine command. The "distinction between automatic excellence and moral desert" is then drawn, clearly and powerfully, and "created moral desert" is shown to be impossible. An argument follows from "God's non-authorship of sin," in which it is shown that while Edwards nowhere else in the Inquiry aggressively maintains necessitation, he recoils when he reaches this topic, and defends the Arminian theory of *non-prevention*. The work closes with the conclusion that freedom is the condition of a possible theodicy (or theodice, as the author prefers to spell the word). The system of necessity, in whatever form presented, must, when run out to its logical consequences, make God an automatic deity, and man an automatic creature, the universe a vast automatism. Whether this automatism be considered an "orery that moves by a force from without," or one "that moves in the same orbit by an intrinsic force," in either case we reach the same fearful result,—responsibility is excluded, and moral government made impossible. "Either there is no divine government, or man is a non-necessitated moral agent."

In conclusion, we feel confident that this work will take its place as a valuable original contribution to the theological

literature of our land. The reader will find it no scrap-book of old statements, arguments, and opinions; everything has passed through the author's alembic; its faults and its virtues are all his own. Of course, doctrinal statements and inferences like these must expect to undergo a fiery ordeal of criticism. To expect that this work will pass unscathed through such a trial would be chimerical enough. In its style and expression, often quaint and sometimes eccentric, incidental verbal coinage, and occasional controversial sharpness, there will be found, by those who do not care to go deeper, ample material for one style of criticism; while the author's thorough handling of the most vital topics of Christian theology must inevitably bring him into collision with candid and long established opinions that are widely prevalent in the church. But there never before has been a time when all the brethren of the great Christian family have been so ready to sit down and calmly take counsel together. All stand to-day upon land shaken with mighty and far-resounding controversies; all alike hear the tremendous questions on whose solution hangs the possibility of a Christian philosophy; and as, age after age, we slowly penetrate these realms of awful shadow and baffling mystery, all alike, who are suffused with the Master's spirit, will hail with shoutings the faintest taper-gleam upon the path.

ARTICLE VI.

EGYPTOLOGY, ORIENTAL TRAVEL AND DISCOVERY.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

THE identification of the hieroglyphic group *Aperi-u* or *Apuruju*, as the Egyptian name for the Hebrews, already mentioned in this Journal,¹ is endorsed by the high authority of Dr. Heinrich Brugsch. M. Chabas of Chalon-sur-Saone was the first to call attention to this name as found in two reports of a commissary of Ramses II. This officer makes a return of the rations furnished by him to these *Aperi-u* = *Hiberi-m*, who were employed upon the public works. In noticing the monograph of M. Chabas, Dr. Brugsch calls attention to this reading as giving a special historical significance to the papyri in which the name occurs; adding, "the Hebrews are therein described as foreigners, who under Ramses II. were compelled to haul stone for building the city Ramses."²

If this curious identification shall be generally admitted by Egyptologists, it will go far to determine the date of the exodus. Ramses II. is assigned by Lepsius, Bunsen, and Brugsch to the third term of the 19th dynasty, — the two former dating his reign from 1388 B.C.; the latter, from 1407 B.C. Poole places him 1340 B.C., Palmer at 1486 B.C., while Uhlemann and Seyffarth assign him to the 18th dynasty, and at about 1690 B.C. All Egyptologists agree in ascribing to Ramses II. immense public works, and a reign of more than sixty years.

Manetho styles him Ramses Miammoun, and assigns to him a reign of sixty-six years; and Boeckh, in his chronological tabulation of Manetho's dynasties, dates the commencement of this reign at 1411 B.C.³ Here, then, is an extreme range of three hundred years between the different schools of Egyptian chronology, within which the period of Ramses II. falls; and within which also falls the date of the exodus according to the received chronology of the Bible. The term "*Aperi-u*" is clearly an ethnic name, and is applied to some foreign race held in subjection in Egypt, and compelled to labor upon the public works of Ramses II. If these can fairly be identified with the Hebrews, then it will only remain to fix the date of one of the most prominent monarchs of the 18th or the 19th dynasty.

The new Journal of Egyptian Philology and Archaeology, edited by Dr. Brugsch, promises to be of great value to students in this department. It is published monthly by J. C. Hinrichs of Leipsic, in numbers of ten or twelve pages quarto. Each number contains one or more plates of hiero-

¹ Bib. Sacra, Vol. XX. pp. 881 – 883 (Oct. 1863)

² Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Alterthumskunde, p. 28.

³ Manetho und die Hundsstern periode, von August Böckh, p. 391.

glyphic text, with an accompanying dissertation upon the subject-matter, and a translation. Then follow critical notices of recent works on Egyptology, and correspondence from scholars in this specialty. Among the topics discussed in the earlier numbers are the recently-discovered lists of the Egyptian Nomes or districts, as registered under the Ptolemies; and the phonetic value of the *Phallus* group, so common in the hieroglyphic writing. The recent exploration, by captain Speke, of the head-waters of the Nile, calls forth an interesting paper from Dr. Brugsch on the sources of the Nile, as indicated by occasional references to the subject in the most ancient Egyptian monuments. The conclusion arrived at is, that in the earliest geography of the Egyptians, the Nile was supposed to issue from two whirlpools or rocky vortices in the vicinity of Elephantine. This belief shows that the Egyptians had not explored the head-waters of their river.

Dr. Sepp's "Jerusalem and the Holy Land," whose First Part was announced in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1862, is now completed, and makes two volumes octavo, pp. 781 and 791. A very thorough index, covering sixty-seven pages, printed in double-columns, is appended to the second volume. The work is illustrated by more than four hundred woodcuts, well executed, and representing natural scenery, ancient monuments and remains, modern buildings, plans of temples, palaces, cities, etc.; in short, whatever can give interest to the past or the present of Palestine and Egypt. Combining with a pleasant narrative of travel, archaeological disquisitions and historical and Biblical references, Dr. Sepp's work will be a useful companion-book for the study of the Holy Land, whether for the actual tourist or for the imaginary traveller in his closet. It sheds little light, however, upon disputed questions, and its principal value lies in the wealth of scriptural and historical associations which the author gathers about his subject.

Sepp's plan of Jerusalem has some peculiarities which distinguish it from almost any other. Taking *Milo* in the sense of a citadel, according to the Septuagint, he locates it at the extreme north of the city, upon the site of the present Mosque *Mulawieh*, near the Damascus gate. There also he places the city of David proper, with the Akra and *Silla* (2 Kings xii. 20). These all lay upon the eastern side of the Tyropoean, which Sepp identifies with the present *Wad al-Tawâchin*, familiarly called *el-Wad*, which runs from the Damascus gate, in a southeasterly direction, through the entire city. The variations of this plan from the topography of Dr. Robinson are obvious at a glance.

A still bolder departure from that topography is made by Rev. Mr. Sandie, in his "Horeb and Jerusalem."¹ Mr. Sandie argues with a good deal

¹ Horeb and Jerusalem. By Rev. George Sandie. pp. 417. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas. 1864.

of ingenuity, from Josephus, the Scriptures, and the Book of Maccabees, that a transverse valley once crossed the present area of the Haram, descending into the Kedron at a point near the modern St. Stephen's gate. The long valley from the Damascus gate down to Siloam he regards as the Tyropoean of Josephus and the Gihon of the scriptures. The entire hill-area to the west of this valley he makes the Upper City of Josephus and the Jerusalem of the scriptures. The northeastern hill — east of the Tyropoean and north of the "valley of the Maccabees" — he regards as the Akra of Josephus and the Zion of David, beyond which lay Bezetha, on the north and east. The temple and the castle of Zion (afterward the tower of Antonia) stood face to face upon opposite sides of the transverse valley, or "valley of the Maccabees." In the descent of this valley into the Kedron, near the present St. Stephen's gate, were the Tombs of the Kings. The stairs of the City of David crossed this transverse valley from the castle of Zion to the temple. The name "Zion" was given to the whole eastward hill, thus divided, so that the temple stood upon Mount Zion.

Mr. Sandie regards as unanswerable the architectural argument of Mr. Ferguson for the "Dome of the Rock" (Mosque of Omar) as the Church of the Sepulchre built by Constantine; and he brings together a variety of collateral evidences, topographical and historical, to illustrate and confirm this view. According to this theory, the scene of the crucifixion was in the vicinity of the Golden gate of the Haram enclosure, and the sepulchre was under the present Mosque. Mr. Ferguson's argument may be found in Dr. Smith's Bible Dictionary, art. Jerusalem, sec. Topography. It is worthy of profound consideration, and may yet revolutionize our modern notions of the topography of the holy city.

Other points in Mr. Sandie's volume deserve notice; e.g. his argument for the Sinai of Robinson, in opposition to the Serbal of Lepsius, as the scene of the giving of the law; and that for Jebel-Attakah as the point of crossing the Red Sea. This last, however, is by no means borne out by biblical and geographical data.

Mr. Sandie notices the difficulties raised by Colenso with regard to the sustentation of the Israelites in the desert. The following is a summary of his argument:

"They came from Egypt with numerous cattle, but their exodus took place in the season when the vegetation of the desert was most abundant. They slaughtered them for food at their first stage of desert life, and only began to cry for the 'flesh-pots' when they were a month away from Egypt, and had come into the wilderness of Sin. The manna was then vouchsafed. They passed on to Rephidim, and there gained a victory over the Amalekites, whose cattle they secured. There was no foe left to dispute the pasture of the peninsula, which was anciently much more abundant, as is proved by the traces of a far more numerous population in the past than can possibly subsist now. The various typical sacrifices prescribed were indispensably carried out in the desert; but those of a ceremonial kind very partially, the people not having yet come into the land of their inheritance.

Moreover, as slaughter of animal life was not permitted after the promulgation of the law, save for sacrifice alone, their cattle needed not to have been so numerous as is generally supposed. During the desert sojourn, the daily manna and the milk of the flock sufficed them for food" (p. 131).

Some additional light is cast upon the Egyptian doctrine of the future state by a dissertation on the sixth chapter of the Egyptian Ritual (in the well-known Turin papyrus), lately published by F. Chabas, of Chalon-sur-Saone. A funeral statuette in excellent preservation, now in the Museum of Langres, contains entire this chapter of the funeral ritual, engraved upon a durable surface of black basalt. The substance of it appears to be a commendation of the deceased as competent to perform all labors required in Kar-Neter, the Egyptian Hades, such as flooding the canals, fertilizing the fields, etc. Other sides of the statuette are covered with drawings of agricultural implements : a hoe, a mattock, a sack of seed, etc. Thus equipped and commended, the deceased was supposed to enter at once upon the duties appropriate to departed shades. As the North American Indian made his heaven a hunting-ground, so the Egyptian seems to have reproduced the peculiarities of the Nile valley and its agriculture in his conception of Hades.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.²

REV. J. Hannah, of Trinity College, in the Bampton Lectures for 1863, discusses THE RELATION BETWEEN THE DIVINE AND HUMAN ELEMENT IN THE SCRIPTURES. While he considers each of these elements complete in itself,—the scriptures being strictly divine and strictly human, the book of God and the book of man—he carefully guards against two opposite theories, one of which excludes the human element, and the other the divine. The human nature of the sacred writers acts in its completest development and freedom ; yet is "guarded from communicating its own imperfections to the revelation which was sent from God to man." No attempt is made to draw the boundary line between the human and divine element.

The subject is discussed with thoroughness, with a reverent, devout, and candid temper. The Lectures are accompanied by over a hundred pages of very valuable Notes (London: 1863. pp. 364).

A very appreciative and discriminating view of THE CHARACTER OF THE APOSTLE PAUL is given in the Hulsean Lectures for 1862, by Rev.

¹ Observations sur le Chapitre VI. du Rituel Égyptien. Paris: Poitevin.

² Several extended Critical Notices intended for this Number are excluded for want of space.

J. S. Howson, D.D., joint author of *The Life and Epistles of Saint Paul*. The subjects of the five Lectures are : Tact and Presence of Mind ; Tenderness and Sympathy ; Conscientiousness and Integrity ; Thanksgiving and Prayer ; Courage and Perseverance. The able treatment of these topics brings out the varied characteristics of the apostle in an unusually clear and tangible form. The work deserves to be republished in this country (London : 1864. pp. 258).

CALVIN, HIS LIFE, LABORS, AND WRITINGS, is by Felix Bunginer, author of *The Preacher and the King*, *The Priest and the Huguenot*, etc., and is published by the Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh. It is written in the vigorous and graphic style for which the author is distinguished. Though less elaborate than most of the *Lives of Calvin*, being but 349 pages, it gives a more distinct and impressive view of the marked characteristics and services of the great Genevan divine than some of the more voluminous biographies. It is full of interest in every part.

EGYPTIAN MYTHOLOGY AND EGYPTIAN CHRISTIANITY, with their Influence on the Opinions of Modern Christendom, is a small volume of 116 pages, by Samuel Sharp, author of the *History of Egypt*. It is designed to explain the Egyptian mythology and "to show the remarkable readiness with which its religious opinions were copied by the neighboring nations, especially the Greeks and Romans." It is an instructive volume, illustrated by 104 wood-cuts (London : 1864).

Among the numerous replies to Bishop Colenso, we have met with none whose arguments are more fatal to his theories than those by Isaac Taylor (*CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PENTATEUCH*, 3d edition. pp. 80) and Johannes Laicus (*ANTI-COLENSO*, an Essay towards Biblical Interpretation, a hand-book for thinkers. pp. 358). The authors are both laymen, and do not deal with nice points of philology ; but their practical, sound sense and sharp dialectics are an overmatch for the difficulties which the Bishop thought impregnable. Some of the exceptions which he takes to the Mosaic history are the very arguments which these grasping minds "seize upon as the most significant evidences of the truth of that history."

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN NAMES, by the author of the *Heir of Redcliffe*. We have full treatises on surnames, but Christian names have been investigated with much less thoroughness. The present work (2 vols. pp. cxliv, 446, and 504) is a broader and more critical investigation of this subject, including the various changes through which the forms of the names have passed, than has yet been made. It treats of patriarchal, Israelite, Persian, and Greek names ; those from Greek mythology ; animals, flowers, historic Greek names, Christian Greek ; Latin nomina, cognomina, prae-nomina ; names from Roman deities, old Italian deities, from holy days, from the Celtic and ancient Celtic, Teutonic mythology, Slavonic, descriptive names, etc. The glossary, giving the definition of all the Christian names, occupies over a hundred pages (London : 1863).

THE FIRST VOLUME OF MERIVALE'S HISTORY OF THE ROMANS UNDER THE EMPIRE was published in England in 1850; the last, in 1862. The whole is embraced in seven volumes. It is written in a pure, clear, and graphic style. It is a work of great interest, and has already acquired a high reputation, and is worthy to succeed Dr. Arnold's History of Rome, left unfinished by the early death of that eminent historian. In fulness and interest, breadth of learning and thoroughness of investigation, in the skill with which the vast amount of material has been digested and arranged, the work stands by the side of Grote's History of Greece. It is now republished by the Messrs. Appleton of New York, in the very best style of the Riverside Press. The scholars of our country are greatly indebted to the publishers for making this large and valuable work so easily accessible.

Four volumes have already been published here.

CHRISTIAN MEMORIALS OF THE WAR. By Horatio B. Hackett. Professor Hackett has done a valuable service in gathering up these waifs and memorials of the war, 'scenes and incidents of the religious faith, patriotism, and bravery of our army,' which would never find their way into history. Even if they do not show better than history itself the spirit of the people, they will constitute an important complement of history, when the present struggle shall be calmly studied in after years. No volume on the war will be read with more tender interest (Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1864. pp. 252).

HEAT CONSIDERED AS A MODE OF MOTION. By John Tyndall. The author is Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Royal Institution of England, and is the successor of Farady. He is favorably known in this country by his work on the Glaciers of the Alps. In the present treatise his object is to make the new views of heat as a *mode of motion*, which have been recently received by scientific men, understood by the popular mind. The views are original, clear, and stated without the technicalities of science, and will richly repay a careful study (Appletons: 1863. pp. 480).

YOUMAN'S CLASS-BOOK OF CHEMISTRY has been extensively used for several years. This new edition is entirely rewritten, and embraces the latest facts and principles of the science. It is a lucid exhibition of the subject, and is well adapted for a text-book or for general study (Appletons: 1864. pp. 462).

Messrs. Sever and Francis, Cambridge, have published a new edition of the PANEGYRICUS OF ISOCRATES, originally edited with Notes, by the late President Felton. The present edition is edited by Professor Goodwin, of Harvard University, who has added grammatical and other Notes, which give increased value to the volume. The Panegyricus is one of the best specimens of Isocrates; and the apparatus furnished in this attractive edition will fully meet the wants of the student.

The three first Books of XENOPHON'S ANABASIS, edited by Professor James R. Boise, of Michigan University, is an admirably prepared elementary text-book in Greek. We have seen nothing of the kind that comes

nearer to the true standard for such a purpose. The Notes, including constant references to Hadley's and Kühner's Greek Grammars, are such as the beginner needs, yet not too full. The volume is also furnished with a copious Greek-English Vocabulary (Appletons: 1864. pp. 268).

A TREATISE ON HOMILETICS. By Daniel P. Kidder, D.D., Professor in the Garrett Biblical Institute. Very few contributions have been made of late, in this country or in England, to the department of Homiletics, and the present treatise does not come into a crowded or exhausted field. This volume is the result of an extensive and careful study of the best materials; and in all its parts gives evidence of having been prepared by one who appreciates the true objects of preaching, and knows the requisites for success in it. It presents, in a systematic form, practical and enlarged views on the whole subject. The student in divinity, and even the clergyman, will find it full of interest and instruction. The Appendix contains a valuable list of authors, from the 12th century to the present time, who have written on the subject of preaching (New York: Carlton and Porter, 1864. pp. 495).

A TREATISE ON LOGIC. By Francis Bowen, Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard College. The science of logic has made very great advances, in this country and England, in the last thirty years. The present work is an index of that progress. Those who studied Professor Hedge's Logic forty years ago, will scarcely recognize the same subject as it is treated in the present volume. The author has thoroughly studied the science in its present state of advancement, has incorporated into his volume what is common to the different systems, and reviews such questions as are still unsettled. There are points in the book which will be called in question; but it will at once take its place as the best text-book on the subject of which it treats (Cambridge: Sever and Francis, 1864. pp. 450).

LIFE OF JOHN MASON PECK, D.D. By Rufus Babcock. The subject of this memoir was, for forty years, a pioneer in the West, in preaching the gospel, establishing churches, sabbath schools, and other organizations for the improvement of the early settlers. Few men have left a wider influence for good in that section of the country. Dr. Lyman Beecher used to say that he led more valuable settlers into the Northwest than any ten men.

Dr. Babcock has shown skill and good taste in the preparation of this interesting memoir (Phil.: American Baptist Pub. Society, 1864. pp. 366).

LIGHT IN DARKNESS, or Christ discovered in his true Character, by a Unitarian. This little volume describes the process by which the author was led, step by step, from the Unitarian system to the one accepted by evangelical Christians. It is a narrative of touching interest, written in a spirit of Christian love, and is adapted to do much good (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1864. pp. 123).

The very neat and attractive form in which Messrs. Sever and Francis have published the PILGRIM'S PROGRESS will secure for it a greatly increased number of readers. It never looked so inviting to our eyes. The style is the same as that of "The Book of Praise," noticed in our last No.

THE
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ARTICLE I.

THE NEW ANALYTIC OF LOGICAL FORMS.

BY PROFESSOR HENRY N. DAY, CINCINNATI, OHIO.

THERE is much of truth, if a little of pretension, in the remark of Scotus, quoted by Sir William Hamilton in his second lecture on logic: "Logica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum, qua aperta, omnes aliae aperiuntur; et, qua clausa, omnes aliae clauduntur; cum qua quaelibet, sine qua nulla." If logic be, as the most profound and most learned thinker of the age has pronounced it to be, "the science of the laws of thought," the vitality and importance of its relationship to all science, to all intellectual discipline, can hardly be overrated. Not more indispensable to the physical astronomer or to the civil engineer is the science of mathematics, as a system to be known, as a discipline to be applied in practice, than the science of the laws of thought to the thinker, both as objective science or complement of principles, and also as subjective discipline or instrument of intellectual training. If there be but a grain of truth and justice in these claims of logic, what can interest more the world of thinkers, the world of educators, — a thinking age, an educating age, — than the present condition and probable destiny of logic?

Time was when all thought went out in public habited

throughout in the dress and cut of logic. Now it would be a spectacle that would strike by its rarity, were there to appear in the public courses of thought a gait or a dress that logic had formed or furnished. Time was when logic ruled queen in the courts of science and education. Now she is scarcely allowed to appear as a servitor. If we bow with deferential homage to the maxim, "*vox populi, vox Dei*," admitting that the sentiment of the world must be in truth and justice, and so acknowledge that there was reason for this remarkable fall of logic in the estimation of philosophers and of educators, it may yet be claimed, in justice, that the rejection of logic is to be attributed to other grounds than a denial of its own intrinsic merits or of its vital relationship to the advance of science and the cultivation of mind. The arrogant pretensions of disciples or the blind devotion of eulogists — *pessimum inimicorum genus* — may repel a sensitive age from real excellence and worth; or an uncouth attire and a barbarous dialect may exclude from a truly refined society. The past literature of logic reveals sufficient grounds in these accidental relations of the science for that general rejection from the halls of education which it has experienced.

Logic claims to be the science of thought. This claim it urges with a strong presumption in its favor. For, that thought has laws, principles governing it, in accordance with which it must proceed, if it proceed at all; laws and principles that are not beyond the range of allowed human research, and which can be ascertained, arranged, and exhibited in an intelligible form and beneficial method; laws and principles which, as acquired and applied, as guiding and controlling, must make all thinking more true and more efficient every way, none will presume, on any *a priori* grounds at least, to question. Let the utmost be conceded to its failure in the past; let it be admitted that the systems of scholastic logic, with their empty pretensions or their narrow exclusiveness and their barbarous terminology, are unworthy of regard but to the philosophical antiquarian, to

whom fossils, as mere fossils, are gems, and who is utterly indifferent whether it be diamond, coal, or granite pebble, so that he finds a product of the ages past, telling its age and history; it still may be that in the recent instauration of the science that chief desideratum to a true thinker and to a true educator, to an age of scientific progress, is actually supplied, which a true system of the laws of all thought must of its own nature promise.

Such an instauration, it is claimed, is in fact realized in "The New Analytic of Logical Forms," by Sir William Hamilton. The nature, extent, and promise of this labor of Hamilton it is now proposed to examine.

The gathered results of Hamilton's labors in this field of science appear in his *Lectures on Logic*,¹ and his *Discussions*.² His earliest contribution to logical science was in an Article published in the *Edinburgh Review*, in April, 1833. This article, which is chiefly a criticism on recent English works on logic, it is interesting to observe, only exposed a fatal defect in the existing doctrine of logic; but did not articulately define its extent or indicate the correction to be made. The article involved the truth of the new doctrine, but only in part, and did not explicitly enounce it. In 1840 he publicly taught the doctrine in full. In his edition of Reid's works, published in 1846, he exposed in form what he calls "a radical defect and vital inconsistency" in the existing logical system. His more matured doctrine of the syllogism is given in a note to Mr. Baynes's "Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms," published in 1850.

The improvements introduced into the science by Hamil-

¹ *Lectures on Logic*. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edited by the Rev. Henry L. Mansel, Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Oxford, and John Veitch, M.A., Professor of Logic, Rhetoric, and Metaphysics, St. Andrews. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1860.

² *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform*, chiefly from the *Edinburgh Review*; corrected, vindicated, enlarged, in *Notes and Appendices*. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. With an Introductory Essay by Robert Turnbull, D.D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1858.

ton are summarily comprehended by him in the three following particulars:

1. The syllogism proceeds not, as had been previously taught, in one, but in the two correlative and counter wholes of comprehension and of extension; — the doctrine as it is familiarly but inadequately denominated, of “the quantification of the predicate.”

2. The enunciation and application of the simple logical postulate, *that what is thought implicitly be stated explicitly*; — a doctrine wide-sweeping and entirely revolutionary of the whole science as a formal system.

3. A new logical notation.

There is certainly but little show of uncommon power or marvellous achievement here. Yet we shall see that there is here precisely the mark and characteristic of great power, — the comprehension as simple of what weakness can deal with only as the multifarious and chaotic. Not more mighty or far-reaching, nor more revolutionary, was the promulgation by Newton, as ascertained law, of the simple principle of universal gravitation to the science of physical astronomy, than this simple promulgation by Hamilton of the nature of the syllogism to the science of logic. In both cases we have a discovery that is not merely corrective of existing systems, but creative of new sciences. Science makes a new development. The human mind reaches a new stage of growth. Thought, both as system and as discipline, is revolutionized. In the case of logic, the revolution is only more radical, more wide-sweeping, because of the nature of its object, because the laws of thought are more fundamental to man than the laws of motion.

Sir William Hamilton has by no means left us, in any of his literary remains, the new forms of the science as necessarily determined to it by these new promulgations. His Lectures do not contain his latest evolutions of his doctrine; and in the loose fragments gathered in his Discussions, and the posthumous papers collected by his editors (Professors Mansel and Veitch), we find only vague hints and une-

laborated suggestions. His Lectures, as we shall see, are strangely immature. His new doctrines, here and there, are given in certain forms of application; nowhere thoroughly developed. His Lectures contain divers teachings that are directly contradictory to his fundamental doctrine. We find this imperfection and inconsistency as well in his own original expositions of the science, as in the large draughts he has drawn from German logicians.

We may, at once, dismiss from our examination, all the claimed improvement in logical notation. With some modification we may accept Professor Mansel's¹ criticism on attempts at representing logical relations by special forms. "If logic," he says, "is exclusively concerned with thought, and thought is exclusively concerned with concepts, it is impossible to approve of a practice sanctioned by some eminent logicians, of representing the relation of terms in a syllogism by that of figures in a diagram. To illustrate, for example, the position of the terms in Barbara, by a diagram of three circles, one within another, is to lose sight of the distinctive mark of a concept,—that it cannot be presented to the sense, and tends to confuse the mental inclusion of one notion in the sphere of another, with the local inclusion of a smaller portion of space in a larger." This remark is certainly too sweeping; for there is a close analogy between quantities in concepts and quantities in space. That the relations in quantity in the one case may be properly symbolized in the represented relations in quantity in the other case, we cannot question. Special diagrams may be serviceable in helping to a right view of the nature of concepts; but the help so rendered is very limited; and there is danger of the evil intimated by Professor Mansel from an extended use of any such system of notation. It was precisely this kind of subjection to outward form in word and symbol that, as it occasioned the overlooking of the contained thought in the symbolism, smothered the life out of the old logic, and forced the living mind of the last century to de-

¹ *Prolegomena Logica*, Chap. I.

mand that the dead be buried out of its sight. Herein, indeed, lay the marvellous power of that simple postulate propounded by Hamilton, that it demanded for the admitted principles of the science an embodiment in which they could live and express themselves. The mighty hold which this dead symbolism of logic retained upon the minds of its few remaining cultivators is well exemplified in the case of Hamilton, both elsewhere, in his steadfast adherence to an antiquated nomenclature, but especially here, in his unabated veneration for logical diagrams. His own elaborated scheme of notation is an admirable instance of constructive genius; but it is a scientific toy, not a scientific instrument. That Hamilton should have held it in such estimation is one of many proofs that his genius was not destructive, but conservative; he loved the old, and accepted its teachings even when erroneous, till the truth within forced him to let them go. He was no iconoclast, while a true renovator, — a noble model of a true radical and, at the same time, of a true conservative. The truth of this will appear more signally in a consideration of the second of those improvements which Hamilton claims to have contributed to logical science.

“The self-evident truth, that we can only rationally deal with what we already understand, determines the simple logical postulate: *to state* explicitly what is thought implicitly.” We do not know where to find, in the history of philosophy, an instance to be compared with this of the power of the simplest truth to overthrow the most formidable system of error, provided only that they be brought into actual engagement. The whole stately structure of the scholastic logic was shaken to its foundations at the first shock of the encounter. One is appalled at the long detail of results which, *inter alia*, as Hamilton says, we obtain from a single application of this unquestionable postulate; the application from which “it follows that, logically, we ought to take into account the *quantity*, always understood in thought, but usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in its expression, not only of the *subject*, but also of the *predicate*, of a judg-

ment." We must refer to the Discussions,¹ for the full enumeration. We can only state generally that, in the first place, before the magic touch of this postulate, the whole magnificent system of logical mood and figure vanishes into thin air, leaving scarcely a shred behind. Not only is it shown to be wholly useless as a scientific instrument,—absolutely worthless except as a fossil for antiquarian study, or as a philosophical amusement,—but actually unsound, defective, leading inevitably to error. Mood and figure, in logic, respect only the external, accidental form of a reasoning, and therefore must be held to be of insignificant importance as compared with its essential nature. Further than this, admitting the natural and easy distinction of syllogisms in respect to the order of stating its propositions into analytic and synthetic, we have no irregularity in form to provide for, except "the single case where the conclusion is placed between the premises," and consequently no further use of a doctrine of mood in logic. And as to logical figure, it is demonstrated in an elaboration of proof to which only a Hamilton was competent, that "there is but one figure, or more properly but one process, of categorical reasoning."² The whole doctrine of logical mood and figure being thus eviscerated from the science, as it has been hitherto taught, we have little left. The stateliness, the charm of the scholastic art, disappear, when *Barbara* and all her cabalistic train take their departure. They bear away, however, few regrets from the springing age of thought. Logic lives still; and its true life will develop itself, now that the winter bands of scholastic mood and figure are burst.

Another grand result claimed by Hamilton to be obtained from this application of the newly enounced postulate is, the reduction of all the laws of syllogism to a single canon, and the consequent evolution of all varieties of syllogism from that one canon, and the abrogation of all the special laws of syllogism. It is much to be deplored that Hamilton has

¹ Appendix II. Logical. A. Of Syllogism, etc. (Am. ed.), p. 602.

² Logic, Lect. XXII. (Am. ed.), p. 318.

given us no expanded evolution of the results thus summarily stated; that he has left even the true import of these brief statements to be conjectured or laboriously deduced from the merest germs of doctrinal statement. The single canon of the syllogism is thus enounced: *What worst relation of subject and predicate subsists between either of the two terms and a common third term with which one, at least, is positively related; that relation subsists between the two terms themselves; in other words: In as far as two notions both agree, or, one agreeing, the other disagrees, with a common third notion; in so far those notions agree or disagree with each other.*"¹ But we cannot believe this to be the highest canon of syllogism as necessarily resulting from the application of the postulate. If it can be interpreted by any possibility to include all that such a canon, as supreme, should comprehend; still its whole form and shape are ill-suited to express such a fundamental principle. The terms "related," in the first form, and "agreeing," in the second, are altogether too vague, too rhetorical, for such a universal canon. Only as these terms are limited to quantity, is the canon, in either form, tenable. If this be regarded as Hamilton's last exposition of the syllogistic law, and his use of it in his scheme of logical notation seems to favor this supposition, then we must apply to him the language he uses of Aristotle: that "it contains the truth; but the truth partially and in complexity, even in confusion. And why? Because [Hamilton] by an oversight, marvelous certainly in him, was prematurely arrested in his analysis."

If Hamilton could justly claim that this postulate necessarily involves "the reduction of all the general laws of categorical syllogisms to a single canon," he certainly has not left us, in his published works, any actual "evolution from that one canon of the species and varieties of syllogism," or the "abrogation of all the special laws of syllogism."

Indeed, the canon called by Hamilton, in his letter to Mr. De Morgan, his "supreme canon," cannot, by any liberality of

¹ Lectures on Logic, Appendix (Am. ed.), p. 587.

interpretation, yield the large fruits which his penetrating eye discerned as inwrapped in the true germinant principle of logical science, and certain in its consummated development to be harvested as its legitimate product. It is not the seed-form for such a crop. At all events, so far as we can discover, Hamilton did not live to mature one solitary fruit of this large promise. The scientific world, we may rest assured, as it has shown no disposition as yet to accept this as the fundamental canon of reasoning, so will never thus accept it.

As a third grand result claimed by Hamilton to have been obtained from this application of the postulate, we may instance that which he enumerates as the second in his long schedule of results: "The revocation of the two terms of a proposition to their true relation; a proposition being always an equation of its subject and its predicate." In our attempt to measure the degree of merit in this claim, we labor under the same difficulty as before; we do not know how much or precisely what meaning to put into the language. Everything turns on the import of the term "equation." No logician before Hamilton, probably, would object to the statement that a proposition is "always an equation of its subject and its predicate." All would have unhesitatingly accepted the formula: $A = B$, as expressive of the true nature of a proposition. If all that Hamilton meant was simply this: that there is an analogy between a logical proposition and an algebraic equation, such that logic may, without transgressing the allowed limits in the use of language, represent the relation between the two terms of a judgment as an equation; if this is all, the claim, so far as this particular is concerned, amounts to little or nothing. But if we take the term in its exact literal import, as denoting an identity in quantity between the terms of the proposition, then we have in the claim a principle revealed that is fundamental. If it be allowed, the whole foundation of logic as a system is subverted and displaced; and the science must be built up anew. The old material may be,

to a certain extent at least, retained; the old hewn stones, the blocks, the pillars, the carvings, may be used again; but the whole structure must be, in shape and appearance, in use and character, essentially new and different. As before, we have here to say, that if this were the meaning of Hamilton, he has certainly left no formal evidence of any such plan having been conceived by him; we find no draft, no sketch, no hints towards a design of such a new structure. His formal course of instruction in logic — his Lectures — give us no such new system. His editors do not seem to have discovered any hints of any such reconstruction. The most significant utterance we find anywhere on this point is in the item of claimed results, which we have quoted in full.

We have stated what may be regarded as the more important of the results claimed by Hamilton as obtained from the application of his new postulate in one direction. He enumerates eighteen in all. Most of these are embraced in the general statements which we have made. The others are of only subordinate importance.

There remains of the three improvements which Hamilton states he has introduced into the science of logic, the first one mentioned, viz. the doctrine of the two correlative and counter quantities in the syllogism. In this doctrine we recognize the vital principle of the New Analytic. As must have been seen, it is by virtue of this principle that the new postulate worked its destructive work on the old logical system. The elaboration of this principle, the demonstration of its truth, and the triumphant vindication of it against its assailants, win for Hamilton the just title of Founder of a new Analytic, worthy to rank with Aristotle as an original expounder of the laws of logic.

He did not originate this distinction in quantity. The quantities of extension and comprehension were familiar terms in logic. He only demanded that in the proposition the subject and the predicate should be regarded as standing in inverse reciprocal relations of containing whole and con-

tained part. Before, the predicate was regarded the one exclusive, containing whole ; the subject was held to be a part of the class denoted by the predicate ; the only quantity recognized was, of course, the quantity of extension. The syllogism : " Man is mortal ; Socrates was a man ; therefore Socrates was mortal ;" was explicated as if it were expressed thus : " Man is contained under the class mortal ; Socrates is contained under the class man ; therefore Socrates is contained under the class mortal." But, as Hamilton taught, it is equally legitimate and proper to explicate in comprehensive quantity, and to say, " the notion ' man ' contains in it the notion ' mortal ' ; the notion ' Socrates ' contains in it the notion ' mortal.' "

The application of this new view of the relationship between the terms of the proposition, — simple, unquestionable, almost obvious as the doctrine is, — gives a new form to the whole development of the science. Happily Hamilton has himself in his Lectures applied the theory most ably and most beneficially. His system of logic, by reason of this one improvement alone, utterly eclipses all other systems, — all at least which have appeared in the English tongue. They were all constructed in error, in serious error ; and the error lay in the very principles of the system. If, as Galen says, " a trivial slip in the elementary precepts of a logical theory becomes the cause of mightiest errors in that theory itself,"¹ the fatal results in the ultimate evolution of the science from such an error in the very fundamental conception of it, can hardly be over estimated. It is true that in the terminology, in the divisions, in the special handling of the several parts of the science, there is little change to be made in order to a full correction of the error. But the entire conception of the science is changed ; a new import is put into all the definitions and laws ; the applications are multiplied and enlarged ; a new world of thought is opened to the view. And in exact correspondence with this, the science as a discipline becomes a new thing ; thinking expands into a new

¹ Quoted by Hamilton, *Logic*, Appendix (Am. ed.), p. 509.

atmosphere; it is freer, larger, more just and natural altogether. A paralysis that had bound one entire half of the intellect is removed; and the mind puts forth its energies with more than a redoubled vigor under the discipline, and makes more than a double growth.

From this summary view of the logical labors of Sir William Hamilton, it will appear that they are to be characterized rather as suggestive and germinant than as exhaustive and complete. His Lectures are incomparably the best complement of logical doctrine in our literature. They bear the marks of his profound learning, his thorough method, his clear and accurate enunciation, his correct taste. No conceivable instrument of intellectual culture for minds sufficiently developed to apprehend it, can compare with it. The system as here presented is not however, in all its details, a perfected one. The Lectures were written before he had fully established in his own mind the new doctrines of logic. Traces of these maturer views appear here and there; but the system was first developed from other principles. The introduction of the new gives somewhat of a patchwork character to the Lectures. The special laws are not always reshaped to the new principle. There are instances of irreconcilable contradiction, which are to be accounted for in the light of this fact. In his large draughts from German logicians he has occasionally introduced presentations of doctrine entirely alien from his own established views. In short, his own matured conception of the principles of logic has not given shape and character to the development of the science in his Lectures. We will, in the sequel, endeavor to enunciate what we conceive to be the full, final form which, from the results of Hamilton's labors in this field of science, logic as a system must assume; into which these results must, by logical necessity, sooner or later emerge.

In the first place, in regard to the proper sphere of logic, its legitimate field and boundaries, the scientific world will hardly be able to resist the demand of Hamilton that logic

shall be limited to the formal laws of thought, — of thought in the narrow import of that term, as the mere product of the discursive faculty. There will doubtless be some hesitancy in yielding to this demand. It will be urged that there should be one comprehensive science, that shall comprehend the laws of the intelligence generally, at least of its original and properly acquisitive faculty, and that that science should be called logic. There is reason in this claim. Why should there not be a science of the laws of the immediate, of the perceptive, and the intuitional, as well as of the mediate — the discursive — intelligence? Good use has warranted this wider import. To all this it may be replied, in the first place, that the progress of science necessarily carries along with it nicer, narrower distinctions, and involves the necessity of narrowing the use of terms to mark and preserve these distinctions. The term “logic” has embraced, in its use by some philosophers, as by Descartes, all mental phenomena, feelings and volitions, as well as intellectual states. If we limit its application to cognitive acts of the mind, we shall need to distinguish two very widely separated departments — the science of immediate and that of mediate cognition, each having laws and modes of development altogether peculiar. More than this, the science of mediate cognition has received a development altogether disproportionate and in advance of that of the laws of simple apprehension; it has now assumed almost the completeness in form which characterizes the science of geometry. And what is, perhaps, still more decisive, the science of mediate cognition can now be regarded and trusted as properly a pure science — having necessary truth as its matter, and admitting demonstrative evidence in all the successive stages of its development. With such a determination of the field of logic to the sphere of the discursive faculty, we have clearly-defined boundaries for the science, as well as a peculiar matter and a peculiar method, so that obscurity and liability to confusion and consequent error are well nigh removed. We thus attain a science possessing all the

eminent beneficial uses of proper mathematical science in intellectual training and discipline, besides giving the promise of all those incomparably higher and richer benefits which a science of thought itself should yield as compared with a science of mere special forms.

Philosophy owes Hamilton a debt of lasting gratitude for having aided so effectually in establishing the proper limits of logic. The contracted views of its sphere presented by the leading British logicians, as by Dr. Whately, limiting it essentially to a fractional part of but one, and that one by far the least important, of the three grand departments of the science, — to the deductive forms of the syllogism, — Hamilton utterly discards. The doctrine of concepts and that of judgments are departments of altogether higher importance and rank than that of syllogisms, in every view that can be taken of the matter. The doctrine of syllogisms concerns altogether a less important part of our thinking than that of judgments or that of concepts, and is founded on those doctrines, and without them must be baseless and futile; and deductive reasoning is by far the least important, in every view, whether of intrinsic rank or of beneficial promise as a study and discipline, of the various modes of reasoning. Hamilton has greatly enlarged the domain of logical science, as marked out by such logicians as Dr. Whately; he has greatly circumscribed its boundaries as defined by such logicians as Watts, Kirwan, *et id omne genus*. He has drawn its circumference in a clear, well-defined line, and marked out thus a science second to none in the entire circle of sciences, both in intrinsic worth and in utility as a study; a science outranking all others as lying at the foundation of all, and determining the validity and the methods of all, strictly and literally *ars artium et scientia scientiarum*. If any still think that logic should embrace in its sphere the laws of intelligence generally, or of the cognitive intelligence, all that they need do, will be to limit the term to its recognized sphere, and denominate what Hamilton would call logic without limitation, discursive logic, or the logic of **mediate cognition**.

Logic, then, or, if any so prefer, discursive logic,—the science of mediate cognition,—is exclusively conversant with the acts of the discursive faculty, and its acts all come within its domain. Their spheres are commensurate. It will be serviceable to indicate more exactly, and from other points of view, the field of mental activity thus denominated.

The discursive faculty has otherwise been known as the understanding properly so called (German, *verstand*), as the comparative faculty, or the faculty of comparison, the faculty of relations, the faculty of thought in its narrower import. It is denominated by Hamilton the elaborative faculty.

Of the nature of the operations of this faculty, the profound and accurate discrimination of Hamilton has given us the most true and exact notions. It is a faculty of cognition, not of retention, not of reproduction, or as Hamilton (as we think) unhappily denominates it, of imagination, but of acquisitive cognition. But of acquisitive cognition there are two easily distinguishable species. There is the immediate, the direct, as in perception and intuition,—recognized on the European continent as the intuitional, and, with some indefiniteness, in English science as that of simple apprehension; and there is the mediate, the indirect. In the one case, the object is given; in the other, it is thought. In the one, we know the object immediately and irrespectively as an individual,—“as a complement of certain qualities or characters considered simply as belonging to itself”; in the other, we know the object mediately and relatively, “as comprising qualities or characters common to it with other objects.” The distinction is clear and unquestionable. It is, we will add, radical, and of as vital importance in the representation in discourse of an object of thought as in the apprehension of it in the mind itself. A “ship,” as an object of immediate cognition, is known as an individual ship—the Pacific—with a certain size, color, rigging, etc. It is known mediately only as having

characters in common with all ships, and is of course never realized in objective reality, either as having those characters only, or as wanting any one of them. "Fortitude," known immediately, is known as an individual action characterized by its relations to space, time, person, etc.; known mediately, is known as one of a class of virtues, with specific characteristics distinguishing it from other virtues, never realized just with these characters alone, and never realized without them all. Mediate cognition thus fastens only on what is common, what belongs to a plurality of objects. In other words, in mediate cognition, we know a character or complement of characters that a plurality of objects possess in common. A mediate cognition of "ship" knows it as an instrument of transportation by water, as the complement of these characters. But these several characters are common to many individuals. That is, many individual objects possess *the same* characters. The discursive faculty as the faculty of mediate cognition, applied to several objects, apprehends such a common character — *the same* character — as belonging to the several objects. This character, as the same, identical in the many individuals, is the object with which it has to do. It is, in fact, in its essential nature an identifying faculty, apprehending the same in the many; and with all deference, we think that this name better indicates its proper character than the other denominations, — discursive, comparative, elaborative, or the faculty of relations. The proper, the peculiar, the individual, it has nothing to do with, as such; it is the common, — what is the same, identical, — in the plurality of individuals alone that it apprehends. All the modifications of its action, in comparison, in analysis and synthesis, in abstraction and generalization, are modifications of this one essential activity of identifying, — of seizing the identical in the many. We compare, thus, by identifying the common character in the objects compared. We analyze and synthesize only that we may separate in a complement of characters some one character common to some other notion, or that is identical with

some one character in another notion, or that we may gather about a single character that is identical in a plurality of objects those objects that possess it in common. We generalize by identifying a property or character in all the individuals of the class. Identifying is the essential, characteristic operation of this so-called discursive faculty. Everything else that is ever associated with it is accidental, — constitutes no essential property.

It would be easy to substantiate this view of the essential nature of this mental activity from the expositions of psychologists. If we find it nowhere formally enunciated, it is necessarily involved in their best teachings. No satisfactory explication, for instance, of the process of generalization has ever been given which did not involve this as the essential element in the process. A single quotation from Hamilton's *Metaphysics*¹ must answer our purpose. "A general notion is nothing but the abstract notion of a circumstance in which a number of individual objects are found to agree, that is, to resemble each other. In so far as two objects resemble each other, the notion we have of them is identical, and therefore, to us, the objects may be considered as the same. Accordingly, having discovered the circumstance in which objects agree, we arrange them by this common circumstance into classes, to which is also usually given a common name." Generalization is thus but that modification of the identifying process in which we view the plurality of objects possessing the same character as one. And what is to be particularly remarked is the convertible use of the terms "resemblance" and "identity." "Similarity," "resemblance," is in fact but partial identity. Two objects are similar, resemble each other, when they are recognized as having any one property the same; and we say that in respect to that property they are the same. All individuals of a given class are the same in respect to that property which constitutes the principle of classification. James and John, and all individual men, are the same in respect of their

¹ Lecture XXXV. (Am. ed.), p. 475.

rationality and immortality. If any two of our notions embrace similar properties and relations in all respects, we of necessity think they alike respect the same object. Now, while it is a contradiction in terms to say that any two real objects are absolutely identical, and we say only that they are the same in respect to one or more properties, that they are partially identical, similar, we may in thought separate one or more properties and think them as the same, although pertaining to different real objects. We say "snow and paper are the same in whiteness"; "the white in the snow and the white in the paper are the same"; "snow and paper are white." In thus thinking, the discursive faculty has identified the common property "white," in the two objects; and by virtue of that identification thinks the objects as so far the same. All generalization is thus but an identifying process.

But we may go further than this. In truth, all judgment is but an identifying act. When it is judged "snow is white," the judgment is true and actual only as the subject "snow" is, in a part of its meaning, identified with the quality "white"; and the real, necessary import of the proposition is that one of those characters that make up our notion of "snow" is the character "white." To predicate a quality of an object is nothing more or less than to judge that quality to be one of the qualities that together make up our notion of the object. We are thus prepared to accept the oracular enunciation of Hamilton, that "a proposition is always an *equation* of its subject and its predicate," in the exact, literal meaning of its terms, regretting ever that he has not carried out his principle in the development of his logical system, and has nowhere indicated whether he designed the language to be taken as rhetorical or strictly scientific. In the exactest mathematical import of the language, we maintain that every proposition, so far as true, is an identification, an equation, of the subject and the predicate. This is the foundation principle of all logic, of all discourse.

This identification of the subject with the predicate which constitutes a proposition, as such, it will of course be remarked, may be total or partial. When the identity affirmed is total, we have the so-called identical proposition. It is absolutely total when notion and word are both identical, as "snow is snow." It is total in thought, when only the outward expression differs, as "snow is crystallized vapor." It is partial in thought when only a part of our notion of the subject is identified with the whole or a part of the predicate, or a part of the predicate with the whole or but a part of the subject; as when we say "snow is white," we mean that one of the qualities that make up our notion of "snow" is "white"; or that "snow" is one of the things that make up the class of objects called "white"; and when we say "snow glistens," we mean that a part of our notion of snow, conceived of as active force, is "glistening force." As would be supposed from the purposes of discourse, language consists chiefly of partially identical propositions. With this distinction of total and partial identity, and confining the statement to affirmative judgments, we are prepared to enounce as the single germinant principle of all logical science, the truth that *every judgment is the identification of one notion with another, partial or total; every proposition is the declared identity, partial or total, of subject and predicate.* From this principle logical science can develop itself in strictest philosophical method into a pure science with mathematical exactitude and certainty. And we venture to add that it is the indispensable condition of any true science of logic.

The judgment is the essential element of logical science. It is the simplest, purest act of thought. The other elements of logical science—the other products of thought, concepts, and reasonings—are derivatives from the judgment. They possess the one essential characteristic of a judgment, that of identity between different notions. A concept is the signalized complement of characters which in several judgments are identified with a notion. The

concept "snow" is the signalized aggregate of the characters which in separate judgments, as "snow is crystallized," "snow is vapor," have been identified as making up a certain object. Thus, as Hamilton teaches, "every concept is, in fact, a judgment or fasciculus of judgments."

A reasoning is but a derived judgment. As a concept is an *aggregation* of the several characters identified as the constituents of an object, a reasoning is the *separation* of one of such identified characters into its constituent characters, and an identification of one or more of these lesser characters with the object. "Snow is vapor," "snow is crystallized," are the first elements of thought. The characters identified in the two judgments aggregated form the concept "crystallized vapor" = "snow." The character "vapor," by another judgment, is identified, in respect of one of its constituents, as "water," of another as "aeriform." So in a reasoning we identify "water" or "aeriform" as one of the characters of snow in so far as we conceive of it as "crystallized vapor"; as "snow is crystallized vapor; crystallized vapor is water; therefore snow is water."

The entire science of logic, accordingly, — inasmuch as it is the science of mere thought, and of thought in the narrower sense as product of the discursive, or more properly the identifying, faculty, the three products of which are concepts, judgments, and reasonings, — is founded on the one principle of identity. It can maintain a scientific character only as this one principle is made to determine all its developments and appear in them all. And when thus developed, we may in the fullest, exactest meaning of the language, use the words of Hamilton, although employed by him in reference only to a part of the science, and, we conceive, in a somewhat rhetorical sense: "Its laws, erewhile many, are now few, we might say one alone, but thorough-going. The exceptions, formerly so perplexing, have fallen away; and the once formidable array of limitary rules has vanished. The science now shines out in the true character of beauty, — as at once one and various. Logic thus

accomplishes its final destination; for as 'thrice-greatest Hermes,' speaking in the mind of Plato has expressed, 'The end of philosophy is the intuition of unity.'"

Accepting this principle of identity as the one principle of logical science, a system of logic should determine at the outset the exact compass and control of this principle. Now absolutely simple as this principle is, it yet, in its applications, presents a threefold aspect; and from these three phases of the one simple principle we derive at once the three comprehensive laws of thought. When, for illustration, we affirm the identity of A with B, we may construe the application explicitly and positively as meaning that A is B; or we may, in the second place, construe it as implicitly meaning that A is not something different from B, or A is not non-B; or, in the third place, we may construe it as implicitly meaning that A is not anything other than B. In other words, the explicit identification of A with B implies necessarily that A is not different from B, and further that A is not something else than B. We may take the principle of identity thus: 1. in its simple positive form; or, 2. in its simple negative form; or, 3. in its exclusive form. We have thus the three general laws of thought: the law of identity proper; the law of contradiction; and the law of excluded middle. The law of reason and consequent, enumerated as the fourth in the text of Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic*, is in his Discussions rejected from the science, as in truth it should be.

The operation of these fundamental and universal laws of thought is, as would be supposed, most vital and most significant as applied to the primitive product of thought—the judgment. They originate, at once, the three forms of the judgment—the categorical affirmative, the categorical negative, and the disjunctive judgment; inasmuch as in affirming the identity of A and B, we may affirm in either of the three ways: 1. A is B; 2. A is not non-B; 3. A is either B or non-B.

As applied to concepts, their operation determines the

whole process of the resolution or analysis of concepts, and gives us the governing special laws of logical division and definition.

As applied to reasonings, their significance is equally obvious, validating in mediate reasonings every conclusion in the categorical affirmative syllogism on the simple principle of the identity between some part of A and a part of B, if B be a part of A; and in the categorical negative, on the corresponding principle that, if no part of A be identical with any of B, then no specified part of A is identical with any specified part of B. In immediate reasonings these laws validate in like manner all legitimate forms of logical conversion; all proper explications, as when we conclude from the proposition, "man is rational animal," that "man is rational" or "man is animal"; and all conclusions in what have been blindly termed the disjunctive and the hypothetical syllogisms. We say "blindly termed," for if syllogism be a mediate reasoning, these reasonings are not syllogistic; and logicians have mistaken a mere accidental form of statement for essential substance. Further, there is nothing of a hypothetical nature in a hypothetical reasoning more than in all syllogisms; and logicians have in this nomenclature also mistaken form for substance.

We may be allowed, in noting this instance of that common vice of logicians, which has so nearly proved the death of the science for all practical use in mental discipline and training, and occasioned its general neglect or rejection,—the substitution of form for substance, and of a dead symbolism for the living spirit of the science,—to turn aside for a moment to indicate another strange oversight of logicians, which has so confused their teachings in regard to the form of reasoning now alluded to—the hypothetical syllogism. It is the oversight of the clear distinction between the verbal statement of a subject when it is a mere object, and the statement of a subject when it is a truth,—the form of stating an original concept, and that of stating a judgment when viewed as a concept. In the first case we use a normal

noun, as it is called in grammar, as "*grass is green*"; in the other case we are obliged to use a grammatical conjunctive, as *if, that, who, why*, etc.; thus, "that grass is green is true," "if it be green may not be questioned," "why grass is green is not known." Now it is of the essence of a hypothetical judgment that the subject be a truth, not a simple object; that it be a judgment viewed as a concept. It was necessary, therefore, in stating it to use a conjunctive. The judgment, "If A is B, C is D," means nothing more nor less than this, that "the truth that A is B involves, that is contains as a part of it, the truth that C is D; or, "a part of the truth that A is B is identical with the truth that C is D." Logicians have stumbled over this distinction, and have in consequence involved the whole doctrine of hypotheticals, so beautifully simple and so congruous with the other doctrines of a true logic, in obscurity and perplexity. Hypothetical reasonings, thus, in the light of this simple distinction, fall at once into the class of immediate reasonings, and come easily under all the laws of logic applicable to this class of reasonings, as distinguished from mediate or proper syllogisms.

This division of reasonings into mediate and immediate is a most important one, and yet has generally been overlooked by logicians. Hamilton, in some fragmentary notes posthumously published by his editors in the Appendix to the Lectures on Logic, recognizes it; but his Lectures ignore it. The distinction is obvious: in a mediate reasoning the partial identity of two notions is recognized through the partial identity of each with a third; in an immediate reasoning this partial identity is recognized from the immediate relation between the two notions, without any intervention of a third notion. The appearance of similarity in the formal statement of the reasoning is entirely illusive. In the categorical syllogism, the judgment which forms one of the three in a hypothetical or a disjunctive reasoning, is not expressed, but is as necessary as in the other forms. Thus in the hypothetical: "If A is B, C is D; but A is B, there-

fore C is D"; the second judgment, A is B, only removes the hypothesis which logic ever attaches to the premises of a syllogism. But this removal is not expressed, and only implied in the usual categorical form. Thus the syllogism, "A is B, C is A, therefore C is B," if as fully expressed as it is in the hypothetical, so-called, would read: "If A is B, and if C is A, C is B; but A is B, therefore C is B." The famous postulate of Hamilton, *that what is implicitly thought be explicitly stated*, would do as fatal execution to the common logical doctrine of the hypothetical as it did in his hands when applied to the old doctrine of mood and figure. In truth, the hypothetical is essentially a categorical judgment, and differs from the other co-ordinate species only in the character of its subject, which here is a truth, while elsewhere it is an object simply; and the general laws of categorical judgments apply naturally and readily here as elsewhere. The hypothetical reasoning is, however, as more commonly employed, an immediate reasoning, involving no comparison beyond that of the subject and predicate. Its formula is: "The truth A involves the truth B; therefore as A is, B is." But nothing forbids the use of this kind of judgment, in which one truth is affirmed to be contained in another, in mediate reasonings; thus: "The truth A involves the truth B; but the truth B involves the truth C; therefore the truth A involves the truth C." This form runs exactly parallel with the comprehensive categorical: "Caius is a man," i. e. the notion "Caius" contains the notion "man"; "man is mortal," i. e. the notion "man" contains the notion "mortal"; therefore "Caius is mortal," i. e. the notion "Caius" contains the notion "mortal."

While the three phases of the general principle of identity thus furnish so many of the special laws that preside over the products of thought, there is another distinction to be made in reference to this principle, which will originate at once other laws equally important. It is that determined by the particular object to which the principle in these several phases is to be applied. The principle accordingly

assumes a more specific form in reference to the nature of thought; in other words, in reference to the several products of thought — concepts, judgments, and reasonings. From the very nature of the faculty of thought, or the identifying faculty, its objects are necessarily composite. Only where there is a plurality in a unity can it operate; as its one function is to apprehend the one, the same in the manifold. It cannot act but by analysis and synthesis. Now the relation of plurality to unity is the relation of quantity; and we see thus that all the processes of thought, all logical processes, are limited to this one relation. They all proceed in quantity, and have no significance or value except as quantitative in their nature and import. In addition to the principles of identity, the more determined relations of quantity, therefore, have sway in logic, and test all its procedures. Only so far as quantitative can an object come into thought, in its stricter import; or, in other words, come into logical consideration. And on the other hand, so far as quantitative it may be brought under logical laws, — it may be thought. It devolves upon logic, as a science for man's benefit, that it exhibit its applications to all the general forms of quantitative relation within the limits of the universal and necessary, which, of course, as a pure science it cannot transcend. It should indicate the general kinds of quantity; and from this enumeration, which must, to be exhaustive, be commensurate with human thought, evolve its doctrines, as specially modified in application to them. There will, we conceive, be no hesitancy in accepting the following enumeration of the forms of universal quantity, or of wholes.

First and most fundamental is the whole of thought itself — *the Noetic whole*. Its parts are the positive and the negative. It gives the formula: "A is B or not-B." It is the whole in which the identifying process, the working of the principle of quantity, first realizes itself. The parts are complementary, they make up the whole, and necessarily infer each the other.

Second is the whole of the necessary forms in which being enters thought, — *the mathematical whole*, with its two species, numerical or that of time, and geometrical or spacial. Under the denominations of extension and comprehension, the two species of this kind of whole have become familiar in logical expositions. The full evolution of these, and particularly the elevation of that of comprehension to a co-ordinate rank and place with that of extension in all logical products, constitute, as we have seen, the main contribution to the science by Hamilton. This is the soul of the “new analytic.” They are applied, however, in logical systems, chiefly to substances.

Third is the whole of substance and attribute, — *the substantial whole*. We cannot think substance but as we think attribute, nor think attribute but as we think substance. Substance and attribute make up a whole to our thought. As such, logic can apply to them the principles of identity. But they necessarily become greatly modified in this application. These modifications it is incumbent on logic, as a useful science, to indicate fully, distinctly, and in form. The necessity of this must be conceded at once, if it be granted that logic should deal at all with objective being; for only till it treats of substantial wholes does it get beyond the mere formal conditions on which being can come into thought. In fact, logical science has ever dealt freely with this kind of whole; but, strange to say, has never consciously recognized its peculiarity. It has blindly endeavored to think substance as mere form—as merely spacial—not as space-filling; just as it has endeavored to think the whole of thought itself as fully mathematical whole; and hence misconceived and utterly misrepresented the nature of disjunctive judgments and reasonings and ignored all immediate reasonings.

Fourth is the whole of cause and effect, — *the causal whole*. We conceive of all objective being as a cause, a force, a power, as time-filling, as necessarily as we conceive of it as substance, and space-filling. A causal whole, the comple-

mentary parts of which are cause and effect, each necessarily implying the other, requires peculiar modifications of the general principles of identity, and such as are most vital to intelligently right thinking.

These are the four quantities or wholes which it is incumbent upon logic, as a science for use and application, to recognize in form, and in reference to them separately and distinctly to develop its principles. They are undeniably distinguishable kinds of quantity or wholes. They are implicitly involved in all logical expositions. They furnish grounds of distinction which are of vital importance; without the clear recognition of which there must be obscurity, confusion, error. They are none of them extra-logical distinctions. The two first will not be questioned as lying within the jurisdiction of logic as a purely formal science. As little can the two last. Whether there be substance, whether there be cause, logic does not inquire, no more than it inquires whether there be thought, or whether there be magnitude or number. It only teaches that if there be thought, if there be space and time, if there be substance and cause, and they can be conceived of as wholes, as quantities, so far logic as the science of the discursive faculty can deal with them; determine what must necessarily be true of them. "Philosophical logic," says Ritter,¹ "is not only science of the forms of thought, but also science of the forms of being." If we can think being, bring being into our thought, we must be able to determine, *a priori*, to a most important extent, from the mere principles of identity, what must be thought of it. So much of the science of being may rightfully come into logic. And if logic be the science of all our knowing—*scientia scientiarum*,—then certainly it is an imperative need that it push its applications further than the mere forms through which we recognize being at all, and which are *a priori* conditional to all knowledge, further

¹ Abriss der Philosophischen Logik. "Die philosophische Logik wird also nicht nur Wissenschaft von den Formen des Denkens sondern auch Wissenschaft von den Formens des Seins," Einl. 8.

than mere mathematical forms, to the forms of being itself, and in its two necessary forms of substance and of cause.

The necessity to a perfect logical science of a distinct formal recognition and treatment of this last kind of whole — the causal whole, as a determining element in the development of the science, will appear from a view of a fatal defect still inhering in the science. The defect appears in the treatment of inductive reasoning. That inductive reasoning comes within the domain of logic, it were needless now to call in question. Logic, then, should expound its true nature and laws. It has not done this. Sir William Hamilton says emphatically: "All you will find in logical works of the character of logical induction is utterly erroneous." This judgment is sweeping, but well-considered, and we must accept it as decisive. But does the learned logician, who so entirely rejects all the teachings of logicians as "utterly erroneous," give us the true theory and the valid laws? He promises this more than once; we fail to find the fulfilment. He leaves the whole matter in as profound darkness as before. He essays a formal exposition of the nature of induction. He defines it, ¶ LXII. of his *Logic*, as "a reasoning in which we argue from the notion of all the constituent parts discursively to the notion of all the constituted whole collectively." But this is no induction. We do not reason from *all* the parts to the whole. We reason in induction from one part, from some of the parts, to other parts, to the whole. There is no reasoning in such a process as that indicated in Hamilton's definition. If we have found, in any legitimate mode of investigation, if we have found, for instance, that A, B, C, D, composing a class, have alike the character *y*, it is by no inductive process, certainly, that we conclude that, as all the members of a class have the character, the class as a whole has it. We induce from the fact in supposition that A has *y*, the fact that B has *y*, that C has *y*, — that all the parts have *y*. The essential nature of induction, everywhere recognized, is this, that we proceed from part as part; hence from a single part, if truly a part,

to other parts, to all the parts. The necessity of a number of observations in order to a certain induction, is of extra-logical consideration. Logic requires but one. In fact, we are often satisfied with one. We are as much convinced from a single observation of the combination of oxygen and hydrogen to form water, that this combination will in the same circumstances always in like manner form water, as from any number of observations. We multiply, in material, physical induction, our observations only for the purpose of determining that we really have a part of a causal whole. But this is all extra-logical. Logic proceeds on what is given or assumed only; and its principle is: "given one part of a causal whole, and the whole is necessarily inferred;" for, by the necessary laws of thought, the part cannot be without the complementary part, and so cannot be without the whole of which it is a part. The part brings in the whole as truly as the whole the part. This is the necessary, the unquestionable principle of logic. Let the case be brought to which it applies, and its influence holds necessarily. We have precisely the same difficulty in the case of a substantial whole, which is the kind of whole that logicians have almost exclusively regarded, that we have in the case of a causal whole — no more, no less. All their examples, all their specific statements of principles, suppose a substantial whole. Even when treating of induction itself, they have seemed able to represent it to themselves only in the forms of a proper substantial whole. It is hence that Hamilton is justified in declaring their teachings to be utterly erroneous. We may, in few words, indicate the precise relationship of this logical consideration of cause to that of substance, as well as to the science generally.

Logic is of no utility except as applicable to objective being. It must of necessity, therefore, develop itself throughout in reference to this applicability. Being we necessarily conceive as substance and also as cause. The latter conception is as important to us as the other; and logic should as much regard it as the other. It assumes; does not prove,

—does not give us the reality of substance. It deals with notions, thoughts only. But its notion of substance is as a whole containing parts, called attributes or characters. As such, and in this relation only, can it deal with them. Now, all real substance is given us in simple apprehension,—in perception or intuition,—in the gross, as a whole. From the whole, as thus given, we proceed, by an act of proper thought, to the parts. Logic, as applied to substance, as realized in it, therefore, more naturally, as more in correspondence with the direction of our ordinary mental activity, proceeds analytically, deductively, from whole to parts. We infer, when dealing with objective being as substance, from the whole to the parts. Cause, as real, on the other hand, is given us by the parts, for its necessary form is succession. The logical consideration of cause, therefore, should more naturally proceed genetically, synthetically, inductively, from the part to the whole. The nature of cause prescribes, *a priori*, this mode of procedure, which is exactly counter to that in the case of substance. The principle of identity works either way just as naturally. The part implies the whole as truly as the whole contains the part; and we need but one part from which necessarily to induce the whole. In substance and in cause we have the same necessity imposed on us of determining the whole, and the part as pertaining to that whole. If we use the premise in a substantial whole, “man is mortal,” we need to assume that the whole of characters denoted by the term “man” contains the character “mortal” as one of them, or that the extensive whole, the class-whole, “mortal” contains under it, as one species, “man”; in other words, man as substance contains the attribute “mortal,” or the class of substances “mortal” contains the substance “man.” Then we have a valid judgment, from which a second, affirming that “Caius,” as a whole of characters, contains among them that of “man,” will enable us, on the deductive application of the principle of identity, to derive our conclusion that “Caius is mortal.” So, precisely, in a causal whole and in induction: “Caius is mortal; Caius is

a man; therefore man is mortal"; the reasoning, as explicated, runs thus: "Caius," as effect, is part of the causal whole "mortal"; Caius, so far as such effect in this causal whole, is man; therefore, the effect "man" is part of the causal whole "mortal." If the reasoning proceed in extensive quantity, then we should explicate thus: "Caius, as effect, is part of the class of effects in the causal sphere 'mortal'; Caius is one part of a class, of which other men are the complementary parts; therefore other men with Caius, that is all men, belong to the class in the sphere 'mortal.'" This is the significance of the principle universally recognized as the one governing and validating principle of induction; that nature is uniform; or that the same cause works, in the same circumstances, ever the same effect. If we verify the existence of the cause thus, as we do when we verify a part of its effect, and if we also determine the sphere within which the cause operates, our conclusion is valid, is necessary for every effect of such cause in that sphere. The causal whole is the cause with its entire effect; a part of that causal whole, on the principle of identity, as applied to the relation of parts to whole, involves the other parts as complementary of that causal whole.

In the application of the logical principle to actual induction in matters of experience, we have difficulties precisely analogous to those which we encounter in deduction or in substances. We must apprehend the effect as the product of a cause, just as in the deductive process we must apprehend the attribute; we must also apprehend the causal whole or sphere, and the effect as belonging to it, just as in the other case we must apprehend the substance and the attribute as pertaining to it. Whether one or more facts are necessary to assure us of the cause, and of its embracing the class of effects in question, is to be determined on the same grounds on which we determine whether one or more observations are necessary to assure us of the substance, and of its attributes. But all this is extra-logical. Dealing only with the process of thought, and confining

itself to the exposition of its nature and laws, logic only assumes the facts to which its processes are to be applied; and this as well in inductive as in deductive reasoning. In the one case its one principle is: "Given a whole, a part of that whole, and a part of that part; and the conclusion follows necessarily, that the part of the part is a part of the whole." In the other case, its principle is: "Given a part; a whole of that part; and a whole of which this whole is a part; and the conclusion follows necessarily, that the whole of which the lesser whole is a part is a whole also of the part of this lesser whole." For example, in the first case: given, "mortal," "man" as part of "mortal," and "Caius" as part of "man"; and deduction gives the necessary conclusion, "Caius is part of mortal." In the other case: given, "Caius," "man" as whole of which "Caius" is part, and "mortal" as whole of which "man" is part; and induction gives the necessary conclusion, "man is part of mortal." The one form is that which our necessary mode of conceiving substance compels us to adopt; the other is that which our necessary mode of conceiving cause prescribes to us. The one form of application involves the other. Logic, as a complete science, should treat of the one as well as the other. In neither does it transcend its bounds as pure, necessary science. Of the two applications, if there be a preference, that to cause in induction is of superior practical importance. At all events, logic has been one-sided in its development, in so far as it has been exclusively in the direction of substantial wholes, and has so far failed in its command of respect and cultivation; just as in giving exclusive consideration to reasonings, to the neglect of concepts and judgments, which are of incomparably greater importance, scientifically and practically, it has become, as a structure, top-heavy, and fallen into ruin.

We are now prepared to enunciate in brief, formal statements, what we conceive to be the form of development which logic as a science should assume; indicating, as we

proceed, what remains to be done even now, after the Herculean achievements of Hamilton, in expurgating the systems as received before his time.

I. Logic must be, throughout, treated as a pure science, developed from necessary principles by necessary methods of thought. Hamilton has done an eminent service in exposing the defects of the logical systems in this respect.

II. Logic, or at least discursive logic, is the science of thought, in the stricter sense, as the product of the discursive faculty. It embraces the whole sphere occupied by this faculty; all its products — concepts, judgments, reasonings. Here Hamilton has achieved a most vital success for the science. He has clearly identified these three products of thought in their derivative affinity and consequent equality of claim to co-ordinate consideration in the science. His exposition of concepts is new to English literature, and has made his system of logic an indispensable necessity in all intellectual training. It will force the study of logic into every reputable institution of learning, as a study without which all training must be regarded as fatally onesided and defective, and thus regain for the science its former distinction, now worthily attained. We go further than Hamilton, who, while he thus identified the three elements — concepts, judgments, and reasonings, — as alike products of thought, yet went little further in unfolding their distinctive natures, as we proceed to indicate the more precise distinction, that in a judgment thought identifies the single character; in a concept, it aggregates single characters, thus separately attained, into one; in a reasoning, it separates this single character into separate constituent characters. The judgment is the original product; the concept arises from the synthesis of thought; the reasoning, from the analysis of thought. Logic, in its fuller developments, we claim therefore, should recognize these specific differences in the elements of thought.

III. The faculty of thought is essentially an identifying faculty. Its one principle, therefore, is that of identity. Hamilton has, in scattered posthumous fragments, pointed

in the direction of this singleness of logical principle. He has not indicated its ground as given by the very nature of the faculty of thought, nor anywhere gathered into one the several principles of the science. This, logic should now do ; and in its thorough development carry out its single principle into all the parts of the science.

IV. The faculty of thought, as identifying faculty, deals only with quantities — with wholes. Its systematic development should be throughout in this relationship of quantity — of wholes and parts. Hamilton has in this field of logic signalized his meritorious achievements for the science. But here, as elsewhere, his labors are to be characterized as initiative, germinant, suggestive only. His Lectures bear proofs of this crudity and immaturity. His Discussions and posthumous papers still indicate that the development had not ripened into perfect fruit in his own mind. We find thus in his latest writings,¹ the strange doctrine that “a proposition is simply an equation, an identification, a bringing into-congruence of two notions in respect to their extension. I say, in respect to their extension ; for it is this quantity alone which admits of amplification or restriction, the comprehension of a notion remaining always the same, being always taken at its full amount.” That this is wrong, and that there is no such difference in the two quantities, is clear at a glance. The proposition, “man is mortal,” taken in extensive quantity, is explicated thus, on the principle that the proposition is an equation, an identification of subject and predicate : “man is identical with one of the species contained under the class mortal,” — the predicate being necessarily restricted to a part of its extension — to one included species. Explicated in comprehensive quantity, the proposition, as identifying subject and predicate, must read thus : “the notion ‘man’ in respect to one of the characters which constitute it, is identical with the notion ‘mortal.’” But here “man,” although taken in its comprehensive quantity, is restricted as truly as it is in the other case, when taken in its

¹ Lectures on Logic (Am. ed.), Appendix V. (iii.), p. 525.

extensive quantity. The principle, indeed, that "every proposition is an equation of subject and predicate," will not hold in comprehensive judgments, if this strange assertion of Hamilton be accepted. We deem it an inconsiderate remark, thrown out in his eagerness to carry a special point in a discussion.

V. Logic, as mainly designed to help us to right, methodical knowledge of objective being, should develop itself co-ordinately in the two directions of the twofold phase of being — substance and cause. If our exposition of the true nature of inductive reasoning be accepted as correct, then not only must we, with Hamilton, reject the teachings of logicians concerning the nature of induction as erroneous, but positively derive it from the necessary forms of the identifying activity which moves in the twofold direction, from whole to part and from part to whole, with equal validity and significance. It should therefore recognize causal wholes equally with substantial wholes, as means of illustrating the nature and application of its principles, assuming, of course, both alike.

VI. Logic should recognize and distinctly expound the two kinds of reasoning — mediate and immediate; and in this reduce hypothetical and disjunctive reasonings to the immediate class.

VII. In order to this, and also to perfect its own development, it needs to establish the distinction between subjects of propositions which are originally concepts — mere objects, and subjects which are judgments — mere truths. Hamilton, in his posthumous papers, has drawn nice distinctions between mediate and immediate reasonings; but the development of the doctrine is imperfect; and the distinction in the nature of the subjects of propositions just indicated seems utterly to have escaped his notice.

VIII. Logic needs to settle the doctrine of modality on its true basis. By earlier logicians it is expounded extra-logically. It is utterly discarded from the science by Hamilton, as thus extra-logical. But modality lies within the

sphere of logic as a pure science. Hamilton's arguments are both of them singular instances of fallacious reasoning. His first argument is that of an example. He adduces the proposition, "Alexander conquered Darius honorably"; and proceeds to show its equivalence to the proposition, "Alexander was the honorable conqueror of Darius." Unfortunately for his success, his proposition is not a *modal* at all, since modality is a property of the copula, not of the predicate. His second argument is, that modality is without the domain of logic as a formal science, inasmuch as to determine the modality of a proposition we must go out of the field of form into a consideration of the matter. But this is all a mistake, although Hamilton may have been correct in his representation of the doctrine of Whately and other logicians, and his reasoning valid against them. But modality, belonging to the copula exclusively, attaches to the form, not to the matter, of the judgment; and the reasoning of Hamilton, therefore, is entirely fallacious. Nor, in our opinion, does Dr. Mansel's distinction between the *logical* and the *psychological* copula¹ help the matter. If logic be, as we have claimed, the science of the products of the discursive faculty, then certainly the necessary general forms of the judgment should come into view in the expositions of the science. Logic loses nothing of its character as pure science by the recognition of these forms of the judgment. It accepts them as psychological facts; its laws apply as well to them as to any of its assumptions, and with all their purely scientific stringency. With much more plausibility, indeed, might the consideration of disjunctive judgments with more than two disjunct members be discarded from logic as pure science. But there is no occasion for rejecting either on any scientific ground.

IX. Logic should perfect its doctrine of methodology. We recognize the hand of a master in the work of Hamilton in this department of the science, as elsewhere. Even if his views were mainly derived from German sources, the Eng-

¹ *Prolegomena Logica*, Note H.

lish mind owes him a debt of gratitude for the introduction of this division of logic in a truly scientific way and form. We have to regret here, also, the immaturity of his views as presented in his Lectures. He has transferred the errors and superficialities of the German logicians, from whom he cites so largely, to an extent that seriously mars the presentation. The attempt to found the three virtues in the formal perfection of thought on the three grounds respectively of, "1, the comprehension; 2, the extension; and 3, the concatenation of notions," is most unscientific. Even the introduction by Hamilton of the very unscientific qualification "principally founded" does not save it from this criticism. The exposition of the doctrine of method is, of course, in serious error and, indeed, often in direct contradiction to the principles of the *New Analytic*. The presentation of "division," thus, in the methodology, is entirely irreconcilable with the teachings given in the doctrine of concepts. The three virtues of perfect thought have no such peculiar relationship respectively to the several principles of method. "Clearness" belongs as much to "extensive quantity" as to "comprehension"; and "distinctness" as much to "comprehension" as to "extension;" as in fact Hamilton expressly teaches in his "doctrine of elements." And "harmony," the third virtue named, does not exclusively pertain to mediate reasonings. The author from whom Hamilton derives his teachings had clearly never recognized the true relation of concepts, judgments, and reasonings; never understood their true nature.

The whole matter of methodology, practically the most important department of the science, calls for an entirely new development on the strictest scientific principles. It may be a question whether the treatment of it should not be wholly relegated to rhetoric. There would seem to be here, in fact, common territory. But if logic undertakes to expound the principles of method, she may justly be required to expound them in exact method. If she show inability to apply her own principles, she discredits herself, and justifies rejection and contempt.

ARTICLE II.

THE BEARING OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ON
THE FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS OF RELIGION.¹

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GENTLEMEN of the Delphic and Pithonian Societies; though I visit your University for the first time, it is not with the heart of a stranger. Our American colleges are, in mutual sympathy and helpfulness, a close confederation; and as a member of one academic body I deem myself a citizen of every other. Moreover, I must the more earnestly crave a friendly reception here, on the ground on which the people of Tyre and Sidon desired peace with Herod, "because their country was nourished by the king's country." Among the books which I always keep at hand for daily consultation is the voluminous Commentary on the New Testament which comes from your Professor of Greek,²—a work derived, indeed, from a German original, but so completely overlaid and incrustated with a dense deposit of Genesee scholarship as hardly to permit us to say that it is *alter et idem*, so much more and better has it become in its American guise. Nor can I forget that, as an editor, I have repeatedly fed my public with supplies furnished by your venerable Professor of Chemistry,³ who at the same time, by his genial correspondence, has taught me to love him as he is loved by you all.

I give you joy on the progress, prosperity, and fair fame of your University — infant in years alone; mature in its capacity of service to the cause of learning and piety.

I would especially congratulate you on the foremost place

¹ An Address delivered before the Literary Societies of Rochester University, July, 1863.

² Rev. Dr. Kendrick's edition of Olshausen.

³ Rev. Chester Dewey, LL.D.

which this institution has already attained among our colleges, as to affluent and extended means for the cultivation of that department of natural science which comprehends the genesis, types, and primeval history of all the rest. This department seems likely to be the Armageddon — the final battle-field — in the conflict with infidelity; and if so, it will be honored as the field of triumph for him, of whom the divine prophecy has gone forth, “He must reign.” The danger is not that of the mere rejection of Christianity, but of the repudiation of a personal God in the name of science, and the setting up in his stead of the vague, formless conception of Pantheism, whose terms are mere euphemisms by which the fool who says in his heart, “There is no God,” seeks to say the same thing a little more decently with his lips.

As appropriate to an occasion like the present, and as made timely by certain specific tendencies of the cosmological sciences at the present moment, I have chosen for my subject Pantheism, or rather, Theism, and my endeavor will be to show you that the great doctrines of Christian theism are wholly untouched alike by the discoveries and the hypotheses, the data and the postulates, of modern science.

It is difficult to define Pantheism, except by what it denies. But its one distinctive and intelligible characteristic, in all its forms, is the denial of the Divine personality, so that what it calls *God* has no moral attributes, stands in no assignable relation to human beings, exercises no discretionary providence, and is not the conscious recipient of prayer or praise. In the philosophy of this school, God is an organizing and energizing principle in nature, — an automatic force, working by inherent and necessary laws, itself unintelligent, and attaining self-consciousness only in the human soul, which is a part of God, detached and intelligent during its life in the body, and at death reabsorbed into unintelligent nature, and so losing its separate consciousness.

There is one aspect under which Pantheism has appeared, in which we look upon it with profound reverence. We

find numerous traces of it in the Greek philosophy, both on its native soil and in Rome; and it had its full development and exposition in the great poem of Lucretius: and, as thus enunciated, it marked an important stage in the progress of human thought. It was the protest of earnest, serious minds against the absurd and foul mythology of the popular faith. It was the *nisus* of man's better nature toward monotheism, arrested at that point by the essential limitations of man's unaided powers; and it has left its multiform record in confirmation of the words of him in whom the Divine became manifest in human form, "No man cometh unto the Father but by me," — words which are still further verified by the uniform tendency, during the Christian ages, of minds that reject Christianity to fall back into the haze and mist of Pantheism.

The Pantheistic tendency has been made determinate, in our own time, among the votaries of physical science, by the theories that are gaining ascendancy with regard to the formation of the visible universe and the races of organized beings, — theories which, whether true or false, are all not only consistent with the being of a personal Creator, but absurd on any other supposition; yet which, in disturbing the traditional cosmogony, have unsettled the theological beliefs with which it had been too closely identified. Among these theories first came Laplace's nebular hypothesis, which, long regarded as a mere chimera born from the brain of an atheistic dreamer, is now received by not a few of the most reverent and devout astronomers. This was shortly followed by the aeons of geology, making the period of human history infinitesimally short compared with the myriads of centuries that have left their memorials in the strata of the earth's crust. Then we had a literal revival of Lucretianism in the development-theory of the *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, which, though repudiated at the time by scientific men, to such an extent that the author in his *Sequel* appealed from them to the unlearned, still left its traces in the speculations of naturalists, and prepared the way for the

form in which it now reappears in Darwin's hypothesis, according to which all animated beings — man included — have sprung, by natural selection, from a very few primitive types, perhaps from one ; and man may say, in a sense which never entered into the thought of Job, to the worm : " Thou art my mother and my sister." Next we have fossil man in pre-Adamite ages, — races* of which tradition holds no vestige, clustering in villages which for uncounted thousands of years have been buried or submerged. Embracing and transcending all these is the Positive Philosophy of Comte, which refers all phenomena of human thought, feeling, and action, the rise and fall of empires and races, the entire march of history, to the same self-enacting, self-executing law by which clustering atoms were vitalized and lower forms of life developed into higher.

It forms no part of my present plan to assail or defend all or either of these theories ; but I wish to show you that they have no validity whatever against the great truths of natural religion as confirmed by the Christian revelation.

I ought to meet at the outset an argument derived from our own subjective experience, real or suppositious, against the divine personality. It is alleged that our own personality is inseparable from and contingent upon our bodily organism, and that an immaterial personality, being opposed to our experience, is inconceivable, and therefore incapable of being believed. But does not this statement reverse the order of thought ? Do we not conceive of our own personality as the prime fact, and of our organism considered in its capacities and uses as the contingent and resultant fact ? My consciousness tells me, not that my brain, limbs, and organs constitute *me*, make me the person that I am, but that I own them, make them subservient to my uses, give them by my oneness a unity which else were not theirs, exercise by means of them functions which are not their prerogative, but mine, — which I can imagine myself as exercising through a very different organism, or without any organism at all. What my organism does for me is to

interpose between me and the surrounding world walls which shut out a great deal of which I might otherwise be cognizant, leaving only these loopholes of the senses, through which sights and sounds enter. But I can distinctly conceive of these walls being thrown down, this organism perishing, and my not only surviving the dissolution, but being by means of it emancipated, enriched, enlarged, exalted. The bodily organism, then, does not constitute, but only limits and confines, the human personality, which to our own consciousness is immaterial, and thus, so far from being a hinderance, is a guide, a help, a type for our conception of the immaterial personality of the Infinite Being.

In considering the bearing of recent scientific theories on the primal truths of religion, I would first speak of their relation to miracles. Precious far beyond the worth of miracles as attestations of a divine messenger or message is their use in demonstrating the divine personality. So long as the ordinary course of nature is uninterrupted, the tendency of the human mind is to identify God with nature, and nature with self-ordained and self-executing law. But miracle detaches, in our thought, God from nature; presents him as supreme over all physical forces; lays bare to human sight the arm of Omnipotence. Miracle implies a personal volition, under whose mandate the laws that seem to bind all nature in their adamant chains become fluent and ductile. A single perfectly authenticated miracle is a more complete refutation of Pantheism than the strongest array of abstract reasoning.

But does not the admission of the theories under discussion exclude the possibility of miracle? By no means. Were Laplace's, Darwin's, and Lyell's theories not mere hypotheses, but as firmly established as is the law of gravitation, they no more disprove the miracles or the resurrection of Christ than they disprove the death of Julius Caesar or the Punic wars. These theories rest on history, *natural history*, — a most significant term, denoting, not universal observation and experience, but the narratives, the stories, the *history*

of an army of scientific explorers in all parts of the world. These narratives rest for their validity solely on human testimony. But human testimony is no more impaired in authenticity by distance in time than by distance in space. The evangelists are as trustworthy witnesses to the events that occurred, in a remote age, within the range of their personal knowledge, as modern geologists are to the results of excavations made in remote regions under their inspection. The only difference is in favor of the former: for the geologist bears his testimony, not to his own cost and loss, but to his own fame and glory; while the evangelists bore their testimony at the hazard of their lives,—a risk which precludes the possibility of falsehood. We know the general uniformity of nature, which modern scientific theories postulate, only through human testimony, and that same testimony certifies us that the uniformity has at specific epochs been disturbed, that the paralytic has been restored by a word, that the living have walked on the sea, that the dead have risen from the bier and the sepulchre. Wise men who have devoted a life of acute and learned research to the inquiry, are as sure that these marvellous events took place in Judea eighteen centuries ago, as geologists are of the existence of the fossil remains of extinct animals in the earth's crust.

Now no physical theory, however plausible or however firmly established, can negative the historical facts of the New Testament, or disprove the divine personality which they demonstrate. I will not, till I am forced by irresistible evidence, relax my hold, as to my physical descent, on the ancient, hallowed ancestral tree that bears on its trunk the inscription, "Which was the son of Adam, which was the son of God," and trace my pedigree to the lower orders of creation. Yet, if legitimate science shall thus humble me, I will contentedly take my place among these meaner kindred, and will call the lowest and most loathsome of them my brother. But all the while the miracles of Jesus assure me that on the spirit-side the gospel genealogy is the

true one, — that I am still allied to the angels and the child of God. Of this faith I cannot be bereaved, till I am convinced that all history is false, all testimony delusive, all the laws of evidence baseless. And should I be driven to that extremity of pyrrhonism, I will then turn upon the theorists, and deny their facts, which lie open to every doubt and cavil that can be urged against the facts of the New Testament. The development theories, or theory (for they all resolve themselves into one), may be true; but, if there be historical truth, the Christian miracles are also true, and they make the development, not the process of automatic nature, but the chosen method of the Almighty Providence, — a method intrinsically no less worthy of the divine wisdom and love than the separate creation of each specific type.

Similar considerations apply to the divine element in the scriptures, Hebrew and Christian. Take, for instance, the Pentateuch, — of late the target specially selected for the shafts of infidelity. The theology and ethics of these books, compared with the age and culture which gave them birth, are as truly a miracle as was the resurrection of Lazarus. I care nothing about the question of authorship, though there are in behalf of their authorship, in great part at least, by Moses strong considerations which I have not yet seen invalidated. The books are their own evidence, not indeed that Moses wrote them, but that whoever wrote them had a wisdom, an insight, a foresight, of which the source does not exist in this world. This divine element in their authorship is a fact which must be taken in connection with the facts which so strongly agitate the world of science. The latter cannot negative the former. Still less can mere theories, even if they furnish the best possible exposition for the physical facts on which they are based, obliterate the superhuman characteristics of that primeval record. Let the lovers of the Bible wait without fear. It may be that these theories will join the long procession of hypotheses that have culminated and then fallen into oblivion. It may be that they will obtain, on just grounds, an enduring foot-

hold in the realm of science ; and if so, instead of making the Bible or any portion of it obsolete, they will only — as has already been the case with the established astronomical and geological truths which at the outset appalled timid believers — attach a profounder depth of meaning to the declaration, “ In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,” and a loftier rhythm to the glorious epic of the Mosaic cosmogony.

Leaving now the province of revealed religion, and meeting the theorists on their own ground, I would show you that these development theories, equally with that of specific creation, imply the divine personality.

Pantheism, even could it account for the development of the universe as it is, cannot account for the beginning to be. Self-executing laws must either be necessary and eternal, or else they must have been imposed upon the creation by a supreme Lawgiver. If there was no beginning of the universe, then the universe is eternal, and may be identical with God. But we know that there was a beginning. The shape of an oblate spheroid can have been given to the earth only by rotation on its axis in a semi-fluid state, and within measurable epochs there have been conditions of the earth’s surface that imply a far less perfect consolidation than exists at the present moment, thus indicating a period when the process commenced, — an era of creation. Even the silent stars, not in poetry, but in figures that cannot lie, “repeat the story of their birth” ; for their movements are marked, not by the absolute uniformity which we should expect in an eternal system of nature, but by secular deflections and changes, which, though their periods are immense, yet necessarily point back to a beginning, and onward to a consummation of the present order of nature. The nebular theory, in its very terms, implies beginning, creation, literal creation out of nothing ; for nebulous bodies actually existing now, if the telescope does not deceive us, exhibit the alleged world-forming process as still going on under our very eyes. But if matter be uncreated and existent in a

past eternity, if the developments from it take place by innate and inherent laws, and if there be no sovereign will, independent of material forms and laws, then in the depths of a past eternity all possible developments must have taken place, and there could now be nowhere in the universe tokens of infancy, of nonage, of creative processes not yet completed.

Moreover, it is admitted on all hands, as the result of observations that have been in progress from Newton's time to the present day, that planetary and stellar motion takes place, not in a vacuum, but in a resisting and retarding medium. If this be so, the planetary orbits are not strictly circular or elliptical, but spiral, with a diameter decreasing, in an infinitesimal ratio indeed, yet in a ratio that could not have been maintained through a past eternity without the absorption of the planets into the sun. Thus, while, on the one hand, geology is multiplying by myriads the formerly reputed centuries of the earth's duration, astronomy, on the other hand, bears equally conclusive testimony to the creation in time of the worlds that now are, and the commencement of the present laws and system of the universe.

Nay, geology equally refutes the hypothesis of an unbeginning, eternal succession of generations. Through ages whose compass our arithmetic cannot count or span, through successive stages of creation of which the earlier types have no counterpart among the present tribes of being, it carries us back to an era when no foot of beast trod the reeking earth, no fin ploughed the turbid chaos, no wing floated in the murky expanse swept by humid wind-torrents; when no plant had either soil for its root or sunlight to feed its growth; when, to employ terms which the Pentateuch might seem to have appropriated from the results of our latest and ripest science: "The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep."

Yet unbeginning existence there must be; for though a past eternity baffles our power of conception, any other

hypothesis is simply absurd. "Had there e'er been nought, nought still had been." The starting of either matter or mind into uncaused being is a theory which refutes itself by its mere statement. But if there was a beginning of material being, then there must be an unbeginning Creator. And in that Parent Mind must have dwelt all life, all properties of beings, — the thoughts that were crystallized into worlds and suns and systems, — the wealth of beauty that has gladdened unnumbered races and generations, — the varied attributes whose inspiration has kindled the vital flame, lighted the lamp of reason, inbreathed the soul of love, and furnished all orders of existence, from the archangel to the worm, with powers and faculties appropriate to their life-work; for from the Creator can have proceeded nought that was not first in him, nought but the effluence of his spirit, the outgoing of his attributes.

I have spoken of the beginning of all things. Let us now consider the bearing of general laws on the question of the divine personality. These laws are, to a certain extent, admitted alike by the Pantheist and the Christian theist. Whether they are universal in their operation, or whether they reach only so far as human calculation or expectation can extend, is a question which in this world we probably shall never be able to answer. It is at least a possible theory, that what we call general laws are simply wonted methods of the divine administration within that region of proximate causes which is the sole sphere of human foresight and action, — methods designed to sustain in man that confidence in external nature without which there could be neither industry, enterprise, nor hope in human affairs; and that beyond this sphere the remoter orders of causes have no law but the discretionary Providence of him who is infinite in wisdom. This theory is indeed open to grave doubt; but it cannot be disproved, and to many believers in revelation it seems to be sustained by the infallible authority of holy writ.

But we will leave this debatable ground, and assume that

the ordinary course of nature is governed by general laws, without variableness or exception. These laws either are or are not uniform in all space and time. We cannot demonstrate their uniformity. In space, we cannot yet comprehend in our generalizations such phenomena as the different rates of velocity in the diurnal rotation of the planets, the varying interstellar distances, the single and binary stars, and many anomalous appearances in the field of telescopic vision. In time, there is among physicists a permanent controversy between the uniformitarians and the catastrophists, — the former maintaining that the changes on the earth's surface are all to be attributed to the causes now in operation; the latter referring them to violent catastrophes, each marking the introduction of a new order of physical causes. If the laws of nature are not uniform in all space, and have not been uniform in all time, then supreme mind, sovereign will alone can have created the difference; for it is inconceivable that the automatic tendencies of nature can have obeyed different impulses at different periods, or in different portions of the universe.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the laws of nature are uniform. Law implies a lawgiver. The two ideas are inseparable. An orderly creation, formed and sustained spontaneously, is as absurd a conception as is the spontaneous building of a house or printing of a book. Correlation, harmony, development of form from form and life from life, — the Darwinian theory, equally with the most orthodox hypothesis of the creation, — implies mind, is inconceivable without mind. The tendency of an ungoverned universe must be to catastrophe and chaos, if indeed by any chance it could ever have emerged from chaos.

Especially does the latest phasis of physical philosophy render this tendency inevitable. We used to consider electricity, caloric, magnetism, and the like, as each a separate force with its own conditions and limits, and, consequently, each a check upon all the rest. We are now taught to recognize but one force in nature, and to regard light and

heat, the galvanic current and the effluence from the storm-cloud, the medium of instantaneous communication between distant continents; and that which conveys sensation to the brain and volition to the limbs, all as mutually convertible forms of one and the same force. There can be among them no system of mutual check and balance. When one of these forms of force exceeds its wonted limits, so far from being repressed by the others, it tends, as is fully ascertained, to convert them to its own similitude, to sweep them into its own vortex. Thus the spontaneous result of every partial excess would be increased and still increasing derangement, so that heat, electricity, or magnetism, once overleaping its normal bounds, would reign ascendant over a devastated universe. This result can be arrested only by him who can say to every else untamable power of nature: "Thus far shalt thou go, and no further."

I pass to another ground of argument. Pantheism infers the spontaneousness of natural phenomena from the unity of the universe; from its harmonious working, like that of a machine operated by internal forces, without those breaks and variations that would imply a discretionary will; from the mutual fitness of part to part, as of one body in which each member bears a fixed and unchangeable relation to every other. But the mutual adaptation of the various parts of the universe may be regarded in two entirely different aspects. One of these aspects is well expressed in that Pantheistic couplet of Pope:—

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul."

If this be true; if all are parts of a symmetrical whole, fitted each to all the others, as every bolt, screw, rod, and pivot of a steam-engine is to every other; or if some parts are the natural and necessary products of others, as cloth is the product of the combined action of the spindle, loom, and dyeing-vat upon wool,—it might be contended with some show of reason that the whole and all its parts are the result of inherent and self-executing laws; and if we could

only conceive of the beginning to be without an intelligent Creator, the Pantheistic hypothesis would account for things as they are.

But this view is not conformed to the facts of nature. The harmony, the mutual adaptation pervading the universe is not that of the parts of a machine, nor yet that of a machine and its products. There are numerous wholes, numerous microcosms, either entirely independent of one another, or acting on one another generally, not specifically; and these separate wholes and all the parts of each are mutually adapted to one another, as any number of clocks of different workmanship might keep time together, or as musical instruments of every variety of material, compass, and tone might be played in harmony, — an adaptation, not of the joint-and-socket order, but (if I may use the term) of independent parallelism. Now adaptations of this order can be traced only to a designing mind, to a supreme intelligence, adapting the parts one to another, each to all, all to each.

Let me give one or two instances to illustrate my meaning. The eye is adapted to light, utilizes it, makes it a minister of health and joy to the dwellers in air, earth, and sea. But the eye is not the consequence of light. Light could not, even though acting on an interminable series of generations, bore the orifice in the forehead, round the pupil, expand the retina, secrete the several humors, develop the eyelid and its fringe. There is manifestly between light and the eye no more connection of cause and effect than between light and the opera-glass, or of part and part than between the eye and a printed book. Physically, light and the eye belong to entirely different systems, to different orders of causes. Yet their mutual adaptation is as close and perfect as if light were a conscious and beneficent artificer, and had created the eye as a recipient for its joy-giving ministries.

To take another instance, the graminivorous, ruminating animals and the food which sustains them are mutually adapted, by the peculiar and complicated organism of

the teeth, stomach, and entire digestive apparatus of the animals, and by the chemical ingredients and the specific nutritive properties of the grasses. But neither can have been the cause of the other. The grasses could not have given shape to the animal organism, nor could the animals, being what they are, have modified the products of the soil. They belong to different systems, with no mutually causative relations; and yet they are as perfectly adapted each to the other as the parts and parts, or the parts and products, of a machine.

It is by adaptations of this class — adaptations without causation — that “all are parts of one stupendous whole.” Such adaptations grow constantly upon our research. Science does little else than to discover and verify them, and thus to trace in every realm of the universe tokens of the Creator’s determined counsel and purpose. Now these adaptations imply a personal intelligence in their adjustment. I see not how the argument can be evaded. It has, to my own mind, all the clearness and constraining force of a mathematical demonstration. These multiform, yet perfectly accordant harmonies — myriads in number, with never a jarring note — cannot have been evolved by chance, by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, by automatic forces of nature, by law without a lawgiver, by a (so-called) God who awoke not to self-consciousness till the last, the master chord of the universal lyre was stretched and strung. They can have been struck only by a living, conscious, omniscient, almighty Author; and the ceaseless burden of their melody, the sound that goes out through all the earth, the anthem-note that vibrates through the universe is, “The Lord God Omnipotent reigneth.”

You may think it strange that, at a moment when all hearts are moved by alternate hope and fear for our beloved country, I should have chosen for this evening a subject of abstract thought, rather than one derived from the engrossing interests of our land and age. I reply, that had I chosen my theme with express reference to the present state of

our public affairs, I would have chosen that on which I have discoursed — the divine personality. It is because we, as a people, have not recognized it that we are now involved in this fratricidal war. But Atheism and its equivalents in science and in political life have one essential point of difference. Science claims for eternal law the sceptre which with impious hand she would snatch from the Eternal God; political tacticians ignore God by denying the supremacy of his law. We, as a people, have grown atheistical in our politics. We have scoffed at the assertion of a higher than human law. We have refused to believe that God rules among the nations. We have dared his retributive providence. We have vainly imagined that we could build our prosperity on concessions of the right and true, of justice and humanity. We have exalted expediency above principle, the voice of the majority above the will of God. We have claimed for inveterate wrong the prescription which is due only to the ordinances of Heaven. We have sown the wind, and not believed that we should reap the whirlwind.

But now the law which we would not honor by our obedience is vindicating itself in our division and desolation. It is the sword of the Righteous Judge before which our young men have fallen in the field. It is the retribution of violated law that has multiplied the widows and the childless in our land. We are now to learn what we would not learn while we dwelt in quietness, — that law is co-eternal and co-omnipotent with God, and that neither men nor nations can defy it with impunity. Happy will it be for us, if this heavy chastening bring us back to a living faith in Him who alone ruleth in the kingdoms of men.

Brethren, scholars, students and alumni of this university, you are to be, not only leaders in science and literature, but, by virtue of your superior culture, guides in opinion and action in the great concerns of the state. While in the laws of organized being you recognize the supreme will of him by whose pleasure they are and were ordained, see that you equally own his sole sovereignty as the harmony, hope, and joy of living souls.

ARTICLE III.

AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH.

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(Continued from page 550.)

2. We pass to certain negative objections, which may be briefly despatched.

(i.) It is asserted that a Mosaic authorship is discounted by some striking omissions, indicating that documents or trustworthy reminiscences were wanting to the author. Among these are mentioned that no occurrences at the eighteen halting-places between Hazereth and Kadesh are recorded; that no account is given of the descent or the death of Hur; that the accounts of Jethro are evidently fragmentary, and that there is a blank in the history respecting thirty-eight years in the wilderness. So reasons Dr. Davidson.

This style of objection scarcely calls for serious refutation.

(1) There is no end to such demands. Why not fuller narratives of the immense lives of Adam, Methuselah, and other patriarchs; further accounts of Enoch, of Lamech, of Cain, and of Seth; more about Noah and his sons, the early life of Abraham, the pedigree of Melchisedek, additional events in Isaac's life, the history of Jacob and his family while Joseph was in Egypt, and of the four hundred years in Egypt? And so on *ad infinitum*. (2) It is in all cases preposterous to prescribe to any historian how he shall shorten his narrative. (3) The very omissions complained of are proofs of the unity and distinctness of the one writer's plan. He writes the history of God's revelation to his chosen people, and the proceedings preliminary. He carefully excludes foreign matter; and, from the necessity of the case, he gives that history in its salient features, essen-

tial facts, and characteristic marks. Nations and individuals brought into relationship with the chosen people, he describes more or less fully according to the closeness of the connection, and finally dismisses. Such historic facts of the chosen nation itself as have no bearing on his purpose, or are superseded by other statements, are omitted. Why minutely recount the occurrences at all the halting-places, if the most striking are narrated? Why should he relate anything more of Hur and Jethro than what concerns the purpose of his narrative? Why cumber his history with the thirty-eight comparatively uneventful years while they may have been quietly pursuing their rural occupations, spread out over the region southeast of Palestine, when the grand characteristic events—the deliverance, the law-giving and organization, the gracious interposition and the judgments—are given in full? Why burden his graphic story with four hundred stagnant years in Egypt? The sacred historian understood his work better than the critic who requires a story to be told after the manner of *Mistress Quickly*.

(ii.) It is objected that there is not sufficient difference between the language of the Pentateuch and that of the books written about the time of the captivity to correspond with the interval of nearly a thousand years.

This is a matter of judgment on a question of degree. Dr. Davidson is too familiar with the Hebrew language to deny the *fact* of a difference: “We do not say that there are no diversities of language between the Pentateuch and later books; but that the differences are such as disagree with the fact of a thousand or nine hundred years’ interval.”¹ Differences, then, are admitted.

But Dr. Davidson is obliged to admit more yet. “Nothing is proved by the list of forms peculiar to the Pentateuch, *except that Moses wrote portions*; and that these obtained a sort of sanctity which gave their diction some prominence.

¹ Davidson’s Introduction, Vol. I. p. 104.

Later writers may have proceeded in part on the model of his *usus loquendi*.”¹

The question then is simply this: How much *more* difference ought there to be between the earlier and the later Hebrew? A question which would doubtless receive as many answers as there are critics. It is, however, asserted, in general, that so slight a difference in the lapse of a thousand years would be without a parallel in the history of language. We answer:

(1.) If this were true, it is also true that the circumstances were without a parallel. (a) In general, a singular fixedness of oriental habits, such as has preserved in many respects the same manners and the same local names in Palestine for three thousand years. (b) The nation, as a whole, was for the greater part of the time bound to the same soil, with very slight relations to foreign nations — intentionally so. (c) The Hebrews were immediately encircled by tribes that used the same language with themselves. (d) Their mode of life remained substantially the same during that whole period; none of those advances in science, art, or modes of living took place which so rapidly change the speech of men. (e) Their institutions were designedly framed and fixed so as to maintain through their whole history the same great circles of thought and speech, and to keep all portions of the nation in annual (or rather tri-annual) contact with each other and the central seat of influence. (f) As Dr. Davidson suggests, their writers must have formed their style greatly on the constant use of the Pentateuch.

(2.) But secondly, the phenomenon is not without a parallel. Waiving all questionable examples (as of the Arabic and the Chinese), “the Syriac dialect of the second century in the Peshito or Syriac version, is the same as is read in Abulfaragius or Bar Hebraeus, a writer of the thirteenth.”² It is useless to reply (as does Dr. Davidson) that “the analogy

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 105. The italics are ours.

² Jahn's Introduction, § 75.

is vitiated by the fact that the Syriac was gradually dying away after the Arabian conquest, and was therefore incapable of receiving new forms." ¹ The *fact* is admitted; but it is alleged that the circumstances were peculiar in this case. So they were in the other. If peculiar circumstances can in one case preserve a language substantially unchanged for a thousand years, they can in another. The objection is extinguished.

(3.) Finally, the objection is also annihilated by facts concerning the Hebrew which the objectors themselves admit. (a) It is admitted by this whole class of writers that we have genuine specimens of *David's* composition, less than half way from Moses to Malachi. De Wette admits as "undoubtedly genuine," Psalms vi., viii., xv., xxiii., xxix., xxx., xxxii., ci. Ewald, Psalms iii., iv., vii., viii., xi., xviii., xix., xxiv., xxix., xxxii., ci., cx. Hitzig iii., iv., vii., viii., xi., xiii., xv., xvi., xvii., xviii., xix.² Davidson thinks these writers too restricted, and would add to the list some (e. g. xvi.) which they have excluded.³ Colenso would include many more.⁴ Even J. Olshausen, who is so chary of admitting David's authorship of any of the Psalms that he even denies the double testimony concerning Psalm xviii. (found in the psalm, and in the narrative 2 Sam. xxii.), is obliged to admit that of the "noble poem," 2 Sam. i. 19–27, "hardly any other than David could be the poet."⁵ Knobel, Tuch, and Bleek place the "Elohistic" portion of the Pentateuch as early as the time of Saul; Lengerke, in the time of Solomon; Stähelin, in that of the Judges or Saul. Now the lapse of time from David to Ezra was about six hundred years—a period when the nation was subjected to foreign influences vastly more than during the four hundred years previous; yet the Hebrew of Ezra and other later writers

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 104.

² De Wette's Introduction, § 269.

³ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. II. pp. 255–257.

⁴ The Pentateuch, etc., Part II. pp. 182, 187, 190, 192.

⁵ Olshausen's Die Psalter, Einleitung, p. 8.

presents no such radical change of the language as would have made the Psalms difficult of apprehension by them. But this is not all. (b) These same critics are constrained to admit that portions of the Pentateuch are as old as the time of Moses. Such is the distinct admission of Dr. Davidson, as quoted above. De Wette says of Num. xxi. 17-18, 27-30, "the following odes may be referred with certainty to the time of Moses."¹ Knobel says that Moses gave laws, and that "he even published such laws in writing, e. g. the Decalogue; although to what extent he did it is uncertain."² Bleek goes further, and specifies Exodus xxv.-xxxi.; Leviticus i.-viii., xi.-xv., xvi., xvii.; Numbers x. 1-8, xix. Davidson specifies more than twenty whole chapters which must have come from Moses with very slight change, among which he regards Ex. xxv.-xxxi., "as probably written down by him in its present state."³ Indeed, conceding, as these writers must, that Moses was the original lawgiver, and conceding too the universal habit of writing, it would be preposterous alike to deny that he committed portions of those laws to writing, and to assert that all his genuine productions must have disappeared from the "books of Moses." Accordingly, as Saalschütz truly remarks, "the most sweeping criticism holds that some portions are the genuine productions of Moses."⁴ The objection, then, drawn from the language of the Pentateuch is annihilated by the admitted fact that portions of it are as old as Moses. The *theory* that a greater change must have taken place is refuted by the *fact* that it did not. And this consideration presses with greatest force on those writers who, like Knobel, find it most difficult to decide what is Mosaic in the Pentateuch and what is not. Should they attempt to evade by implying (with De Wette) a later revision, then we may inquire by what right they assume the

¹ De Wette's Introduction, § 149.

² Knobel's Numbers, etc., p. 592.

³ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 109.

⁴ Saalschütz, Das Mosaische Recht, Vorwort, p. 29.

process of revision so far as suits their convenience, and deny it any further.

3. We proceed to a class of irrelevant objections. They really concern rather the quality of the composition than the question whether Moses was its author; but they are, some of them, so commonly alleged in this connection, and with so much of popular show, that they cannot properly be dismissed without notice.

(i.) The progressive character of the legislation is alleged against the composition of the Pentateuch by Moses. "It is derogatory to the divine perfections to suppose, as the advocates of the Mosaic authorship do, that Jehovah spoke to Moses enacting such and such rules, and sometime after changing or rescinding what he had expressly appointed. In making enactments for his people, the Almighty Legislator could not have proceeded in this way."¹

This argument is brought "against the Mosaic authorship"; and it well illustrates the random character alike of the assertions and the logic which are expended on this theme. (1) As to the fact itself — what is the whole course of revelation but a series of progressive disclosures, keeping pace with the changing circumstances as they were shaped by divine Providence, often accompanied (as at and after the flood) with the introduction of what might be called a change in the outward policy of government? And the New Testament dispensation — does it not include the repeal of a great mass of observances enforced for hundreds of years with the sternest of divine sanctions? Or will the objector deny all this too? (2) The progressive character of the legislation is really one of the strongest marks of authenticity. Laws engrafted on the changing circumstances, carry evidence, so far, of having originated in those circumstances; and Colenso even attempts to cast discredit on the legislation in the wilderness by citing provisions that contemplated the permanent home in Palestine. The entire absence of enactments for transient uses and changing

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 75.

circumstances might have been handled with some effect. (3) Still, if there were force in the objection, it would bear, not on the question whether Moses composed the Pentateuch, but whether he had made a suitable representation of God and his methods.

(ii.) The "unsuitableness of sections and paragraphs often observable in the Pentateuch," is used to invalidate the testimony.¹ "It is derogatory to the great lawgiver to suppose that he left the Pentateuch in its present form." Certainly it is refreshing to find this sudden appreciation of the intellectual qualifications of the man who was too short-sighted to have left a permanent record. If the Pentateuch is beneath him, what is worthy of him?

What then are these unsuitable things, so far as the specifications answer to the indictment? These: sometimes portions of the narrative are badly connected with each other; they do not properly continue the history; are located too early or too late; sometimes might be taken away without being missed, or they even do violence to the context by breaking the thread of the narrative.²

We will not now discuss the propriety of the allegations, nor the special cases cited under them. The minute examination of passages would only divert attention from the irrelevancy of the objection. The allegations, true or false, may bear on the qualities of the writer, or his mode of composition; but (1) they have not the slightest bearing on the question whether Moses wrote the volume, unless we know beforehand just what kind of a composition Moses would write — a pretence which would be the height of folly. (2) The same allegations, sustained by striking instances, could be made against each of the Gospels; interruptions of the continuity by sentences, paragraphs, chapters; the insertion of many things which could be omitted without being missed; statements made far away from the order of their occurrence, and sometimes from their natural

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 88.

² Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. pp. 89, 90.

connection. But who dreams of urging such considerations against their having been written by their reputed authors?

(iii.) Repetitions, duplicate accounts, diversities, and alleged contradictions, are said to disprove unity of authorship, and hence the authorship of Moses.

Repetitions may be freely admitted. They belong to the simplest method of narrative, and occur in the other books of the Old Testament. Yet there is usually some occasion for them. Sometimes they occur for the purpose of singling out and making prominent some particular circumstances of a general account. Sometimes they are made the means of transition from one topic to another. Occasionally they prepare the way for a new and striking fact. In other cases they are the means of resuming an interrupted narrative. These things mark an inartificial style, and nothing more. It is the highest form of art so to construct a narrative or other composition, that nothing shall be anticipated and nothing repeated or retraced. To this style of art the Bible makes no pretension.

In this sense also we may freely admit the existence of duplicate accounts, that is, of subsequent statements of transactions briefly referred to before, but now repeated and intentionally expanded for some other purpose in view. Here belong many of those instances which it has become the settled custom of German criticism to cite as contradictions. Thus the fuller account of the creation of man in the second chapter of Genesis, can be completely vindicated. It was unnecessary, and even superfluous, in the condensed survey of the course of creation in the first chapter; but it was the needful introduction to the narrative of the marriage institution and of the fall, which immediately follows. It cannot be shown to contain any contradiction, but is a suitable and timely expansion. Such repetitions, indeed, belong to every age.¹

¹ Bancroft, in his *History of the United States*, first sketches the influence of Calvin on Europe (Vol. I. p. 266); he afterwards (pp. 277, 278) expands and

Among the repetitions which Knobel¹ reckons as marks of different writers, we find the births of Seth and Enos twice mentioned, but for different purposes: once in connection with the family history of Adam (Gen. iv. 25, 26), again in the complete genealogical table of the patriarchs (v. 3, 6). The corruption of the earth is twice stated; once as the occasion of God's purpose of vengeance (vi. 5), again in connection with the communication of that purpose to Noah (vs. 11 – 13). So God's gracious intentions after the flood are twice recorded: first as the decision of his own mind when Noah made his acceptable offering (viii. 20, 21), again as his utterance to Noah on establishing a covenant with him (ix. 9 seq.). Numerous similar cases present so obvious reasons for the second allusion as to require no labored explanation.

Here too belong some of those cases of fuller statement which have been cited as contradictions, not only by such writers as Knobel, Bleek, and Davidson, but by Kalisch too.² Thus in the sixth chapter of Genesis, when Noah is commanded to build an ark, he is told in general that when it is finished, he is to take into it the animals, "two of every sort, to preserve them alive, male and his female." In the next chapter when the ark was finished and in readiness (one hundred and twenty years later, as many understand Gen. vi. 3³), God repeats the general command to take two of every kind, male and female, with the more specific addition to take the clean beasts by sevens. And this is one of Kalisch's "irreconcilable" contradictions.

defines the subject; and still later (Vol. II. pp. 459 – 463) sets forth the political influence of Calvinism. Neal's History of the Puritans gives a notice of Wiclif's, Tyndal's, and Cranmer's Bibles (Chap. I.), and later in the volume (Part II. Chap. II.) a more complete account of English translations, covering the same field, but with variations of statement which require some thought to harmonize. Such things are of constant occurrence.

¹ Knobel on Numbers, etc., pp. 497, 498.

² Kalisch on Genesis, pp. 83, 183, etc.

³ So Delitzsch, Gerlach, Rosenmüller, Hofmann, Kurtz, Luther, Jerome, the Targums; against Ewald, Tuch, Baumgarten, Kalisch, Hävernicks, Knobel, with Philo and Josephus, who interpret it of the future length of human life.

Here, however, we meet an attempt, made by Knobel, and others of that class, to smuggle in certain distinct narratives of *different* transactions as duplicate accounts of the same transaction clumsily and unconsciously introduced by an awkward compiler. Of the several instances selected by Dr. Davidson from Knobel's larger list, not one will bear a careful, few a casual, examination. Let us look at them. "Sarah is taken by Abimelech at Gerar (Gen. xx.), as she had been taken in Egypt by the king of the country (ch. xii.), with the intention of making her a wife. The same thing also happens to Rebekah at Gerar (ch. xxvi.)." But the reader will find the first two transactions widely separated both in time and place, connected with different monarchs, and with *different circumstances throughout*, except that Abraham repeated his unworthy device, because of the continuance of Sarah's extraordinary beauty, and that God again delivered the mother of the promised seed from pollution. He will also see that "the same thing" did *not* happen to Rebekah; but that while the feeblar Isaac copied in Gerar the folly of his father, the monarch (whether the same man or his successor), as if rendered cautious by that mistake, did not take Rebekah, though Isaac was there "a long time"; but, on discovering the relationship, warned them of the possible consequences of their course, with perhaps even an allusion to the previous transaction (xxvi. 10). Dr. Davidson admits that "there is room for doubting the original identity of the facts." There is no room for confounding them. It may be singular that they occurred; and yet in such lands and such times it may not. Again, the narratives of Hagar's two departures (Gen. xvi., xxi.) are summarily pronounced "identical." But the one was before Ishmael's birth, the other when he was fifteen or sixteen years old (compare xvi. 15, xxi. 5, 8); the one was occasioned by Hagar's insolence, the other by her son's misconduct; one was a voluntary, transient flight, from which God directed her to return, the other a deliberate and final dismissal by Abraham under God's direction; in the first instance she

had no trouble, in the second she almost perished with thirst. There is mentioned in each case a well (so often mentioned in the early narrative), and an angel with a communication from God; but in one case it was on the way to Shur, between Kadesh and Bered, in the other it was in the wilderness of Beer-sheba; the communications, and even the promises in the two cases are widely diverse, both in form and specification, and the results opposite. The recurrence of trouble between Sarah and Hagar cannot be matter of surprise, nor the mention of so important a matter as a well in the wilderness in both instances. Nor is the expanded repetition of God's promises a strange event. Yet these are the main points in common. So Knobel and Davidson would confound the two narratives of the quails (Ex. xvi., Num. xi.), though the one was at the wilderness of Sin, on the west of the peninsula, the other at some point east of mount Sinai; one in the second month of the first year, the other after the passover of the second year (Num. ix.); one in connection with the first fall of manna, the other when the people were weary of the manna (Num. xi. 6); one was, says Davidson, "as a boon of God, to satisfy the hunger of the people, and convince them of their dependence on God," the other in anger and judgment; one was attended with no ill consequences, the other with a terrible plague. The *only* common point is the bringing of quails — birds which are still found in enormous quantities in that region and at that season of the year. The same writers insist on the identity of the miracles of bringing water from the rock (Ex. xvi., Num. xx); though one was before reaching Sinai, the other at Kadesh near Palestine, and in the following year; and the second is remarkably distinguished from the first by all the circumstances of the offence which excluded Moses from the land of promise. "The same name [Meribah] could not have been given twice," says Davidson. Why not, if it was equally characteristic and appropriate, and all the more readily that it had been once applied in a similar case?

In none of the above instances can the poor apology be made that one narrative is purely Elohistic and the other Jehovistic. They can be made so only by using the scissors.

A double description of the manna is said to be found in Ex. xvi. and Num. xi. The latter passage, however, simply contains a supplementary statement of its pleasant and useful qualities, and its divine mode of bestowal, called forth as a comment on the unthankfulness of the murmuring people. It contains no contradictions of the former notice, nor is a repetition of it. It is attempted to strengthen the case by affirming the latter passage to be Jehovistic and the former Elohistic (so De Wette, Davidson, Knobel); but this *Elohistic* passage contains the name "Jehovah" nine times, and Elohim as an independent name not at all.¹

It is asserted that there are duplicate, and therefore conflicting, etymologies of the names Issachar (Gen. xxx. 14, 16, 18), Zebulon (vs. 19, 20), and Joseph (vs. 23, 24). But even a compiler must be a sad bungler who would thus unwittingly introduce incompatible etymologies *in successive verses* three times in one chapter. There is no occasion for the supposition. The first instance offers no indication of a double derivation. The fundamental word of Issachar is simply שָׂכָר, *hire*; ² which applies, and is applied, equally to Sarah's hiring her husband and receiving her hire (i. e. its result) from God. In the other two instances we may freely recognize the characteristic paronomasia, whereby each name involves a double allusion — not by the unpardonable stupidity of jumbling together in the same verse contradictory statements, but by the felicity (as the Hebrew viewed it) whereby one name enwraps two *coincident* facts.

¹ This whole process in the Old Testament will remind the reader of similar attempts to confound diverse transactions in the Gospels: e.g. Matth. ix. 32-34 and xii. 22-30; xiv. 15-21 and xv. 32-38 (comp. xvi. 9-10); Matth. xxvi. 6-13 and Luke vii. 36-50; Luke ix. 1 seq. and x. 1 seq.; John ii. 14-17 and Matth. xxi. 12, 13; John iv. 26-54 and Luke vii. 1-10.

² It is variously conjectured in its precise form, either יֵשׁ שָׂכָר, or יֵשׂא שָׂכָר, or יֵשְׁכָר. The Keri and Chethiv are different.

The name "Zebulon" probably plays on both the words זֶבֶן, *gift*, and יָבֵן, *dwells*; and is the memorial of the sentiment, "from this gift [or dowry] I see that my husband will dwell with me" (vs. 20). The name "Joseph," with its play upon יֹסֵף and יָסַף, records in one word the twofold aspect of the one event which takes away the mother's reproach and adds a second son.¹

These are the instances which Dr. Davidson has drawn out in detail. They wholly fail to make good his position.²

But we are further told that discrepant and contradictory statements are found, which indicate a diversity of authorship, and invalidate the testimony that Moses composed the book. But (1) if we grant the premise, *this* conclusion does not follow. It would affect rather the character of the composition — its correctness and its inspiration — than its authorship. For example: within about two years, three different works have appeared, bearing the name of Dr. Davidson — *Biblical Criticism*, the second volume of *Horne's Introduction*, tenth edition, and an *Introduction to the Old Testament*, — containing the most conflicting views and statements; yet there can be no reasonable doubt that they were by the same author. (2) The objection proves too much. All these critics necessarily suppose a final editor or "redactor," who combined his materials at discretion; omitting, inserting, transposing, recasting, *with great labor and care*. But the argument which would disprove the composition by a single mind, would also disprove the compilation by a single mind. The constructions which would make so wretched a blunderer of the accredited compiler of a great nation's history, laws, and institutions, must be per-

¹ No Hebrew scholar is ignorant of this alliterative tendency in the Hebrew mind. The name Isaac (יִצְחָק, *shall laugh*) is played upon in four different ways: Abraham's laugh of wonder and pleasure (Gen. xix. 17), Sarah's laugh of incredulity (xxiii. 12), Ishmael's mocking laugh (so probably xxi. 9), and Sarah's laugh of unmingled joy (xxi. 6, 7). So a collection of various allusions in one word is supposed by Ellicott (*Life of Christ*, p. 86) and others to be found in the word Ναζωραῖος, Matth. ii. 23. De Wette finds a twofold reference.

² He refers summarily to additional cases less available.

versions. Accordingly (3) the alleged discrepancies can be shown to be mostly captious. No doubt there are some points of real difficulty; not such as show diversity of authorship, but such as grow out of the brevity of the narrative, the omission of slight explanatory statements, and the lack of collateral sources of explanation. One can go over the narrative and find a multitude of passages where the omission of some one statement would create other similar difficulties. But the main part of these alleged discrepancies are captious. As they belong to the question, not of authorship, but of historic truthfulness and inspiration, we must dismiss them for the present.¹

(iv.) The incorporation of pre-existing materials has often been urged as an overwhelming objection to the Mosaic authorship. We refer to the "document" theory, in some of its forms. Colenso declares that "this simple fact is enough to set aside the ordinary notion of the whole Pentateuch having been written by Moses, and as such coming to us, in every part, with the sanction arising from his divine mission."²

It would require a separate discussion to do full justice to the attempts of modern criticism to disintegrate the Pentateuch — its high pretensions, arbitrary methods, baseless assertions, illogical positions, and conflicting results. For our purpose it is not necessary. No progress is made by the objector in finding documents in the narrative, *unless he can show that some of them are subsequent to Moses*. No matter what genealogies or traditions, oral or written, the writer may have used, the universal testimony of antiquity is not invalidated or even assailed till it be shown that these sources themselves are certainly of later date than his time. Grant, if you will, a "redactor," with as many writings before him as Ewald could desire; that redactor may still have been Moses. This whole theory, therefore, leaves us

¹ We had intended but for the length of this Article, for the reader's satisfaction to give some specimens to show their nature. But we must omit them.

² Colenso on the Pentateuch, Part I. p. 62.

where we were; it simply conjectures what materials were used by the author, and leaves the question who was the author intact. It brings us back to the one inquiry: Are there in these supposed documents or fragments any evidences of a later date than Moses?

Lest it should be supposed, however, that there is some mysterious potency in this boasted theory, we will not dismiss the subject without a few words on the inherent weakness of the weapon, though it does not even touch the mark.

In general, the only points on which the advocates of this document theory are agreed, are that the Pentateuch is mainly a compilation, of which the parts are quite discernible: but there is no general agreement what those parts are. There is more approach to unanimity as to the "ground-writing," or Elohist portion in Genesis, because the use of the word "Elohim" is a partial guide as far as Exodus vi. 3. Yet there is much diversity here; and some, like Hupfeld and Davidson, advocate an older and a younger Elohist.

But aside from the fundamental failure in the result, it can be abundantly shown that the attempt to dissect the Pentateuch breaks down in the process.

(1.) Its fundamental principle is to the last degree arbitrary. It takes the liberty of breaking up all passages at will, no matter how close the connection, or how small the fragments, even down to sentences, half-sentences, and *single words*. Colenso only states the constant practice of De Wette, Hupfeld, Knobel, Davidson, etc., when he writes thus of the theory he adopts. "The Jehovist in fact may have revised what the Elohist had written, making his own insertions here and there, sometimes in long passages (as in the second account of the creation), sometimes in shorter ones (as in the small section about the deluge), sometimes interpolating two or three verses only, or even a single verse, or part of a verse, which makes its appearance in the midst of the older writing, and now and then in such a way as to make it difficult to assign precisely to each writer his own

particular portion." Let the reader ponder carefully the above statement by a friend of the system, remembering that every allegation in it can be abundantly illustrated from every advocate of the system, and he will see what a drifting fogbank is the whole system *in its essential method*.¹

(2.) The system attempts to explain very simple facts by assumptions far more difficult, and even unaccountable. The theory holds that though the Elohist was perfectly familiar with the name "Jehovah," yet as that name was not impressively made known till the transaction in Exodus vi. 3, he *refrains even from using it himself* in the previous portions of his narrative. It was a singular scrupulousness, the more so, as Davidson admits that the name, after all, "was usual among the maternal forefathers of Jochebed."² It is a caprice that no sacred writer or speaker adheres to in speaking of pre-Mosaic events. By his side we have the Jehovist, equally familiar with both names, with an opposite freak, predominantly avoiding the use of the other name. Then we have the redactor (if diverse from the Jehovist, as most hold), while taking the utmost liberties in combination and substitution, yet on the one hand so carefully respecting these two eccentricities that when inserting half a verse in one narrative from the other, he breaks the continuity of style and retains the different name of God, and on the other hand sometimes replacing whole sections of the Elohist (such is the theory) with a new use of the materials and a change of Elohim to Jehovah throughout. Meanwhile this Jehovist (or redactor) can with transient

¹ Illustrations will appear in the sequel. See, however, the loose and helpless mode in which Davidson defines his position. After giving us a Jehovist, an Elohist, a younger Elohist, and a Redactor, he says: "It is pretty clear there were one or more writers between the Elohist and the Jehovist" (Vol. I. p. 42). "It is probable that the Elohist used several brief documents, besides oral tradition. So too the Jehovist may have done. For this reason traces of older documents appear in these two" (p. 46).

² Vol. I. p. 20. The reader will also observe, that as the special disclosure (Ex. vi. 3) was made to Moses, so there is nothing whatever in the use of the names to conflict with his authorship.

forgetfulness couple the two names twenty times in one section (Gen. ii. 4-iii. 24). Who will explain the explanation?

(3.) The divisions which the theory makes are self-refuting. The greatest liberties have been taken, and a variety of divisions adopted to prevent the so-called older sections from pre-supposing the later. But in vain. Keil has given an extended list of hiatuses in the Elohist, leaving his subsequent narrative incomprehensible, and of references in that portion to statements contained only in the (supposed later) Jehovistic portion.¹ Dr. Davidson replies, "the instances are fewer than he [Keil] supposes." But reducing the number will not destroy the fact.

(4.) The chief statements on which the dissection is attempted will not bear examination. It is not true that the name "Jehovah" was unknown till the declaration in Ex. vi. 3. That passage can be shown on sound principles to mean only that God was not before adequately made known in the character which that name imports. The name itself is not only put by the writers in the mouths of men from Eve downward, but proper names were certainly compounded with it prior to the time indicated in Exodus. No one denies (we believe) that it is found in Jochebed, the mother of Moses (Ex. vi. 20); hardly any in Moriah (Gen. xxii. 2, 8, 14). The book of Chronicles also furnishes the names Azariah, Abiah, Ahijah, Reaiah, Jonathan, Rephaiah, and others, prior to the time of Moses. The method of dealing with these cases is summary. Colenso denies the derivation of Moriah, against Delitzsch, Knobel, and Gese-

¹ Keil, *Einleitung*, pp. 77-80. For example, a hiatus between Gen. ii. 3 and v. 1 seq., since without the fall the corruption of all flesh (vi. 11-13) is an enigma; for God had created all things good, very good (i. 9, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31). So many other cases. By reason of the reference of Gen. v. 29 to iii. 17, the critics cut it away. Gen. v. 3 refers to iv. 25; xvii. 20 to xvi. 10; xix. 29 to xiii. 10-13, xviii. 17-22; xxi. 9 to xvi. 15, etc. There is some practical difficulty in selecting these references; for each new "critic," as soon as he is embarrassed by any allusion of the kind, cuts it away, whether it be a sentence or a clause. Each new writer is compelled to make some new dissection.

nus, as well as the drift of the narrative in Genesis xxii.; he pronounces Jochebed an interpolation, and the names in Chronicles *inventions* of the chronicler.¹ Dr. Davidson attaches "little weight" to the statements of the chronicler, because "the Hebrews often altered old names for later ones." For *Moriah* he would change the reading, without the slightest authority; but Jochebed, he is obliged to admit, "shows a trace of the name "Jehovah" in the pre-Mosaic period,—but he adds, "it had not then received any special significance."² The admission, though ungracious, is as fatal as it is inevitable.

In like manner lists of phrases have been designated as belonging respectively to the Elohist and the Jehovistic writers. But Keil has shown that these characteristic words and phrases are either (*a*) in some respect different, or (*b*) not used exclusively by either writer, or (*c*) found only in one or two passages.³ Here again Dr. Davidson is obliged to admit that "some of the phrases that are considered peculiar to one writer may be found now and again in the other. Our argument is based on the prevailing, not the *exclusive*, usage in each."⁴ This is a yielding of the point.

(5.) The positions assumed cannot be consistently carried out. It is conceded, as we have seen, that the distinguishing characteristics of style are not entirely characteristic. Even in the names of the Supreme Being there occur very puzzling cases of intermingling. Accordingly it is found necessary to concede that the Jehovist occasionally uses the name "Elohim" because of its *appropriateness*, as Gen. iii. 2-5; ix. 27.⁵ But as the same liberty cannot so well be granted to the Elohist, whenever it is necessary to get rid of the word "Jehovah," the passage, though but a single clause and however closely connected with the narrative, is cut away. All these critics cast out half of verse 16 in Genesis vii. and verse 29 of chapter v. Hupfeld removes an inter-

¹ Colenso, Part II. pp. 130, 131.

² Keil, Einleitung, pp. 102-108.

³ Knobel on Gen. ix. 27.

⁴ Introduction, Vol. I. 18.

⁵ Introduction, Vol. I. p. 30.

mediate half-verse for this purpose in Gen. xii. 4; xxv. 16, 21. Tuch, Knobel, Delitzsch, remove all of chapter xix. except verse 29. Tuch drops from the connection Gen. xii. 7. Knobel removes xvi. 2; xxv. 21-23; xxix. 3; vii. 5, and parts of the following verses; x. 25; xii. 8; xiii. 10, 18; xxxix. 2. He carries so sharp a knife that in chapter xxi. he not only cuts off the first half of verse 1, but cuts out the "Jehovah" of the last clause to leave the remainder to the Elohist; and in like manner he informs us that the whole of chapter xvii. "except יהוה in verse 1, is an unchanged portion of the ground-writing." Tuch also in these passages refers all except the name "Jehovah" to the Elohist. An easy way of maintaining a theory.

Such dilemmas as the above are commonly avoided when practicable by assigning connected passages that contain both names to the Jehovist, who is endowed with the liberty to employ both if necessary. This liberty is often the largest liberty: Thus, Gen. xx. contains the name "Elohim" five times (vs. 3, 6, 7, 11, 13, 17), and that of Jehovah twice (vs. 4, 18.); yet Knobel makes the whole passage Jehovistic, against Tuch and Delitzsch, the former of whom declares that the whole color of the language and mode of view make it Elohist. This dilemma, and the devices to meet it, are well illustrated in the connected section, Gen. xxviii. 10-xxiii., in which both names of God occur quite abundantly, Elohim largely preponderating, with certain characteristics of style, which, as Tuch maintains, point out the Elohist. Knobel, however, cuts the knot, by assigning eleven and a half verses (detached from each other) to the Elohist, some thirty-four verses in six different portions, to the Jehovist; twelve detached passages or verses to a "law-book," thirteen other sections, verses, and half-verses to a "war-book," which the Jehovist uses here and elsewhere, and which account for some of the older peculiarities. Tuch, on the other hand, not being prepared with this device, and constrained by the inner connection of chapter xxx. with chapter xxix. (though the latter contains a Jehovistic pas-

sage) ascribes nearly the whole section to the Elohist, removing only the most troublesome portions. Delitzsch takes an intermediate position, referring most of chapters xxxi., xxxii., and xxxiii. to the Elohist. And this brings us to remark that,

(6.) The methods of argument which the advocates of this theory employ, are singularly loose, and even vicious. The division relies largely on the distinctive names of God. Yet when the names would involve the theorists in difficulty, the Jehovist has infinite liberty of exchange, till, after Ex. vi. 6, the distinction is supposed to be obliterated, and whole passages (e. g. Ex. xvi. 9–26)¹ containing only the names of Jehovah are pronounced Elohistical. Again, as we have seen, the Elohistical portions are summarily cleared of single verses, half-verses, and even, if need be, of the solitary word “Jehovah” (Gen. xvii. 1; xx. 1.), to make them conform to the scheme.

To relieve the harshness of the process, we are again informed that the critics do not rely solely or mainly on the use of the names, but on other co-ordinate circumstances²—the phraseology and circle of thought. When we approach the phraseology, this too, as a distinctive mark, slides from under us, and we learn that the phrases are not absolutely peculiar to the separate writers, but “our argument is based on the *prevailing*, not *exclusive*, usage in each.”³ And when both the word “Elohim” and the style too (Gen. xxix. xxx.) should belong to the earlier writer, but the passage is encumbered with the Jehovistic name in part, Knobel can divide the difficulty by giving a part of the earlier portion to the Elohist and portions to two other writings used by the Jehovist; the same convenience of which Davidson avails himself in giving both to the Jehovist and the Elohist “several brief documents.”⁴

¹ De Wette, who refers most of the first half of the chapter in this way, says it is known to be Elohistical from the accurate date (v. 1) and the consecration of the Sabbath.

² Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 18.

³ Ibid., p. 30.

⁴ Ibid., p. 46.

Meanwhile the allegation of a different circle of ideas pervading the different writers is sustained by a process which is hard to be distinguished from reasoning in a circle. Thus, all passages bearing certain resemblances in style, sentiment, and subject are culled out and ascribed to one author; others to another writer; till as many authors are found as are needful for the emergency; then all conflicting names, passages, and *clauses* even, are pronounced to be interpolations of the supplementer or from *some other document*, — a second Elohist being even invented for the purpose by Hupfeld and Davidson, — and are summarily removed; and after all these disintegrations and manipulations, to make certain sets of passages homogeneous with each other and diverse from the remainder, it is *concluded* that there are certain diverse channels of thought and expression, indications of diverse authorship. The truth of this description is capable of abundant illustration, and will presently appear. Specimens of harmonizing like the following can be cited to any extent. Knobel declares that the expression נָשָׂא קוֹל (lifts up the voice) is met with only in the Jehovist; and having found two alleged cases (Gen. xxvii. 38; xxix. 11) he forces the third by cutting away the last half of xxi. 17 from its connection, and referring that to the Jehovist. In the same chapter, verse 14, he removes the single phrase, “putting it on his shoulder,” as characteristic of the “over-laborious” Jehovist, — in regard to whom the theory is that he is more minute in his description than the Elohist. The same acute writer, in order to carry out the position that the Elohist never deals with Levitical matters, such as the distinction of clean and unclean, rends away the first half of Gen. vii. 8 from the passage preceding and following. Davidson declares that the expression “angel of God” and “angel of Jehovah” never occur in the Elohist; and in order to escape the force of Gen. xxi. 17; xxxi. 11, he pronounces the first, notwithstanding the invariable use of Elohim before and after, to belong to the redactor, and the second, similarly situated and twice containing the word Elohim, to a

second Elohist. Knobel despatches these cases by his "Rechtsbuch."

Consider the following statement by Davidson and the instances cited: "There is a Levitical tone [in the Jehovist] which it is useless to deny by quoting a Levitism in Elohistic passages which are not Elohistic at all; for cleansing in Gen. xxxv. 2, belongs to the redactor; the erection of altars, xxxiii. 20, xxxv. 1-7, is in the Jehovist and redactor; burnt offerings and drink offerings, Gen. xxii. 13, xlv. 1, are in the Jehovist and junior Elohist; vows and tithes, Gen. xxviii. 20, xxxv. 1-7, are in the junior Elohist; the appearance of angels, xxi. 17, 18, xxxviii. 12, is in the redactor and junior Elohist."¹ The reader who shall carefully follow the connection of most of these passages, will be at a loss to know by what legerdemain these points are carried, till he reads the excisions of Dr. Davidson's table.² He will then see in the first case (Gen. xxxv. 2) the necessary four verses struck out from the Elohist [by Knobel three and a half]; in Gen. xxxiii. 20 one verse separated and assigned to the Jehovist;³ in Gen. xxxv. verses 1-4 assigned to the Elohist, 5 to the Jehovist, 6 and half of 7 to the younger Elohist, 8 and parts of 7 and 9 to the redactor; in Gen. xxii. verse 13, ascribed to the *junior* Elohist, and verse 14 to the Jehovist; in chapter xlv. four and a quarter verses (1-5½ containing the name Elohim four times) referred to the redactor, three fourths of the next verse (vs. 5, containing no names of God) to the Jehovist, the next two verses (6, 7, containing no name of God) to the Elohist, the next four verses and a half (8-12½, containing part of the genealogy only) to the junior Elohist, half of verse 12 to the redactor, then twelve verses (the remainder of the genealogy) to the junior Elohist, and seven to the Jehovist; in

¹ Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 28.

² Davidson's Introduction, Vol. I. pp. 58-61.

³ Knobel is a bold dissector. In this troublesome chapter he assigns the adjacent verses 16, 18, 19, 20, respectively to the Elohist, the Kriegsbuch, Rechtsbuch, and Jehovist.

Gen. xxviii. he will see a chapter cut up into sections convenient for the theory, viz. vs. 1 – 9, 10 – 12, 13 – 16, 17 – 22, ascribed successively to the Elohist, younger Elohist, redactor, younger Elohist; Gen. xxxv. a variegated patchwork of *fifteen* different pieces, extending from one or two words to five verses each, ascribed to four different writers: ¹ Gen. xxi. similarly shredded into *thirteen* fragments, ascribed again to four different writers in such violent modes as to meet the exigencies of a theory. It is easy to frame a specious theory when there is liberty to shape all the facts to the occasion, to *assume* the most convenient number of writers, to assign them certain convenient traits, and then to break up connected narratives, and remove even refractory words and clauses at pleasure, in proof of those traits. But sound reasoners will hold that to assert the existence of separate writers in one continuous narrative on the ground of obvious distinctive traits, and then to cut up that continuous narrative literally *piecemeal* in order to make out those obvious distinctive traits, is but a thinly-covered process of reasoning in a circle.

We have said thus much on the untenableness of this theory, rather that we may not seem to evade the subjects than from the necessities of our argument. It avails nothing to show the marks of various writings or traditions in the Pentateuch, unless it can be shown that some of these writings are posterior to Moses. The great lawgiver might still be the Jehovist, the supplementer, or the redactor who used those pre-existing materials, and gave his great name and authority to the narrative thus formed.²

Accordingly, it is proper to add, Christian scholars have very extensively held a simple view of the case, which alike accords with the belief that Moses was the author, and

¹ Knobel makes ten sections of this chapter. Similar pieces of patchwork are made of chapters x., xxxi., xxxii., xxxvii., xli.; some of them still more minute. In chapter xli. Davidson carries the process of abrasion so far as to make some *forty* detached pieces, greater or less; Knobel, *twenty*.

² Delitzsch and Kurtz actually make the supplementer to be a contemporary of Moses and Joshua.

meets the phenomena which have been used to frame these untenable theories. They hold that Moses, like others of the sacred historians, received by revelation only such materials as were to be had in no other way; but that all matters which lay within his observation, or other ordinary means of knowledge, were ascertained by him in the usual way. No man supposes that his genealogical statements came otherwise than from genealogical records or traditions. The events of his own time he saw in person. The history of Abraham's warfare (in Gen. xiv.) may be as old a chronicle as Ewald and Bunsen would have it—stamped as it is with peculiarities and antique modes of description. There can be no valid reason for objecting to the supposition that such an event as the flood, which left its impress on the whole human race, may have been handed down in a distinct and truthful shape in the line of the covenant; especially as the narrative itself bears so strongly the marks of being the account of an eyewitness. And when we consider that, according to the Bible, but part of a generation intervened between Adam and Noah, we need not be staggered at the suggestion that even the earlier narratives of Genesis may contain accounts handed down from the most ancient times, and that Moses may have used them as modern historians their trustworthy material, oral and written, often in the language of the original. Thoughtful scholars have recognized some diversity of phenomena in the Pentateuch, authorizing them to go so far as this. But be those materials less or more, they furnish no more occasion to deny the proper authorship of Moses than do similar methods that of Lamartine, Thiers, or Alison. It is emphatically denied that the composition can be divided out into a set of diverse narratives merely edited together. It is also denied that the names "Elohim" and "Jehovah" require any such supposition to explain their use. The names have different shades of meaning, which regulated their earlier, and to some degree their later use. The name אֱלֹהִים is the more general term designating "God," either the strong one

or the being to be feared in the fulness [intensive plural] of his being and attributes, as the omnipotent author and governor of all. יהוה (more probably יהוה or יהוה) strictly designates God as manifesting himself, unfolding his character and being; God in his revealed character and covenanted relations to man.¹ In describing the work of creation God is named by the more general term. In setting forth his relation to man (Gen. ii.) he is designated by his more special name, and this is coupled with the former (יהוה אלהים) to identify the God of creation as the same who was afterward revealed to Israel. The change of names in the second chapter is, as Kalisch and Delitzsch have shown, a real progress. "By the use of the name 'Jehovah' the narrative advances a very important step towards the peculiar theocratic character of the Pentateuch; but by combining it with Elohim, it reminds also of the omnipotent Creator. The God of the universe is the God of Israel, but the God of Israel is at the same time the Governor of the whole world. [He adds virtually, that Jehovah was a name of deeper awe; and proceeds.] That this was really the idea of the Hebrew writer is evident from the striking fact that in the whole conversation with the serpent, not Jehovah Elohim but simply Elohim is used (iii. 1-5); it would have been a profanation to put the holy name of God in the tempter's mouth, or to pronounce it before his ears. Thus the identity of Jehovah and Elohim having been once impressed, it was not necessary to repeat this composition, except on peculiar occasions. Wherever it is subsequently employed, it adds pathos and sublimity to the ideas; but the nature

¹ Two etymologies are given of אלהים: from אהל, *to be strong*, with Gesenius, Tuch, and others, or from a root still existing in Arabic, اَلِه, *he worshipped*, with Hengstenberg, Delitzsch, Keil, and others. The name "Jehovah," also, has been differently explained. The two fundamental views worthy of attention rest either on the radical idea of *being*, i.e. the existent, hence self-existent, eternal, immutable, so exhibited in the fulfilment of his promises; or on the idea of *becoming*, "he who becomes or will become," not in existence, but in manifestation, unfolding himself to his people, historically revealed. For our purpose it is needless now to enter more fully on the subject.

of this emphasis is always colored by the context in which it occurs.”¹ The respective names of God are subsequently used, often with a clear reference to their distinctive meaning, and often indiscriminately. It is therefore unnecessary for Hengstenberg and Hävernicks to persist that the names are *always* carefully discriminated in the use; and impossible for Davidson to force upon the advocates of Moses’s authorship the alternative of an invariable discrimination or no discrimination at all.² It is ridiculous to assert that there must be such peculiar exigencies *in every instance* as to require the one term pre-eminently, or that such a writer, intent on other thoughts, must always be pondering subtle shades of fitness in the selection of two terms, either of which is adequate. It is precisely as with the two principal names of the Saviour in the New Testament. Jesus was the personal name, Christ the official. Now in the first chapter of Matthew, we have the first three times, the second twice, both together twice, discriminatedly used. But are we to force this nice distinction through the whole New Testament, or even any one writer of it? By no means. The narrators commonly use the personal appellation, even where the transactions were seemingly official. The epistolary (and later) writers commonly use the official name, even where the personal epithet would be in strictness more appropriate; and while frequently using the names, single and conjoined, with undoubted discrimination, they more commonly used them much alike.

The view we have thus indicated meets all the exigencies of the case. In regard to the use of God’s names, it escapes the necessity of forcing a peculiar significance into every casual allusion, and it avoids arbitrary and violent disintegrations of a connected narrative to sustain a drifting theory. In regard to other peculiarities of portions of the narrative, it offers a fair solution of the phenomena, and leaves to the

¹ Kalisch on Genesis, pp. 103, 104.

² Davidson’s Introduction, Vol. I. p. 24. “No middle course can be followed. The one writer always used the two names indiscriminately, or he did not,” etc.

unanimous testimony concerning the authorship its proper weight.

Nor is this view of the materials which Moses may have used a novel opinion. Dr. Colenso expresses some amazement at finding Mr. Rawlinson advocating this opinion, "so differing from the ordinary view."¹ But wider knowledge would have mitigated his surprise. This view, in substance, is as old as Vitringa,² was adopted by Le Cene, Calmet, Bishop Gleig,³ advocated by Rosenmüller,⁴ received by Jahn,⁵ Turner,⁶ Bush,⁷ Stuart,⁸ apparently by Prof. Barrows,⁹ and Prof. Lewis,¹⁰ as well as by Mr. Rawlinson,¹¹ and others. But whether this mode of view be accepted or not, it remains true that no showing of diverse elements employed in the composition invalidates the position that Moses is responsible for the book, as such, unless it be shown that some of those constituent portions were certainly later than his time, or for other reasons *could not* have passed under his hand.

Here we must rest our argument for the authorship of the Pentateuch, without allowing ourselves space for a closing review of the discussion. It will be seen that the systematic policy of the objectors has been to hurl all manner of missiles, taken at random, in the hope that some of them may reach the mark. It will also be seen that out of that whole mass of materials, scarcely more than half a dozen passages, lying on the surface of the narrative, could fairly suggest the thought of a later hand; and that these can be accounted, on intrinsic probabilities, general testimony, and special indications, as superficial glosses, without for a moment disturbing the concurrent testimony of all antiquity that Moses was the responsible author of the Pentateuch.

¹ Colenso. Part II. pp. 120, 121.

² Cited by Rosenmüller, Scholia on Genesis, p. 46.

³ Cited by Turner on Genesis, p. 16.

⁴ Scholia on Genesis, p. 44.

⁵ Jahn's Introduction, § 15.

⁶ Turner on Genesis, p. 16.

⁷ Bush on Genesis, Vol. I., Introduction, p. xxxiii.

⁸ Stuart on the Canon of the Old Testament, p. 54.

⁹ Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. XIV. p. 85.

¹⁰ Lewis's Divine-Human, p. 224.

¹¹ Aids to Faith, p. 288.

ARTICLE IV.

PALESTINE AND THE DESERT, PAST AND PRESENT.

BY REV. LYMAN COLEMAN, D.D., EASTON, PENN.

THE leader of Israel was commissioned by the God of Abraham to lead his people out of Egypt into a land of the most exuberant fertility, "unto a good land and a large, a land flowing with milk and honey" — the familiar Hebrew expression to denote the exceeding fertility of the land of promise. The delegation whom Moses sent to spy out the land — "whether it be fat or lean, whether there be wood therein or not" — brought back a "cluster of grapes of Eshcol, with pomegranates and figs," in evidence that "it is a good land, and surely floweth with milk and honey." It is "a land of corn and wine, a land of bread and vineyards" — "of brooks of water, of fountains and depths that spring out of valleys and hills, a land of wheat and barley, and vines and fig trees and pomegranates, a land of oil-olives, and honey, a land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack any thing in it." It is "a pleasant land," "as the garden of Eden," "the glory of all lands," "a field which the Lord hath blessed." "God hath given it of the dew of heaven, and of the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine." It is "a land of hills and valleys, and drinketh water of the rain of heaven, a land which the Lord thy God careth for. The eyes of the Lord thy God are always upon it, from the beginning of the year unto the end of the year."

These representations of exuberant fertility require us to ascribe to ancient Palestine every element in soil and climate that can enrich the land, and evoke, sustain, and mature its rich and varied productions. It implies the existence of hills and mountains covered with woodland and forests, — vast primeval forests crowning the misty mountain-tops

with verdure, and scattering broadcast over the land their vegetable deposits, to feed the luxuriance of hill and plain and valley on every side. It implies a boundless evaporation not only from river, lake, and sea, but from the leaves of the forest, the grass of the field, and the teeming earth, — all giving off their vapors to be condensed in the clouds, and returned in showers that water the earth anew and drop down fatness on every field. It implies the benignant vicissitudes of sunshine and showers, as well as of the former and the latter rain in their season, with the genial influences of the heavens above and of the earth beneath combined to bless the labors of the husbandman.

All that is said by the sacred writers, of groves and thickets, forests and woods, of vapors and clouds and rain and showers that water the earth; of hail, hoarfrost, snow, and ice, — all that pertains to the meteorology of the land, its climate and changes of temperature, seems to be descriptive of a country, climate, and seasons resembling those of our own land rather than anything now known in Syria.

The Hebrew language, again, has a wonderful copiousness of expression for rivers, brooks, and springs. For these three words of our own language it has, we are told, not less than eight or ten, each of which conveyed its proper distinctive sense to the Hebrew ear.¹ The English language, with eighty or a hundred thousand words, exhausts its vocabulary, "in this watery department," with fifty or sixty words; while the Hebrew, comprising only six or seven thousand words, has as many as *fifty* of this same class; nor is it to be doubted

¹ It is worthy of special notice that the New Testament is equally barren of the same class of words. Even the terms "river" and "fountain," whether singular or plural, occur but seldom; and these, we believe, exhaust its vocabulary on this subject. This singular fact, were other evidence wanting, would go far to prove that a great change had taken place in this respect between the periods when the Old Testament and the New were respectively composed. Both have the same air of country life. The writers of both are eminently in sympathy with the scenes of nature. The absence, therefore, or infrequent allusions to "woods," "forests," and "groves"; to "springs," "fountains," "brooks," "streams" and "rivers"; "clouds," "showers," "rain," "hail," etc. indicate conclusively a corresponding change in the country and the climate.

that the colloquial language of the common people had many more words of the same character.

All these peculiarities in the language of the Hebrews, all the imagery of their poets and their prophets, the whole tenor of the teachings of their historians, betoken a country, climate, and condition in striking contrast with the present aspect of this Land of Promise. The mountains in that land now rear aloft their summits, bald, barren, bleak, and desolate. Upon the plains below they send down nothing to fertilize the soil, but much to spread a wider desolation around their bases. The face of the country is a cheerless waste, where the flocks, instead of reposing on verdant pastures, roam in restless search of a scanty subsistence. The fountains, few and far between, sink at once into the dry and thirsty land, or sweep on in channels deeply worn, sustaining no verdure beyond the thick and thorny jungle which lines their rocky bed.

The springing of the year is cut short by the untimely drought of summer. Through all those dreary months of a Syrian summer no cloud intervenes to mitigate the burning heat. No rain descends, no dew distils; but every green thing withers and expires under the protracted, intolerable drought that fills up the gloomy interval between the former and the latter rain. The vine, the fig-tree, the olive, the apricot, and the citron linger still upon some of the hill-sides; wheat, barley, and lentils still spring in some of the valleys and plains, sad memorials of the primitive luxuriance which has passed away, never to return. The Palestine of the present day is not the Palestine of the time of Moses, of Solomon, or even of our Lord. It has undergone a great change. Its forests have utterly disappeared, its fountains have dried up; climate, soil, and productions have changed; and the whole country appears desolate, withered, parched,—the very opposite of a land of invitation and of abundant blessings like the Promised Land.

“ In Palestine the grass grows only so long as the ground that is adapted for it is moistened by the winter rains. The

traveller who passes through these tracts in the spring is ravished with the luxuriant vegetation and the multitude of flowers; but scarcely have the latter rains ceased, and the storms of the vernal equinox subsided, than an almost vertical sun withers up the grass and flowers, the scorching south winds come up from the wilderness; and the traveller who to-day has passed over a verdant and variegated carpet of herbage and flowers, will, three weeks after, at the same place, not meet with a blade of grass. All vegetation he will then find scorched to death; and if, during that interval, the sirocco has been more than usually powerful in its blast, then the grass, after being shrivelled into hay will have been swept off, and the surface of the ground will have assumed a dingy, yellowish, copper-hue"¹

"There is no doubt that the climate has, along with the entire physical condition of the country, undergone a very sensible change for the worse since the times when the judgments of desolation spoken of in scripture² reached their accomplishment. The destruction of trees in many places exposed the face of the land to the parching rays of the sun. Elsewhere fountains have been choked up; and the atmosphere, being thus deprived of its ordinary supply of moisture emanating from the soil, has, as the first natural consequence, not been able to return it in the shape of rain. The early and the latter rain have indeed not ceased to come down from heaven, but their amount is now comparatively small."³

The forests which crown the mountains and cover the hillsides and rocky districts of a country unsuited to tillage, are, in the economy of nature, at once the refrigerators of the climate and fertilizers of the soil. By their immense evaporation they supply the needful moisture to the atmosphere, the first requisite of vegetable life, and indispensable element of fertility. Year by year they overspread the earth with a vast amount of vegetable matter to enrich the

¹ Van de Velde, Vol. III. p. 81.

² Matth. xxiv. 15.

³ The greatest quantity of rain in one year, observed by Dr. McGowan at Jerusalem, is one hundred and eight inches. Van de Velde's Memoir, p. 29.

soil with another element of fertility equally essential to the support of vegetation. Their vast evaporation cools the atmosphere, disturbs its equilibrium, raising alternately the stormy wind and the whispering breeze, which sweep away the noxious exhalations from the earth, and circulate health and happiness through all the habitations of man. The vapor, received from the forests chiefly, is returned in fruitful showers to feed the luxuriance of every field. Thus God in his beneficent providence 'watereth the hills from his chambers, and sendeth the springs into the valleys which run among the hills. He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man, that he may bring forth food out of the earth.'

But by the destruction of the forests, the mountains, denuded and barren, suspend their fertilizing influences on the valleys below; the showers of summer are reduced or suspended, the rains diminished, and the plains, deprived of their sources of fertility, are impoverished. The wash from the hills and mountains by winter rains and torrents, no longer a rich compound of vegetable matter, mixed with earth to fertilize the soil, becomes the waste of barren heights, overspreading with barrenness the fields which once it enriched with its alluvial deposits. The insects that prey upon the productions of the earth are multiplied, the temperature is increased, the labor of the husbandman fails, the earth refuses her increase, and whatever of fruit or grain or grass starts into life in the springing of the year, scorched by the summer's heat, brings forth little or no fruit in her season.

"My view of the case," says Captain Allen, with reference to the present condition of Palestine, "may be thus summed up: 'The destruction of the primeval forests, for the wants of an improvident population, created an element of sterility, which by reaction caused depopulation.'"¹

"So it has been in Palestine," says Isaac Taylor. "Once it was a land of dense timber growths, and of frequent

¹ Dead Sea Expedition, Vol. II. p. 298.

graceful clusters of small trees, and of orchards, and of vineyards, which retains now only here and there a remnant of those adornments."

With this disappearance of her forests, many ages since, the climate has changed, the rain has abated, the fountains and streams have dried up, or failed, in a great measure, to yield their wonted supply;¹ the soil has become impoverished and many portions of the country hopelessly desolate and irreclaimable. The fixed, industrious, and populous residences of other days have given place to the wretched, restless, roving Arabs who pine in want, consumed by drought, on the fields which God had blessed, and selected as the abode of his chosen, where they should neither fail to eat bread without scarceness, nor lack any thing in it. Over all this land, where "the pastures were clothed with flocks, the valleys covered over with corn, and the little hills rejoiced on every side," now roams the gaunt and hungry Arab, tending his famished flocks amid the ruins of forgotten cities.

Bare of herbage is the country round,
Nor springs nor streams refresh the ground.

Not only upon Palestine proper, but upon the Desert of Sinai also, a similar blight has fallen. The population of this desert must anciently have been numerous and powerful; compared with which the present inhabitants are but the gleanings of the summer's vintage. In the Exodus a single tribe for some time resisted the advance of two millions or more of the Israelites. In a pitched battle, with a chosen army under Joshua, the fortune of the day remained a long time doubtful. Israel and Amelek both by turns prevailed. But at present, the entire population of the pen-

¹ The brook Kidron must in the time of the kings of Israel have been a running stream, where now not a particle of water is found, except for a time in the season of the winter rains, 1 Kings xv. 13; 2 Kings xxiii. 6; Neh. ii. 15, etc. Dr. Barclay, in his *City of the Great King*, has noticed other striking failures about Jerusalem in the supply of water to that ancient city. The same is doubtless true of several other fountains and streams, now lost, of which mention is made in Jewish history.

insula is variously estimated by Burekhardt, Rüppell, and Robinson from four to seven thousand.

It may therefore be assumed as a fact that, since the period of recorded history, the population of the desert has been reduced from numerous and formidable hordes to a few petty tribes, weak and small, who have declined, age after age, with the increasing sterility of this "great and terrible wilderness."

The vast ruins scattered over this wilderness tell of its former resources and population. Dr. Robinson discovered the ruins of a single city, before unknown, which must have contained a population of more than double that of all the tribes of the desert at the present time. These ruins occupy a "level tract, of ten or twelve acres in extent, entirely and thickly covered over with confused heaps of stones, with just enough of their former order remaining to show the foundations and form of the houses and the course of some of the streets. Once, as we judged upon the spot, this must have been a city of not less than twelve or fifteen thousand inhabitants. Now it is a perfect field of ruins—a scene of unutterable desolation—across which the passing stranger can with difficulty find his way."¹

In this connection the ruined cities of Elusa and Eboda claim each a distinct consideration as indicative of the ancient population of the desert. The former of these, Dr. Robinson supposes, may have contained a population of fifteen or twenty thousand souls, and the latter "must have been a place of importance. But the desert has reassumed its rights; the intrusive hand of cultivation has been driven back, the races that dwelt there have perished, and their works now look abroad, in loneliness and silence, over the mighty waste."

In the desert of Sinai, again, the old city of Pharan, probably the Rephidim of the Exodus, where the Israelites encountered the Amelekites, attests the existence formerly of a numerous population. In the early centuries of the church

¹ Biblical Researches, Vol. I. p. 290.

it was the seat of an Episcopal see. The large church, crowning the summit of the hill in the valley, where Moses by his earnestness in prayer may have turned the battle against the foe, the chapel surmounting the neighboring height, and innumerable cells, caves, and hermitages on all the surrounding mountain-tops and declivities, evince the abodes of thousands of anchorets, who must have found subsistence there where now a few Bedouins of the desert scarcely obtain a precarious sustenance. In many other places, scattered over the desert, are found ruined cloisters, hermitages, gardens, and fields, — lone monuments of the people who once inhabited these parched places in the wilderness, now a salt land and not inhabited.

The mysterious Egyptian monuments of Surâbet el-Khâdim, again, evince the existence once in this “waste, howling wilderness” of an ingenious and powerful people. Here are found catacombs and hieroglyphics, and other memorials of the dead, near vast copper mines and enormous mounds of clay. These copper mines, Lepsius learns from the monuments still remaining, were worked here more than three thousand years before the Christian era.¹ They lead us back into the gray mists of antiquity, and constrain us to contemplate with wonder and awe the stupendous remains of men who labored and died here ages before Abraham lived.

In one tract now utterly desolate, “of tolerably fertile soil, capable of tillage,” were found by Dr. Robinson the remains of long ranges of low stone walls, which probably once served as the divisions of cultivated fields. Afterwards many such walls were observed which obviously were not constructed by the present race of Arab inhabitants, but must be referred back to an early period.²

All these monumental remains point unmistakably to a more numerous and cultivated race, who, in a happier age, under a more propitious climate, cultivated a soil upon which the blight of the desert had not yet fallen.

¹ Lepsius's *Letters, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Peninsula of Sinai*, p. 300.

² *Biblical Researches*, Vol. I. p. 281.

Isaac once sowed on this land in the margin of the desert, "now barren and desolate in the extreme," and received "in the same year an hundred fold" (Gen. xxvi. 12). No husbandman could now recover from the same soil the seed sown.

Moses took his wife and his sons, and set them upon an ass, and he returned to the land of Egypt (Ex. iv. 20). No Arab of the desert would attempt the same journey by similar means. It is an utter impossibility except perhaps in the midst of the rainy season.

The brethren of Joseph, once and again went down from the land of Canaan into Egypt, in time of extreme drought and famine, with asses (Gen. xlii. 26; xlv. 13). Jacob with all his sons and their families went down into Egypt by the same means of conveyance, taking with them their cattle (Gen. xlv. 23; xlv. 6). This route has in a few instances been traversed by modern tourists with horses, though not without subjecting the horse to extreme suffering for lack of water; but neither the ass nor the ox could by any possibility make the journey, which was oftentimes accomplished under the pressure of a fearful famine and drought.

The flocks and the herds of the Israelites, "even very much cattle," subsisted for forty years on the desert where at the present time they could only be sustained by a continued and stupendous miracle. The children of Israel repeatedly complained for lack of water for themselves and their flocks, but only in specific localities, at different intervals; nor is there an intimation that their continuous supply was miraculous. In this connection the reflections of Dr. Robinson on this subject are peculiarly pertinent and suggestive: "How they could have obtained a *sufficiency* of water during their whole stay in the peninsula and their subsequent wanderings in the desert, even when want of water is mentioned, is a mystery which I am unable to solve; unless we admit the supposition that water was anciently far more abundant in those regions than at present. As we saw the peninsula, a body of two millions of men

could not subsist there a week without drawing their supplies of water, as well as of provisions, from a great distance.”¹ What possible solution of this mystery can be offered other than that of this learned traveller, that the supply of water and of provisions for man and beast was then vastly more abundant than at present over all the desert?

The existence of the *petrified forest* which overspreads the desert between Cairo and the Red Sea, is a significant fact, worthy of particular attention in this connection. This region is a part of the great desert, of which that of the peninsula of Sinai is only a larger section. “If the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth there it shall lie.” There the trees of this petrified forest are still lying in vast numbers in the place where first they fell, — a perpetual memorial of the primeval forest which originally overspread the desert. But no portion of the wilderness is now more hopelessly barren, more utterly void of vegetation, than that of the petrified forest, which once spread a verdant landscape out over these regions of drought and desolation.

Seetzen, in what is perhaps as arid and desolate a region as any in the whole desert, asked his guide to mention all the neighboring places whose names he knew. He received a list of sixty-three places in the neighborhood of Madūrah, Petra, and 'Akabah, and of twelve more in the Ghôr es-Sephia, of which total of seventy-five all save twelve are now abandoned to the desert, and have retained nothing but their names, — “proof,” he remarks, “that in very early ages this country was extremely populous, and that the furious rage with which the Arabs, both before and after the age of Mahomet, assailed the Greek emperors, was able to convert into a waste this blooming region, extending from the limit of the Hedjaz to the neighborhood of Damascus.”²

Joshua enumerates “six cities with their villages” (xv. 61, 62) in the wilderness of En-gedi, west of the Dead Sea,

¹ Biblical Researches, Vol. I. p. 106.

² Seetzen, Reisen, Vol. III. pp. 17, 18. Cited in Smith's Biblical Dic.

where David lived "among the rocks of the wild goats," and where no human habitation is found but the tents of the wild Arab of the desert.

In view, therefore, of all the foregoing considerations, the conclusion is irresistible that the resources of the desert were aforetime much greater than at present. There the ox and the ass of the patriarch traversed, in safety, the wilderness, and the flocks and the herds of the Israelites found pasturage — there where now only the stricken, starving camel drags on a miserable existence. And primeval forests drank of the dew of heaven and the fatness of the earth, from out of those dreary wastes where now all verdure sickens and dies.

Tantum aevi longinqua va-
let mutare vetustas.

This devastating change is, in a measure, still in progress in some parts of the desert. Burckhardt, in 1813, near the Aëlanitic gulf, passed many ruins of walls, where, half a century before, was a fruitful valley abounding in date-palm, and other fruit trees. These were swept away by a flood, and the whole valley had become utterly waste.¹

Wellsted records a similar catastrophe in the same region. Ruppell, again, in his route from 'Akabah to Sinai, passed through the Valley of the Fountain, which appeared evidently to have been covered with forest trees.² Ritter, in addition to other authorities, cites that of Ewald, the learned historian of the Jews, and concurs himself in the same opinion, that the desert of Sinai anciently sustained a population vastly more numerous than its present inhabitants.³ Even as late as the seventeenth century, if we may trust the expression of Monconys, the Wady en-Rahâv, north of Horeb, and near the convent of Saint Catharine, now entirely bare, was a vast *green* plain, — "une grande cham-

¹ Travels in Syria, p. 538. Cited by Ritter, Erdkunde, Vol. XIV. p. 219.

² Geschichte des Volkes Israel, Bd. II. 1843, § 201, u. s. Compare Ritter, Erdkunde, Theile XIV. pp. 926 – 928.

³ Cited by Ritter, Erdkunde, Theile XIV. p. 274.

pagne verte."¹ The soil, originally lean and meagre, having no recuperative power in itself, once wasted, changes into an arid desert.

But this change, which in the lapse of ages has passed upon Palestine and the desert, is only such as is incident, more or less, to other lands under the influence of similar causes. Denuded of their native forests, which reduced the temperature of the climate and supplied the sources of fruitful showers, the result is a heated atmosphere and an arid soil. Bad husbandry and improvident tillage lend their influence to augment the increasing sterility. Vast tracts of country, inadequately supplied with the essential elements of a permanent self-sustaining fertility, change thus, in process of time, into desert wastes. As the desert has become utterly desolate, Palestine wasted and worn out, so in other lands the same results are observable, under the operation of similar causes, around the whole circuit of the Mediterranean.

Let us begin our survey on the desert waste of the African shore, of which the desert of Sinai and of the petrified forest is only an integral part. The result is given in the language of an accomplished English scholar: "Within the lapse of what is called historic time, the Lybian wastes have become far more arid than once they were; and in consequence they have acquired a higher mean temperature. North Africa is much less abundant in corn, and is much less graced with tropical vegetation, than in ancient times. In the course of two or three thousand years, the sand hurricanes of Lybia and of the Sahara, in sweeping over the valley of the Nile, have not only sepulchred its sepulchres and entombed its temples and palaces in a covering of ten, or twenty, or thirty feet in depth, narrowing continually the Nile, but they had given dryness for moisture to the neighboring countries. Dense forests once shed coolness and humidity over large tracts of northern Arabia."² In this

¹ Cited by Stanley, *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 26.

² Isaac Taylor, *Hebrew Poetry*, p. 116.

connection it is pertinent to refer to ancient authors on the condition of the coast of the Lybian desert, once regarded by the Greeks as a kind of terrestrial paradise, where they located the Gardens of the Hesperides, where flourished the powerful and populous cities of Cyrene and Ptolemais, now given over to irremediable ruin by the encroachments of the desert and the lack of water.¹

Even the isles of the sea, by the destruction of their forests, are subject to the same deterioration of soil and rise of temperature, notwithstanding all the counteracting influences of the ocean. We shall recur again to the condition of the Grecian Isles, but subjoin in this place a brief remark of Malte Brun, the great geographer: "In the Cape de Verd Islands it is the clearing of the forests which has dried up the springs and rendered the atmosphere sultry. Persia, Italy, Greece, and many other countries have thus been deprived of their delightful temperature."²

Barrenness has, in like manner, fallen upon a large part of both Spain and France. The benign influence of forest land upon the soil and climate of a country, and the disastrous influence of the axe in felling the forests of Spain, have been forcibly illustrated in a recent number of Chambers' Journal.

The writer states from personal observation that the great central plateau of Spain is "almost denuded of its primeval forests, leaving it in summer dry, barren of grass, and dreary. The springs and rivers, in summer, are nearly dried up. We inquired the reason: The inhabitants cut down

¹ In Palestine and many other parts of Asia and northern Africa, which in ancient times were the granaries of Europe, fertile and populous, similar consequences have been experienced. These lands are now deserts, and it is the destruction of the forests alone which has produced this desolation. — Asbjørnsen, cited in *Man and Nature*, p. 189, by G. P. Marsh, a work of vast research and profound erudition, in which the desolation which succeeds the destruction of forests is largely discussed.

² *Geography*, Vol. II. chap. xvii. p. 404. "The terrible droughts which desolate the Cape de Verd Islands must be attributed to the destruction of the forests." — *Man and Nature*, p. 184.

the trees many years ago, because, they said, the woods harbored birds which destroyed the grain!"¹

The change of climate in Spain is forcibly manifested by contrasting the statements of Strabo with the present temperature of that country. This geographer, who wrote near the beginning of the Christian era, states that "the part of Spain next to the north, which borders on the ocean, is extremely cold; and besides its rugged character, has no communication or intercourse with other countries, and thus to dwell there is a peculiar hardship."²

It agrees with this that the olive, the vine, and the fig, the productions of a warm climate, were not found in the north of Spain. "In olives, vines, figs, and every kind of similar fruit trees, the Iberian coast next the Mediterranean abounds; they are likewise plentiful beyond. Of the coasts next to the ocean, that towards the north is destitute of them on account of the cold."³

As in Spain, so also in France, Strabo informs us that on the coast bordering on the Atlantic ocean "the vine either does not grow at all, or attains no maturity."⁴ "As we advance towards the north, and the mountains of the Cevennes, the plantations of the olive and fig disappear, but the other fruits remain. Likewise the vine, as you proceed northward, does not easily mature its fruit."⁵ This is said of the interior of France, proceeding northward from the coast of the Mediterranean.

Such is Strabo's account of the temperature of France, now proverbially mild and genial. This account of Strabo is fully sustained by Diodorus Siculus, though he seems to

¹ "I do not know at what period the two Castiles were bared of their wood, but the Spaniard's proverbial 'hatred of a tree' is of long standing. Horace vigorously combats this foolish prejudice; and Ponz, in his prologue to the ninth volume of his journey, says that many carried it so far as wantonly to destroy the shade and ornamental trees planted by the municipal authorities. 'Trees,' they contended, and still believe, 'breed birds, and birds eat up the grain.'" — *Man and Nature*, p. 279.

² Book III. chap. II. § 2.

³ Book III. chap. IV. § 16

⁴ Book II. chap. I. § 16.

⁵ Book IV. chap. I. § 3.

refer particularly to the north of France, as far as the parallel of the Rhine. Possibly his representations may be qualified by his notions of it as a northern country. "Lying near the north, it [Gaul] is exceedingly wintry and cold. For in the wintry season, in cloudy days, instead of rain abundance of snow falls; and in clear days it abounds in ice and extraordinary frosts, by which the rivers when frozen are by their own nature bridged over; for not only ordinary travellers in small numbers pass over the ice, but immense armies cross over with their baggage and loaded wagons." After naming the Rhone, the Rhine, and the Danube as the principal rivers, and giving some account of them, he adds that there are many other navigable rivers in Gaul. "But almost all of them, hardened by the frost, bridge their currents; and because the ice by its physical properties causes those who are passing over to slip, the crossing is made safe by laying down chaff.¹

The facts already noted, on the authority of Strabo, of the failure of the olive and the fig at a short distance from the Mediterranean coast, and of the vine also in the interior of France, by reason of the cold, stands in confirmation of these representations by Diodorus of the severity of the climate, and indicate conclusively a great rise of temperature since these authors wrote near the beginning of the Christian era. France is now the vineyard of the world, and the vine grows in the greatest luxuriance several degrees north of France, on the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Danube.

These changes of temperature and climate are justly

¹ Κειμένη δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ὑπὸ τὰς ἄρκτους, χειμέριός ἐστι καὶ ψυχρὰ διαφέροντως. Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν χειμερινὴν ὥραν ἐν ταῖς συνεφέσιν ἡμέραις, ἀντὶ μὲν τῶν ὕμβρων χιόνι πολλῇ νίφεται, κατὰ δὲ τὰς αἰθρίας κρυστάλλῳ καὶ πάγαις ἐξαισίοις πληθύνει· δι' ὧν οἱ ποταμοὶ πηγνύμενοι, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως γεφυροῦνται. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ οἱ τύχοντες ὁδῶν κατ' ὀλίγους κατὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου πορευόμενοι διαβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατοπέδων μυριάδες μετὰ σκευοφόρων καὶ ἁμαξῶν γεμονσῶν ἀσφαλῶς περαιοῦνται. . . . Πάντες δὲ σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάγου πηγνύμενοι, γεφυροῦσι τὰ βεῖδρα, καὶ τοῦ κρυστάλλου διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ιδιότητα ποιοῦντος τοὺς διαβαίνοντας ὀλισθαίνειν, ἀχύρων ἐπιβαλλομένων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς, ἀσφαλῇ τὴν διάβασιν ἔχουσι. — Biblioth. Hist., Lib. V. c. 25.

ascribable to the various agencies of man in opening a country and reducing it to a condition adapted to the diversified wants of civilized life. For this end all the resources both of nature and of art are made subservient to man. "Now, fire, water, steam, gravitation, his own muscular strength, and that of animals rendered obedient to his will, are the instruments by which he has converted the desert into garden, drained marshes, cut canals, made roads, turned the course of rivers, cleared away forests in one country and planted them in another. By these operations he has altered the climate, changed the course of local winds, increased or diminished the quantity of rain, and softened the rigor of the seasons. In the time of Strabo, the cold in France was so intense that it was thought impossible to ripen grapes north of the Cevennes.¹

In this connection let us particularly notice the effect of these influences, not only upon the climate and seasons, but upon the sources of supply, from above and from beneath, of water upon the earth. A late French writer has shown "that within two centuries the extent of forest in France has been reduced *by two thirds*; and that according to the calculations of the illustrious Laplace, if this extent of forest be not restored fuel will entirely fail." He adds that by this destruction of the woods the supply of water has been reduced, and in many places its sources have entirely failed.²

Several of the Alpine provinces of the south of France, comprising a territory of fourteen or fifteen thousand square miles, have, within the last generation, been reduced to the most appalling desolation by the clearing of their forests. "Signs of unparalled destitution are visible in all the mountain zone, and the solitudes of these districts are assuming an indescribable character of sterility and desolation. The gradual destruction of the woods has, in a thousand localities, annihilated at once the springs and the fuel." The

¹ Miss Somerville's *Physical Geography*, chap. xxxiii. p. 451.

² *De l'Influence des Déboisements, etc.*, par M. Paul Laurent, Prof., etc., a Nancy.

population has decreased or entirely withdrawn from these fearful wastes of the woodman's axe. "I have, the present season," says Blanqui, in 1843, "found not a living soul in districts where I remember to have enjoyed hospitality thirty years ago." Authorities to the same effect, and terrible statistics, in extended detail, are given in the work from which these citations are taken.¹ The following statement indicates the efforts of the tree to recover itself and repair the desolations made by man on the earth. The governments of Europe have of late sought by legislation to aid this restorative process of nature. Many thousands of dollars are annually expended in France to restore by culture the woods in her southern provinces. "The law of July 28, 1860, appropriated ten million francs, to be expended, at the rate of one million of francs per year, in executing or aiding the replanting of woods. It is computed that this appropriation will secure the creation of new forest to the extent of about two hundred and fifty thousand acres."²

Humboldt found that in consequence of the clearing of forests in the valley of Aragua, in the province of Venezuela, during a century, the waters of Lake Tacarigua had been much diminished. This cause having ceased, M. Boussingault, twenty years afterwards, found that, with the growth of the forests, the surface of the lake had regained more than half its ancient bed.³

The classic authors of Rome abundantly attest the severity of an Italian winter in their day, even in this bland and sunny land, where now ice and snow are seldom seen, and frost but slightly felt, except upon the mountains. The change of climate in this country, and the causes thereof, have been distinctly noted by the learned Dr. Arnold.

"On the Apennines, and in Etruria, and in Latium the forests occupied a far greater space than in modern times. This would increase the quantity of rain, and consequently

¹ *Man and Nature*, pp. 237-252.

² *Man and Nature*, p. 396.

³ Cited by Capt. William Allen, *Dead Sea*, Vol. II. pp. 279-281. Compare *Man and Nature*, p. 242.

the volume of water in the rivers; the floods would be greater and more numerous; and before man's dominion had completely subdued the whole country there would be larger accumulations in the low grounds, which would still further increase the coldness of the atmosphere. The language of most writers on the whole favors the same conclusion, that the Roman winter in their day was more severe than it is at present. It agrees with this that the olive, which cannot bear a continuance of severe cold, was not introduced into Italy until long after the vine. Fenestena asserted that it was unknown as late as the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, and such was the notion entertained of all inland countries, even in the latitude of Greece, that Theophrastus held it to be impossible to cultivate the olive at the distance of more than forty Roman miles from the sea."¹ But at the present time Italy is not only the natural habitat of the olive and the fig, but even the tropical spices, the clove and the pepper tree, flourish in the gardens of Rome as in their native climate. These facts stand as decisive proof of a great change of climate in Italy.

Dr. Arnold adds in a note that "the *freezing of the rivers*, as spoken of by Virgil and Horace, is an image of winter that would not, at the present day, suggest itself to Italian poets at any point to the south of the Apennines." He cites also the authority of Chevalier Bunsen, who, after a residence of seven years at Rome, affirms that "ice in the Tiber is now as unknown as it would be between the tropics." But Horace, after all due allowance for poetic licence, leaves us the image of a stern winter's day, even for our own latitude: Soracte in the distance covered with snow and ice — the woods bending under the weight of the snow, and the rivers congealed in their course by the cold.²

¹ Pliny, Nat. Hist., Lib. XV. I. Arnold's Hist. of Rome, chap. xxiii.

² Vides ut alta stet nive candidum

Soracte; nec jam sustineant onus

Sylvæ laborantes; geluque

Flumina constiterunt acuto. — Od. I. 9.

We subjoin a few familiar passages from the same author which indicate the prevalence of snow and ice as a common phenomenon of an Italian winter.¹

Juvenal, in his terrible satire on Roman women gives an account of a superstitious woman *breaking the ice* of the Tiber to bathe in its wintry stream.²

To the same effect are also Virgil's representations of the severity of an Italian winter — the earth congealed, and the fields covered with hoarfrost.³ As a prudent and careful shepherd he commands an ample supply of straw and fern for a litter to protect the tender flock of sheep from the cold.⁴ Even the hardy goat requires the same attention to protect him against the rigors of an Italian winter⁵ in the south of Italy, where the rivers are frozen and the rocks rent by the frost.⁶ From these representations make the most liberal abatements for poetic exaggeration, and you must leave a cold reality, quite unlike all that is now known of the frosts and rigors of winter in the south of Italy.

But perhaps the strongest proof that the rivers of Italy were usually frozen over in winter, is derived from Aelian, who devotes an entire chapter to a description of the mode

¹ Positas ut glaciet nives

Puro numine Jupiter. — Od. III. 10. 7.

Diffugere nives. — Od. IV. 7. 1.

Brama nives Albanis illinet agris. — Epist. Lib. I. 7. 10.

Cum tonantis annus hibernus Jovis

Imbres nivesque comparat. — Epod. 2. 29.

² Hibernum *fracta glacie* descendet in amnem ;

Ter matutino mergetur. — Sat. VI. 522–523.

³ Rura gelu tunc claudit hyems, nec semine jacto

Concretam patitur radicem affigere terrae. — Geor. II. 317.

Horrida cano bruma gelu. — Geor. III. 443.

⁴ Et multa duram stipula filicumque maniplis

Sternere subter humum glacies ne frigida laedat

Molle pecus. — Geor. III. 297.

⁵ Ergo omni studio glaciem, ventosque nivales

Avertes. — Geor. III. 317.

⁶ Et cum tristis hyems etiamnum frigore saxa

Solveret, et glacie cursus fraenaret aquarum. — Geor. IV. 136.

of catching eels in the river Po, when it is frozen over with ice. This scrap of history is at once so curious and so conclusive that we insert the description, giving the original in the note.¹ The scene of this fishery is on the river Po, at the junction of the Tanarus with it, near the city of Turin. In a cove or small bay in the river's bank, where the eels are accustomed to lie collected in a tangled mass, the fishermen, "in the early spring, while the river is still bound fast with the ice, cut away a circular trench, and let down a wide net, made fast to the margin of the ice by strong ropes, to cut off from the eels all chance of escape. Then the men on the bank, in large numbers, detaching the ice from the land, drag the net ashore, filled with fish, with the ice, and the fishermen upon it, as if borne along on a floating island." But we are informed by a gentleman who has resided several years in the north of Italy that "he has crossed the Po, and some other rivers of northern Italy, at all seasons of the year, and never knew nor heard of their being frozen over." From the foregoing authorities it must be accepted as an undeniable conclusion that in all Italy a great change of climate and temperature has ensued since Virgil and Horace, Juvenal and Aelian lived.

¹ Εἶτα ὑπαρχομένου τοῦ ἡρος, τῶν βρυμάτων τῶν προειρημένων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν εἶπον ἔτι ἐστῶτων, κολπῶδη τινὰ τόπον προαιροῦνται οἱ γεωργοὶ τέως, νῦν δὲ ἀλιεῖς, καὶ περιτέμνουσι τοῦτον εὖ μάλα τεθηγμένοις πελέκεσι, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀναφαίνεται περιφερὲς κατὰ τέλμα· οὐ μὴν πλησίον ἔτι τῆς ὕχθης κόπτουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐῷσι τὸν κρύσταλλον ὡς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνετράφη· περιβάλλουσιν οὖν τῷ χώρῳ τῷ γεγυμνωμένῳ πλατὺν δίκτυόν, καὶ μέντοι περιβάλλουσιν [lege αὐτῷ] αὐτὸ κάλων ἁρρότερον. Καὶ τοῦτό γε τὸ δίκτυον ἐπισπῶσιν ἄνδρες ἐπὶ τῆς ὕχθης ἐστῶτες, καὶ ἀλιεῖς καὶ ἄλλοι· καὶ μέντοι τὴν τῶν ἰχθύων ἅλωσιν δεῶνται πολλοί, τῆς τέχνης οὐκ ἐπαίοντες, ψυχαγωγία δέ τις ὕπαισις αὐτοῦς. "Ὅταν γε μὴν ἀγόμενοι τῆς ὕχθης πλησίον ἀφίκωνται, τῆνικαῦτα καὶ τὸν ἐντεῦθεν τέμνουσι κρύσταλλον [lege οἱ ἐξῶθεν· οἱ ὑδροδῆραι γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῇ δῆρᾳ.] οἱ ἐξῶθεν ὑδροδῆραι· τῇ γὰρ τοι δῆρᾳ ἐνέχονται, καὶ ἀναστέλλονται τοῖς ἰχθύσι τὸν ἕξω πόρον. Τοῦτου δὲ οὕτω γενομένου, πλήρες ἰχθύων τὸ δίκτυον ἐκείνο τὴν περιτμηθεῖσαν ἐπωθεῖ τοῦ κρυστάλλου πέτρᾳ, καὶ [lege συνεπάγει.] συνεπάγει, καὶ οἱ γε ἐφεστῶτες ἀλιεῖς αὐτῇ εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ νήσου φέρεσθαι πλωτῆς. — Aelian, de Nat. Anim. (ed. F. Jacobs). Jena, 1832. XIV. 29.

For this passage from Aelian we are indebted to an able Article on The Change of Climate in Italy and some other Countries, by the Hon. Daines Barrington, in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. LVIII.

The following paragraph from Gibbon's *Decline and Fall* of the Roman Empire indicates a similar change of temperature in Germany: "Some ingenious writers have suspected that Europe was much colder formerly than it is at present; and the most ancient descriptions of the climate of Germany tend exceedingly to confirm their theory;" in proof of which the author specifies two remarkable circumstances:

"1. The great rivers which covered the Roman provinces, the Rhine and the Danube, were frequently frozen over, and capable of supporting the most enormous weights. The barbarians, who often choose that severe season for their inroads, transported, without apprehension of danger, their numerous armies, their cavalry, and their heavy wagons over a vast and solid bridge of ice. Modern ages have not presented an instance of a like phenomenon. 2. The reindeer, that useful animal, from whom the savage of the north derives the best comforts of his dreary life, is of a constitution that supports, and even requires, the most intense cold. He is found on the rock of Spitzberg, within ten degrees of the Pole; he seems to delight in the snows of Lapland and Siberia, but at present he cannot subsist, much less multiply, in any country to the south of the Baltic. In the time of Caesar the reindeer, as well as the elk and the wild bull, was a native of the Hercynian forest, which then overshadowed a great part of Germany and Poland. The modern improvements sufficiently explain the causes of the diminution of the cold. These immense woods have been gradually cleared, which intercepted from the earth the rays of the sun. The morasses have been drained; and, in proportion as the soil has been cultivated, the air has become more temperate. Canada, at this day, is an exact picture of ancient Germany. Although situated in the same parallel with the finest provinces of France and England, that country experiences the most rigorous cold. The reindeer are very numerous, the ground is covered with deep and lasting snow, and the great river of St. Lawrence is regu-

larly frozen, in a season when the waters of the Thames and the Seine are usually free from ice.”¹

Ovid earnestly represents, in many passages, that the region of Bulgaria west of the Black Sea and south of the Danube, to which he was banished, had all the rigor of a Siberian climate. He appeals to the personal experience of the Roman governors, whom he names, for the truth of his assertion, that not only the Danube, but the sea itself to a great extent, was frozen in winter; that his wine was served on the table in broken fragments, and that the snows of winter often remained through the whole summer. Modern travellers describe this inhospitable climate as now temperate and genial; and the soil as yielding in abundance the fruits and crops of the season. After making large allowance for the exaggerations of the impatient, exiled poet, the passages cited in the margin constrain us to recognize a great change of climate since the days of Ovid, in the region of the Danube and the Black Sea.²

Hungary, on the same parallel as this inhospitable country,

¹ Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. I. chap. ix.

² Ipse vides certe glacie concrescere Pontum :

Ipse vides rigido stantia vina gelu.

Ipse vides, onerata ferox ut ducat Jazyx

Per medias Istri plaustra bubulcus aquas.—

Ovid, *Epist. ex Pont.*, Lib. IV. 7.

Mentiar, an coeat duratus frigore Pontus ;

Et teneat glacies jugera multa freti. — Lib. IV. 9.

Hic agri infrondes, hic spicula tincta venenis :

Hic freta vel pediti pervia reddit hyems.

Ut qua remus iter pulsus modo fuerat undis,

Siccus contemta nave, viator eat. — Lib. IV. 10.

Nix jacet : et jactam nec sol pluviaeque resolvunt :

Indurat boreas, perpetuamque facit

Ergo, ubi delicuit nondum prior, altera venit ;

Et solet in multis manere locis.

.

Quaque rates ierant, pedibus nunc itur : et undas

Frigore concretas ungula pulsat equi.

Perque novos pontes, subter labentibus undis

Ducunt Sarmatiae barbara plaustra boves.—

Tristium, Lib. III. 10.

next to France, is now the greatest wine-producing country of Europe. Wine is the universal beverage among the rich and the poor.

But Strabo fully sustains the representations of Ovid: "Near the mouth of the Palus Meotis, [the Sea of Azof] the frost is so strong that a general of Mithridates defeated the barbarians here, in a cavalry engagement during the winter, and on the very same spot in a naval fight in summer, when the ice was thawed."¹

Indeed, the parallel of the mouth of the Don and of the Dnieper is, according to this author, the limit of the habitable parts of the world: "The countries beyond this, which border upon the regions uninhabitable on account of their cold, have no interest to the geographer."² "We are acquainted with the mouths of the Don; but a small part only of the tract above these is explored, on account of the severity of the cold and the destitute state of the country."³ The passage across the Cimmerian Bosphorus, he informs us, "is at times performed in wagons, thus being both a sea passage and an overland route,"⁴ as the season may determine.

The limits of the habitable parts of the earth on the north might be indicated, according to our author, by a line running from the mouth of the Sea of Azof to the north of Ireland: "The geographer should attend to none but our own habitable earth, which is defined by certain boundaries,—on the south by the parallel which passes over the Cinnamon country; on the north, by that which pass over Ierna"⁵ [Ireland]. "Modern writers tell us of nothing beyond Ierna, which lies just north of Britain, where the people live miserably and like savages, on account of the severity of cold."⁶ The farthest voyages northward were to Ireland, "which, on account of its extreme cold, barely sustains life."⁷ But the climate of Ireland is now mild and temperate, like that of the middle latitudes of our own states.

¹ Book II. chap. i. § 16.

² Book II. chap. v. § 43.

³ Book XI. chap. ii. § 2.

⁴ Book VII. chap. iii. § 18.

⁵ Book II. chap. v. § 34.

⁶ Book II. chap. v. § 8.

⁷ Book II. chap. i. § 13.

Polybius, B.C. 146, describes the climate, even of Arcadia, as "very cold and severe," in strong contrast with the present climate of Greece. On account of this rigor of their climate¹ he supposes it was that the Arcadians themselves were strong and rough in character, except as qualified and refined by their culture of music.

Fraas has endeavored to show, by the history of vegetation in Greece, not merely that clearing and cultivation have affected climate, but that change of climate has essentially modified the character of vegetable life.²

In view of all these data, the conclusion is irresistible that in the south of Europe, along the whole line of the Mediterranean, the climate and seasons have greatly changed, and the temperature increased as the forests have been cleared away for the service of man, and the soil subjected to tillage in the progress of civilization.

Can this coldness in the classic ages of Greece and Rome have been the lingering chill of that unknown, mysterious glacial period in which a great part of Europe lay incruusted under boundless fields of ice? Once, we know not when; for ages, we know not how long; and for causes alike mysterious, inscrutable, this quarter of the world must have been overspread with stupendous fields of glaciers, and buried deep beneath their ample folds of thick-ribbed ice. Can, then, the cold of the early historic ages of Europe be the lingering influence of that long, dark, and dreadful winter which, in ages yet more distant, wrapped her in those fearful folds of more than polar ice and snow? In answer to this inquiry, science the most profound sits in dumb amazement, musing silently over this unsearchable mystery.

Let us turn to topics more obvious to our comprehension. In Syria the change of *temperature* may perhaps have been less marked than in Europe. There, so far as is known, the fig and the olive have ever grown together, as at present.

¹ Διὰ τὴν τοῦ περιέχοντος ψυχρότητα καὶ στυγνότητα. — Lib. IV. c. 21.

² Man and Nature, p. 9.

But a variation of a few degrees of temperature would break up the companionship of these two indigenous fruits of Palestine. With the exception of temperature, however, the change of climate and seasons in this country appears to have been greater than in those on the coast of the Mediterranean, which have passed in review before us.

"Most travellers have noticed the almost *treeless* condition of eastern countries. On the shores of the Euxine Sea, and especially on the *northern* slopes of the mountains of Asia Minor; having perhaps never been very thickly peopled, the primeval forests have never been subdued. This primeval belt stretches almost from the Archipelago to the Caspian Sea. But of this mountain range, the back-bone of Asia Minor, all travellers describe the southern slopes as a perfect contrast to the well-wooded northern side. 'The huge forms of these hills are all bare,'¹ except in some few localities difficult to be reached."

"In the central basin of Asia Minor, containing the great salt lake of Tuzzoli, the country is remarkable for its wild and stony districts, which are all wanting in wood, though it has fertile plains.

"All the hills and mountains in the neighborhood of Smyrna are extraordinary in their nakedness, as well as those of the south coast of the Bosphorus; and these countries are comparatively deserted.

"The mountains of the Peloponnesus, as well as nearly all the islands of Greece, are bare, and the population is so scanty as to form the mockery of a kingdom."² Long ages since have passed away the forests, woodlands, and groves of classic Greece; the haunts of her wood-nymphs, poets, and philosophers. Now their fair land, with her thousand isles, and the whole coast of Asia Minor, and Palestine herself, — treeless, bald, and barren, arid and desolate, — all wear the common aspect of neglect, decay, and destitution.

¹ See Hamilton, Ainsworth, Walpole, War. Smyth, and others.

² The Dead Sea, a new Route to India. By Capt. William Allen. Vol. II. pp. 277-279.

In all the East, indeed, this process of deterioration is still in progress. Far away in the east the process itself is forcibly sketched by one of the missionaries of the Presbyterian Board of Missions in India, as having passed under his own observation. The valley to which his remarks have reference is near the river Indus and the boundaries of Hindostan and Afghanistan.

“Forty years ago Lord Elphinstone was charmed with the aspect of this valley, when on his way to the ill-fated Shah Shujah. He entered it in March, and that certainly is the finest month in this region. He would then see the plain clothed with richest verdure; the gardens and trees just covered with fresh foliage; the river banks fringed with willows and tamarisks; the orchards, rich with their immense variety of blossoms; while a few groups of date-trees, and the never-failing peepul tree, hiding some Hindu tank or temple, would remind the traveller of the heat that must reign here during the summer months.

“But the thirty years of strife succeeding have crushed out the beauty and opulence of this unhappy valley. One victorious army took possession of it only to yield in turn to another more powerful, until at length it fell under the comparatively peaceful but hated rule of the British; and though the land is very slowly and slightly improving, the poverty of resources makes rapid advances in improvement impossible. A few orchards have again sprung up here and there, and kind nature does much to beautify the most desolate scene. But the remains of alleys of trees, ruined fountains, dilapidated tanks, ornamental groves, neglected bridges over now dry water-courses, are the sad reminders of past times. Much of the valley lies uncultivated; and it is a curious observation one is often forced to make in many portions of India, the Punjab, and Afghanistan, that nature resents fiercely the neglect of man: regions left uncultivated for many years, through wars and misrule, change evidently their character; where there are abundant indications of past fertility and richness, the land now seems often abso-

lutely irreclaimable. I apprehend much of the same nature has taken place in the land that once flowed with milk and honey — Palestine. It is certain that Persia has gone through that process; and no Cyrus, even, *could* ever make Persia a prosperous empire again.”

It appears, then, that in all of northern Africa and southern Europe, in Greece, Asia Minor, Syria and the desert of Arabia, the destructive agency of man has changed climate and soil alike, exhausted the fertility even of those countries which were distinguished by the most happy combination of physical advantages, and reduced many of them to frightful, remediless desolation. A large part of the Roman Empire, once fertile and populous, has, by the improvidence of man, been withdrawn from human uses, and abandoned to hopeless sterility; and the destruction of the forests has caused this desolation.

On the other hand, the influence of forests in collecting moisture and diffusing it through the soil is subjected to the test of actual observation by the Rev. Mr. Van Lennep, of the American Board of Missions in the eastern part of Asia Minor, in Asiatic Turkey. The following extract is from a late number of the *Missionary Herald*. It should be noted as another illustration of the important service which our foreign missionaries render to the public by their contributions to our current literature and science.

• “In this region, some three thousand feet above the sea, the trees are mostly oak, and attain a large size. I noticed an illustration of the influence of trees in general in collecting moisture. Despite the fog, of a week’s duration, the ground was everywhere perfectly dry. The dry oak leaves, however, had gathered the water, and the branches and trunks of the trees were more or less wet. In many cases the water had run down the trunk and moistened the soil around the roots of the tree. In two places, several trees had each furnished a small stream of water, and these uniting had run upon the road, so that travellers had to pass through the mud, although, as I said, everywhere else the ground was

perfectly dry. Moreover, the collected moisture was not sufficient to drop directly from the leaves, but in every case it ran down the branches and trunk to the ground. Further on we found a grove, and at the foot of each tree, on the north side, was a lump of ice, the water having frozen as it reached the ground. This is a most striking illustration of the acknowledged influence of trees in collecting moisture; and one cannot for a moment doubt that the parched regions which commence at Sivas, and extend in one direction to the Persian Gulf and in another to the Red Sea, were once a fertile garden, teeming with a prosperous population, before the forests which covered the hill-sides were cut down, — before the cedar and the fir-tree were rooted up from the sides of Lebanon.”

It follows that a wooded soil is favorable to the production of springs; even the half civilized Turks are well aware of this influence of woodlands on the ground which they occupy. There is at this day, in the neighborhood of Constantinople, a splendid wood of the finest beech and oak which is protected by law because it feeds a spring which supplies the city with water, conducted there by an aqueduct.¹

The moisture, the shade, and the evaporation of the woods produce also a cooler atmosphere and a lower temperature.² Humboldt includes among the causes which tend to lower the mean annual temperature, the existence of extensive woods, “acting in a threefold manner, by shade, evaporation, and radiation.”²

The woodlands of a country perform an important office, not only in collecting and retaining the moisture of the soil by overshadowing the land and staying the exhausting process of evaporation, but they at the same time spread out from their leaves a boundless evaporating surface to supply the atmosphere with requisite moisture, drawn by the roots

¹ Many similar examples of the influence of the forest on springs are recorded in the Hon. G. P. Marsh’s learned work, *Man and Nature*, pp. 197 – 209.

² *Cosmos*, Vol. II. pp. 319 – 320.

from hidden springs within the earth, without exhausting the surface of the soil. The *extent of surface* which is opened out by the leaves of a forest for evaporation outruns all calculation ; and the aggregate amount of water that, by this process, is drawn off into the skies is equally vast, immeasurable, inconceivable.¹ Various attempts have been made to estimate the amount of evaporation from the trees of a forest. These experiments, though but approximations to the truth, have brought out the most surprising, startling results. By an experiment conducted some years since with great care in Vermont, an acre of forest trees was found to throw off, on the 12th of June, eight hundred and seventy-five gallons in twelve hours.² By another independent process, an acre of wheat, in luxuriant growth, has been estimated to give off two thousand five hundred gallons of water in twenty-four hours. A distinguished naturalist, who has bestowed much attention on this subject, has expressed the opinion that the amount of evaporation from a given surface of woodland is as great or greater than that from lake or sea of the same extent. But the evaporation in twenty-four hours from a tropical sea is, according to Maury, equivalent to a sheet of water half an inch in thickness over the evaporating surface. In our latitude the average evaporation in the summer months, by the most careful observation, is found to equal two hundred and twenty-one one thousandths of an inch in the same time. According to these estimates, the evaporation from an acre of water in the tropics equals eleven thousand one hundred and twenty-two gallons, and in our latitude it equals four thousand eight hundred and eighteen gallons, in a day. These several estimates, though but approximations to the truth, sufficiently show how vast is the amount of water that is drained off from sea and land by evaporation.

¹ The Washington elm at Cambridge, a tree of no extraordinary size, was some years ago estimated to produce a crop of seven millions of leaves, exposing a surface of two hundred thousand square feet, or about five acres of foliage. *Man and Nature*, p. 146.

² See Williams's *History of Vermont*, pp. 89-91.

"All the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea is not full," because all their waters are taken up by evaporation. "Unto the place whence the rivers come, thence they return again." The sea is but a vast evaporating basin, a part of a stupendous system of hydraulics, by means of which all the rivers of the earth are made to discharge their contents, through the seas, into the skies.

How beneficent the providence of God in establishing this stupendous laboratory of nature for the health and happiness of all the living. The rivers drain from the land, in decaying animal and vegetable matter and noxious miasmata, many ingredients of disease, and flow on to the ocean, turbid, foul, and feculent, charged with pestilence and death. But by this wondrous process of distillation, they return, through the skies, pure, fresh, and sweet, shedding down, anew, streams of life and health and joy over all the earth.

But be it remembered the while, that we are not indebted to the ocean alone for these streams of life and health. This vast laboratory is in like ceaseless action over all the wide world, on the dry land as well as upon the sea. The distillations from the forests especially, in proportion to their extent, send up a freer, fuller flow of waters into the heavens to refresh and water the earth.

But when the forest has been removed, the "great reservoir of moisture stored up in its vegetable mould is evaporated, and returns only in deluges of rain to wash away the parched dust into which that mould has been converted. The well-wooded and humid hills are turned to ridges of dry rock, which encumbers the low grounds and chokes the water-courses with its *debris*, and—except in countries favored with an equable distribution of rain through the seasons, and a moderated and regular inclination of surface, the whole earth, unless rescued by human art from the physical degradation to which it tends, becomes an assemblage of bald mountains, of barren, turfless hills, and of swampy and malarious plains. There are parts of Asia Minor, of Northern Africa, of Greece, and even of Alpine Europe,

where the operation of causes set in action by man has brought the face of the earth to a desolation almost as complete as that of the moon; and though, within that brief space of time which we call 'the historical period,' they are known to have been covered with luxuriant woods, verdant pastures, and fertile meadows, they are now too far deteriorated to be reclaimable by man; nor can they become again fitted for human use, except through great geological changes, or other mysterious influences or agencies of which we have no present knowledge, and over which we have no prospective control."¹

These considerations illustrate the part which the forests of a country are designed to play in the economy of Providence. Where the supply of atmospheric water is deficient and the distribution unequal, as in Palestine, and the temperature high, there the presence of extensive forests is indispensable to qualify excessive heat, and by their various fertilizing influences, to sustain the productions of the earth. Remove these forests, and the country changes to a dry and thirsty land; the labor of the husbandman fails; "the heaven overhead becomes brass, and the rain of the land powder and dust."

On the contrary, where the waters of the earth are in excess, as in the valley of the Mississippi for example, there the clearing away of the forests promotes, by evaporation from the surface, the drainage of the waste waters, and redeems the soil from the floods for the service of man. The rivers, the natural channels for draining the land, do in reality carry off but a small part of its superfluous waters. Far the larger portion is taken up by evaporation.

The Commissioner of Patents at Washington, in his Report on Agriculture for the year 1859, has an instructive paragraph on the effect of cutting away the forests on the shores of the Mississippi in diminishing the waters of this river.

"In a report made by Andrew Brown and Hon. M. W.

¹ *Man and Nature*, p. 43.

Dickeson to the American Association in 1849, these gentlemen remark that the annual quantity of rain that falls in the valley of the Mississippi may be estimated at 169,128,960,000,000 cubic feet, which is about $11\frac{2}{3}$ or 11.3633 times the quantity which is discharged by the river; or, in other terms, $\frac{2}{3}$ pass off by evaporation and $\frac{1}{3}$ are discharged by the river. There can be but two ways by which this immense quantity of water can make its escape from the valley; one is by the course of the river, the other, by evaporation. Thus we arrive at a fact of the most momentous importance to the planting interests of Louisiana and Mississippi; for it will be at once perceived that the more exhalations are promoted, the less liable will the low or bottom lands of these two states be to the periodical inundations by the river.

"If it is asked by what process it is expected that evaporation can be promoted over such an extensive area as the Mississippi valley, so as visibly and permanently to affect the planting interests of the above-named states; the answer will be found in the fact that the process has been, and is now, in the most rapid and successful progress, and of that kind which is the best calculated to produce so desirable a result, viz. the clearing of such large portions of the valley of its forest for the promotion of agriculture, and the consequent exposure of the lands to the action of the sun and winds, the very best promoters of the evaporating process, particularly on a large scale.

"So rapid is the progress of this increased exposure, and its consequent evaporating tendency, that one may hazard the assertion with safety, *that there is not now, by twenty-five per cent, as much water passing down the Mississippi as there was twenty-five years ago.*"¹

Our author proceeds to show that vast tracts which were then annually overflowed and valueless are now in a "high

¹ The river Volga, the life artery of Russian internal commerce, is drying up from this cause, and the great Muscovite plains are fast advancing to a desolation like that of Persia. — *Man and Nature*, p. 299.

state of cultivation," and adds: "Such changes are progressing, generally unsuspected and overlooked, but not the less sure."¹

In the Professional Papers of the United States Topographical Engineer Corps, whose observations and operations were in progress during ten years ending with 1860, it is stated that only about a quarter of the water that falls in the valley of the Mississippi runs off by the river, the other three quarters passing off by evaporation, or by striking into the ground.²

The humidity of the atmosphere depends pre-eminently on the forests of a country. The prevalence of fogs, vapor, clouds, streams, rain, and snow is determined in a great measure by the same source of supply. These all modify or determine the temperature of the climate in a given latitude as relatively cold or hot, humid or dry. The mountains and highlands both of the Levant and of Palestine, beyond a doubt originally covered with forests, were at once the original refrigerators of the climate and fertilizers of the soil. They sustained a vast evaporation which mitigated the intolerable heat of the climate. They cast over the land their cooling shade, and spread out the clouds as a covering from the scorching heat of a cloudless sky. They caused the timely vicissitudes of sunshine and rain. They brought on both the small and the great rain in their season, causing the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man. They fed a thousand hidden springs with fountains, rills, and streams which ran among the hills, giving drink to every beast of the field. But these same mountains and hills, now treeless, bald, and barren, only give off in the rainy season, desolating winter torrents, mixed with the waste of barren heights to spread barrenness over the fields which once they enriched with their deposits. Thus, by the operation of fixed laws of nature, Palestine, once flowing with milk and honey, has become a parched land; much of it

¹ Patent Office Report, 1859, pp. 144-145.

² See No. 4 of the Series, by Lippincott and Co. 1861.

hopelessly desolate. The rivers are turned into a wilderness, the water springs into dry ground, a fruitful land into barrenness. The land still retains lingering traces of great fertility: portions of it continue to yield an abundant increase, particularly in wheat. Doubtless much more might, by skilful husbandry, be restored; but it is mainly a waste land, bare of verdure, barren, and unproductive.

Manifold and powerful are the causes which, for thousands of years, have been in operation upon Palestine and the Desert, in common with the other countries which have passed in review before us, to work out this strange contrast of the past with the present.

In this connection the changes in the productions of Palestine are worthy of notice, as indicative of a change of soil and climate. Several of the distinguishing products of the country have entirely disappeared; others linger in decayed and stunted growth, as if struggling for subsistence on the unfriendly soil which once generously yielded them a boundless luxuriance. The balsam, for example, or the balm of Gilead, once included in the costly merchandise of the country, of which Theophrastus, Dioscorides, Pliny, and Justin, Strabo and Josephus, make mention, in common with the scriptures — this has entirely disappeared. Not a vestige of the palm remains on all the plains of the city of Palm Trees, and but a few solitary remnants linger in all the land. The vine, which once sent out her boughs unto the sea, and her branches to the river, has withered away. It still flourishes in the valley of Eschcol, but is rarely seen on the hills which once were covered with the shadow of it. "The spoiler has fallen upon her summer fruits and her vintage, and joy and gladness is taken from the plentiful field." The labor of the olive has failed in a great measure. Near Bethlehem an extensive olive-yard is cultivated; a few olive-trees still linger in Gethsemane, at the base of the Mount of Olives; elsewhere, at distant intervals, a few may be seen, lone remnants and representatives of former luxuriance. Even the fig languishes, as if hastening on to its

final extinction. At Jerusalem, in answer to the inquiry: How can the city obtain a supply of fuel; there is no forest timber in all the land, no coal or peat? the missionaries resident there replied: "There is no lack of fuel. The city is abundantly supplied from the roots of olive-trees, which are grubbed up and brought to market, as from an exhaustless storehouse; the supply always equaling the demand." This single fact presents the past productiveness of the land in striking contrast with its present destitution.

But desolate though this good land may be, even in her desolation she remains an undeniable witness still of the truthfulness of all that the sacred historians, prophets, and poets have said and sung of her goodly mountains, her charming landscapes, her exuberant soil, and matchless productions.

The glory has indeed departed from this holy land, but it is holy still, hallowed by the presence of godly men, — patriarchs prophets, apostles, martyrs enshrined in her tombs; thrice hallowed by the foot-prints of the Son of Man; thrice hallowed by his heavenly words and works, by the tears, the blood he shed for our redemption. *Palestina*, *Judea*, that holy land! her tragic history, the sorrowful catastrophes of her wondrous story, the holy memories and sacred associations that throng around her still, in the sear and yellow leaf of age, — these all lend a strange charm to her faded features, which smile in desolate beauty on her rugged hills, and sink in sad repose on her silent, deserted plains.

Blest land of *Judea* — thrice hallowed of song,
Where the holiest of memories, pilgrim-like, throng
In the shade of thy palms, on the shores of thy sea,
On the hills of thy beauty, — my heart is with thee.

ARTICLE V.

IS THEOLOGY AN IMPROVABLE SCIENCE?

BY REV. LEONARD WITHINGTON, D.D., NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

Equidem non inficior (qua sumus ignorantia circumsepti) quin plurima nobis implicita nunc sint, et etiam sint futura, donec deposita carnis mole propius ad Dei praesentiam accesserimus: in quibus ipsis nihil magis expedias quam iudicium suspendere, animum autem offirmare ad tenendam cum Ecclesiâ unitatem.

CALVIN, INST., Lib. III. Chap. II. Sect. 3.

THIS is a question which no man likes to answer promptly without knowing who the inquirer is. If it were put to a clergymen in New England by a rigid Scotch Calvinist, a follower of John Knox, he would probably answer intrepidly in the affirmative, and feel no hesitation as to consequences; but if it were put to him by a disciple of Theodore Parker, he might say: "No; I want no improvements which deny the materials and destroy the ground on which we must build." Yet the question is an absolute one. Theology either has reached its perfection and is incapable of further advancement, or it is still capable of amendment and shining with a clear light on a believing world. The argument which some bring to prove that it is incapable of advancement is not valid; namely, that it is founded on a divine revelation — it came in its origin perfect from the hand of its author; because we may say the same of creation and its laws — they have been all before us since man has been a spectator to their operations, and yet how slow have we been in finding out what seems so obvious when once found! When Papal delusion reigned over Christendom, the Bible was the same and was still in existence; yet we speak of Luther and the Reformers as great enlighteners of the world. The simplicity of truth is often the last thing that purblind mortals are fated to find.

The great secret is to find a medium, to improve for the future, and not destroy the past or present. It is one of the infelicities held out by such a glowing writer as Dr. Channing, that just in proportion as he awakens confidence in future discoveries, he pours distrust on all our present speculations and attainments.

The question, then, is, what is improvement? What is that which mends without destroying? If we saw a partially-lighted church for an evening service, we should conclude that its condition was not to be mended by pouring a flood of redundant light from a thousand chandeliers and gas-lamps, which would only oppress the eye and create confusion; but the object would be to carry the original glimmer to a permanent brightness; so in theology, we shall never cease in this world to see *through a glass darkly*, but we may polish the glass, and explain the enigmas as far as our faith may rest on certainty.

Our first business is to obtain a tact, or previous perception of what our cause needs, and what are the feasible passages to better light. We should say to ourselves, here is a defect, and here is an innovation which may supply it. As the gardener before he prunes his trees carefully surveys the branches and selects the dead or redundant limbs for his saw, so we should weigh the importance of the previous work. A vast deal of real ingenuity has been wasted on impractical attempts. Some parts of theology present at a glance difficulties which it is desirable to remove *if it were possible*; but our instinctive forecast and the whole tenor of church history shows that they are difficulties which always must meet a finite mind. All those questions which arise from comparing divine infinitude with human finites must ever remain unfolded, and a well-constituted mind naturally shrinks from them. The only thing you can say about them is: "there they are, in all their darkness and all their immensity, and all we can do is to discover the causes of their darkness, and draw the limit of our powers in respect to them." What does the reader think of the three following

quotations (let him compare them together), and which of the men has uttered the fairest truth?

“ Though they are all, all honorable men,”

which of them awakens the deepest recognition in your soul? Governor Everett, in an address at Amherst a few years since, says: “ Who does not in these choice and blessed moments, in which the world and its interests are forgotten, and the spirit retires into the inmost sanctuary of its own meditations, and there, unconscious of anything but itself and the infinite perfection of which it is the earthly type, kindling the flames of thought on the altar of prayer; who does not feel in moments like these, as if it must at last be given to man to fathom the great secret of his own being, to solve the mighty problem

‘ Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate.’ ”

So far the sanguine statesman; Dr. Channing coincides: “ This great subject has indeed baffled as yet the deepest thinkers, and seems now to be consigned, with other sublime topics, under the sweeping denomination of metaphysics, to general neglect. But let it not be given up in despair. The time is coming when the human intellect is to start into new fields, and to view itself and its Creator and the universe from new positions; and we trust that the darkness which has long hung over our moral nature will be gradually dispersed. This attribute of free-agency, through which an intelligent being is strictly and properly a cause, an agent, an originator of moral good and evil, and not a mere machine, determined by outward influences, or by a secret yet resistless efficiency of God, which virtually makes him the author and sole author of all human actions, — this moral freedom, which is the best image of the creative energy of the Deity, seems to us the noblest object of philosophical investigation. However questioned and darkened by a host of metaphysicians, it is recognized by the common consciousness of every human being. It is the ground of responsibility, the fountain of moral feeling. It is involved

in all moral judgments and affections, and thus gives to social life its whole interest, while it is the chief tie between the soul and its Creator. The fact that philosophers have attempted to discard free-agency from their explanation of moral phenomena, and to subject all human action to necessity, to mechanical causes, or other extraneous influences, is proof enough that the science of the mind has as yet penetrated little beneath the surface; that the depths of the soul are still unexplored.”¹ Archbishop Leighton strikes a different note: “One thing we may confidently assert, that all those things which the great Creator produces in different periods of time were perfectly known to him from eternity; and everything that happens throughout the several ages of the world proceeds in the same order and in the same precise manner that the eternal mind first intended it should. All that acknowledge God to be the author of this wonderful fabric, and all the things in it, which succeed one another in their turn, cannot possibly doubt that he has brought, and continues to bring, them all about according to that most perfect pattern subsisting in his eternal councils; and those things which we call casual are all unalterably fixed and determined by him. For according to that of the philosopher, where there is most wisdom there is the least chance, and therefore surely where there is infinite wisdom there is nothing left to chance at all.

“These things we are warranted and safe to believe; but what perverseness, or rather madness, is it to break into the sacred repositories of Heaven, and to pretend to accommodate those secrets of the divine kingdom to the measures and methods of our weak capacities. To say the truth, I acknowledge that I am astonished and greatly at a loss when I hear learned men and professors of theology talking presumptuously about the *order* of divine decrees, and when I read such things in their works. Paul, considering

¹ Channing's Review of Milton. When a writer throws out such splendid anticipations, is he not bound to give us some little clue to the solution he teaches us to expect?

this subject as an immense sea, was astonished at it, and, viewing the vast abyss, started back, and cried out with a loud voice, 'O the depths!' etc. Nor is there much more sobriety or moderation in the *many notions* that are entertained, and the disputes that are commonly raised, about reconciling divine decrees with the liberty and free-will of man.

"They always seemed to me to act a very ridiculous part who contend that the effect of the divine decree is *absolutely irreconcilable* with human liberty; because the natural and necessary liberty of a rational creature is to act or choose from a *rational motive*, or spontaneously and of purpose; but who sees not that on the supposition of the most absolute decree *this liberty* is not taken away, but rather established and confirmed? For the decree is, that such an one shall make free choice of, or do some peculiar thing freely. And whoever pretends to deny that whatever is done or chosen, whether good or indifferent, is so done or chosen, or at least may be so, espouses an absurdity. But in a word, the great difficulty in all these disputes is that with regard to the *origin of evil*. Some distinguish, and justly, the substance of the action, as they call it, or that which is physical in the action, from the morality of it. This is of some weight; but whether it takes away the whole difficulty I will not pretend to say. Believe me, young gentlemen, it is an abyss, it is an abyss, it is an abyss, never to be perfectly fathomed by any plummet of human understanding."¹ Hopeless investigations then are certainly to be avoided. No doubt we may be discouraged too soon. No doubt the same problem seems hopeless to one man which is not so regarded by another. But an improvement that never can command general conviction in the church, or an innovation that sinks the very foundation on which it stands, are both to be avoided by an intelligent and humble foresight.

But in order to be understood let us take a few cases of hopeless innovations, which are not improvements, because they overthrow the very foundations they profess to modify.

¹ Archbishop Leighton's Theological Lectures, Lect. X.

With regard to sovereign grace, we must say, either it is communicated to the sinner by God, or the first impulse comes from the creature himself. The work is begun by man or God; whichever side you take, certain difficulties follow. If you say it is all grace, you must not unsay what you have affirmed. You must be consistent. You must not avoid a difficulty by a timorous ambiguity. There is an absolute question before you and there is no middle point; you must not divide the line which has neither breadth nor thickness.

With regard to unconditional election, it must be wholly without foreseen merit in the creature. This is the perfection of grace, that God seeks his creatures and they do not seek him. *Nullum elegit dignum; nullum tamen punit indignum.* This we cannot modify; this stands essential to the doctrine. We pass into another system if we cross the line which separates the two problems. We may indeed show that, on a subject so deep and so elusive of our logic, we cannot push our doctrine to all its apparent consequences. But we must beware of all improvements of our tenet which overthrow the very substance which they attempt to improve.

The attempt to establish the foreknowledge of God without election is a case in point.

The Trinity is a doctrine rounded off in the fourth century by keen defenders in the face of keen opponents. It is well compacted, and one part tallies with another. The Athanasian Creed (as it is called) was not intended to kindle devotion, but to show the logical possibility of the doctrine in the face of all the objections urged against it; and for that prime object it is a most perfect symbol. It presents a central idea well developed; and we confess, there is much more hope of overthrowing the doctrine than of improving it by any amendments which would make it more palatable to an objector. We expect no improvements in theology in that line; and for their non-expectation two reasons may be offered: 1st, The perfect unity of the

whole scheme; and 2d, The historical fact that no amendments have been successful; they have proved destructions. We have had Macedonianism, Sabellianism, the scheme of Dr. Samuel Clarke, and several others, and they have all ended in silently denying the doctrine, or removing no substantial objection. Even in the late improvement of denying the *eternal generation* of the Son, we see no gain. If the first person in the Trinity is the Father, and the second the Son, there must be some corresponding relation between them. Why not express it in the language of the old formulas? If Christ has a derived existence, i.e. the derived fulness of the Godhead; if the Father is the fountain of being, and Christ the stream — but the full stream — why not express it by some significant term? There is danger if you innovate here, you will disturb the connection of thought, and verge to Sabellianism, which Dr. Priestley tells us is only an artful way of being a Unitarian. The idea that supports this terminology is justified by some remarkable passages of scripture: (Coll. i. 15), “Who is the image of the invisible God, the first born of every creature” (*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*). It is scarcely possible to give a full meaning to those words without adopting this doctrine or falling into Arianism. So in John i., Christ was *with God* as a son; also (verse 14), he was *ὡς μονογενοῦς*, the *peculiarly begotten* of the Father. In the Epistle to the Hebrews an emanation is taught under a different figure, *ὡν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως*: and it is hard to show this emanation without recurring to the established terminology. Innovations in language in such cases lead to innovation in thought. Besides the established language has this advantage, that, having floated through many a contest, it has been again and again explained, has been guarded from misconception, and ripened into perspicuity; whereas innovations demand new limitations and new explanations and renewed discussions which may be permitted to sleep.¹

¹ There are various passages of scripture which it is hard to interpret without supposing a peculiar derivation of the Son from the Father: Prov. viii. 22;

One of the most remarkable instances of *improvement*, which upsets the very system it improves, is afforded by the late John Foster. Foster was a very ingenious, foreseeing, serious, and, some might say, a consecutive man. He thought he saw objections to the doctrine of eternal punishment. He allows that the scripture is fearfully strong on this subject, and he professes to retain all the other points in the evangelical system. He does not reject the rectitude of the law, the impossibility of being justified by it, the Divinity of Christ, or the necessity of an atonement. He leaves his old system just where it was, with the single exception that it is inconsistent with the goodness of God to make a human soul miserable forever. After allowing that the language of the Bible is formidably strong, he proceeds to say that his doubts arise from the moral argument (such as Dr. Channing recently brought against Calvinism); that is, eternity is so long and a commensurate punishment so dreadful, that it shocks our feelings, and we find it hard, perhaps impossible, to reconcile such a conviction with our best conception of the goodness of God. Man is the creature of time, born weak, and with innate propensities to evil; tempted, deceived, urged, harassed, and forsaken; how can he sin in his span of earthly being to a magnitude of guilt which cannot be expiated but by an eternal groan? Such is his significant question.

Now there sprang up another inquiry. Can his question be answered in the negative, and yet not impair or shake the

Colos. i. 18; John xiv. 28; Psalm ii. 7; Matth. xxviii. 18; John xvi. 15, x. 17, 18, v. 18-23, 30, and if we follow the ancient authorities, Isa. liii. 8. We do not suppose that the Son is more dependent on the Father than the Father on the Son; all the persons in the sacred Trinity are equally interdependent. But the Bible presents them in a distinct order, and in eternal relations, and so let us reverentially receive them. We bow to the ancient authorities. The only objection that can be made is, that the doctrine of the eternal generation introduces human conceptions into the divine existence. But how careful were the ancient Fathers to explain. Chrysostom says: *γέννησις, ἄχρονος, ἀσώματος, ἀόρατος, ἀπαθήs, παντελῶs ἀνέκφραστος καὶ ἀκατάληπτος*, a generation not in time, not bodily, not of human passion, invisible and (carnally speaking) incomprehensible.—See Suicerus *Lexicon*, Vol. I. p. 755.

other parts of the believer's creed? If it is inconsistent with the goodness of God to punish the guilty forever, it is unjust. If unjust, then the law of God never was what we supposed; sin never was so great an evil; it never needed so important an expiation, and Christ was never so great a Saviour. The cross fades from our view; the atonement becomes unnecessary; in short, the whole system is shaken by the improvements. Foster himself could not have stood on his own ground; he must have gone forward or back; and certainly the whole school of his followers (if he had made any) must have sunk into a new theology. He placed a slippery sledge on the side of an icy hill, set it in motion on the glassy surface, and expected it to stop before it reached the bottom.

No improvements, then, can be expected from those modifications which are inconsistent with the original form and genius of the system into which they are introduced. The reason is, that truth is harmonious, and the mind has consecutive conceptions; and the discrepancy is sure at last to be discovered and rejected. Each system may be compared to a musical instrument; if one of the strings is *let down*, all the others must be relaxed, or that single string restored; for the instrument to be useful must be in tune.

We have no hope, then, from such amendments. We have no hope from finding any middle ground between Arminianism and Calvinism; we have no hope of finding any amendments of the doctrine of the Trinity. These issues have been so often stated and tried in different ages by the keenest minds that pride or piety could sharpen, that there is very little hope of new discoveries. The doctrines may be rejected, but they are not likely to be modified. There is no hope of a system of love without any doctrine like that partially advocated by Cudworth and More, and the Cambridge men of that age, and lately revived by some among us. There is no hope from a vague and all-embracing terminology, like that adopted by Bushnell, Higginson, Emerson, and all the transcendentalists; what they wish to gain in comprehen-

siveness they lose in precision. There is no hope from any of these sources; yet we profess to belong to the onward party; and, saying this, we feel bound to give some conception of the quarter from which new light may be expected.

In pushing forward any science there is a certain wise anticipation, arising perhaps from a careful retrospect of its wants, which is necessary in order to point our efforts to a hopeful direction. We must survey our powers, and consider what is within their scope; what is feasible, and what is impossible. *Prudens interrogatio*, to use the oft quoted maxim of Bacon, *est dimidium scientiæ*. "Every philosophical inquirer" says Dugald Stewart, "before he begins a set of experiments, has some general principle in his view, which he suspects to be a law of nature; and, although his conjectures may be often wrong, yet they serve to give his inquiries a particular direction, and to bring under his eye a number of facts which have a certain relation to each other." In ascertaining the distinction between the hopeful and hopeless in theological investigation, we have two rules to guide us. First, the inquiries which revelation discourages; and secondly, whatever the history of the church records as useless, subtle, vague, and unprofitable. Under the first class, we advert to the instance presented Rom. ix 19, 20: "Thou wilt say, then, unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God," etc. It is natural to ask: why does the apostle bear down inquiry in this authoritative way? Why does he seem to discourage free investigation? Is not the gospel favorable to the freest thought? Yes; but consider the question to which he opposes this silencing answer. It is the hopeless question of the origin of evil, on which men have spent their strength in vain, and labored for naught. Now on such and all similar questions, to the investigation of which our powers are wholly inadequate, it is our wisest course to bow to the speaking or silence of the Bible, and not entangle our feet in a snare from

¹ *Elements of Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Vol. I. p. 395.

which no human speculation can ever extricate us; there is an emphasis and a significance in the peculiar kind of questions on which the apostle imposes his awful prohibition. "Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God." That man eminently replies against God, who selects one of his deepest mysteries as the subject of his own impertinent response. But, secondly, the dogmatic history of the church presents us a series of controversies in which piety, ingenuity, and learning have found no result. Curiosity has opened the road, but patience has found no end to its furlongs. These controversies have returned in various ages; and though some have elicited profitable truth, others have been attended with no positive light. They have labored in vain, and spent their strength for naught. They have sunk their Artesian tube down to the deepest layers, and all Israel has joined their efforts and their voices; saying: "Spring up, O well, sing ye unto it;" and, after all their labor and exhausted music, God has given them no water.

It is the signal of a well-constituted mind, and is what every theologian should aim at, to have the tact or foresight to see the mendable parts of his science; to draw the line in his own mind where human progression must stop, where the ground susceptible of cultivation meets the shore of the untillable deep; we must walk *παρὰ θεῖν' ἀλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο*, and mark the windings of the margin. "If we were to examine," says Dugald Stewart, "the present state of morals, of jurisprudence, of politics, and of philosophical criticism, we believe we should find that the principal circumstance which retards their progress, is the vague and indistinct idea which those who apply to the study of them have formed to themselves of the objects of their researches."¹ How true! How important! The remark holds with increased force in our religious investigations. Let us never waste our time on researches in which the human mind has always been baffled, and on which the sacred writers have preserved a significant silence.

¹ Elements, Vol. I. p. 48.

Having thus stated the importance of this line, and the difficulty of drawing it, perhaps it may be thought immodest in us to attempt to present some of the questions which seem to us to excite our better curiosity, by exciting the hope of a progressive solution. The catalogue of useless investigations would be a very long one. Let us implore the readers indulgence, while at the expense of our reputation perhaps, we, with a trembling hand, point to that part of the horizon where the refulgent stars may be expected to rise on some blissful morning.

First, then, though the evidences of religion is a hacknied subject, yet on this theme the church seems to be calling for new light. Particularly the prophecies are in a very confused state. The argument from the fulfilment of the prophecies is presented in a very uncritical and unsatisfactory manner; much more calculated to justify infidels than confirm Christians. When do the apostles quote the Old Testament strictly, and when loosely? How much chronology is intended in the definite numbers of their fervid strains? Let us reflect that infidels have been blamed for not accepting constructions which afterwards the most learned orthodox interpreters have upset. Recollect the four kingdoms in the second and ninth chapters of Daniel, and Professor Stuart's interpretation of them. The fact is, all our books on this subject are behind the age. Then the interpretation of the prophecies in the New Testament lie in the greatest confusion. We have either the neological temerity or the pious dogmatism of the Adventist, and each unworthy of our confidence. Oh for some sanctified erudition to clear up this subject. Oh that Christ would verify his promise, and give to some selected student in Andover, or some other seminary, the morning star to beam on our darkness.

¹ Bishop Chandler's work, entitled "A Defence of Christianity" from the Prophecies of the Old Testament, is by far the most critical and safest that we remember in the English language; yet he, we think, mistakes the meaning of Haggai ii. 6, 7, 8, 9; Gen. xlix. 16, and has given a doubtful meaning to other places.

Secondly, we need a better system of mental philosophy, written with a special reference to its bearing on theology, and especially limiting itself to the knowledge and ignorance of man. We cannot accept the postulate of Wardlaw, that the unregenerate metaphysician must be all error (reserving to ourselves at the same time the prerogative of judging who is unregenerate), and we cannot trust the dogmatism of Dr. Emmons; but some auspicious babe must be born, and some new book remains yet to be published, which shall harmonize our views and cause our philosophy and our faith to conspire in making our whole moral and intellectual being a unit in the service of our God and in the belief of his eternal truth.

Thirdly, we need a better exegesis of both the sacred languages. Much has been done, but much remains to be done; we have leaned too much to the side of reversion; we need to slacken back to a middle path. Here it is natural to recur to the name of Professor Stuart, a man whose labors are never to be recollected without a mingled sentiment of astonishment and veneration. In this country he almost created the science in which he was so much distinguished; with an imperfect training he had to force his way through a dark forest without a guide and without an associate, and to find his path amidst discouragement and suspicion to the light; his learning was only surpassed by his force of character. No mere man since the fall could complete his gigantic work, and *such* a man must die before his best influence could be felt. He had one fatal obstruction to the clearness of his lettered vision. He seemed to be ambitious to weld together the benefits of two hostile schools of interpreters — those who deny and those who receive the full inspiration of the Bible. This was an attempt above his strength; and certain maxims which did very well in the neologic school were utterly out of place among the receivers of authoritative revelation. This led him to some conclusions which neither party could adopt. In tuning his harp of ten strings, here were two that he could not bring

into concord. Many examples might be given. Let us take one,—the most striking perhaps. In interpreting the book of Daniel (ch. ix.) he makes all the glowing facts accumulate in the times of Antiochus Epiphanes; and yet he holds to a real Daniel, living in the times of the Persian empire. Now this is incredible. Why should that little, unimportant span of time in Jewish history so loom up in the enraptured vision of a prophet living almost four centuries before, and darting his eyes down through the whole line of redemption; how could such an interval of about three years and a half become so important to one standing on such an elevation? And then to be told that the Messiah which was “cut off, but not for himself,” was only a Jewish high priest, Onias III., and not the Lord of glory, who died for men! What a dwindle and a diminution for the common reader of the Bible! Now all this is much more consistent with an assumed Daniel, who took the old prophet’s name and lived in the time of Antiochus (we always exaggerate contemporary events) and made no pretensions to inspiration or historical truth, than it is to Mr. Stuart’s theory. The venerable professor is to be regarded as a miner, who went deep into the soil, and threw up vast heaps of ore, where the gold and quartz lie combined and confounded together, and where some hand, not with more skill, but more caution, must come and make a careful selection. We may at least hope that some dwarf may arise, who shall see farther by standing on the giant’s shoulders — non omnia possumus omnes.

But, fourthly, a very important improvement, and of which scarcely too much can be said, is a better *proportioning* the essential truths of the Calvinistic system, and indeed all the truths of revelation. We have seen, in some hazy evening, when Venus was shining in the east or west, the starry sky give a very inadequate conception of its collected light. Some of the brightest orbs were covered by a cloud; on one side there was clearness and on the other there was darkness; even the brightest planets, that did bore through,

were diminished in their lustre, and the whole celestial refulgence was altered in its proportion as well as its brightness. We have already expressed our sense of the danger of touching the old terminology, and our total want of hope of any improvement which shall consist in removing of the vital elements of the old system; in which "all the building, fitly framed together, groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord." They were rounded off in their first conception, and there was a dominant idea in the minds of the authors which led to consistency. There was something above the individual which governed him, even the immortal reason, a central light, a spark caught from the altar of God. It is peculiarly so with the Calvinistic system; its parts are necessitated by its central idea. But there are two innovations which may turn out to be improvements, of which it is still susceptible. One is, blending the elements in their true relative proportion — removing or diminishing all false antagonisms; and the other is, stating the most paradoxical parts cautiously, with a due regard to the weakness of our powers. The man that tries to have an intellectual faith beyond his inmost perceptions is insincere. There are two great constituents in Calvinism — sovereignty in God, sin in man; and sin cannot exist but by a violated obligation. Both are essential; both must be explained. Now it is clear that in old Calvinism, as it was left by Calvin, Beza, the Synod of Dort, and the Scotch school generally, the sovereignty element overshadows the other. It does not accommodate itself sufficiently to those natural difficulties which the carnal mind is sure to find.¹ Our determination and effort always has been to alter *this proportion*. If we find the sovereignty element, like a great frowning pillar, placed near the doorway of the temple, we try — not to deny its existence or importance — but to remove it to its proper place, behind the chancel and beyond the altar. We take it from the abstract and put it into the concrete. It was

¹ We rather mean the apprehension of man as man, *ὁ ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος*, whether carnal or not. The unassisted reason.

said of G. Poussin, the great Italian landscape painter, that his skill consisted in his admirable grouping. His particular parts—his single trees, lambs, and shepherds,—when closely surveyed, were found scarcely equal to the most ordinary artist; but when the whole scene was united, none could match him. There is a grouping also in theology. Half the trouble is made by a bald, insulated truth out of place. The original reformers were all high sovereignty men; and why? They met the enormous Pelagianism of the Romish church. Times have altered, and the same proportions do not accomplish the same end. Let us ask what a *modern* Luther would be. We must “rightly divide the word of truth.” It requires great skill to present a paradoxical doctrine in its just proportion and in its right place. When the centurion came to Christ to heal his servant (Matt. viii. 5), our Lord seized that opportunity to present one of the most repulsive principles that could meet a Jewish mind: “I say unto you, that many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven.” What an instructive example! This discretion is left us. A preacher is like his own sexton,—a certain number of lights are given to illuminate the building; the arrangement is left to his own discretion, so as to fill every dark corner in the house; and thus the theologian must adjust the parts of his system so as to distribute the light, following only the demands of humanity and the general example of revelation.

As to the other part—the stating these difficult doctrines with a due regard to human weakness,—you will know what we mean when we refer you to the example of Bishop Butler. Butler’s theology may be imperfect; but his caution is perpetual. He is not a sceptic; his belief does not move round in a circle of perpetual occultation. No mind can be brighter when he faces the light.

In this connection we may mention the antagonisms which need to be removed. We are told in the Cambridge Platform, that formula of faith left by our fathers, Chap.

III. sect. 1, "God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will freely and unchangably ordain whatsoever comes to pass, yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered unto the will of the creature, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." Now if this be true, let it be carried out to all its consequences; and half the Arminian objections drop to the ground; their reasoning and ours must be greatly modified, and perhaps the best men in the right wing of both parties be brought to agree.

Fifthly, There is another improvement. The language of the old formulas is *more* inadequate to convey the meaning in this age than in the times when they were written. The language of philosophy, the language of common life, has suffered silent innovation, as we see in our translation of the scriptures. Words suggest thoughts which their authors never intended, and often the hue and shading convey new impressions. Now this danger should be obviated by appreciating the change and restoring the original meaning. Let us give an example. We are told in the Westminster Shorter Catechism (Quest. 30) "God having out of his mere good pleasure elected some to everlasting life," etc. But "what" says an objector, "Does God act from caprice alone? Has he no reason for his conduct but his mere good pleasure? Do reason and foresight never govern his counsels; and does wisdom never enter his original designs?" Now from what we have just quoted from the Cambridge Platform, that "God did from his most wise and holy counsel ordain," etc., it is obvious that "by mere good pleasure" the Westminster divines could not mean caprice in opposition to wisdom; their design was to deny and give the negative to all foreseen merit in the creature in the ordainings of God; but their language needs to be explained. Many other instances may be given; and it sometimes calls for a smile of pity to see an obstinate conservative straying into the widest field of innovation, merely

because he has misunderstood the language of his master.

Sixthly, we need a fuller development of the gospel in its bearing on sentiment and practice; to discover and open some new roads from old ideas to new life. The bud is as yet but half blown; we long to see its expanded beauty and sweetness. We may compare the well-arranged truths of religion to the lamps on Cambridge bridge; as you ride in the evening from Boston, light after light strikes your eye, all glittering in an harmonious line, and every light shedding its radiance on your path as you continue your progression. The tree of life is blooming before us; its tendency is to cast its boughs on every side; let us not so prune the branches that it shall disgrace the earth by a mutilated shade.

Seventhly, It would be a great improvement to learn the concrete way of presenting some of the most difficult articles of religion. They become paradoxical chiefly by abstraction. The concrete method is abundantly sanctioned in the Bible. It was the very genius of a primitive people, and to such primitive conceptions God has seen fit to condescend. How much are we taught in the sacred record, by history, by symbols, by parable, by supposition, by visible illustration. Compare, for example, Moses's method of proving the existence of God and his right to our homage with that of Dr. Paley. Dr. Paley lays down the abstract principle, that design proves a designer; but Moses shows us God as actually creating the world, saying: "Let there be light, and there was light." He gives us the history of creation; and how much more impressive to the common mind. The death of Christ is illustrated by the previous sacrifices; and, to our mind, the doctrine of substitution is much more clearly exhibited by the account of the scape-goat (Lev. xvi. 20) than it is in some metaphysical diatribes we have read on that much-disputed subject. Some of the most important words in theology, the very lights that guide our reasoning, are only to be explained by their use in sacred history. Faith, for example, *πίστις*, the cardinal word, would

not present to Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero a glimpse of the meaning which it has acquired in the apostolic use. The same may be said of the words, God, Jehovah, Lord, flesh and spirit, righteousness, sin, repentance, justification, crucifixion, being crucified to the world, being crucified with Christ, regeneration, heaven, and hell; all these words acquire a meaning and a force in sacred history to the simplest reader, which no Pagan lexicon can impart. King William III., the glorious deliverer of England from arbitrary power and Popery, was accustomed to say to Bishop Burnet, that he must believe in the doctrine of predestination because it was involved in the doctrine of a special providence. Dr. Emmons has a very striking sermon in which he very clearly proves that the same doctrine lies at the bottom, as a sunk foundation, to all the other parts of the Christian system — foreknowledge, a special providence, the atonement, the Jewish dispensation, the success of the gospel; and Calvin, in his first book (*Institutes*, chap. XVI. sect. 4, 5), has illustrated the same truth. Very well, gentlemen; it is even so; but if the concrete way makes the doctrine more plain, why not always (certainly often) make it more plain by presenting it in the concrete way. This is the way adopted by all the sacred writers but Paul, and even he adopts it often.

Perhaps the most exercised metaphysician or mental philosopher, if he would confess the truth, never understands a principle, until he has seen it in its exemplification. Facts lead to principles, and principles are best seen in facts.

Eighthly, when looking back on the recollections of education, and remembering the lacerations of mind which come from contending principles taught with equal authority, one cannot but long and pray for some comprehensive and organizing mind to arise — a Bacon or a Leibnitz, who should harmonize our impressions and pour all the devious streams of knowledge into one channel. We want a better reconciliation of science and theology; so that eternally we

may not be weaving Penelope's web, to unravel in the night what was spun in the day. What we mean may best be illustrated by a remark of Charles Butler, the author of the *Reminiscences*, who tells us, that at the papal seminary where he was taught, all the lessons had one direction, which was to illustrate and confirm the Christian faith. Now if this was done by a false faith, or a mutilated science, it is not what we mean; but what we want is some comprehensive formula which shall save enlightened Christians from the shock felt when the discoveries of Galileo first dawned on the church, or which we felt when first told that the world was not literally made in six days. This apparent war of science and revelation often makes a college a bad place.¹ We often hear our older divines complain of the scepticism that now prevails; men have lost their faith; they are now sure of nothing; the dry-rot has reached the pulpit, and the preaching has lost its power, because it is neither so ardent nor decisive as in the precedent age. One reason undoubtedly is the want of harmony in our knowledge. What is a good theologian? He is undoubtedly an instructed Christian; and all his received impressions must blend in one just conviction. If it be truth, the deeper the better. Now it must be true, if science be true and revelation be true, that there is no real discord between them. *We* have made the discord by untuning the instruments; and though we allow that a well-trained mind must be accustomed to objections, and taught to triumph over them, it is delightful to come at last to an harmonious conclusion. Oh for a reformer worthy of the name and equal to the

¹ Let us speak from recollection. We must say on a calm review of college days that the passing from the materialism of Locke to Vincent's Catechism was a violent transition; and how the Moral Philosophy of Paley, which has Epicurianism involved in every page, got a place in an orthodox seminary, was a wonder. To keep any harmony in the instruction,

"Virtue must call oblivion to her aid."

Certainly college text-books are now better selected. The great object of education should be to have free investigation with as little inculcated scepticism as possible.

purpose, with a head radiant like the sun, and made beautiful and fragrant with every flower that piety can impart, — a Calvin and a Bacon blended, — to scoop our knowledge together, and make every article “ borders of gold with studs of silver.” Let us indulge the hope that it is possible.

Lastly, the danger of improvement, or rather holding up great hopes of future improvement, is, that it is apt to cast a secret distrust on our *present* attainments. The wisdom of an advancing orthodoxy must consist in bringing out of its treasures things new and old. It cultivates the tree without impairing the root. As Mr. Burke says in another department: “ By a constitutional policy working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of policy, the good of fortune, the gifts of Providence, are handed down to us and from us in the same course and order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts, wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole at one time is never old or middle-aged or young, but in a condition of unchangable constancy moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete.”¹ To cast a broad eye over the past and the future, to discern what the past has given us and what the future demands, has always been the character of intellectual reformers. Let Dr. Channing instruct us even by his very excesses. In his review of Milton, he says (page 47): “ We want new light, and care not whence it comes; we want reformers worthy of the name; and we should rejoice in such a manifestation

¹ *Reflections on the French Revolution.*

of Christianity *as would throw all present systems into obscurity.*" No, doctor, no; we want no such thing; and still less would we rejoice in such an effect.

Alack,

You are transported by calamity, —
Thither where more attends you.

We hold no form of Christianity which may not keep its identity and yet receive improvement.

Surely it is not necessary to be a sceptic in order to be a reformer. The greatest reformers have not been so; they have confined their innovations to the defective parts. In 1492, Oct. 12th, Columbus discovered America, or rather one of the Bahama Islands. How much remained to be explored; how many sounds and seas and rivers and creeks, the continent and its two great divisions! and yet nothing happened afterwards to disturb the certainty or diminish the glory of what the first day revealed.

POSTSCRIPT.

A reflection obtrudes itself on us here, and impels us to ask, what is the character of that mind which God may select as competent to the high office of the finished and finishing interpreters of theology to man. He has raised up men very accomplished, though not reaching absolute perfection. Paul was inspired; and apart from inspiration he was a chosen vessel, well fitted beforehand to receive the higher light. Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, were all organic men. But time, while it has increased the demand for the work, has in some respects rendered it more difficult. The materials have multiplied on our hands; the glittering fragments lie confused in a broken heap. Who shall select them? and what shall be the principle of the selection? Harmony and the word of God. Whoever has read the Supplementary Dissertations of Sir William Hamilton on the writings of Dr. Reid, must have been struck with the vast advantage the commentator receives from his thorough knowledge of the history of his subject. He selects well,

because he has a vast choice to select from. He confutes and rebukes with stunning blows, because he seems so much at home in the history of human opinions. He brings out of his treasures things new and old, because he knows what is new and what is old; and (if his corrections be correct) his predecessors are often at fault in speculation, because they are babes in dogmatic history. The man that is to mend our future theology must be a thorough student in past opinions; and oh what a field! One is tempted to say, as an old beggar we have heard of. A man led him into a vast field of potatoes, and promised to give him all he would dig; and he burst into tears, and exclaimed in agony, he should never *get it done*. The true reformer must know what has been said; he must trace the current of ecclesiastical speculation; he must see the cause and tendency of the varying systems; how they arose and why they vanished; he must see how artfully error imitated truth, and how much she prevailed through the specious imitations; how much theology has been influenced by philosophy; how much harm unsanctified learning has done, and how much more harm sanctified ignorance; he must be conscious of the benefits and dangers of free discussion, and how true it is that they who make the greatest clutter about free discussion are often the very people most imprisoned by man; he must see how all the sciences cluster about religion, receive from it an influence, and cast an influence on it; he must be a bold and yet a cautious man, independent and yet humble; he must have an honest and yet not affected partiality; he must see the bearing of the most tenuous questions; he must grasp a remote abstraction and the most delicate probability; he must give to "an airy nothing a local habitation and a name";¹ he must understand definitely, the "*quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est: operamque dare ut collatae inter se majorum consulantur sententiae, eorum duntaxat, qui, diversis licet temporibus et locis, in unius tamen ecclesiae catholicae*

¹ i. e. what seems so.

communione et fide permanentes, magistri probabiles extiterunt et quidquid non unus aut duo tantum sed omnes pariter uno eodemque consensu aperte, frequenter, perseveranter tenuisse, scripsisse, docuisse cognoscantur, sed absque ulla dubitatione non credendum, sed *examinandum* intelligatur. In a word, he must have a profound veneration for the word of God; like the Saviour, he must know "what was in man;" he must go from the wants of nature to the magazines of revelation, and from the magazines of revelation to the wants of nature; when the harp of God has ten strings he must not play on two or five, but pour all the fulness of its music on our listening ears, and charm our hearts by all the notes of the song of Moses and the Lamb; that is, we want a system which has fulness without deficiency; in which nothing is omitted, and nothing overstated; where a just proportion is observed, and, as the apostle says: "The whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edification of itself in love" (Eph. iv. 16).

Nor is this a flight of the imagination. Such a man and such a system will yet be found. We have organizations of Christianity which, relatively speaking, have *almost* accomplished all this. What has been done is therefore possible; that to which pious research shows a manifest tendency will at last be ripened into perfection. The late amiable and excellent Dr. Lowell had one distinction on which he was fond of dwelling, and which he supposed to be a central light for all investigation—the distinction between *Christianity* and *theology*; he supposed them to be two things, entirely distinct; and he cherished this distinction as an amulet, which he always wore next his heart to preserve him from all bigotry and speculative delusion. "I take up,"¹ said he, "a dictionary of religion, and find I know not how many hundred names of sects into which the

¹ Dedication Sermon at Cambridge, Dec. 25, 1857.

Christian world is divided. And when I behold these en- signs of party distinction, these badges of submission, as they too often are, to human authority, my perplexed and agitated mind goes back to repose itself at Antioch, where the believers, the brethren, they who were of one heart and one mind, were content with the simple appellation which denoted their allegiance to their Divine Master." But surely the good man overrated the value of healing words when they are not the symbols of healing things. He seems to think that one inclusive expression will merge all theo- logical odium in eternal oblivion. Besides, does he not mistake the design of a system of divinity? The com- pleteness of revelation does not supersede the necessity of a developed system, any more than a sight of the sun pro- hibits all research and speculation what the particles of the sun are. A system of divinity is, first, an organization of what the parts of revelation are; secondly, showing their connec- tion; thirdly, carefully stating them with a strict reference to human ignorance and a limitation of our powers; fourthly, giving their adhesions, such as their metaphysical connec- tions and their connection with material science; fifthly, their proof; and lastly, their bearing on the hearts and con- duct of believers. Here is surely enough to do, without suffering theology, like Pharaoh's lean kine, to devour Chris- tianity. Revelation, in its intrinsic perfection, reminds us of the torches of the lighthouse, lighted up on some semi- clouded night; in themselves they may be perfect, but that very perfection leads us to view them in their effects on the surrounding scene; we ask, how far their rays extend; how near them does the channel lie; what is the relative position of point Alderton and the Graves; shall we enter the inner harbor through broad sound-way or the direct channel. All these things the skilful pilot has in his mind, and may as well lay them down in his chart of the harbor; and in all these things even religious knowledge is progressive. Chris- tianity stands parallel with nature, and nature is always the same; but our *insight* into nature is progressive, and per-

haps will be so, until her system is dissolved by the sound of the last trumpet, and the last fire causes the elements to melt with a fervent heat.

This shows us, too, why the future systems of divinity may be better than the past. For our part (we may be partial to the man) we do not believe there ever was a clearer head or a sounder heart, or a more organizing genius, or a more reverential faith, than were combined in John Calvin. Consider how he found systematic theology; consider how he left it; and if you could raise him from the dead, and project him among all the facilities of half a millennium *after* his own age, who would write a better system than he? The defects of Calvin are very much owing to the pressure of surrounding cognitions and influences. The sovereignty of God is enormously elaborated; but recollect, the world had just awoke from the enormous Pelagianism of the Roman church, and the evils of Antinomianism had been very imperfectly developed. Then, as to his bigotry: suppose you had met him just after the combustion of Servetus; suppose a committee of the liberals could have been sent to him from Boston, with Dr. Lowell for chairman. The modern addresses the ancient: "I am surprised, old man, at your want of charity; I am astonished that you should not see that theology is not Christianity. What! burn a man for differing from you in your theology, when his Christianity is the same! Horrible! Do you not see that the law of Jesus is the law of love; that many things in theology are very difficult; opinions have been divided; good men have differed; and that we ought to be careful to pull out the beam from our own eye before we condemn a fellow creature for his mote?" Now what would Calvin reply? Looking at him sternly, as Homer describes Achilles, he would say: "Young man, I do not know who you are, nor where you come from; but you had better get out of your swaddling-clothes before you come here to Geneva to teach your grandfather a lesson which he knew before you were born. To be sure I know that

charity or love is the law of the gospel; I have said so a hundred times; I know that, strictly speaking, theology is not Christianity; I know the difficulty of the subject and the vast extent of human ignorance; I allow that in things indifferent, we must tolerate the difference of each other's opinions; but here is a wretch that breaks through all bounds; he has a morbid appetite for every enormity; he believes that our very blood is vital, and runs a race through our arteries and veins; he calls the Trinity a three-headed Cerberus; he is a blasphemer full as much as a heretic. No, young man; when I burn the murderer, I protect the state; and here is a wretch who systematically murders souls!" We learn our moral lessons, as well as our material philosophy, through a long train of experiments.

From considering who the man is that can mend our theology, we can clearly see who is *not* qualified for that momentous work: and it is not always the man who is the most ready to encounter the task. It is no sign that a man is sure to succeed, because he is a volunteer. Men are apt to make one mistake: because religion addresses our affections, and lays its very terminology in our emotional nature, some are apt to think that it is also addressed to our fancy. Now the laws of the moral emotions are much more fixed than the laws of the individual fancy. This mistake is not confined to the old heretics, such as Marcion, Basilides, Manes, etc., etc., but it has floated down all time, and has been seen in all ages. A very forgetive fancy may be exercised in *interpreting* the record, as well as substituting some system in its place. Laying out of view the morbid and the crazy, such as Baron Swedenborg and others, how many cobblers have we had in this sacred work, who did not know where the holes were in the old shoe to which the patches must be applied. The last man for this purpose is he whose fancy is strong as his reason is weak; who, so far from drawing the limits of human ignorance and how revelation meets it, has never once suspected there is such a border; the man who never read Butler's Analogy, or if he

has, could never understand it; who is always talking about logic, and always meaning a logic of his own; who has a wonderful mind for tracing recondite resemblances, and is incapable of seeing the broadest dissimilitudes; who has a craving for the most insolvable questions; who is charmed, in selecting an opinion, with the difficulty of defending it; who delights to walk by moonshine, provided it come from a full moon shining on crusted snow; who builds a castle in the air, and then laughs at all his antagonists because they find no place for planting their batteries to overthrow it—because, *Negantis incumbit probatio*. Such geniuses we have; and their systems are irrefutable: “Wilt thou break a leaf driven to and fro; and wilt thou pursue the dry stubble?”

We estimate a man's power, in some degree at least, by the questions he selects for investigation. Thus we should hardly deem a man destined for success in mechanical invention who should spend years in searching after perpetual motion. We see the infancy of the age in the early heresies of the church, such as her maturity never solved, but consigned them over to a wise oblivion; no wise man will ever disturb their repose. All the first heresies (nearly) turned on the origin of evil. After having played with these puerile shadows for a time, the church then proceeded to real issues, the Divinity of Christ, and, a little later, to the Pelagian controversies. Now who would ever wish to go back? Who would ever call from its sepulchre, to a shadowy resurrection, a question that none but infants could ask, because none but angels can expect to answer it?

It becomes vastly more important that safe and competent men should take the work of improvement into their hands, from the fact that many modern improvements are destructive of old foundations. We have improvements coming upon us in shoals: they swim in a deluge. But what are they? They are not grafting the tree, but laying the axe at the root, cutting it down, tearing up its stump, and destroying every relict of its blossoms and its fruits. To improve

Christianity now, is to eliminate from its sacred record every vestige of the supernatural; to separate the influence of the gospel from its authority; to leave every man free to his own inventions, because he can palm these inventions on God; and to build a Sinai and a Calvary in every imagination that enlarges itself enough to receive them. Now every conservative man should state to himself what he wants. What are the peccant parts, not in revelation, but in our reception of it? Is the shadow of the tree distorted by the radiance of a setting sun? To speak plain, can Calvinism, or rather Paulcianism, be improved without destroying its ancient features? There used to lie at one of the wharfs in Boston, half a century ago, an old Dutch ship, very large and very clumsy; the most uncouth thing that ever floated on the water. It seemed to have been made by a company of artists who had a premium for doing their worst. And yet it was a ship, no mistake about it; there were the prow, the windlass, the stumps of the masts, the hatches, the quarter deck, the cabin, the rudder, and the tiller; indeed, all the components of a true ship. Place beside her one of the modern clippers. What a change! And yet what an identity!

Felix, quibus bene

Priscis ab omnibus

Possit libellulis

Vitam beantia

Haurire dogmata.—*Sir Thomas More.*

ARTICLE VI.

THEOLOGY OF THE MODERN GREEK CHURCH.

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THE religion of "the Orthodox Eastern church"—for that is the title by which it chooses to be known—is professed by not far from seventy-five millions of the human family. Nearly sixty millions of these are the subjects of the Czar of Russia; about eleven and a half millions are found in the Turkish Empire; nearly three millions in Austria; not quite one million in Greece; and about three hundred thousand in Montenegro and the Ionian Islands.

As one of the three great parties into which Christendom is divided, the Greek church is justly entitled to a proportionate share of the attention of Christian scholars. It has, indeed, on several accounts, a stronger claim than that which is derived merely from the relative number of its adherents. As the most ancient branch, or rather the original stock, of Christianity in its visible and organized manifestation; as occupying the regions where the apostles chiefly labored, and to which most of their inspired letters were directed; as the scene of all the early general councils of the church, and the depository of their original decrees; as retaining still the very language in which the New Testament writings were composed; and, finally, as having, in all likelihood, no inconsiderable part to perform in the future history of those classic and sacred lands which it occupies; the Greek or Anatolic church fairly challenges a larger share of the attention and study of Christian scholars than it has hitherto obtained.

Though for many centuries united with the Western church in one ecclesiastical communion, yet it had from the beginning its own peculiar spirit and its own distinct law of development. The same germ of divine doctrine, en-

grafted on stocks so different, as the subtile, speculative Greek, and the practical, organizing Roman, bore fruit of the same species, indeed, but of a somewhat different flavor and quality. The divergence began to appear in the very first centuries ; but the actual separation did not take place till the latter half of the ninth century, when the patriarch Photius and the Pope of Rome mutually excommunicated and anathematized each other (A.D. 867). The two churches were afterwards nominally united again ; but the breach was never healed ; and less than two centuries later (A.D. 1054) the separation was solemnly re-affirmed by the patriarch Michael Cerularius. This may be regarded as the final rupture between the Eastern and Western churches. Attempts to re-unite them were renewed from time to time, even down to the period of the overthrow of the Eastern Empire by the Turks in 1453 ; but these attempts only tended to keep up the irritation, and to exasperate the parties still more, by the frequent discussion of their differences. At the Council of Florence, indeed (A.D. 1438-1442), the Greek deputies, with only one exception, overcome by bribery or by menace, assented to the decrees dictated by the Papal party ; but their action was at once indignantly repudiated by their constituents, and very soon abjured by themselves.

Whatever the Greek church may have, therefore, in common with the Romish, whether in doctrines or in usages, we must remember that it occupies a position of declared antagonism to the Papal system as a whole.

Its relation to Protestantism, though less distinctly and formally pronounced, is virtually the same. Some of the Reformers of the sixteenth century cherished the idea of a friendly alliance with the Eastern church, believing that she had preserved more of the primitive purity of doctrine and worship than her younger sister of the West. Melancthon, about the year 1559, sent a copy of the Augsburg Confession to Joasaph II., Patriarch of Constantinople, with a friendly letter ; but he never obtained any reply. The theologians

of Tübingen renewed the attempt in 1574, when Jeremiah II. was patriarch. After several interchanges of letters, the intercourse was broken off, upon the patriarch's expressing his wish that their correspondence should contain no further discussion of doctrines, but be confined to friendly civilities. "From that time," to quote the words of Alexander de Stourdzza, one of the ablest Greek writers of the present age, "the silence and neutrality of the Eastern church ceased; the doctrine of the Reformation was rejected by her; and the more recent Councils of Jerusalem, in 1648, and of Jassy, in 1678, traced between the church and the Protestant communion *an unalterable line of separation.*" The church of Constantinople had indeed a Protestant patriarch, in the beginning of the seventeenth century — the ill-fated Cyril Lucar; but he was so far from being able to bring over to his views the church which he represented, that he lost his life in the attempt (A.D. 1638). There was much friendly correspondence on the subject of union, between the English hierarchy and the Eastern ecclesiastics in the time of Peter the Great; but his death, in 1725, broke off the negotiations. For the last fifteen years, since the decision of the famous Gorham controversy, a decision equally unsatisfactory to the tractarian and the evangelical parties, because it gave neither the right to expel or censure the other, the former, the tractarian or Puseyite party in the Anglican church, have been endeavoring to effect a union between the two churches; or, in default of this, to secure for themselves satisfactory terms of admission into the Greek church; and there are recent rumors of their special activity in efforts to accomplish this end. But they have not heretofore made any considerable progress, nor met with any such encouragement as to afford a prospect of ultimate success. The Greek church is, in fact, much less disposed to relax the strictness of any of her ecclesiastical rules, for the sake of facilitating accessions to her communion than the Roman Catholic; principally, no doubt, for the reason, that she is less ambitious of universal supremacy. While occu-

pying, therefore, a position of antagonism just as distinctly towards Protestants as towards Romanists, she has had less occasion to manifest her hostility in the former case than in the latter, because she has not been brought into such near relations to the Reformation as she has to the Papacy, nor had the same reason to apprehend the disturbance of her quiet by attempts to make proselytes from among her adherents.

Having thus defined in general the relation of the Oriental church to the other two great divisions of the Christian world, we proceed to speak more particularly of the Theology of the Greek church of the present day. In executing this task, we are obliged to proceed somewhat differently from what we should do in the case of either of the other two portions of Christendom. In giving an account of the theological belief of the Romish church, or of any particular Protestant communion, we could refer to recognized standards of faith, to the writings of learned theologians, the discourses of eminent preachers, and the religious usages of the common people. In the case of the Greek church, there are no universally recognized standards of faith later than the first seven councils. The Eastern church has had no modern council, like the Council of Trent in the Western, whose decrees are universally received; she has no modern articles of faith, like those of the church of England, or the Westminster Confession; she has had no modern theologians, whose writings constitute an accepted exposition of her doctrines, as those of Luther and Melancthon do among German Protestants, those of Calvin and Turretin among the Reformed churches, and those of Bellarmine and Bossuet among the Papists;¹ she has had no great preachers, whose discourses embody the latest phase of her theological belief. Her appeal is still to the three ancient creeds and the seven ancient councils, from whose definitions and decrees it is her boast that she has never departed; and be-

¹ Theophanes Procopowicz deserves, if any one, to be named here as an exception.

tween these and the common popular belief there is hardly anything that can be called an authoritative or official setting forth of her distinctive doctrines. The document which most nearly approaches to this character is the Confession of Petrus Mogilas, the metropolitan of Kiew, published in 1640. This was signed by all the Greek patriarchs in 1643, and was solemnly recognized at the Synod of Jerusalem, in 1672, as the Confession of Faith of the Oriental church. It has the highest authority of any modern exposition of the faith of the Greek church, especially in Russia. It is composed in a somewhat polemical spirit, and was designed especially to confirm the members of the Greek church, in view of the actual or apprehended encroachments of Romanists and Protestants, more especially of the latter. It states the antagonism of the Greek church to the Protestant more strongly than the prevailing feeling of the most enlightened portion of the Greek church of the present day would justify.¹ Next to this is the Catechism of Platon, Metropolitan of Moscow, published a little before 1770, when its author was at the head of the monastery in Troitza. This is less polemical than the preceeding, and on those points in which the doctrines and usages of the Greek church are most opposite to those of Protestants, these doctrines and usages are presented in their least offensive form, and defended with much moderation. These two Confessions, together with the writings of Alexander de Stourdza, the learned layman of Odessa, are the sources of which the freest use will be made in the present Article. A residence of more than half a score of years in lands where the Greek religion is the prevailing belief has given the writer somewhat favorable opportunities for becoming acquainted with the faith of the Greek church, as it actually exists in the minds of the people who profess it.

Many of the questions in theology which have been much

¹ The title of this work is 'Ορθόδοξος Ὁμολογία τῆς Πίστεως τῆς Καθολικῆς καὶ Ἀποστολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας, τῆς Ἀνατολικῆς. It has been published in Russian, Latin, and German, as well as in Greek.

discussed among Protestants, and especially such as have been most largely discussed within the past half century, have scarcely been moved at all among the members of the Oriental church. The inspiration of the scriptures; the harmony between human freedom and divine sovereignty; the order and mutual relations of repentance, faith, love, and regeneration — these, and other questions familiar to us, are hardly known among them as topics of discussion. On points of this kind our statements will necessarily be brief and general. On the other hand, the Greek mind has been much occupied with questions which among us are little known, except to scholars. To this class belong the disputes concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, whether from the Father only, or from the Father and the Son, and also concerning the question of one will or two wills in the person of Christ. The first of these, which was so earnestly disputed in the early controversies between the Eastern and Western churches, remains still the most prominent point of debate between them. We refer to this difference between them and us, in respect to the current subjects of theological controversy, as accounting for what might else seem a strange disproportion in the relative prominence given in the present Article to the several topics that come under our notice.

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

The doctrine of the Greek church in regard to the holy scriptures is stated in her standards in this simple and general form:—"The holy scriptures are the true word of God." Questions pertaining to the nature and extent of that divine inspiration under which prophets and apostles spoke and wrote, are hardly known as subjects of discussion in the modern Greek church. She contents herself with the statement, that the Holy Spirit is the author and communicator of scripture, and the prophets and apostles are the media through which that communication is made to men. In regard to the Apocrypha, the Greek church occupies sub-

stantially the same position with the English, as this latter is defined in the sixth of the Thirty-nine Articles. The church reads the Apocryphal books, "for example of life and instruction of manners; but doth not apply them to establish any doctrine." They are always included in the sacred volume, but are not regarded as of canonical authority. In this important respect the doctrine of the Greek church differs from that of the Romish, which, since the time of the Council of Trent, "receives and venerates with equal reverence" the Apocryphal and the Hebrew books.¹ There is not however, it must be confessed, the same agreement among the Greek authorities, ancient and modern, on this subject, which there is in the different Reformed confessions, and in almost all the Romish writers since the Tridentine Council. Even in the earlier centuries there was a difference of opinion. The Council of Laodicea (A.D. 363) names the book of Baruch as a part of the Canon.² That of Carthage (A.D. 397) omits Baruch, but includes Tobit and Judith, and according to some copies Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom, and 1 and 2 Maccabees.³ The Apostolical Constitutions include the two books of Maccabees only.⁴ And of the ancient catalogues given by individual writers, several include Baruch. There is something of the same diversity in the more modern authorities. The synod of Jerusalem (A.D. 1672) affirmed the canonical authority of the Apocryphal books as a whole, with an explicit censure of those who rejected them; but the decisions of this synod were under a controlling Romish influence, and did not fairly represent the general state of belief in the Greek church at that time. The authorized Russian Catechism receives as canonical only the books extant in Hebrew; and the same is true of the catechisms in general use in the kingdom of Greece. In regard to the Old Testament, the Greek translation of the LXX is practically regarded as of higher authority than the original Hebrew, though its superiority

¹ Session IV., April 8, 1546.² Canon LX.³ Canon XXXII or XXVII.⁴ Canon LXXXV.

has not been formally sanctioned by any authoritative decree, nor explicitly affirmed by any of the standard catechisms. Hebrew learning is very little cultivated in the Greek church; and it is not strange that a version so ancient, and having the traditionary reputation of being inspired, should have practically supplanted the original as an ultimate standard of appeal. One of the most learned of the Greek ecclesiastics, who died a few years ago, Constantine Economos, published a voluminous work on the Septuagint, in which he attempts to support the fabulous account given in the letter of Aristeas to Philocrates in regard to the miraculous correspondence, even to a letter, of the translations made separately by the seventy-two learned Jews employed for this purpose by Ptolemy. But this writer, though one of the ablest and most learned of the ecclesiastical writers of modern Greece, was a representative of the ultra conservative or high church school, and notoriously opposed to all progress and reform.

The Greek church does not forbid the use of the scriptures by the common people. As Chrysostom, in the olden time, loved to extol the word of God, and to recommend to all, but especially to those most engaged in secular employments, the constant and devout study of the sacred volume, so the modern Greek writers, with a great approach to unanimity, advocate the universal dissemination and perusal of the oracles of God. The Synod of Jerusalem is believed to be the only Greek council that ever gave a negative answer to the question, whether the scriptures ought to be read by all Christians, without distinction. But the decisions of that synod, for the reason already mentioned, are not entitled to be regarded as a statement of the authorized and prevailing doctrine of the Greek church. Platon, the metropolitan of Moscow, in his *Catechism of Orthodox Doctrine*, enumerates among the errors of the Romish church, the denial of the scriptures to the common people; and he mentions as one of the most important safeguards against doctrinal error the reverential study of the holy scriptures,

and the adoption of them as the guide of all our thoughts and actions.¹ And the learned Koraēs, in his annotations to the modern Greek translation of that work (first published in the Russian language), says: "There are a few, even among us, who are so ignorant as to think that the reading of the holy scriptures in private ought not to be allowed. But, thanks be to God, such was never the doctrine of the Oriental church." Of this exceptional class are those who, in the early history of Protestant missions to Greece, violently opposed the translation of the New Testament into the modern Greek dialect for the use of the uneducated. But while there were some among the Greek priesthood, who thus opposed the efforts of foreign missionaries to enlighten the common people, there were others, and some who ranked among the ablest and most popular ecclesiastics, such as Neophytus Bambas and Theoclytus Pharmakides, who either directly co-operated with the missionaries in the work of translation, or boldly defended them against the assaults of the former class. And it is but a few months since a new translation of the Bible into the vernacular language of Russia has begun to be circulated among the population of that vast empire, with the concurrent encouragement of the highest civil and ecclesiastical authorities.

OF THEOLOGY PROPER, OR THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOD.

The Greek church has always held fast to the exact form of the Nicene Creed, as enlarged by the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381), in regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit. The language of that creed is: "We believe in the Holy Spirit, which proceedeth from the Father." In the Western church, this expression was changed, about two hundred years later (at the Synod of Toledo, A.D. 589), by the addition, "and from the Son" (filioque); and this alteration, though disapproved at first by the See of Rome, was finally adopted as the doctrine of the Western church. Against this innovation in the form of the ancient symbol,

¹ Part II. chap. xxviii. p. 121.

the Greek church has always protested, with an earnestness which does not seem, to those unacquainted with the history of the controversy, to be justified by the intrinsic importance of the difference. But in the minds alike of those who condemn and of those who justify the addition of these words to the creed, the doctrine which they teach is intimately connected with just views of the mutual relations of the three persons of the Godhead. The Greeks, in condemning this addition of "filioque," appeal to the words of our Lord in John xv. 26, with which the language of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed precisely agrees; and they maintain that to derive the procession of the Spirit from the Son as well as from the Father, is to place the Spirit in a relation of seeming dependence on, and inferiority to, the Son, which has no warrant in scripture, and tends also to displace the Father from that primordial position which the scriptures assign to him, as the "fons divinitatis," to use the language of the schoolmen of a later age. The Greek church has here the unquestionable advantage of adhering literally to the inspired text, from which the church of Rome, and after her all the Protestant Confessions of Faith, have departed. In the controversy between the Eastern and Western churches which resulted in their separation, this subject of the interpolation of this addition into the creed was always prominent; and in all the discussions that have since taken place between them, it has occupied the chief place. At the Council of Florence, this was the first and principal topic of discussion between the two parties. Indeed it occupied the whole of the first twenty-four sessions of this council, and the greater part of the twenty-fifth and last. After the Greek deputies were brought to accede to the Romish doctrine on that point, the remaining differences were soon settled. In like manner, in the reply of the patriarchs of the East to the overtures of reconciliation made to the members of the Greek church by Pius IX., soon after his accession to the pontificate, this subject takes precedence of all others. The patriarchs fill up ten pages of

their encyclical letter with fifteen distinct arguments against the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son.

In regard to the decrees of God, the Greek theologians, both ancient and modern, lean strongly toward the Arminian, rather than the Calvinistic view. It has been said that many of the Russian clergy are ardent admirers of Calvin ; but all the leading theologians, and indeed the ecclesiastical acts that are read in their churches, denounce Calvinism as a dangerous heresy.

OF THE DOCTRINE OF MAN.

Holding the common doctrine of all Christians, that man was originally created in the image of God, the Greek church understands that image of God to consist mainly in the spiritual endowments of reason, freedom of choice, and immortality, but partly also in the dominion with which man is invested over this lower world,—a faint image of the universal dominion of the Supreme Ruler.

By the transgression of our first parents, sin was not only introduced into the world by one example of disobedience, but it became common, and the whole race of Adam was corrupted at the fountain of its being. This corruption instead of being mitigated by transmission, and diminished in intensity by extension and subdivision, became, on the contrary, more virulent with the lapse of time and the increase of the human race. For the rays of that original divine light, which could not be wholly darkened in our first parents, grew continually fainter and dimmer in their posterity, the further these were removed from their primitive source. The form in which this doctrine of inherited corruption is stated by the Greek theologians, Platon and Stourdza, though not very explicit, leans rather towards the theory of Traducianism than of Creationism.. The reverse of this is true of the ancient teachers of the Oriental church.

OF REDEMPTION.

The Greek church teaches that the Son of God, who was

truly and perfectly God, begotten of the Father from all eternity, became truly and perfectly man, in order to effect the salvation of sinners. By this union, the God-man was qualified to become the mediator between God and man. The doctrine of two natures and two wills in this one Christ, as defined long ago by the Councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople, is still the declared doctrine of the Greek church, though these subjects have almost entirely ceased, for many centuries, to occupy the attention of the Greek theologians. As to the work of Christ, his death is represented as a true sacrifice for sin, by which satisfaction was made to divine justice. The sufferings and death of Christ were regarded by the Father as if the sinner himself had suffered them, and the punishment¹ of the innocent Saviour was, according to the inscrutable decree of God, reckoned to us instead of the punishment which we deserved. By faith in this divine Mediator, we are justified and saved. Good works, though they do not contribute anything towards the sinner's justification, are indispensable as evidences of his conversion and proofs of the genuineness of his faith.

OF THE CHURCH.

On this topic, we find the statements of the Greek theologians more explicit and full. Their doctrine is compendiously stated in the words of the ancient creed, — the church is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. They find these attributes of the true church nowhere but in their own communion; hence no other churches are regarded as entitled to the name. In speaking of the unity of the church, Platon says: "From this unity of the church all those have separated who either do not receive the divine word at all, or mix with it their own absurd opinions. Hence, such communities are not churches, but rather assemblies of errorists, who are governed, not by the Spirit of God, but by the spirit of enmity and hatred. We see in these days, to

¹ *τιμωή* is the word which Platon uses.

the great scandal of the Christian religion, three principal heresies, those of the Papists, the Lutherans, and the Calvinists. The Papal communion is full of deadly superstitions, and is blindly subject, in defiance of the divine word, to the decisions of the pope. The Papists pervert the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit, in opposition to plain testimonies of holy scripture; they deprive the laity of the cup of the divine eucharist, and do not allow them to read the holy scriptures. They believe in a purgatorial fire, the offspring of their own fancy; and, arrogating to themselves a sovereignty unknown to the Gospel, they persecute with fire and sword all those who will not agree with them. The Lutherans and the Calvinists separated from the Papists a few centuries ago; but in their desire to cast off the papal superstitions, they have rejected also the apostolical traditions. They both hold the erroneous doctrine of the Western church in regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit. The Lutherans attribute to the body of Christ a universal presence, which is the attribute of the divine Being only; and the Calvinists subject human actions to a certain and inevitable fore-ordination. The correctness of our Russo-Grecian church is founded on indubitable proofs; for from the times of the apostles to the present it has preserved, entire and uncorrupt, not only the faith preached by them, but also the traditions of the ancient church. Greece was taught the Christian religion by the apostle Paul; and it has kept the truth taught by him through all subsequent ages, and has rooted out, by means of general and local councils, all the delusive heresies, which have tried to gain a foothold in it. God was pleased afterwards to enlighten Russia also with the same pure and faultless doctrine. Neither in Greece nor in Russia has this doctrine ever undergone any change, as we see that papal doctrine did in the time of Luther; and, although among some of our co-religionists superstitions and malpractices have found place, yet the church does not sanction such corruptions; but she pities, reproves, and corrects those

who fall into them. Besides, particular erroneous views and practices of some who are ignorant of the truth, cannot bring any just reproach upon the whole church. Hence we conclude, that our Orthodox church is not only the true church, but the only one, and the same from the foundation of the world.”¹ In explaining the term “holy,” as applied to the church, the same author says: “Although there are sinners in the church, yet only those who confess their sins before God with true repentance, and receive his gracious pardon, are really members of it; the impenitent and hard-hearted are not members of the church.”² There seems to be no clear conception here of the distinction between the visible church and the invisible.

The Greeks are strenuous advocates of three orders in the ministry. Some of the more strict and zealous among them were much disturbed, or at least professed to be so, soon after the first Protestant missionaries were sent to Greece, lest their hierarchy should be supplanted by Presbyterianism, or some other form of church government founded on the purity of the ministry. Some of the Greek priests were accused of conspiring with these foreigners to bring about this result. The learned Economos wrote a treatise in defense of the three orders. He was answered by Pharmakides and Bambas, whom he had accused of being partners in this plot. They both indignantly denied the charge; but the former, in a subsequent work, published in 1852, did not hesitate to affirm that the constitution of the primitive church was *democratic* in its character.

The vow of celibacy is not required of deacons or presbyters, but only of the bishops. These, therefore, are always selected from the monastic order. The parochial clergy are required to be married before their ordination; but they may not marry a second time after ordination. This rule, which was adopted at the council called Quinsextum, held in Constantinople A.D. 692, has remained in force to the present day. In defending the usage of the Greek church

¹ Orthodox Doctrine, Part II. § 28.

² Ibid.

on this point, de Stourdza says: "The Orthodox church regards the bishops as holocausts, smoking upon her high places, and having for their vocation to diffuse afar the vivifying light and the sweet odor of their perpetual sacrifice. In prescribing the celibacy of bishops, our church has thought she ought to honor and realize the doctrine of the Saviour, who teaches us that there are some men who are capable of devoting themselves to perpetual chastity. And at the same time, in restricting this institution to the episcopate, the Orthodox church reconciles the laws of revelation with those of nature, and does not impose on human weakness burdens which it is not able to bear."

The monastic life has only a very limited development in the modern Greek church, as compared with its extent in the Papal. In the kingdom of Greece most of the monasteries were abolished soon after the revolution. In the vicinity of Mount Athos the monks are still counted by thousands. But the countries where the Greek church predominates are not, like most Roman Catholic countries, burdened with swarms of lazy monks, of numerous varieties of garb and order. The Greek monks nearly all follow the rule of Basil.

In respect to ecclesiastical government, the Greek church lacks that unity which makes the Papal church so formidable. It has no single universally acknowledged head, the fountain of priestly authority, the ultimate arbiter of spiritual discipline, the centre of ecclesiastical unity. The different geographical divisions of the church are governed in a different manner. The churches of Russia, Greece, and Austria, are national establishments, the two former being governed by a synod, and the latter by the Archbishop of Carlowitz, with the title of patriarch. Most of the remaining portions of the Oriental church are under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the four patriarchs of Constantinople, of Alexandria, of Antioch, and of Jerusalem. Of these, the patriarch of Constantinople enjoys the pre-eminence, and is virtually the primate of all who profess the oriental faith in

the Turkish Empire, in the Danubian Principalities, in the Ionian Islands, and in Venice. The Island of Cyprus, though belonging to the Turkish Empire, has an independent ecclesiastical government, under the rule of its bishops, four in number; and the churches of Montenegro and Mount Sinai also enjoy ecclesiastical independence, though each consists only of a single bishopric. Of the three national churches, that of Greece is least dependent on the secular power. In fact, since the kingdom of Greece has been established, it has never had a sovereign who belonged to the prevailing faith of the people. The lately deposed Otho was a Catholic, and his queen a Protestant. The present king, George the First, is a Protestant, belonging to the Lutheran church. Many of the Greeks are opposed altogether to the union of church and state. Economos, whose name has already been mentioned, wrote a very able argument against this mixture of things sacred and secular.

OF THE SACRAMENTS.

The Greek church, like the Papal, makes the number of sacraments, or mysteries as she calls them, to be seven. She is however more careful than the papal to assign a pre-eminence to baptism and the Lord's supper. She gives the name of confession to that which the Romish church calls penance; and her anointing is not like the extreme unction of the Western church. It is used, not as a preparative for death, but rather as a means, through the prayer of faith, of the recovery from sickness and forgiveness of sins. It is defined in the larger Orthodox Catechism of the Russian church, as "a mystery in which, while the body is anointed with oil, God's grace is invoked on the sick, to heal him of his spiritual and bodily infirmities." Or, as it is in the Catechism of Platon, "the mystery in which the priest anoints the sick with oil, and prays to God to heal him and forgive his sins."

Baptism is defined by Platon as "the mystery in which,

when the body is washed in water, the soul is washed in the blood of Christ." Its effects are explained as consisting in regeneration, the remission of all sin, and the entering into covenant with God, whereby we obtain a title to everlasting life. The form of baptism in the Greek church is always a triple immersion. The priest, pronouncing the baptismal formula, plunges the child into the water simultaneously with the pronunciation of each of the names of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The Greek church does not allow the validity of baptism by aspersion or affusion; nor will she receive proselytes from those communions which practise these modes, unless they submit to the triple immersion. The Russian church was, however, prevailed on by the influence of the patriarch Nikon, about the middle of the seventeenth century, to make an exception to this rule in favor of the Roman Catholic church. The members of that church, who may wish to unite with the Greek church in Russia, may be received without any other ceremony than the chrism or confirmation. This exception does not include Protestants, nor has the example been followed in any other division of the Greek church. In administering baptism, the priest does not say, "I baptize thee"; but, "the servant of the Lord (here follows the name) is baptizied," etc. The Greeks defend this form on two grounds; first, as being more modest on the part of the administrator, who is made too prominent, they say, by the use of the first person; and, secondly, as intimating the voluntariness of the baptized person, since the verb may be taken either as the passive or the middle form.

The Greek church gives the rite of chrism or confirmation, immediately after baptism. Indeed the two offices are combined into one. The administration of this rite is not, as in the Romish and Anglican churches, the prerogative of the bishop, but, as in the Lutheran church, it is performed by presbyters.

In the case of adults, auricular confession is regarded as a qualification for communion. But in pronouncing the

absolution connected with this, the priest does not say, "I absolve thee," but "may the Lord absolve thee."

The Lord's supper is thus defined by Platon: "The holy eucharist is a mystery, in which the believer receives, under the form of bread, the very body of Christ, and under the form of wine, the very blood of Christ, for remission of sins, and everlasting life." The word "transubstantiation" was never used by the Greek church till after the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, in 1453. It is said to occur for the first time in the confession of faith presented by the patriarch Gennadius to the sultan Mohammed II, shortly after the capture of the city. The Greek church differs from the Roman Catholic in regard to the precise moment of the service when the miracle of transubstantiation is wrought. While the Romish church assigns the miracle to the moment when the priest pronounces the words "this is my body," the Oriental church assigns it to a subsequent part of the service, when the priest prays, in the words of Chrysostom's rubric: "Make this bread the precious body of thy Christ, and that which is in this cup the precious blood of thy Christ, *changing* them by thy Holy Spirit." They thus involve themselves in inconsistency; for the priest repeats the Lord's words, "this is my body," and the people respond, "Amen; we believe it," before the change of substance is effected. The communion is always administered in both kinds, and to all infants after baptism, as well as to adults. In regard to this last point, Stourdza has the following significant note: "The Orthodox church administers the sacrament to infants at the breast, desiring to sanctify them from the cradle: The Western church does not give the communion till a more advanced age. There is more of faith in the former of these usages; more of reason in the latter."

OF WORSHIP.

The worship of the Greek church differs in this important particular from that of the Romish, that the services are not

conducted in an unknown tongue. For the ecclesiastical Greek, though differing from the written, and still more from the spoken, language of the present day, cannot be regarded as a foreign or unknown tongue to the worshipper. Another difference which the spectator at once notices is, that there is far less in the Greek church than in the Latin of that ecclesiastical mummary and pantomime, in which the priest alone plays his part, without any apparent consciousness of the presence of the people. So far as the worship of images is concerned, the only important difference (if indeed this is important) between the two churches is, that the Greek disallows the use of *graven images*, and limits herself to pictures painted on board or canvas. She professes also to disallow the use of pictorial representations of the Deity, excepting those of the Son, who, as having actually assumed the nature of man, may be lawfully represented in a human form. But in practice this distinction is little regarded, and pictures of the Father, as a venerable old man with a flowing beard, and of the Holy Spirit, as a dove, are very common, both in churches and in private dwellings. The Greek church also professes, in her better formularies, to guard the members of her communion against the abuse, or superstitious use, of images. Thus Platon, in his orthodox instruction, says: "The respect which may be lawfully paid to pictures degenerates into the heinous sin of idolatry when reverence is directed to the picture in itself; when one picture is considered holier than another; when an ornamented picture is more honored than a plain one, or an old one more than a new, or when persons decline to pray where there is no picture." But, in fact, the church's caveat is little regarded, and all these prohibited forms of abuse are common. The images used in the Greek church are not likely to attract the idolatrous reverence of those who look upon painting as almost a divine art. They are far inferior, in this respect, to those used in the Roman Catholic church.

The invocation of saints is as universal in the Greek

church as in the Latin. The mother of Christ, the ever-virgin, the all-holy, is invoked quite as often and as fervently as her divine Son.

The veneration of relics is also as much a part of the Greek worship as of the Romish.

Prayers for the dead who have departed in faith are defended on the ground of the unity of the church. Believers on earth and spirits of the just made perfect in heaven make up one communion of saints.

The abundant reading of the scriptures is a marked feature in the services of the Greek church. This has undoubtedly contributed to keep her from sinking to the level of ignorance and superstition which is seen in countries entirely under the sway of the pope. It has also operated effectually to prevent the Greek language from becoming obsolete, and has prepared the way for that purification and improvement of the language, which has been going on with such remarkable rapidity since Greece became an independent kingdom.

In respect to fasting, the rules of the Greek church are less minute than those of the Roman Catholic. Fasting is a duty of the Christian. It involves the three elements of the *time*, the *quantity*, and the *quality* of food. As to the second, the church, in view of the diversities of age, constitution, and circumstances, does not lay down any rule. But as to the times of fasting and the quality of food she gives direction to her faithful children. She prescribes entire abstinence as a preparation for receiving the eucharist, and four principal feasts in the year. These she regards as means of improvement, and not as meritorious works. As to the quality of food, her general principle is to prescribe the less substantial and less savory kinds of food, as a security against excess.

THE FUTURE LIFE.

We come now to consider the doctrine of the Oriental church in regard to the world to come. The Greek church

has never received the Romish doctrine of purgatory. And yet, with what seems to Protestants a strange inconsistency, she has always sanctioned prayers for the dead. She reconciles the seeming inconsistency in this way. The penalty of sin is twofold, consisting partly in eternal reprobation, and partly in temporal chastisements. Remission of the first is obtained by penitence and faith, through the merits of Christ. But the liability to the temporal consequences of sin, such as human justice, shame, affliction, sickness, and death is not removed by repentance. Now many die in a state of penitence indeed, but before they have undergone the temporal penalty of their transgressions. To supply this deficiency, the church imposes on them pious exercises, voluntary privations, which are called canonical penalties. It is for those who die before they have undergone these providential or canonical penalties, that the maternal solicitude of the church has appointed prayers and commemorations. There is nothing here of expiation in purgatory, nothing of *merits* or *demerits* after death; but only a maternal aspiration of prayer on the part of the church in behalf of the dead, with a view to their obtaining the free remission of the temporal penalties which they have incurred, while as yet their *eternal destiny* is not irrevocably fixed by the sovereign Judge. Nothing short of certain signs of final impenitence imposes silence on the distressful cry of her maternal heart.

In regard to the resurrection of the dead, and the eternal awards that follow it, there is nothing peculiar in the doctrine of the Eastern church.

The above statement of the belief of the modern Greek church will put the reader in a position to judge of the correctness of the assertion made by a Scotch apologist, that "the principles of the Protestant Reformation and Eastern Orthodoxy (separated from practical abuse, and fairly exhibited) are *identical*."¹ In another part of his book, the same author qualifies somewhat this identity:

¹ An Apology for the Greek Church. By Edward Masson. p. 41.

“The standards of the Greek church, strictly speaking, contain, in fact, but two points of difference between the Greek and the Protestant faith. The Greeks admit pictures into places of worship, and maintain the Nicene Creed in its original form, without the undeniable Western interpolation.”¹ The object of this apologist is to show, “that the complete regeneration of the Greek church is perfectly compatible with the integrity of her standards.”² As an inference from this view, he maintains, “that a system of missionary operations, founded on the principle of non-interference, may be rendered entirely efficient; and that every other system will end in disappointment.”³ This is not the place to argue this question; but while the writer heartily approves the principle which restricts the series of Articles in this Periodical on the theological views of different divisions of the Christian church to the statement of facts, principles, and arguments, to the exclusion of heated polemical discussions, yet he is unwilling to close this view of the doctrines of the Greek church without recording his profound conviction, the result of more than ten years’ observation and experience of missionary operations among the Greeks, that the only missionary policy which has produced, or which promises to produce, any thorough reform of faith and worship in the Greek church, is that which, while conciliatory and Christian in its spirit, is distinctly and avowedly aggressive in its principle: “Every plant, which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be *rooted up*.”

¹ An Apology for the Greek Church. By Edward Masson, p. 78.

² Ibid., p. 41.

³ Ibid., p. 4.

ARTICLE VII.

GOD THE SUPREME DISPOSER AND MORAL GOVERNOR.

BY REV. ENOCH POND, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY.

IN the scriptures, God is represented as being himself, in some sense, the end of all his works: "Thou hast made all things for thyself" (Prov. xvi. 4); "Thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created" (Rev. iv. 11); "For whom are all things, and by whom are all things" (Heb. ii. 10).

By the most respectable theologians these scriptures are understood to mean that the glory of God is the great object and end of all his works; that in all that he has done, or ever will do, his prime object is, to exhibit himself, to display his perfections, to show forth his glory, so that his intelligent creatures may have the means of knowing, loving, and enjoying him in the highest degree of which they are capable. And this involves, necessarily, their highest good. In this view, the brightest display of God's glory, and the highest good of the intelligent universe are identical, and together constitute the ultimate and most worthy end of the Supreme Being in all his works.

In displaying his glory to the view of creatures, God necessarily exhibits himself in different attitudes and lights. He represents himself as discharging different offices and works. Viewed in one aspect, we behold his power; in another, his wisdom; in another, his goodness and his truth. In fulfilling one office, he displays his glorious sovereignty; in another, his glorious justice and his grace. In these ways God makes a more full exhibition of himself than would otherwise be possible. He glorifies himself in the highest degree.

Among the different offices which God fulfils, and in the fulfilling of which he shows forth his glory, are those of

Supreme Disposer and Moral Governor. There is a manifest distinction between these offices ; and in what follows we shall endeavour to illustrate and apply it, and show its importance in a system of theology.

In different parts of the Bible God speaks, and is spoken of, in each of these different offices and works ; and, first, as *the Sovereign and Supreme Disposer* : “ I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness ; I make peace and create evil ; I, the Lord, do all these things ” (Is. xlv. 6, 7). And again, in a parallel passage : “ I am God, and there is none like me ; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done ; saying, my counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure ” (Is. xlvi. 9, 10). “ He is of one mind, and none can turn him ; and whatsoever his soul desireth, even that he doeth ” (Job xxiii. 13). “ He doeth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou ” (Dan. iv. 35) ? “ Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another to dishonor ? ” “ I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion ” (Rom. ix. 15, 21). “ Who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will ” (Eph. i. 11).

In these and the like passages God speaks, and is spoken of, in the high character of supreme and sovereign disposer. It was in this office of supreme disposer that he in eternity formed the plan of all his future operations. It was a boundless plan, extending through all space and time, to all contingences and events. It was an infinitely perfect plan, requiring no change, admitting no improvement or alteration. At the appointed season, and in fulfilment of his eternal purpose, God brought the worlds into existence ; some higher, and some lower ; some material, and some spiritual ; some nearer the great source and centre of being, and some at remoter distances from it. He upholds in existence the

worlds he has made; he moves them in regular order, according to established laws; he has filled them with living creatures of different orders and species, from the highest angel to the meanest worm; he preserves and disposes of all things according to his pleasure. Not a planet rolls or an angel flies but by his power; not a hair is plucked or a sparrow falls without his notice. Not a human being is born or dies, is prospered or afflicted, is saved or destroyed, but his hand is, in some way, concerned in it all.

The affairs of nations, too, as well as of individuals, are all subject to his providential control. He builds up or plucks down, as seemeth good in his sight. He often dashes guilty nations one against another, and makes them the instruments of their own destruction. Even those events which are brought about by human agency are not exempt from his providential control. "Man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps." "The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is from the Lord" (Prov. xvi. 9, 33).

Thus, God is not only the original contriver and creator, but the supreme disposer of all things; and the devout mind loves to regard him in this light. He loves to see God exalted above all contingences, beyond the reach of all his foes. He delights to behold him rolling along the great wheel of his providence in its appointed course, bringing light out of darkness, and good out of evil, and overruling all things, however they may seem to us at present, for his own highest glory and the greatest good. It is under impressions such as these that the believing heart exclaims: "Be thou exalted, O God, above the heavens, and thy glory above all the earth." "Let every thing that hath breath praise the Lord. Praise ye the Lord."

Such is God, the supreme disposer. Let us now turn and contemplate him in that other aspect of which we spoke, as *moral governor*. The moral government of God is that government of law which he exercises over intelligent and moral beings. In kind it resembles human governments,

and like them is administered by laws and motives, rewards and punishments. It differs essentially from that sovereign disposal of things of which we have spoken. That is altogether in the hands of God, and men have naught to do with it, except to submit and rejoice in it. But in the moral government of God men have a deep and active concern. They are themselves the responsible subjects of this government. Its motives are addressed to them; its laws bind them. If obedient, they are entitled to its promised rewards; if disobedient, to its just penalties. As supreme disposer, God orders all the circumstances and events of our lives, according to his pleasure; while as moral governor he makes known to us his will, and presses upon us, with the authority of a sovereign and the affection of a father, our obligation to obey.

Theologians generally have marked the distinction between the eternal purposes of God and his law. The law of God is clearly revealed; but his purposes, except in a few leading particulars, he has not revealed. They are among the secret things which belong only to himself. The law of God is a rule of conduct for us; but his purposes, even when we know them, are not to us a rule of conduct. The law of God is often broken — broken in every case of sin; but his purposes are never broken, not even by the greatest wickedness. The murderers of our Saviour most terribly violated the law of God; but they fulfilled his purpose. “Him being delivered by *the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God*, ye with wicked hands have crucified and slain” (Acts ii. 23).

These points of distinction between the law and the purposes of God, which are so very obvious, and so generally understood, show the fact of the distinction which we are endeavoring to illustrate. The eternal purposes of God belong to him as supreme disposer. They constitute the boundless and perfect plan, according to which all the movements of his providence are conducted: “He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” But the law of

God pertains to his office and work as moral governor. It is the rule of conduct which he has prescribed to his creatures, and which he is bound, as moral governor, to enforce. Heaven and earth might better pass away than that one jot or tittle of the law should fail.

These different parts of the divine administration, in some cases, run together; while in others, they present an aspect of diversity, if not of contrariety. Thus the free actions of men, which fall under the moral government of God, are also subject, somehow, to his providential control. While "man's heart deviseth his way, the Lord directeth his steps." "The preparations of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, are from the Lord." Then the dispensations of God's providence are often employed as motives in carrying into effect his moral government.

In every act of obedience, the law and the purpose of God are both fulfilled, and the two parts of his administration run quite together. But how is it in cases of disobedience? There the law of God is broken; but is his purpose also broken? Is that defeated? Never. "My council shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." "Him, being delivered by the determinate council and foreknowledge of God, ye with wicked hands have crucified and slain."

It adds immensely to the interest of God's work of moral government, to consider it in its connection with the atonement of Christ. It was the exigencies of moral government, in *the salvation of sinners*, which made an atonement necessary. It is in connection with moral government, in its bearing upon the great question of human salvation, that an atonement has been made. We have all rebelled against the government of God, have broken his holy law, and exposed ourselves to suffer its righteous penalty. God's justice binds him to inflict this penalty. If his moral government is to be sustained it must be inflicted, unless some expedient of mercy can be devised, which shall satisfy the justice of God and answer all the ends of law and gov-

ernment as well. If such an expedient can be provided, then a righteous moral governor may, if he pleases, and on such terms as he pleases, remit the penalty to the transgressor; because, by the supposition, remission, pardon, justification, under such circumstances, weakens not at all the authority of God's government, and does no dishonor to the law. But if no such expedient can be provided, then, as sure as the Lord reigns, and will reign in justice and glory forever, no sinner of the human race can be saved.

Now this expedient of mercy, so indispensable to our salvation, is no other than the atonement of Christ. When we were exposed to die, Christ died for us. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. By his voluntary sufferings and death he magnified the law we had broken, and made it honorable; he vindicated the authority and satisfied the justice of the Supreme Ruler; he laid the sole and sufficient foundation, on which fallen, guilty, ruined sinners, who return to him in penitence and faith, can be pardoned and saved.

Standing on the ground of this atonement, and speaking in the capacity of moral governor, we hear the great God making terms to his revolted creatures, sending forth his invitations of mercy, and beseeching them to become reconciled to himself: "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth"; "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters"; "Whosoever will, let him come, and take the waters of life freely." In the same capacity we hear him pouring forth the desires of his heart for the salvation of the lost, in language such as this: "Oh that there were such a heart in them that they would fear me, and keep my commandments, that it might be well with them and with their children forever!" "O that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their latter end!" In the same capacity, too, we hear him lamenting the miserable doom of those who had sinned away their day of grace, and shrinking, as it were, from the inflictions which he found himself constrained to visit upon them. "How shall

I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee Israel? My heart is turned within me, and my repentings are kindled together." "Oh that thou hadst known, in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace; but now they are hidden from thine eyes."

Language such as this is altogether befitting the Supreme Being in his capacity of moral governor, administering a government of law over apostate creatures for whom a provision of mercy had been made, and upon whom it was tenderly and persuasively urged. But it would not at all befit him in that other capacity of sovereign and supreme disposer, who "doeth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of earth"; who "bath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth."

In the capacity of moral governor, God commands, invites, and intreats his apostate creatures; he promises, threatens, and expostulates. In some instances he seems at a loss to know what to do with them: "Then said the Lord of the vineyard, What shall I do? I will send my beloved son." He expresses the intensest sorrow at their ingratitude and wickedness, and yearns over them, as we have seen, with all the affection of a father. He finally passes judgment upon them, and rewards or punishes them according to their deeds. In short, the Bible, from one end to the other, is little more than a record of God's various dealings with men, as a moral governor. Occasionally, he speaks out, in that other capacity to which we have referred. We hear also of his sovereign, providential dispensations. But probably nine tenths of the contents of the book of God has respect to that other part of the divine administration, his moral government.

It is sometimes said that those strong expressions of desire on the part of God, as a moral governor, for the salvation of the wicked, and of regret and sorrow at their wilful blindness and ruin, are not to be understood literally. It is God speaking after the manner of men, and representing

himself as in possession of human passions and feelings. But we see no objection to understanding these expressions, for the most part, literally. God has an emotional nature, as well as an intellectual and voluntary nature. He not only perceives and wills, but he feels. He feels intensely, as such a being must, if he feels at all. He feels pleasure and displeasure, love and hatred, joy and sorrow, desire, concern, interest, and regret, just as he exhibits himself in the Bible. We certainly are subject to all these affections, and should have been, had we never sinned; and we are expressly said to have been made in the image of God.

It is further said, that by the distinction we have set up, we virtually make two Gods; two distinct and independent beings. But this is not true. It is the one God of whom we speak, presenting himself before us in different attitudes and lights; discharging different offices and works; and thus displaying himself more adequately and truly, and showing more of his glory, than would otherwise be possible. The three persons in the Trinity perform distinct offices in the great work of our redemption; but this does not prove them three distinct and independent beings. The Lord our God is one God and one only.

The distinction which has been made between the sovereign disposals of God and his moral government is believed to be one of great importance. It is so theologically and practically.

In the first place, it helps us to understand and to harmonize some apparently discrepant representations of scripture. To some extent, these scriptures have been quoted already. In one class of scriptures it is said that God "doeth according to his will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth"; that he "is of one mind, and none can turn him, and that whatsoever his soul desireth, even that he doeth"; that he "hath mercy on whom he will have mercy"; that his "counsel shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure." But in other scriptures it appears that God's pleasure is not always done; that his will is crossed; and

that he intensely desires many things which are not accomplished : “ Oh that there were such an heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments, that it might be well with them and with their children forever.” “ Oh that thou hadst known, in this thy day, the things which belong to thy peace ! ” “ Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die ? ”

In order to remove this difficulty, some have presumed to say that God cannot convert and save all men. He earnestly desires the salvation of all, but he cannot effect it. He converts and saves as many as he can. But this, obviously, is not harmonizing the two classes of scriptures at all. It is rather annulling the one class in order to save the other. God desires the salvation of his guilty creatures, undoubtedly ; for he hath said it. But how is this truth consistent with those other declarations, that he “ doeth according to his will ; ” that he “ hath mercy on whom he will have mercy ; ” and that, “ with him, all things are possible ? ” Here is the real difficulty of the case ; and the solution above suggested goes not a step towards removing it.

Some have thought to remove the difficulty by insisting that all men will finally be saved. God desires the salvation of all, and will ultimately save all ; for “ whatsoever his soul desireth, even that it doeth.” But it is certain from many scriptures, and even from some of the class referred to, that all men are not to be saved : “ Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die ? ” “ Oh that thou hadst known, in this thy day, the things which belong to thy peace ; but now they are hidden from thine eyes.”

Others have attempted to remove the difficulty by saying that while God desires, in itself considered, the salvation of all men, he does not purpose, on the whole, to put forth his power and save all. A distinction is made between what God desires, in itself considered, and what he purposes, on the whole. And this, I have no doubt, is a valid distinction. It is one which is continually made and acted upon in common life. It is one which may properly be applied to the case in hand. And yet it does not seem to

us to tell the whole truth on the subject. It does not reach to the full extent of it, or embrace all that requires to be said.

In order to make the matter plain, we need that other distinction which has been insisted upon in this discussion. As supreme and sovereign disposer God puts forth certain claims, and utters a peculiar language. It is all true. It is glorious truth, on which every friend of God delights to ponder and to rest. God could not show forth his glory to his creatures, and withhold those sublime exhibitions of himself, which, as sovereign disposer, he has been pleased to make. At the same time, in administering a moral government over free, intelligent creatures, and especially over apostate creatures, whom, on the ground of the atonement, he is endeavoring to win back to the truth and save, it is proper that he should use quite another language. It is proper that he should invite, exhort, reprove, entreat, and warn; it is proper that he should express his desires, and pour forth his paternal yearnings, and urge every appropriate motive to bring the sinner to repentance. And if he will not return to his duty, it is proper that the injured Sovereign should give vent to his feelings in the language of our blessed Lord: "Oh that thou hadst known, in this thy day, the things which belonged to thy peace; but now they are hidden from thine eyes." Language such as this, with which the scriptures abound, is all true and important, and most honorable to the heart of its divine author, and indispensable to a full exhibition of his character and glory. Nor is it at all inconsistent with that other language which, standing in a different relation, and speaking and acting in a different capacity, God uses to set forth his supreme control over all creatures and all worlds.

The distinction on which we have insisted is important, as it goes to vindicate the sincerity of God in his invitations and entreaties, and in all the efforts which, as a compassionate moral governor, he is pleased to make, to bring sinners to the knowledge of the truth. It is often said that if

God's claims of sovereignty are just, he cannot be sincere in his invitations. Having all hearts in his hands, and being perfectly able to turn them as he pleases, if he really desires the conversion of sinners, why does he not turn them to himself? Why does he not put forth his power, and subdue their wills, and end the struggle at a stroke? And is not the fact that this is not done conclusive proof, either that he lacks the power, or that in the expression of his desires, he is insincere? Or to place the difficulty in another light: how can God sincerely invite and entreat those to come to him and live whom he certainly knows never will come, and respecting whom he has even a plan, a purpose, that they never shall?

We have chosen to present this objection in all its force. It has been a perplexing one to ministers and Christians; a difficulty with which they have been unwilling to grapple; preferring rather to leave it among the dark things of God. And we frankly acknowledge that, except on the ground of the distinction above illustrated, we should be at a loss how to dispose of it.

The objection to God's sincerity, it will be seen, is twofold. The first form of it is grounded on his absolute control over the hearts and actions of men. If he has such a control, and sincerely desires the salvation of sinners, why does he not exercise it, and turn all men to himself? The other form of the objection is grounded on the universal purposes and foreknowledge of God. If it has entered into his great plan of providence and grace that certain individuals are not to be saved, how can he sincerely urge them to accept of life?

It will be seen that both these objections owe all their plausibility to a confounding of the distinction between God as the supreme disposer and a moral governor. It is God in the same office, and acting in the same capacity, who has formed his decrees of election and reprobation, and exercises a sovereign control over the hearts and actions of men, while at the same time he is inviting and entreat-

ing all men to come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved. And this, it is said, and said justly, seems crooked and insincere.

But we have seen that it is not God in the same office, and acting in the same capacity, who gives utterance to these seemingly discrepant forms of speech. It is God, the supreme and sovereign disposer, who has formed his universal plan, and is giving it effect throughout his immense dominions of providence and grace. It is in this capacity that none can stay his resistless hand, or say unto him, What doest thou? But it is in a very different capacity; that of a father, a ruler, a compassionate moral governor, that he gives utterance to his invitations, his entreaties, his paternal yearnings, for the salvation of those who persistently turn their backs upon the overtures of his love. He is perfectly sincere in these utterances. He is intensely earnest in them. He feels all that he expresses, and infinitely more than can be expressed in the language of mortals.

Without the distinction which has been indicated there is no such thing as vindicating the sincerity of the divine Being in the invitations of his love. But with this distinction clearly formed, rightly understood, and carried with us in our interpretations of the Bible, there is no difficulty. In both the capacities in which God presents himself before us, his utterances are all true; they are precious truths; and infinitely honorable to himself.

Nor let any one think to refute our reasonings on this subject, by comparisons drawn from mere earthly relations, as of a father to his children, or a ruler to his subjects. The truth is, no earthly relations can reach to the vastness of the subject in hand, or can be employed, except in a very little way, to illustrate it. The parent may exercise a kind of moral government over his children. He may give them laws, and desire and exact obedience. He may also, during their minority, have the disposal generally of their affairs. But is he their Creator and their Supreme Disposer? Does

he exercise such a sovereignty or such a moral government over them as God does? Or is he under a necessity of speaking and acting in different relations and capacities, as God is, in order to unfold more adequately his character and display his glory? We make these remarks for the purpose of showing how dangerous it is to attempt illustrating divine things by human things; or to attempt refuting the plain declarations of God's word by comparisons drawn from mere human relations.

The distinction of which we have spoken is further important, because, if correctly understood and applied, it would heal many differences and disputes among evangelical Christians. The most of these differences cluster around the great subjects of God's sovereignty and our responsibility; his purposes and our duties; his uncontrollable agency in disposing the affairs and actions of men, and our freedom to do as we please, and form characters good or evil. Some good men are so enamoured of the doctrines of God's decree and his sovereignty as to think of little else. They forget a class of truths which lie over on the other side: such as man's freedom and accountability, his subjection to law, and his obligations to labor for the salvation of his own soul and the souls of others. "God will fulfil his own purposes, he will gather in his own elect, he will overrule all things for his highest glory and the greatest good; and why should we trouble ourselves about duties and responsibilities? Commit everything to God, rest implicitly in his decrees, and wait the disposals of his blessed will." Thus some men reason and act on the subject of religion, who, if they should do the same in regard to the common affairs of life, would be justly thought to require a guardian.

But at the farthest remove from these, and often in sharp controversy with them, is a class of religionists who think little of God's sovereignty and decrees, and believe still less. They know that we are free, responsible agents; that God has given us his law, and that we are bound to obey it. They know also that God has revealed to us the gospel,

which we are bound to accept; that if we do accept it in faith and love, we shall be saved; but if we turn from it, and refuse obedience, we shall be lost. They know as much as this, and this they say is enough. Under the influence of truths and motives such as these, they are working out their own salvation; and they look with distrust, perhaps contempt, upon those who, passing over these weightier matters, are prying into the deep things of God.

It is true of both these classes of persons that they regard God as speaking and acting, in his word, in only one capacity or character; they endeavour to square all that he says to that; and what cannot be made to square with it they either ignore or throw away. And as they fail to ignore the same classes of passages, the result is that they widely differ in their understanding of the scriptures, and fall into altercations and disputes. Now, the only remedy for this state of things is for them to set up the distinction on which we have insisted, and carry it with them through the Bible. We do not believe in two Gods, but in *one*, who, the better to display his character and perfections, speaks and acts in two different capacities. He certainly is the creator and supreme disposer of all things. He formed his plan in eternity; his purpose shall stand; and he “worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.” It will not do for us to ignore representations such as these, or to pass them slightly over, or to attempt to explain them away. If we do so, we shall lose the noblest views of God — those which fill all heaven with rapturous adoration, and which he has revealed for our comfort while here below.

On the other hand, it is certain that God is a moral governor over free, intelligent, active beings, who are bound to serve and obey him, and who, having revolted from him, are bound to return to him in penitence and love, as a compassionate moral governor. God invites us, in all sincerity and earnestness, to return and accept the overtures of his grace. Let us believe God in all that he says of himself,

and in all that he says to us. Let us take in, so far as we may, that full view of his character and glory which he has set before us. So shall we be, neither Antinomians nor Arminians, nor one-sided heretics of any description; but may hope to grow up "into the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."

We have said that the distinction on which we have insisted is one of great importance *practically*. We must regard our God in the capacity of sovereign and supreme disposer, in order that we may gain the most exalted conceptions of him, and under all circumstances may repose and rejoice in him. There are times when we want to see God as an uncontrollable sovereign, seated on the circuit of the heavens, and rolling into effect his undisturbed decrees; bringing light out of darkness and good out of evil, and causing the wrath of man to contribute to his praise. There are times when, if we could not take these high and ennobling views of God, we should have no ground of hope or comfort left.

At the same time, we love to regard the Almighty as a righteous moral governor, as a most beneficent ruler, as our heavenly Father, who has given us the best of laws, and whose government over us is perfectly wise and good. More especially do we love to regard him in the dispensations of his grace, opening a way for the recovery of the lost, and calling to his wandering children to return unto him and live. Without these views of God, we might adore and fear him, but we could not love him as we ought. We could not be melted, as we now should be, in the ever warming, enlivening beams of his tenderness and love.

If we mistake not, the Christian world affords examples of the danger of taking in but partial conceptions of God, of entertaining a one-sided view of his character. To say nothing of those who so represent the sovereignty of God as to cut off entirely the free-agency of man; or of those, on the other hand, who so exalt the human will, as to leave God no certain control over the hearts and actions of crea-

tures; there are undoubtedly pious persons, sincere Christians, whose characters suffer on account of the partial, imperfect views which they are led to take of the Supreme Being. Here, we will suppose, is a class of Christians, to which we have before referred, whose minds dwell chiefly on the sovereignty of God. They think much of his sovereign purpose and providence. They rejoice that "the counsel of the Lord standeth forever, and the thought of his heart to all generations"; that he "is of one mind, and none can turn him, and whatsoever his soul desireth, even that he doeth." The effect of dwelling almost exclusively upon topics such as these, is to form a particular type of Christian character — trustful, stable, firm, and for the most part joyful; but still hard, rigid, wanting in gentleness, tenderness, sometimes in conscientiousness, and in a wakeful, active concern for the good of souls. Persons of this character will sometimes put over to the sovereignty of God what they ought to be using means to accomplish themselves.

At the other extreme we find a class of Christians who, owing to wrong instruction, prejudice, or some other cause, think little of what is called the sovereignty of God. They do not understand it, are afraid of it, and, as it presents itself to their minds, feel no complacency in it. They prefer to dwell on another class of subjects, such as the goodness of God, more especially as manifested in the work of redemption; on the love of Christ in consenting to come into the world and die for sinners; on the freeness and universality of the gospel offers; on the invitations and motives of the gospel, and on the obligations of men, everywhere, to yield to these motives and secure everlasting life. Now, the dwelling perpetually on considerations such as these — true and important as they may be in themselves — tends to form a particular type of Christian character, and a very different type from that last exhibited. These Christians will be earnest and active, certainly, at times. Their love, zeal, and engagedness will rise very high. And yet, perhaps, they will be fitful, unstable, driven about by gusts of feeling,

or the force of circumstances, like a ship without anchor, ballast, or helm. They need those high views of the sovereignty of God, to which they have never yet attained, to steady them, to sustain them, to give them comfort in seasons of darkness as well as of light; to lead them to adore and fear God as well as love him; to confide in him as well as actively serve him; in short, to give proportion and symmetry to their Christian character, and form them in a meetness for heaven.

The two classes of persons to whom we have referred are supposed, both of them, to be truly pious; and the characters of both are formed (as every person's must be) according to the views which they respectively entertain. And the characters of both are one-sided, out of proportion, because they have been led to entertain partial, one-sided views of God. We must habitually think of God, not only as the supreme disposer, but as a righteous moral governor; not only in the steady march of his glorious sovereignty, but in his tender love and pity for dying men. We must think of him in his whole character, as he has revealed himself to us in his works and in his word; and then, if we are Christians indeed, our hearts will be formed into his whole image and likeness.

As the two aspects in which we have been led to view the divine character are very distinct, so the duties resulting from them are distinct also. We are to adore and fear, in view of the divine sovereignty. We are to submit to it, and rejoice in it. We are to stay ourselves upon it at all times, so we shall not be greatly moved.

But as active beings, free moral agents, bound to avoid the evil and choose the good, and to do good to the utmost of our ability, we have to do with God, chiefly, as a moral governor. His holy law binds us. This is to be, at all times, our standard of character and rule of life. We have indeed broken it, and incurred its fearful penalty, but as a kind, paternal, moral governor, God is not willing to give us up. He has opened a way of recovery for us, and in all

the benignity of his infinite heart, is crying after us to be wise: "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters." "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." Our first and immediate duty to our great moral governor, is to listen to those accents of mercy, and comply. Tenderly invited, we must come with the whole heart, and receive the waters of life freely.

And having received this living water ourselves, we must do all in our power to impart it to others. The views which the scriptures give us of the sovereignty of God, will be no hinderance to us in this mighty work. Who was ever a more firm believer in the sovereignty of God than the apostle Paul? And yet who ever burned with a more ardent desire, or labored with a more untiring fidelity, for the salvation of souls? Happy the gospel minister, happy the private Christian, who takes the same view of the divine character with the apostle Paul, and forms his own character after the same model.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE BRETHREN OF CHRIST.

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ON the question of the brethren or brothers¹ of our Saviour, three different opinions have been entertained and are still current among commentators: 1) They were only cousins of Jesus, sons of either a sister of Mary or a brother of Joseph; 2) They were younger children of Joseph and Mary, or uterine brothers of Jesus; 3) They were children of Joseph by a former marriage, and hence step-brothers of

¹ In our English Version of the Bible the word "brothers" never occurs, but always "brethren" instead. But in modern English the former is used for natural, the latter for moral or spiritual relationship. See the Dictionaries.

Jesus. The whole Latin church has long settled down upon the first view as the only one consistent with her theory of the higher merit of celibacy, and the dignity both of Christ himself and of his parents. The older Protestant divines acquiesced in the Roman Catholic view, and paid very little attention to the whole subject. But modern Protestant commentators have submitted the subject to a new and more thorough exegetical and critical investigation. For a time it seemed as if the second view had come to prevail, while the third was hardly considered worthy of serious attention. Quite recently, however, Dr. Lange, on several occasions,¹ has zealously opposed the second, and ingeniously defended the first theory, and put it on more plausible ground.

The question, as every other that relates to the personal history of our Saviour, is certainly one of interest, and not of mere idle curiosity, although it can hardly be said to have much doctrinal importance at the present stage of the controversy. This would only be the case if it could be clearly established on exegetical and historical evidence, that the brothers of Jesus were his *uterine* brothers, or younger children of *Mary*. Such a result would overthrow, at once, the dogma of her perpetual virginity, and undermine the very foundation of Roman Catholic asceticism and Mariolatry.

After a renewed investigation of the subject, to which we devoted some attention more than twenty years ago,² we are substantially confirmed in our former view, and beg leave to protest against Dr. Lange's views, and to dissent from the cousin-hypothesis, even with the new and plausible modification it has received from him. We shall confine ourselves to present, as clearly and precisely as we can, the

¹ In his Article *Jakobus*, in Herzog's Real-Encyclopadie, in his Commentary on Matthew, especially ch. xiii. 55-57 (p. 103 seq. of the 3d edition), and in his Introduction to his Commentary on the Epistle of James, 1862.

² Compare the author's book on "James the Brother of the Lord" (Berlin: 1842), where the whole subject is discussed exegetically and historically, with special reference to James of Jerusalem, his relation to James of Alphaeus; also *History of the Apostolic Church*, p. 378.

chief exegetical data, on which the proper conclusion must be based.

1. The *brothers* of Jesus, four in number, and bearing the names of Jacob or James, Joseph (or Joses), Simon, and Jude, are mentioned with or without their names fourteen or fifteen times in the New Testament (not *ten* times, as Alford *in loc.* says), twice in connection with *sisters* (whose number and names are not recorded), viz. twelve times in the Gospels, Matt. xii. 46, 47; xiii. 55, 56 (ἀδελφοί and ἀδελφαί); Mark iii. 31, 32; vi. 3 (here the *sisters* are likewise introduced); Luke viii. 19, 20; John vii. 3, 5, 10; once in the Acts (i. 14); and once by Paul, 1 Cor. ix. 5, to which must be added Gal. i. 19, where James of Jerusalem is called "the brother of the Lord." Besides, the Saviour himself speaks several times of his brothers (brethren), but apparently in a wider sense of the term, Matt. xii. 48–50; Mark iii. 33–35; Matt. xxviii. 10; John xx. 17.

In the former fourteen or fifteen passages it is agreed on all hands that the term *brothers* must be taken more or less literally of natural affinity, and not metaphorically or spiritually, in which sense all Christians are brethren. The question is only, whether the term means brothers proper, or cousins, according to a somewhat wider usage of the Hebrew אח.

2. The exegetical or grammatical (though not perhaps the dogmatical) *a priori* presumption is undoubtedly in favor of the usual meaning of the word, the more so since no parallel case of a wider meaning of ἀδελφός (except the well known and always apparent metaphorical one, which is out of the question in our case) can be quoted from the New Testament. Even the Hebrew אח is used only twice in a wider sense, and then only extended to *nephew* (not to *cousin*), viz. Gen. xiii. 8; xiv. 16, of Abraham and Lot, who was his brother's son (xl. 27, 31), and Gen. xxix. 12, 15, of Laban and Jacob his nephew and sister's son (comp. vs. 13). Here there can be no mistake. The cases are therefore not strictly parallel.

3. There is no mention anywhere of *cousins* or *kinsmen* of Jesus according to the flesh; and yet the term ἀνεψιός, *consobrinus*, *cousin*, is well known to the New Testament vocabulary (compare Col. iv. 10, where Mark is called a cousin of Barnabas); so also the more exact term υἱὸς τῆς ἀδελφῆς, *sister's son* (comp. Acts xxiii. 26, of Paul's cousin in Jerusalem); and the more general term συγγενής, *kinsman*, *relative*, occurs not less than eleven times (Mark vi. 4; Luke i. 36, 58; ii. 44; xiv. 12; xxi. 16; John xviii. 26; Acts x. 24; Rom. ix. 3; xvi. 7, 11, 21).

Now if the *brothers of Jesus* were merely his cousins (either sons of a sister of Mary, as is generally assumed, or of a brother of Joseph, as Dr. Lange maintains), the question may well be asked: Why, we may rationally ask, did the sacred historians never call them by their right name, ἀνεψιοί, or υἱοὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς τῆς Μαρίας, or τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ Ἰωσήφ, or at least more generally συγγενεῖς?¹ By doing this they would have at once prevented all future confusion among commentators; while by uniformly using the term ἀδελφοί, without the least intimation of a wider meaning, they certainly suggest to every unbiased reader the impression that real brothers are intended.

4. In all the passages where *brothers* and *sisters* of Jesus are mentioned, except in John vii. (where they are represented in conflict with the Lord), and 1 Cor. ix. (which was written probably after the death of Mary), they appear in close connection with him and his mother Mary, as being under her care and direction, and as forming one family. This is certainly surprising and unreasonable, if they were cousins. Why do they never appear in connection with their own supposed mother, Mary the wife of Clopas (or Alphaeus), who was living all the time, and stood under the cross (Matt. xxvii. 56: John xix. 25) and at the sepulchre (Matt. xxvii. 61).

¹ Hegesippus (ap. Eusebius, Hist. Eccles., IV. 22) speaks of cousins of Christ, calling Simeon, the successor of James in Jerusalem, ἀνεψιὸν τοῦ Κυρίου δεύτερον.

Lange calls to his aid the double hypothesis of an early death of Clopas (whom he assumes to have been the brother of Joseph¹) and a consequent adoption of his children by the parents of Jesus, so that they became legally his brothers and sisters. But this adoption, if true, could not destroy their relation to their natural mother Mary, who was still living, and one of the most faithful female followers of Christ. Besides the assumption, both of the early death of Clopas and the adoption of his children by Joseph, is without a shadow of either exegetical or traditionary evidence, and is made extremely improbable by the fact of the poverty of the holy family, who could not, in justice to themselves and to their own son, adopt at least half a dozen children at once (four sons and two or more daughters), especially when their own mother was still living at the time. He would have to assume that the mother likewise, after the death of her husband, lived with the holy family. But would she have given up in this case, or under any circumstances, the claim and title to, and the maternal care of, her own children? Certainly not. The more we esteem this devoted disciple, who attended the Saviour to the cross and the sepulchre (Matt. xxvii. 56, 61; John xix. 25), the less we can think her capable of such an unmotherly and unwomanly act.

5. There is no intimation, anywhere in the New Testament, either by direct assertion or by implication (unless it be the disputed passage on James in Gal. i. 19), that the brothers of Christ, or any of them, were of the number of the twelve apostles. This is a mere *inference* from certain facts and combinations, which we shall consider afterwards, viz. the identity of three names, James, Simon, and Judas, which

¹ Hegesippus (in Eusebius, Hist. Eccles., III. 11) asserts that Clopas was the brother of Joseph. Lange denies that Mary the wife of Clopas was the sister of the Virgin Mary. But Lichsteinstein (Lebensgeschichte des Herrn. Erlangen: 1856, p. 124) assumes that the two brothers, Joseph and Clopas, married two sisters, both named Mary. Clopas dying, Joseph took his wife and her children into his family. Schneckenburger reverses the hypothesis, and assumes that Mary, after the early death of Joseph, moved to the household of her sister, the wife of Clopas.

occur among the brothers of Christ and among the apostles, and the fact that a certain Mary, supposed to be the aunt of Jesus, was the mother of James and Joses (but she is never called the mother of James, Joseph, Simon, and Jude), and with the fact of the eminent apostle-like position of James the brother of the Lord in the church at Jerusalem.

6. On the contrary, the brothers of Jesus are mentioned *after* the apostles, and thus *distinguished* from them. In Acts i. 13, 14, Luke first enumerates the eleven by name, and then adds: "These all [the apostles] continued with one accord in prayer and supplication, with the women, and Mary the mother of Jesus, and with *his brethren*." Here they seem to form a distinct class, with their mother, next to the apostles. So also 1 Cor. ix. 5: οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τοῦ Κυρίου. Such distinct mention of the brothers after the apostles was not justified if three of the four, as is assumed by the cousin-theory, were themselves apostles, consequently only one remained to make a separate class. The narrative Matt. xii. 46–50 likewise implies that the brothers of Jesus who stood without, seeking to speak with him, were distinct from the disciples (vs. 69), who always surrounded him.

7. More than this, before the resurrection of Christ, his brothers are represented in the Gospel of John, ch. vii. 3–10, long after the call of the apostles, as *unbelievers*, who endeavored to embarrass the Saviour and to throw difficulties in his way. This makes it *morally impossible* to identify them with the apostles. Even if only one or two of the four had been among the twelve *at that time*, John could not have made the unqualified remark: "*Neither did his brethren (brothers) believe in him*" (vii. 5); for faith is the very first condition of the apostolate. Nor would Christ in this case have said to them: "My time has not yet come; but your time is always ready; the world cannot hate you; but me it hateth" (vs. 6 and 7). Nor would he have separated from them in his journey to Jerusalem. It will not do here to weaken the force of πιστεύειν, and to reduce their unbelief to

a mere temporary wavering and uncertainty. The case of Peter (Matt. xvi. 23), and that of Thomas (John xx. 25), are by no means parallel. The whole attitude of the brothers of Christ, as viewed by Christ and described by John, is entirely inconsistent with that of an apostle. It is an attitude, not of enemies, it is true, but of doubtful, dissatisfied friends, who assume an air of superiority, and presume to suggest to him a worldly and ostentatious policy. After the resurrection they are especially mentioned among the believers, but as a distinct class, with Mary, next the apostles.

All these considerations strongly urge the conclusion that the brothers of Christ were real brothers, according to the flesh, i.e. either later sons of Mary and Joseph, or sons of Joseph by a former marriage (more of this below), unless there are very serious difficulties in the way which make this conclusion either critically or morally or religiously impossible.

Let us now approach these difficulties:

8. There are serious but no insurmountable objections to the conclusion just stated.

(a) The first objection is the identity in *name* of three of these brothers with three of the apostles, viz. James, Simon, and Jude.¹ But it should be remembered that these were among the most common Jewish names. Josephus mentions no less than twenty-one Simons, seventeen Joses, and sixteen Judes. Why could there not be two or three persons of the same name in the apostolic church? We have, at all events, two Jameses and two Simons and two Judes among the twelve apostles. This difficulty is more than counterbalanced by the opposite difficulty of two sisters with the same name.

(b) The second objection, likewise of a critical and exegetical character, is derived from Gal. i. 19, "But other of

¹ Dr. Lange in his Article on James, in Herzog's Encyclopædie, Vol. VI. p. 412, calls this die Unhaltbarkeit einer dreinamigen Doppelgängerlinie in dem apostolischen Kreise, and afterwards eine unerhörte zwei bis vierfache Doppelgängerrei.

the apostles saw I none, save (ἐὶ μὴ) James the Lord's brother." Here James, who was one of the brothers of Jesus, seems to be included among the apostles; and this must have been James of Alphaeus, or James the Less.¹ But the passage bears the exactly opposite interpretation, if after ἐὶ μὴ we supply simply εἶδον and not εἶδον τὸν ἀπόστολον, viz. "I saw none other of the apostles besides Peter (vs. 18), but only (I saw) James, the Lord's brother." This interpretation is very old,² and is defended by some of the highest grammatical authorities of our age.³ We think, with Meyer,⁴ that James is here distinguished from the twelve to whom Peter belonged, and yet at the same time numbered with the apostles in a *wider* sense of the term. In other words, he is represented as a man who, on account of his close natural relationship to Christ and his weight of character and piety, enjoyed an apostolic dignity and authority among the strict Jewish Christians. He was the acknowledged head and leader of this branch, and the first bishop of Jerusalem, where he permanently resided and died, while the apostles proper were not fixed in a particular diocese, but travelling missionaries, with the whole world for their field of labor. That this was precisely the position of James, is evident from various passages in the Acts, in the Epistle to the Galatians, from Josephus, Hegesippus, and the traditions of the Eastern church.⁵

(c.) The third objection is of a moral character, and derived from the consideration that Christ on the cross could

¹ So Schneckenburger on the Epistle of James, and all the commentators on Galatians who adopt the cousin-hypothesis, also Ellicott ad Gal. i. 19, who, however, does not enter into a discussion of the general question.

² Victorinus, in his Commentary *in loc.*, says: "Paul disclaims James as an apostle, saying that he saw no other apostle besides Peter, but only James."

³ Winer, Grammatik (6th ed.), p. 557, (§ 67, sub. 1); who quotes, for a similar use of ἐὶ μὴ, Acts xxvii. 22 and Rev. xxi. 27.

⁴ In his Commentary on Gal. i. 19; Fritzsche, Commentary in Matthew, p. 482, who translates alium apostolum non vidi, sed vidi Jacobum; Bleek (in Studien und Kritiken for 1836 p. 1059), and, as to the inference drawn, also Meyer and Hilgenfeld ad Gal. i. 19.

⁵ This subject is fully discussed in the author's book on James.

not have commended his mother to the care of John if she had other sons (John xix. 26, 27). "But why," we may ask, with Andrews,¹ "if James and Judas were apostles and his cousins, sons of her sister, and long inmates of her family, and it was a question of kinship, did he not commend her to their care?" The difficulty, then, remains, and must be solved on other grounds. The brothers of Jesus at that time, as appears from John vii., were not yet full believers in Christ, although they must have been converted soon after the resurrection (Acts i. 14). Moreover John was the most intimate bosom friend of the Saviour, who could better sympathize with Mary and comfort her in this peculiar trial than any human being. If the modern interpretation of John xix. 25 be correct, as it probably is, Salome (not Mary, wife of Clopas) was a sister of Christ's mother, consequently John his cousin. But we would not urge this as an additional reason of the commendation, which must be based on a deeper spiritual affinity and sympathy.

(d.) The fourth objection is religious and dogmatical, arising from the pious or superstitious belief in the perpetual virginity of Mary, and the apparent impropriety of the birth of any later descendants of the house of David after the birth of the Messiah. The perpetual virginity of the mother of our Saviour is an article of faith in the Greek and Roman church; it is taught also in a few of the older Protestant symbols,² and held to this day by many evangelical divines. Bishop Pearson says that the church of God in all ages has maintained that Mary continued in the same virginity.³ Olshausen takes the same view, and Lange, though the latter only as far as offspring is concerned. Dr. Jos. Addison Alexander, a Presbyterian, who will not be accused of

¹ The Life of our Lord upon the Earth, p. 115.

² The Articles of Smalkald, Pars I. Art. IV. (p. 303, ed. Hase): *Et Maria pura, sancta, semper virgine*. The Form of Concord, p. 767: *Unde et vere Θεοτόκος, Dei genetrix est, et tamen virgo mansit*. Even Zwingli shared in this view, Commentary in Matthew i. 18, 25, and the Helvetic Confession speaks of Jesus as *natus et Maria semper virgine*.

³ Exposition of the Creed, Art. III.

any sympathy with Romanism, says, with apparent approbation: "Multitudes of Protestant divines and others, independently of all creeds and confessions, have believed, or rather felt, that the selection of a woman to be the mother of the Lord, carries with it, as a necessary implication, that no others could sustain the same relation to her; and that the selection of a virgin still more necessarily implied that she was to continue so; for if there be nothing in the birth of younger children inconsistent with her maternal relation to the Saviour, why should there be any such repugnance in the birth of older children likewise? The same feeling which revolts from one hypothesis in some, revolts from both hypotheses in both."¹

A doctrine or feeling so old and widely spread must be treated with proper regard and delicacy. But it should be observed:

In the first place, that these doctrinal objections hold only against the view that the brothers of Christ were younger children of Mary, not against the other alternative left, that they were older children of Joseph by a former marriage.

Secondly, the virginity of Mary can be made an article of faith only as far as it is connected with the mystery of the supernatural conception and the absolute freedom of Christ from hereditary as well as actual sin. But neither his, nor her honor require the *perpetual* virginity after his birth, unless there be something impure and unholy in the marriage relation itself. The latter we cannot admit, since God instituted marriage in the state of innocence in paradise, and Paul compares it to the most sacred relation existing — the union of Christ with his church.

Thirdly, the apostles and evangelists, who are certainly much safer guides in all matters of faith and religious

¹ Commentary on Matthew xiii. 56, pp. 383 and 384, and in the same language, Commentary on Mark vi. 3. Dr. Alexander does not decide one way or the other (though leaning to the cousin-theory), and thinks that the difference of taste and sensibility on this subject is likely to continue to affect the interpretation until the question has received some new and unequivocal solution.

feeling than even Fathers and reformers, seem to have had no such feeling of repugnance to a real marriage between Joseph and Mary, since they not only frequently mention brothers and sisters of Christ, without any intimation of an unusual or indefinite sense of the word, but Matthew and Luke (ii. 7) call Christ the first-born son of Mary, and Matthew moreover says (i. 25), that Joseph knew not Mary, i. e. did not cohabit with her as man and wife, till she had brought forth her first-born son. We admit that neither *πρωτότοκος* nor *ἕως* are conclusive in favor of subsequent cohabitation and offspring, but they naturally look that way, especially in a retrospective historical narrative, and in connection with the subsequent frequent mention of brothers and sisters of Christ by the same writers. At all events, we are warranted to say that those terms could not have been used by the evangelists if they had regarded legitimate cohabitation as essentially profane, or in any way degrading to Joseph and his mother. The Old Testament, it is well known, nowhere sustains the ascetic Romish views on the superior merits of celibacy and represents children as the greatest blessing, and sterility as a curse or misfortune.

Finally, it may be regarded as another proof of the true and full humanity and the condescending love of our Saviour, if he shared the common trials of family life in all its forms, and moved, a brother among brothers and sisters, that "he might be touched with a feeling of our infirmities." This last consideration, however, has its full weight if we adopt Dr. Lange's modification of the cousin-hypothesis, viz. the formal adoption of Christ's cousins into the holy family.

9. It remains to be seen whether the cousin-theory is more free from difficulties. This theory is very old and goes back, not only to Jerome, as is generally stated, but even to Papias, at the beginning of the second century,¹ probably also

¹ In a remarkable fragment on the four Marys (ap Routh, *Reliquiae Sacrae et Cod. MSS. 2397*): 1. *Maria*, mater Domini. 2. *Maria*, Cleophae sive Alphaei uxor, quae fuit mater Jacobi Episcopi et Apostoli, et Simonis, et Thadei [Judae Jacobi], et cujusdam Joseph. 3. *Maria* Salome, uxor Zebedei, mater Joannis

to Hegesippus, although this may be disputed, and has the authority of the whole Latin church, and the older Protestant divines, who, however, paid very little attention to this question.¹ But this theory did not obtain credit and currency without an undue weight of dogmatical considerations connected with the perpetual virginity of Mary and the superior sanctity of celibacy (as is very evident from Jerome's work against Helvidius). It has, moreover, to contend with all the facts presented under Nos. 1–7, which are as many arguments against it. And finally it has to call to its aid two assumptions, which are at least very doubtful, and give the theory an intricate and complicated character. These assumptions are:

(a.) That Mary, the mother of James and Joses (Matt. xxvii. 56; Mark xv. 40), was a sister of the virgin Mary, and that consequently her children were cousins of Jesus. But who ever heard of two sisters bearing the same name without any additional one by which to distinguish them? Then, the only passage on which the alleged relationship of the two Marys is based (John xix. 25), admits of a different and more probable explanation, by which the term "his mother's sister" is applied to Salome,² who stood certainly under the cross (see Matt. xxvii. 56; Mark xv. 40), and could not well be passed by in silence by her own son, John; while he with his accustomed modesty and delicacy omitted her name, and intimated her presence by bringing out her relation to Mary.

(b.) That Clopas, or Cleophas, the husband of Mary, the

evangelistae et Jacobi. 4. *Maria Magdalena*. But Papias omits one, *Mary of Bethany*, and is well known to have been somewhat weak-minded, superstitious, and confused; although in a mere matter of fact his testimony may, nevertheless, be very valuable.

¹ Calvin, for instance, regards the question as one of idle curiosity, in Matthew i. 25: *Certe nemo unquam hac de re questionem movebit nisi curiosus; nemo vero pertinaciter insistet nisi contentiosus rixator.*

² This explanation was first clearly brought out by Wieseler (in the *Studien und Kritiker* for 1840, p. 648 seq.), and adopted by Meyer, Lange, and Alford. But the old Syriac Version already implied this interpretation by inserting a *καί*

supposed sister of the virgin Mary, is the same with Alphaeus, the father of James, the younger apostle of that name, who is called Ἰάκωβος ὁ τοῦ Ἀλφαίου (Matt. x. 3; Mark ii. 14, iii. 18; Luke vi. 15; Acts i. 13). But this, though not improbable, and supported by the testimony of Papias, is at least not certain. Besides, Matthew (or Levi) was also a son of Alphaeus (Mark ii. 14), and if Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου and Simeon, two of the twelve, were likewise among the brothers of Christ, we should have four apostles, of whom it is said in John vii. that they did not believe. Finally, Mary, it should be remembered, is called the mother of James and Joses only, but never the mother of Simon and Jude, the other two brothers of Jesus, and both of them supposed to have been apostles, which Joses was not. It is nowhere intimated that he had more sons than two, or any daughters at all, and even from her two sons, one Joses must be exempt from being a namesake, since *Joseph*, and not *Joses*, according to the correct reading (Matt. xiii. 55), is the second brother of Christ.

Dr. Lange, it is true, avoids some of these difficulties by giving up the sisterhood of the two Marys, and assuming in its place the brotherhood of Clopas, or Alphaeus, and Joseph¹ as the basis for the cousinship of their sons, and calling to his aid the additional hypothesis of the early death of Alphaeus, and the adoption of his children into the holy family; but all this without a shadow of exegetical proof. The absence of all allusion in the Evangelists to Mary, the real and still living mother of these children, when they are collectively mentioned, is a surprising fact, which speaks as strongly against Lange's hypothesis as against the older and usual form of the cousin-theory.

10. We conclude, therefore, that the strict grammatical

before *Μαρία*, and translating: "And there were standing near the cross of Jesus, his mother, and his mother's sister [Salome], and Mary of Cleóphas, and Mary Magdalene."

¹ Hegesippus, in Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. III. 11, compare IV. 22, asserts that Clopas was the brother of Joseph, but it does not appear whether he uses the term "brother" strictly, or for brother-in-law.

explanation of the term *brothers* and *sisters* of Christ, though not without difficulties, is still far more easy and natural than the explanation which makes them mere cousins.

But from the exegetical data of the New Testament we are still at liberty to choose between two views:

(a.) The brothers of Jesus were *younger children of Joseph and Mary*, and hence his *uterine* brothers, though, in fact, only half brothers, since he had no human father, and was conceived by the Holy Spirit overshadowing the blessed virgin. This view may be supported by the *ἔως* and the *πρωτότοκος* in Matt. i. 25, and Luke ii. 7, and has been adopted by Tertullian, Helvidius, and many modern Protestant commentators of Germany, as Herder, Neander, Winer, Meyer, Wieseler, Rothe, Stier, and a few English divines, Alford (on Matt. xiii. 55), F. W. Farrar (in W. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, Vol. I. p. 23), and, though not decidedly, by Andrews (Life of our Lord, p. 114). This view of the case is the most natural, and would probably be taken by a majority of commentators, if it were not for the scruples arising from the long and cherished doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary. Once clearly and fully established on the testimony of scripture and history, this theory would give a powerful polemical weapon into the hands of Protestants, and destroy by one fatal blow one of the strongest pillars of Romish Mariology and Mariolatry, and the ascetic overestimate of the state of celibacy. But the case is by no means so clear, at the present state of the controversy, that we can avail ourselves of this advantage; and Protestants themselves, as already remarked, differ in their views or feelings or tastes concerning the perpetual virginity of Mary.

(b.) The brothers of Jesus were *older sons of Joseph* from a *former* marriage, and thus, in the eyes of the law and before the world, though not by blood, brothers and sisters of Christ. This view has the doctrinal advantage of leaving the perpetual virginity of Mary untouched. It seems, moreover, to have been the oldest, and was held not only among

the Ebionites and in the pseudo-apostolical constitutions, but by several earlier Fathers, as Origin, Eusebius (who calls James of Jerusalem a "son of Joseph," but nowhere of Mary), Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, Epiphanius, who even mentions the supposed order of births of the four sons and two daughters, Hilary, Ambrose, etc. It is equally consistent with the scripture data on the subject as the other alternative, and in some respects even more so. For it agrees better with the apparent difference of age between Joseph (who early disappears in the gospel history) and Mary, and especially with the patronizing and presumptuous air of the brothers of Christ, when they sought an interview with him at a particular crisis (Matt. xii. 46), and when they boldly dared to suggest to him a more expeditious and ostentatious Messianic policy (John vii. 3-10). This is at least more readily explained if they were older according to the flesh; while on the other theory some of them must have been almost too young to figure so prominently in the gospel history. It is true, they are nowhere called *sons of Joseph*;¹ but neither are they called *sons of Mary*. The reason in both cases must be found in the fact that Christ is the great central figure in the Gospels, round which all others move.

¹ See the quotations in the author's book on James, p. 80 seq. Chrysostom may also be included in this class; at least he clearly separates the brothers of Christ from the apostles, for the reason that they were for a long time unbelievers (Hom. v. in Matthew).

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

ALGER'S HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE.¹

WE have perused this closely-printed, well-studied volume with mingled emotions of admiration and sadness — admiration for the labor, the learning, the rhetorical talent, the eloquence here displayed; and sadness at the earnestness with which all have been prostituted, for the purpose of setting aside the revelation of God, and quenching the only light which can possibly guide us in our inquiries respecting the future world.

Mr. Alger divides his work into five parts. In the first, he presents the different theories which have been held as to the origin of the soul, and as to death; also the grounds of our belief in a future state, and theories respecting the soul's destination. In the second and third parts he sets forth the opinions which were entertained among various ancient nations, and by the writers of the Old and New Testaments, as to the state of the dead. Part fourth contains the views of the early Christian Fathers, and later Christians on the same subject. Part fifth is made up of historical and critical dissertations on a variety of connected topics: such as the transmigration of souls, the resurrection of the body, the doctrine of future punishment, the recognition of friends in the future life, etc.

In the second and third parts, which will naturally attract the chief attention, Mr. Alger presents the mythologies of the Druids, the Scandinavians, the Tuscans, the Egyptians, the Brahmans, the Persians, the Greeks and Romans, and the Mohammedans, respecting the future life; also the mythologies of the Hebrews and of the apostles on the same subject; for *their* views are equally mythological as those of the heathen.

The ancient Hebrews believed that departed souls went at once into *לְאֵלִים*, the under-world, where the righteous and the wicked dwelt together, and, for aught they knew, were to dwell forever. They had no prospect or hope of deliverance. Later down in the Hebrew state, the scribes learned from Zoroaster and the Persians that the under-world was divided into two compartments, the higher and the lower, the better and the worse; the former to be the abode of the righteous, and the latter of the wicked. These views, which generally prevailed among the Jews in the time of Christ, were accepted and inculcated by the apostles and primitive Christians; with the additional idea, that the soul of Christ, at his death, went into the under-world, and proclaimed deliverance to "the spirits in prison;" a deliverance to be accomplished at the second appearing of Christ, which

¹ A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life; with a complete Bibliography of the Subject. By William Rounseville Alger. Philadelphia: George W. Childs. 1864.

they expected in a very little time. The spirits of the departed are then to come forth and meet the living at the judgment seat, where all will have an impartial trial; from which the righteous will be received up into heaven, a place located somewhere in the sky, beyond the shining expanse above us, and the region of the stars; while the wicked will be remanded to their Tartarean prison, to be confined there forever. Such was the *mythology* of the apostles and primitive Christians respecting the state and prospects of the dead; and, what is more, Christ himself inculcated the same views; although Mr. Alger charitably thinks that he knew better, and that his language may be so spiritualized, so divested of its oriental cast and imagery, as to teach the true doctrine. Further down in the history of the Christian church, when the coming of Christ had been long delayed, the received mythology was somewhat changed. The martyrs and more eminent saints, when they died, were received at once to heaven; while the under-world became a purgatory, from which there were various methods of deliverance.

The views here presented show what must have been the theory of the apostles and early Christians as to the doctrine of redemption by Christ. It was not what the Unitarians represent, viz. that of a mere *moral, recovering influence*. This by no means comes up to the language of the sacred writers. Neither was it what the orthodox represent—an *expiation*, an *atonement*, on the ground of which pardon could be extended to transgressors. But it consisted in Christ's going into the under-world, and proclaiming deliverance to the prisoners there; and in his bringing them forth to judgment, and receiving his approved people to mansions in the skies.

Some of Mr. Alger's readers may have supposed that this was his own view as to the work of salvation by Christ, and that he had really made an advance upon the commonly received doctrine of the Unitarians. But it is not so. Mr. Alger no more accepts what he sets forth as the doctrine of the apostles on this subject, than he does the extremest doctrine of the orthodox. It is all mythology with him; and what he has written is but a history of the Christian myths.

Will it be asked, then, what does Mr. Alger believe? He has given us his creed in plain terms; and it is the merest naturalism in the world; far short of the platform of Lord Herbert, and most of the old English infidels. The good will be happy in the future world, simply because they are good; and the wicked will be unhappy for like reason, though not forever. The doctrine of endless misery, though taught by Plato, and by our author's favorite prophet Swedenborg, he of all things most abominates. "A hell of fire and brimstone," to use his own elegant language, "is the great raw-head and bloody-bones in the superstition of the world."

Respecting the proper resurrection of Christ, Mr. Alger is not so explicit as on some other points. That he appeared in spirit to his disciples on and after the third day, he has no doubt; but that his dead body was raised to life he does not believe. "We maintain," says he, "that the essential fact in this historic act is not the resurrection of the dead body, but the celestial

reception of the deathless spirit." What became of the dead body he does not say; nor does he attempt to explain what Christ said to his doubting disciples: "Handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have" (Luke xxiv. 39).

Mr. Alger discards from his theology almost every doctrine that is peculiar to Christianity: the inspiration and truth of the scriptures; the divinity and atonement of Christ; the fall and ruin of man; his need of regeneration and justification; the resurrection of the body, and a general judgment. Indeed, he avows himself a *rationalist*; and says, that "this position is, in logical necessity, and, as a general thing, in fact, that of the large though loosely-cohering body of believers, known as Liberal Christians." Whether "Liberal Christians" will thank him for this avowal remains to be seen. He has no doubt that the whole world is yet to subside into Rationalism, and find its millennium there.

What are known as the doctrines of evangelical religion, Mr. Alger treats always with unfairness, and often with the greatest rudeness. He perverts them, frequently caricatures them, and turns them into ridicule; and then seems to fancy that he has demolished them forever. And yet, for some reason, they continue to live, and constitute the endeared faith of a vast majority of the Protestant Christian world.

The use which is made, in the volume before us, of the doctrine of an intermediate place, the under-world, the abode of the departed immediately after death, leads us to say a few words, in closing, on that particular topic. Mr. Alger represents it as the doctrine of the Bible — the Old Testament and the New — that there is such a place, into which the souls of all men, the good and the bad, descend at death, awaiting a deliverance in the final resurrection. To be sure, he has no faith in the doctrine himself. It is to him a myth; and on this point we fully agree with him. But we entirely disagree as to the fact that the sacred writers teach any such doctrine. Primarily, the *hevel* of the Old Testament signifies the grave, and is so rendered in many scriptures: "Ye shall bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave" (Gen. xlii. 38). "The Lord killeth, and he maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up" (1 Sam. ii. 6). David charged Solomon concerning Joab: "Thou shalt not let his hoary head go down to the grave in peace" (1 Kings ii. 6). Job says: "Oh that thou wouldst hide me in the grave!" "If I wait, the grave is my house." "They shall go down to the bars of the grave, when our rest together is in the dust" (Job xiv. 13, xvii. 13, 16). Such is the primary use of the word in question, as it occurs in the Old Testament. But as the grave is regarded by most persons, and was especially so by the ancients, with awe and dread, as being the realm of gloom and darkness, so the word denoting it soon came to be applied to that more dark and miserable world which is to be the abode of the wicked forever. Numerous passages to this effect may be quoted from the Old Testament. "A fire is kindled in mine anger, which shall burn to the lowest hell" (Deut. xxxii. 22). "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art

there" (Ps. cxxxix. 8). "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God" (Ps. ix. 17). The hell here spoken of certainly is not the grave, nor any other place, in this world or the next, into which the righteous go. It is the place prepared for the future abode of the wicked, and for them exclusively. In other words, it is *hell*. And so in the following passages: "Thou shalt beat him," the unruly child, "with a rod, and shalt deliver his soul from hell"; not from the grave certainly, nor from the future abode of the righteous, but from *hell* (Prov. xxiii. 14).

In the New Testament, *ᾗδης* is used much as *הַאֵשׁ* is in the Old, except that in a less proportion of cases it signifies the grave. Still, there are instances in which the word is used in this sense; as "O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory!" In general, however, the *ᾗδης* of the New Testament is no other than the world of future misery. "Thou Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell" (Matt. xi. 23). "On this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi. 18). In hell, the rich man "lifted up his eyes, being in torment" (Luke xvi. 23).

Neither *הַאֵשׁ* nor *ᾗδης* is ever used in scripture to signify the abode of the spirits of the just. In opposition to this statement, a single passage is referred to. David says: "Thou wilt not leave my soul¹ in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption" (Ps. xvi. 10). The apostle Peter, having quoted this passage and applied it to Christ, goes on to assure us that David here "spoke of the resurrection of Christ, that his soul was not left in hell, neither did his flesh see corruption" (Acts ii. 31). We have then, in this verse, a poetical prediction of the resurrection of Christ from the tomb, and of nothing else. The prediction is expressed after the usual manner of the Hebrews, in a parallelism, the plain import of which is, that Christ should be raised from the dead, and raised speedily. His life was not to be left in the grave; his flesh was not to see corruption. The original words in this passage properly signify the grave, and not the world of future spirits. In this interpretation, we are sustained by eminent critics, some of whom are advocates of the intermediate place.

As this passage is the only one on which the semblance of an argument can be founded that the words in question are ever used in the scriptures to denote the world of happy spirits; and since, properly interpreted, they have no such signification here; we are warranted in affirming that they have it nowhere. They signify the grave, the place of the dead body, and also the world of miserable spirits; but never the future abode of the righteous.

On the contrary, the scriptures represent the holy dead as going at once to *heaven*, and as dwelling with Christ in *heaven*. Thus, our Saviour said to the dying thief: "This day shalt thou be with me in *paradise*;" which, in the estimation of Paul, was but a synonyme of heaven—"the third heaven"

¹ The Hebrew word here translated soul, נַפְשׁ, properly signifies *breath, life, the vital principle*.

(see 2 Cor. xii. 2, 4). Stephen, too, just before his death, saw the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God." And he prayed and said: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit" (Acts vii. 56, 59). Who can believe that this prayer was rejected, and that Stephen, instead of being received up to heaven, was sent down to *ᾗδης*, to remain there till the judgment day?

The apostle Paul represents the whole church of God as being, at present, either in heaven or on earth. "Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named" (Eph. iii. 15). How is this representation to be reconciled with the idea that the greater part of God's redeemed family are now neither in heaven nor on earth, but in the dark and secluded prison of embodied souls? In several other passages of Paul's Epistles, the souls of believers are represented as being with Christ in heaven: "We know that, if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." (2 Cor. v. 1). "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ, which is far better" (Phil. i. 23). We are taught also in the Epistle to the Hebrews that in the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, there dwelt, not only God the Judge of all, and Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant, and an innumerable company of angels, but the spirits of just men made perfect (ch. xii. 21-24). And when the heavens were opened to the beloved John, he saw, in repeated instances, vast multitudes of these redeemed spirits, standing before the throne of God and the Lamb, and heard them singing a new song, which no beings in heaven could sing except themselves.¹

But we will not pursue the subject further. We regard the theory of an intermediate place, an under-world, into which both the righteous and the wicked descend at death, of which Mr. Alger has so much to say, and which some sounder divines have incautiously adopted, as one having no real foundation or countenance in the oracles of God. The doctrine is of heathen and not Christian origin; one better becoming a believer in the mythology of Greece and Rome, than a disciple of the Saviour. We regard it, too, as of dangerous influence. Should it be generally received by Christians, it would be followed in a few years, — if not by the infidelity of American and German Rationalists, — yet with prayers for the dead, with the doctrine of a future probation and restoration, and with all the superstitions of purgatory. This is the course which the error took in the ancient church, and there is every reason for supposing that it would take the same again. Let, then, the believers of God's truth beware — *obsta principis*.

By far the more important part of the volume before us is the bibliography with which it closes. This has been compiled, with immense labor and fidelity, by Mr. Abbot, and will be a great help to those who may be called to investigate the doctrine of a future life.

¹ See chapters v. 9, vi. 9, vii. 9, and xiv. 1-3.

DR. NAST'S COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPELS OF MATTHEW AND MARK.¹

This large and solidly-printed volume is from the pen of a gentleman, who, once a Tübingen student, a classmate of Strauss, and sharing his views, was, after his removal to this country, brought to a hearty reception of the gospel, not as a myth, but as it is in truth, the word of God; and who is now an eminent minister of the Methodist Episcopal church. The title-page of the volume accurately describes its plan and purpose. Though the author is a German, and a man of German learning, it is evident from the whole tone of his work that he is entirely free from an exaggerated estimate of the results of modern exegetical researches; at the same time he cannot but be sensible that the auxiliaries of biblical study accessible to the general Christian public, have, up to the present time, been for the most part founded on the comparatively scanty researches of a former generation, and adapted to the modes of thinking and aspects of controversy then prevailing. He has a just understanding of the great value of the mine of biblical learning opened since that period, especially in his native country, and recognizing the fact, which no one but the most conceited of Anglo-Saxons can deny, that in biblical science the English world has become secondary to the German, and that the most formidable attacks, upon the truths of the Christian records, as well as the ablest defences of them, are for the most part of German origin, he justly believes that the time has come to make accessible to the public at large the chief points of those rich results of devout learning which have hitherto been only sparingly shared even by the clergy of the United States. At the same time, he is very far from confining himself to the labors of German authors. He quotes very extensively from all the writers, English and American, who have won for themselves a good name in sacred literature. His aim, in short, is to communicate to the general reader the interpretation and vindication of the records of our faith in such a form as shall embrace all the results that have been secured in the past, and shall at the same time be adapted to the special necessities of the present. The work thus prepared has a very fair amount of intrinsic merit. The author is a man of competent learning, a sound judgment, a broad and liberal spirit, and a firm and living faith. The labors of such a man, if applied to such an end as that proposed by him, cannot but be profitable to his fellow Christians.

The plan of the work is one which evinces a self-denying humility in the author, who is content to postpone his own fame to the profit of his fellow believers. Instead of aiming to have his commentary homogeneous, by

¹ A Commentary on the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical; embodying, for popular use and edification, the results of German and English Exegetical Literature, and designed to meet the Difficulties of Modern Scepticism. With a General Introduction, treating of the Genuineness, Authenticity, Historic Verity, and Inspiration of the Gospel Records, and of the Harmony and Chronology of the Gospel History. By William Nast, D.D. 8vo. pp. 760. Cincinnati: Poe and Hitchcock. 1864.

making it of his own authorship, at least in form, throughout, Dr. Nast has been content to fill it, in large part, with copious extracts from all those authors, who, in his judgment, have given the essence of what is to be said on the various points, more perfectly than he himself could express it. His intention in this has been excellent, but we think the results less satisfactory than they might have been made. A collection of fragments, or a work largely interlaid with fragments, however excellent and pertinent they are in themselves, almost of necessity produces a jarring of mind, incompatible with a distinct or strong impression. A work to last must be homogeneous — the production of one mind. Unity of treatment with reasonable ability, such as Dr. Nast's own writings show, is a merit outweighing any superiority of ability in the separate works from which a cento of quotations is made up.

The original portions of the book, however, are less distinct and squarely cut, in style and thought, than we could wish to see them. There is a diffuseness hanging over it, which makes it fatiguing to read. This diffuseness, however, is perhaps not so great a defect for popular readers as for students. In one particular, nevertheless, the author has been brief where it would have been well for him to be extended. In his preliminary treatise on the genuineness of the Gospels, he refers to the various testimonies, direct and indirect, of ancient writers to the early existence and authority of our present canonical books. He refers to these testimonies, however, in terms so vague and general that they are less valuable than they might have been. Had he quoted these various passages in full, so that his readers could examine and judge for themselves, he would have rendered a very great service to the thinking men and women of the laity. With this exception, however, the preliminary treatise is quite a clear and comprehensive presentation of the evidence for the genuineness and authenticity of our present canon. The commentary, on the whole, is clear, full, candid, and devout, and will be extensively serviceable to American Christians. The author proposes to devote the remainder of his life to the continuation of the work on the same principles.

JEHOVAH, THE REDEEMER GOD.¹

This work is an enlargement of a former Article by the author, which appeared in the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, January, 1854, under the title of the Antediluvian Theocracy. Its distinguishing position in regard to the origin and import of the divine name "Jehovah" is the same that was subsequently maintained by Mr. Alexander McWhorter in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, in an Article which appeared in January, 1857, entitled, *Jehovah considered as a Memorial Name*, and in a volume entitled, *Yahveh Christ*, or *the Memorial Name*; in respect to both of which productions the author

¹ *Jehovah, the Redeemer God: the Scriptural Interpretation of the Divine Name, Jehovah.* By Thomas Tyler, B.A., London. יהוה גאל ישראל קדושו, Isa. xlix. 7. 12mo. pp. viii and 71. London: Ward and Co. 1861.

of the volume now under consideration complains that Mr. McWhorter has reproduced his view in a modified form, but with the omission of an acknowledgment of the source whence the ideas on which they were based were derived.

Both Mr. Tyler, the author of the present volume, and Mr. McWhorter after him, agree in rejecting the common interpretation of the divine name — *He is*, or, *He that is* — and in maintaining that its true signification is, *He who will be*. They both, moreover, ascribe its origin to our first parents, who, as they suppose, used it of the promised seed that should bruise the serpent's head; so that, upon the birth of Cain, Eve, supposing that she had received the fulfilment of the promise, exclaimed: "I possess a man, even Jehovah"; that is, the promised seed, known by us under the name of *Him who shall be*.

On the above view we remark:

First, that it necessarily implies the existence of the word יְהוָה (Yahve or Yahave, according to the pronunciation now generally assumed) as a proper name previously to the declaration of Eve now under consideration. By no possibility could she have said, consistently with the laws of Hebrew syntax: קָנִיתִי אִישׁ אֶת־יְהוָה, *I have gotten a man, even him who shall be*, if יְהוָה be regarded as simply the future tense of the old verb יָהָה. To express the idea intelligibly, the Hebrew must then have run either thus: קָנִיתִי אִישׁ יְהוָה, or elliptically: קָנִיתִי אִישׁ יְהוָה. The introduction of אֶת without אִישׁ marks יְהוָה as a noun; that is, if אֶת be taken as the sign of the accusative and not (as we prefer) as a preposition (= *apud*, *with*, *with the help of*).¹

Secondly, upon the supposition that the word "Jehovah" (יְהוָה) was used as a proper name by our first parents, before the birth of Cain, in the sense claimed, *He who shall be*, then, as Eve here employed it, it must have had exclusive reference to the promised seed, through whom redemption was to come. And since there is not the least intimation that it has in this passage a different meaning from that which elsewhere prevails in the Pentateuch, we come of necessity to the conclusion that it had originally a Messianic reference, being, in fact, equivalent to the well-known Jewish designation of the Messiah, as *He who is to come* (הַבָּא). This is, indeed, the position distinctly assumed by Mr. McWhorter. He explains the words of God to Moses, Ex. iii. 15, as follows: "Thus shalt thou say unto Israel's children, YAHVEH, He who will be, the Coming One, God of your Fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob hath sent me unto you. This is my name forever, and this is my memorial unto all all generations."² Here he expressly makes Yahveh (Jehovah) equivalent to "the Coming One"; a name which is appropriate to the Messiah only. But this is utterly inconsistent with the Old Testament usage of the word "Jehovah," which distinguishes it from the Messiah in passages where both

¹ As the Greeks use σύν and μετά — σύν θεῷ, μετ' Ἀδελφότητος.

² Bib. Sacra, Jan. 1857, p. 110.

Jehovah and the Messiah are spoken of, as is shown in the Article entitled *The Angel of Jehovah*, which appeared in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October 1859. In the fourteenth chapter of the volume now before us, Mr. Tyler frankly admits, in view of several pertinent passages quoted by him, that "Jehovah is not the Old Testament name of the Messiah," claiming that it rather "designates God as *The Redeemer*."³ We should rather say that it is the covenant-name of God, by which he pledges himself to give redemption to his people through the Messiah. But not to insist on this distinction, it seems to us that the above concession of Mr. Tyler virtually abolishes the whole fabric of argument built on the assumption of the original future significance of the word Jehovah (יהוה).

With regard to the origin of the word "Jehovah," we are inclined to the view that it existed from the earliest times; though it was not till the period of the exodus that God assumed it as his special covenant-name, as recorded by Moses (Ex. iii. 13 - 16, vi. 2 - 9). Its prior existence is clearly implied in the words: "by my name Jehovah"; that is by the name "Jehovah" which already belongs to me. But its peculiar force dated its origin from the time when God solemnly assumed it as his covenant title, in connection with the declaration: "This is my name forever, and this is my memorial unto all generations."

As to its primitive significance, we adhere to the old view, that it means *He is*, or in the first person, *I am*; the future being used, as often in Hebrew, to express a permanent state without reference to time. Thus we readily explain the words of God to Moses: אֲנִי יְהוָה אֲנִי, *I am who am* (*Ego sum qui sum*, as the vulgate has it); that is, in accordance with the English idiom: *I am he who is*, precisely as the Septuagint renders: ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν. If we may assume that God gave to himself the name "Jehovah" at the time when he created our first parents, "and called their name Adam" (Gen. v. 2), then we must understand it in the widest sense, as signifying that he who bears the name *He is* or *I am* has in himself all fulness of being — self-existence, eternity, and infinity included; in a word, as signifying all that God is by virtue of his own nature. Surely such a name was most appropriate as the covenant-title of the God of Israel.

It is true that some difficulties respecting the use of the divine names in the Pentateuch remain unsolved. Hengstenberg's attempt to show that Moses always employed the words אֱלֹהִים, *God*, and יְהוָה, *Jehovah*, with a conscious apprehension of their difference and choice between the two, must be regarded as a failure. The documentary hypothesis, which assumes that Moses, in the composition of the book of Genesis, employed older documents, that varied in their usage of the divine names, explains some difficulties, but not all. Here, as in many other cases, we must reverently wait for more light.

¹ Page 62.

CHRIST THE LORD.¹

This is by the author of "Jehovah, the Redeemer God," just noticed, and is an interesting description of the names applied in the New Testament to our Saviour, especially of the name *κύριος*, *Lord*, or *ὁ κύριος*, *the Lord*. The fundamental position of the author is that this is "the fulfilment of the prophetic name 'Jehovah.'" Had he succeeded in establishing the grand position of the first volume, "that the Divine name 'Jehovah' has the signification, *He who shall be*"; that it "was a prophecy seeking its fulfilment and realization in 'him that should come,' and in the kingdom which he should establish,"² then, since *κύριος* is the word used in the New Testament for Jehovah of the Old Testament, his work would have been accomplished. But he himself admits, in the sixteenth chapter of the above-named first volume, that Jehovah is not the Old Testament name of the Messiah, which, as we contend, it must have been, if its proper significance was, *He who shall be*, or *He that shall come*. That it was prophetic of redemption by Christ we admit. For it was the *covenant name* of the God of Israel; and the sum of the covenant is Christ's redemption. But it did not itself specially designate the person of the Messiah, like the Jewish term *מָשִׁיחַ*, *he who is to come*. Consequently *κύριος* in the New Testament, as applied to our Lord, does not specially answer to Jehovah of the Old Testament.

It is indeed true that in many passages of the New Testament what is spoken of Jehovah in the Old Testament is applied to Christ directly or indirectly, and thus he is identified with the God of Israel, as is abundantly shown in the volume now under consideration. But in other passages the Lord (*κύριος*) of the Old Testament is distinguished from the Son, as, for example: "The Spirit of the Lord (Heb. *רוּחַ יְהוָה*, *the Lord Jehovah*) is upon me, because he hath anointed me,"³ etc. In a word, *κύριος* is used in the New Testament (1) of God in his simple unity, without reference to the distinction of persons, according to the common use of Jehovah in the Old Testament; (2) of the Father, in distinction from the Son, as in the passage just quoted; (3) of our Lord Jesus Christ, as "the Lord of glory," the God-man, whom all men are to honor as they honor the Father.

KALISCH'S HEBREW GRAMMAR WITH EXERCISES.⁴

This is a work of ripe learning, and will be hailed with pleasure by Hebrew scholars. Its two chief peculiarities are the following:

¹ Christ the Lord, the Revealer of God, and the Fulfilment of the Prophetic Name "Jehovah." With a Reply to Bishop Colenso on the Name "Jehovah." By Thomas Tyler, B.A., Author of "Jehovah, the Redeemer God." ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΚΥΡΙΟΣ, Luke ii. 11. 12mo. pp. xxx and 160. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.; Edinburgh: T. Menzies. 1863.

² Page 2.

³ Luke iv. 18.

⁴ A Hebrew Grammar, with Exercises. By M. M. Kalisch, Ph.D., M.A. In two parts: Part I. The Outlines of the Language, with Exercises; being a Practical Introduction to the Study of Hebrew. Part II. The Exceptional Forms

First, it has for its first part a system of Hebrew exercises interwoven with its sections throughout, making it at once a grammar and a chrestomathy. Such a system (either arranged by itself, with continual references to the sections of the grammar, or interspersed, as here, among the sections) is essential to any grammar that is designed for use in the class-room. The exercises in this grammar are very copious, and must essentially contribute to the thoroughness and accuracy of the student who shall faithfully use them.

Secondly, this grammar is arranged in two volumes, each containing a separate course. The first is designed to contain "all that is necessary in order to acquire the broad outlines of the language," but no more, that "an abundance of detail may not impede the first and most difficult steps of the beginner." The second part "completes and fills up the outlines drawn in the first. It embodies the exceptional forms and constructions, points out their divergence from the fundamental rules or principles, and endeavors to explain the nature of their anomalies." We have no doubt that in the hands of the author this double arrangement will work well. Every good teacher succeeds in carrying out his own system. We are not sure, however, but that most teachers would prefer the plan of a double text—a coarser, containing, for substance, what the author has thrown into his first volume; and a finer, "to complete and fill up the outlines," where the exceptional forms and constructions should be found and explained. Such a plan would have the advantage of keeping in convenient proximity the regular forms and constructions and the anomalous deviations from them. With regard to the syntax, the author admits that, from its close internal connection as one whole, he has been obliged to put it "in an almost complete connection" into the first volume. We think that, for the same reason, the regular and so-called irregular verbs ought to be treated in immediate connection.

It is with great delight that the thorough Hebrew teacher or student will refer to the full lists of anomalies contained in the second volume. There, for example, he will find all the verbs middle-doubled which contain irregularities arranged together, with the anomalous forms given under each. And so in respect to other things.

TESTIMONY OF THE HEATHEN TO THE TRUTHS OF HOLY WRIT.¹

Whatever may be the explanation of the fact, there are unquestionably striking resemblances between many truths and turns of thought in the

and Constructions; preceded by an Essay on the History of Hebrew Grammar. 8vo. pp. xv and 374, and xvi and 324. London: Longman, Green, Roberts, and Green. 1862 and 1863.

¹ Testimony of the Heathen to the Truths of Holy Writ: a Commentary on the Old and New Testaments; compiled almost exclusively from the Greek and Latin Authors of the Classical Ages of Antiquity. By Rev. Thomas S. Millington, Incumbent of Woodhouse Eaves. 8vo. pp. xxxi and 648. London: Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday. 1863.

Bible and those found in the classical writers of antiquity. Whether this agreement and parallelism is owing to traditional knowledge derived from the Bible, or is entirely independent of the scriptures, being the result of reflection, the truth in the case is not altered. Some of the agreement is doubtless to be traced to the fact that many of the classical writers lived at the same age as the writers of the Bible, and that at a given period similar customs, views, and modes of thought prevail.

The present work is designed to illustrate the Bible by parallel thoughts or expressions taken from the best classical writers. The author begins with the books in their order in the English Bible, and where a particular verse, or several verses, are illustrated by any parallel expression in the classics, he places it under the verse or verses to be illustrated. In this way the work becomes a kind of commentary on the scriptures by the classical writers. Much that is found in these writers not only confirms the truth of sacred history, but throws light upon many things which would otherwise, from our ignorance of the manners and customs of the times, be involved in obscurity. Classical literature, too, explains many allusions in the Bible, and enables us to enter more fully into the feelings, thoughts, and motives by which the men of the scripture period were influenced.

The size of the volume might have been considerably reduced by applying a more severe test to the illustrative passages. Many of these have no special pertinence, and should have been rejected. The work would have been more valuable, too, if the author had made himself familiar with the investigations of more recent writers, especially those of Germany. But the work as it is, is one of interest, and will afford important aid to the student of the Bible.

GENTILE AND JEW IN THE COURTS OF THE TEMPLE OF CHRIST.¹

The history of Christianity cannot be fully understood without a knowledge of the influences with which it has come in contact. "The religious systems, modes of thought and speculation, philosophy, life, and manners," of the different people to which it was communicated, would promote or hinder its diffusion. The Greek, Roman, Persian, Egyptian, and the Jew, from the diversity of their social and moral state, systems of philosophy, forms of government, and literature, looked upon the Christian religion when it was made known to them, from very different points of view; and they received it with more or less favor, or entirely rejected it, according to the influences under which they had been formed. To understand the history of Christianity, therefore, we must inquire into what soil its seeds were cast—"to what doctrines and systems of thought could it attach itself?

¹ The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ. An Introduction to the History of Christianity. From the German of John J. Dollinger, Professor of Ecclesiastical History to the University of Munich. By N. Darnell, M.A., late Fellow of New College, Oxford. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 489 and 437. London: Longman and Co. 1862.

what circumstances paved the way for it, and forwarded and facilitated its expansion? what obstacles, prejudices, and errors had it to overcome? what adversaries to encounter? what evils to remedy? how did Paganism react on Christianity?"¹ The solution of questions like these is the object of these volumes. The investigation is broad and deep, giving a view of Paganism previous to the time of the promulgation of Christianity, and also the attitude of the Jewish mind.

This work is, therefore, a broad survey of the Hellenic religious systems, those of Asia Minor, Middle Asia, and Africa; the religions of the West, — Etruria, Rome, Gaul, and Germany; the philosophy and literature of the Greeks and Romans, so far as they influenced the religious conduct of the people, and also of their social and moral state. It embraces likewise the historical development of Judaism, the moral and social condition of the Jews, their religious life, and their doctrines.

The work in all its parts indicates high scholarly attainments, and gives a more complete view of Paganism before the time of the Christian era than has yet been attempted, and is a valuable introduction to the history of Christianity.

MAN AND NATURE.²

This volume, which has been for some time before the public, and has been received, so far as we know, with unqualified favor, is marked, first, by honest and extensive research. Mr. Marsh has given the titles of more than three hundred volumes consulted in the preparation of it. Not a quarter of these are in the English language. The bulk of the works are French, German, Italian, Danish, and Swedish. These have evidently been carefully and thoroughly studied, their facts and opinions weighed, and their conclusions carefully stated. The book is marked, secondly, by a wide and critical observation. In all his extensive travels the distinguished author has been watchful of the phases of nature, not only in her annual and regular changes, but in those slower and more permanent transitions to which man has directly contributed, by which the facility and prosperity of states and nations have been advanced or essentially retarded. Every region of nature, the minute and the vast, seems to be brought under contribution. The trout brooks of New Hampshire, and the maple orchards of Vermont, the wild honey-bee of New England, and the universal grasshopper, tell their story, as well as the sands of the Arabian desert, the dikes of Holland, and the lofty peaks of the Alps. The book is crowded with facts and suggestions. As an illustration of the influence of a nicely critical and classical spirit acting upon a habit of observation, we may mention that Mr. Marsh incidentally suggests his belief that the exquisite phrase of the Greek poet, the now familiar *ποντίων κυμάτων ἀνηρίδμον γέλασμα* refers to

¹ Preface.

² Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as modified by Human Action. By George P. Marsh. New York: Charles Scribner.

the *audible*, not the *visible*, laugh of the wave, — the musical murmur, and not the sparkle of the sea.

Another characteristic of the book, is its independence and thorough honesty. The facts are not bent to a theory, but the conclusions are based upon the facts which support and illustrate them. The author does not write as a professed physicist, nor for scientific readers merely, but addresses himself "to the general intelligence of educated, observing, and scientific men." His object is, by practical suggestions, to help us to correct certain common errors and to save ourselves from some of the evils which carelessness and improvidence have brought upon other nations. The indiscriminate destruction of our forests, for example, although we are so young a people, has already begun to tell upon the fountains and streams in some parts of the country, as well as rapidly to exhaust the supply of wood and timber, which with a little protection would have been an unfailing source of wealth.

The work is divided into six chapters. In the first the author lays out his subject in general. He shows the deterioration of certain parts of the globe through the influence of man. He presents man as a destroyer — a wanton and reckless destroyer, and inquires into the causes of physical decay, and whether it may not be arrested. The second chapter treats of the influence of man upon animal and vegetable life. The third, fourth, and fifth, of the action of man as affecting the woods, the waters, and the lands. The concluding chapter is on the probable or possible geographical changes to be effected by man.

The whole volume abounds in suggestions — we may call them theological as well as economical — which are of great consequence, and we heartily wish the volume could be read and pondered by every thoughtful man in the country.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF DAVID COIT SCUDDER.¹

The subject of this memoir was endued with strong powers of mind, which gave promise of full and large development. The germs of a philosopher were in him, and the cause of science had much to hope from him. He had an honesty of heart which won the confidence of all who knew him. His piety was sound and healthful. His natural energy and firmness of will formed the basis for a vigorous and robust Christian character. He was an enterprising missionary, and bade fair to accomplish a far greater work on heathen soil than is ordinarily assigned to a single individual. He united the most amiable modesty with the most unselfish daring. His brief missionary career was distinguished by the multiplicity of his projects for advancing the cause of science and religion; by the force, steadfastness, and perseverance of his will in executing all that he had undertaken; by his

¹ *Life and Letters of David Coit Scudder, Missionary in Southern India.* By Horace E. Scudder. 12mo. pp. 402. New York: Hurd and Houghton; Boston: E. P. Dutton and Co.

zeal tempered with humility, and the diffidence that lay hidden under his high aims. His death seemed like a tragedy. It illustrated the truth, that infinite riches belong to God, and therefore he can dispense with any earthly ornaments of his earthly temple. The record of our young missionary's last labors and death, as it is given in the present volume (pp. 367 - 385), swells the heart with grief. The entire memoir is written in a style unusually natural and honest. It is truly a wholesome book. It forms a fitting monument alike of departed worth and of brotherly faithfulness. The Biography will be hailed with gratitude by those who have perused the essays of the young missionary in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. XVII. pp. 709 - 755, and Vol. XVIII. pp. 535 - 595, and 673 - 724. He had formed plans for communicating various elaborate essays to this periodical. That so many of his projects for earthly labor have been baffled by his sudden death is a deep mystery.

NEW MISSIONARY ATLAS.

Rev. R. Grundemann, Ph. D., has commenced the preparation of a Missionary Atlas, giving, in accurate special maps, the position of all missionary stations, and adding historical statements which will explain the present relations and prospects of the missions. Dr. Grundemann has a high reputation among the evangelical divines of Germany; and his competency for the important work which he has undertaken is fully attested by Dr. Hoffmann, Dr. Tholuck, and men of like reputation. He is to be addressed at *Frankfurt on the Oder*, Prussia.

He has prepared the following questions, to which he desires an answer from all the foreign missionary stations under English and American patronage. We trust that the friends of missions who read the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, will exert themselves to secure for Dr. Grundemann full reports of our own missionary stations.

A. *Geographical Questions*.—1. What is the name of the station, and of the country, province, and district in which it is situated? 2. Name of the capital of that country, province, and district, and its distance and direction from the station, as well as from some fixed and known points on the coast. 3. What other towns of religious, political, or commercial importance in the vicinity of the station?—Name; distance from station; direction; remarks. 4. What mountains near the station? Direction of the range? Names of their chief summits? Distance of each from the station? 5. What rivers near the station? Where do they rise? In what direction do they flow? Where do they empty? 6. What chief roads near the station? Where leading to?

B. *Ethnographical Questions*.—7. Name of the native tribe at the station (in singular and plural)? 8. To what other tribes is it related? 9. Population of the tribe, and boundary of its territory? 10. Form of government, and name of the present ruler, or rulers? 11. What was the original religion of the tribe? 12. Remarks on the past history of the tribe, and its present political and social condition.

C. *Philological Questions.*—13. What is the native language of the tribe? 14. Is it already a written language, and, if so, what alphabet is employed? 15. If the alphabet is not yet known through the medium of a good grammar, please write it out, and give the force of each letter by a corresponding letter of the "Standard Alphabet."¹ If the alphabet has never hitherto been reduced to writing at all, please represent the sounds in use, as far as possible, by means of the letters of the "Standard Alphabet." 16. If the literature of the language is modern and limited, an account of the various works, including titles, authors, and dates of publication, would be very acceptable. If, however, it is ancient and extensive, it will be sufficient to denote to what extent it is used at the station. 17. What grammar or grammars and lexicon exist of the language? If you know of any philologist who has made the language a special study, please give his address. 18. Should no grammar or dictionary of the language exist, please give the *numerals*, the *possessive pronouns*, and the words for *father*, *mother*, and such like.

D. *Missionary Questions.*—19. When, and by whom was the station founded? 20. Number, names, and functions of the laborers employed, both foreign and native? 21. How many people belong to the congregation—*a*. Adults: baptized—males, females; Communicants—males, females; *b*. Children? 22. What place or places of worship at the station? Do the missionaries preach in the native language, or employ an interpreter? 23. What schools for moral, intellectual, or industrial improvement at the station, and what is the language employed? 24. Number of scholars: Males, females; Names of the schools (*a*) (*b*) (*c*)? 25. Sums raised by the congregation for church and missionary purposes during the last year. 26. What out-stations have been established:—Name; distance; direction; number of laborers; number of converts—baptized, communicants; schools and number of scholars; remarks on the situation of the place? 27. Are there any regular preaching places near the station? 28. What missionary efforts are made by other societies in the vicinity of the station? Any information relating to such stations will be acceptable.

DWIGHT'S MODERN PHILOLOGY.¹

We noticed favorably the First Series of Dr. Dwight's Modern Philology in Vol. XVI. p. 887. The present volume treats of comparative phonology, and of comparative English etymology, or English etymology in its comparative elements and aspects, especially on its classical side.

The principles of phonology here presented have special reference to the Sanscrit, Greek, and Latin. This part of the work gives the more important results of the investigations into the changes in words of the same radical forms in these languages. The subject is one of great difficulty,

¹ Standard Alphabet for reducing unwritten Languages and Foreign Graphic Systems to a uniform Orthography in European Letters. By Prof. C. R. Lepsius.

² Modern Philology: its Discoveries, History, and Influences. By Benjamin W. Dwight. 2d Series. 8vo. pp. 554. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864.

requiring the most critical study of the great variety of causes, many of them extremely subtle, which have occasioned these changes. It starts the questions: why one people use the lips, tongue, nose, teeth, or throat in speech more than another; why vowel sounds preponderate in languages spoken in milder climates, and consonants in colder; why one nation prefers nasal sounds and another guttural; why one language, as the Latin, avoids aspirates, and another, as the Greek, shows a fondness for them. Some of the causes of the changes in the forms of words radically the same will be found to arise from substituting one movement of the organs of speech for another nearly related to it; others from the influences of climate, occupations, habits, and culture; and a very large part from mere laziness — an indolent people not being willing to make the effort necessary to sound certain letters.

Every student will find new interest in classical study by making himself familiar with the general laws of change in the forms of words, which are here so fully illustrated.

The study of English etymology, too, as here treated, is full of interest and profit; it will give a freshness and fulness to the meaning of many words, which before were comparatively tame. A large number of words were originally pictures of what they expressed; this pictorial power they will regain by proper etymological study.

In another edition Dr. Dwight will probably modify the treatment of some of these subjects; but generally they indicate extensive, thorough, and independent investigation. He has done a valuable service to philology in the preparation of these attractive volumes; and our countrymen are greatly indebted to him for presenting in so accessible a form the results of his long and faithful study.

We are glad to announce that Professor Thayer, of the Theological Seminary, Andover, is to prepare a New Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament. It is to be translated from the *Lexicon Graeco-Latinum* of Dr. L. W. Grimm, the first part of which appeared in 1862.

Dr. Grimm aims not only to exhibit the recent improvements in lexicography, as they are embodied in the Paris edition of Stephens's *Thesaurus*, and Rost's edition of Passow's *Dictionary*, but also to produce a Lexicon which shall correspond to the present condition of textual criticism, of exegesis, and of biblical theology. He notices all the readings found in the Elzevir edition of the Greek Testament, in Griesbach, Lachnam, and Tischendorf (ed. 7, minor, 1859). In his definitions he studies brevity, perspicuity, and strict observance of logical and historical arrangement. He takes proper notice of the use of terms in the Septuagint, and in the Apocrypha of the Old Testament; and, when referring to the usage of profane authors, he gives the age, or the class of writers, in which the word under consideration is found. In the opinion of eminent judges this work, when completed, will be by far the best Lexicon of the New Testament. Professor Thayer will introduce such changes and additions as will adapt it to the wants of American and English students.

ARTICLE X.

RECENT GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

BY CHARLES M. MEAD, M.A., BERLIN, GERMANY.

Die Synoptischen Evangelien — ihr Ursprung und geschichtlicher Charakter. By Prof. H. J. Holtzmann, of Heidelberg. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann. This is an octavo volume of 514 pages, devoted to the discussion of the vexing question: When and by whom were the synoptical Gospels written? The author gives first a history of the various theories on the subject, especially of the German investigations since Koppe, Storr and Michaelis first gave currency to the proposition that Mark's gospel was the original; from which sketch it appears that almost every possible hypothesis respecting the source, the mutual relation, and historical character of these three Gospels has found advocates. Undismayed however, Prof. Holtzmann attempts to solve the knotty problem. Rejecting, as hardly worth noticing, the view that the books in question were the original products of the alleged authors, writing independently of one another, on account of the minute resemblances, particularly in grammatical construction and forms; rejecting, however, quite as decidedly, on account of the striking discrepancies in the different narratives of the same events, the view that either of the three books was the original Gospel, on which alone the others were based, he advocates the hypothesis that, besides tradition, there were two primitive Gospels, from which the existing ones were compiled. One of these (designated by him A, or Urmarcus) is found, little changed, in Mark; the other (designated Δ , or Urmatthäus), together with the first was the source from which Matthew and Luke derived their information. Matthew used A more than Luke; Luke used Δ , especially the collection of Christ's discourses contained in it, more than Matthew. Matthew wrote just before the destruction of Jerusalem; Luke shortly after; so also probably Mark. As to the credibility of the Gospels, pre-eminence is to be assigned to Mark; next to him stands Matthew, who, however, arranged his material artificially, thus sacrificing chronological to logical order. Luke is still less reliable as regards the historical sequence of events, but his Gospel is especially valuable as containing so many of Christ's sayings not to be found in the others.

The work before us has evidently been prepared with great labor and care, and is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the criticism of the synoptical Gospels. That his peculiar theory, however, can be considered as proved, is not conceded. It can hardly escape notice that he sometimes magnifies the force of considerations which are in themselves trivial, e.g. that the satanology of Luke xiii. 11-16 is widely different from that of the Gospels in general; that Matthew's account of the healing of the leper, (ch. viii. 1-4) is less accurate than that in Mark i. 40-45, for the reason that Christ's prohibition to make the case known would have been aimless if,

as is stated Matt. viii. 1, great multitudes were present. Moreover, the general point of view of Prof. Holtzmann is altogether too independent of a belief in inspiration to inspire confidence in the conclusions to which he arrives. Though decidedly condemning Strauss' theory of the mythical origin of the Gospels in general, he pronounces various passages in Matthew to be nothing but unreliable legends, without the shadow of a demonstration. In this way he disposes of Matt. iii. 14, 15; xiv. 28-32; xvii. 24-27; xxi. 14-16; xxvi. 52-54; xxvii. 3-10, 19, 24, 51-54, 62-66; xxviii. 2-4, 11-15. The miracles of Christ he divides into those which plainly had a benevolent end, and those "which have more or less of an aesthetic character." Of the former he says: "They deserve at least a very careful consideration, and, as we shall see, a certain degree of historical evidence in respect to them is attainable." As to the latter, although not indiscriminately rejecting them, he considers them credible only in so far as their symbolic character is clear. Among them he classes the *resurrection* of Christ, and holds that from the synoptical Gospels no certainty can be attained respecting its reality. The temptation of Christ he calls, in plain terms, a myth. On the whole, the book before us may be considered as important, not only as a contribution to biblical science, but as representing the tone of a very large, perhaps an increasing, party of German theologians.

Die Lehre von den Sakramenten in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung innerhalb der abendländischen Kirche bis zum Concil von Trient. By Dr. G. L. Hahn, Prof. in Breslau. Breslau: C. Morgenstern. 1864. A learned and valuable work, presenting a purely historical treatment of the subject under consideration. The author discusses the meaning of the term "sacrament," as originally and subsequently used; the ecclesiastical dogmas and views concerning the necessity and appropriateness of sacraments; the difference in sacraments of different periods; what are the strictly Christian sacraments; the constituents, the institution, and the administrators of the sacraments; the conditions necessary to their fulfilment; their efficacy; the origin and conditions of their efficacy. Copious references are made to the various authorities consulted.

Kirchliche Glaubenslehre. By Prof. F. A. Philippi of Rostock. Stuttgart: Samuel G. Liesching. The fourth volume of this work is before us. It contains a discussion of the work of Christ, divided, according to the method which since Schleiermacher has become the favorite one in Germany, into Christ's work as Prophet, as Priest, and as King. The larger part of the volume is occupied with the treatment of the second of these topics. Philippi represents the extreme Old Lutheran orthodoxy. As to the dogma here discussed, he holds to the strict view of a literal transfer of the punishment, and even of the *guilt*, of man to Christ (p. 167). He recognizes indeed the force of the objection that guilt is essentially untransferable from one person to another, but answers it by pointing to actual cases of vicarious suffering, e.g., Louis XVI., the sacrificial lamb, who bore and expiated the sins of his ancestors"; and, in answer to the question under what conditions such a substitution can really be considered valid, he

points to "the intimate relation in which the representative surety and substitute is connected with the person or community represented by him, which connection is so close that the representative may serve for the one represented, and, as it were, an identity of the persons is effected." In the case of the atonement, this, "as it were," falls away; "all this, which in earthly relations is only typically, relatively, and imperfectly realized, is found in Christ in an archetypal and absolute form." "Therefore he is able and willing to interpose and be our surety, and expiate our guilt by doing and suffering. As the first Adam was made by God, so Christ, as the second Adam, made himself the head and representative of mankind." Philippi also holds to the doctrine of the two obediences of Christ; the strict infinity of man's guilt, sin being "in its deepest essence self-deification, and therefore in its real tendency the annihilation of God," and accordingly to the strict infinity of the penal sufferings of Christ, — "he emptied at one draught to the last drop the cup of God's infinite wrath." "God's death for God's death, — that is the perfectly full equivalent for our guilt" (p. 29).

The style of this book is lively and clear. The sketch of the various theories of the atonement is extended and thorough; so likewise the exposition of the signification of the Jewish sacrificial offerings. The author avoids the more material and offensive forms of representation which former advocates of the strict satisfaction theory have used; but this very avoidance leads him into indefinite, almost mystical, forms of expression, so that just where the kernel of a discussion lies he is liable to be the least intelligible.

Das Leben Jesu, für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet. By D. F. Strauss. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. This is an entirely new form of the famous work which first appeared in 1835. The author has aimed to popularize and defend the views which he then advanced. By way of introduction he subjects the different lives of Christ which have appeared during the last century to a criticism, the result of which is a confirmation of his own theory (the mythical) as the only one tenable. As we may have more to say of this work in the future, we will at present only remark that, in spite of the manifest untenableness of the author's view, it will probably live longer than that of Renan, and may do more harm, although it is not written in a style adapted to excite so much popular enthusiasm.

Das Charakterbild Jesu. Ein biblischer Versuch. By Prof. Daniel Schenkel of Heidelberg. Wiesbaden: Kreidel's Verlag. Following close on the heels of Renan and Strauss, Prof. Schenkel has here given us his view of the problem of Jesus' life. Although he is not so thorough an unbeliever as his predecessors, in this department his work must be assigned to the same class. He makes Mark's Gospel the basis of his biography, denying the genuineness of John's. With regard to this latter point, it would seem that it is likely to be for the next few years one of the most important subjects of controversy among biblical scholars in Germany.

According to Schenkel's own confession, his tendency has been from a more orthodox, towards his present rationalistic, point of view.

Der Grundgedanke des Buches Hiob. Von L. Chr. F. W. Hinecke, Archidiaconus zu Clausthal. Clausthal: Grosse'sche Buchhandlung. A treatise of 72 pages aiming to prove that the book of Job is designed to set forth the truth that "even the servant of God must suffer, but the Israel of God should not quarrel with the unsearchable God, for at last all will be right." The author not only denies that the book of Job has a historical basis, he does not allow it even to rest on a legend. Its authorship he assigns to a period after the exile.

Die Weissagungen Sacharjas, erklärt von Lic. Dr. August Köhler, ausserordentlicher Prof. der Theologie in Erlangen. Erlangen: Andr. Deichert. This is the second half of the work, which first appeared in 1861. Well worth recommendation as a learned and sound commentary.

Zur Kritik des Barnabasbriefes aus dem codex Sinaiticus. By Dr. C. H. Weizsäcker, Professor in Tübingen. Tübingen: L. F. Fues. A short work defending the antiquity of the Epistle of Barnabas.

Erklärung des Propheten Daniel und der Offenbarung Johannis, sowie der Weissagung von Hezekiels Gog., Cap. 37-39. By J. M. Gärtner. Stuttgart: Belser.

Beiträge zur Erklärung des alten Testaments, Vol. V. By Prof. Laur. Reinke. Münster: Theissing.

De natura et notione symbolica cheruborum. Commentatio. By E. C. A. Riehm, Prof. in Halle. Basel: Balmer und Riehm.

Bilder aus der Reformationsgeschichte 2te Bd. By Prof. Karl Strack. Leipzig: Schlicke.

Die Geschichte des Pietismus. Von H. Schmidt, Prof. der Theol. in Erlangen. Nördlingen: C. H. Beck. A very valuable work.

Das Schulwesen der Jesuiten nach den Ordensgesetzen, dargestellt von Dr. Gustav Weicker, College am Königlichen Pädagogium zu Halle. Halle: Waisenhaus Buchhandlung. Highly recommended by good judges.

Conciliengeschichte, nach den Quellen bearbeitet. Von Dr. Carl Joseph Hefele, ord. öffentlichem Prof. der Theol. an der Univ. Tübingen. Freiburg: Herdersche Buchhandlung. This is the fifth volume of Prof. Hefele's work, and covers the period from Gregory VII. to A.D. 1250.

Die Catechismen der Waldenser und Böhmisches Brüder, als Documente ihres wechselseitigen Lehraustausches. Kritische Textausgabe mit kirchen- und literargeschichtlichen Untersuchungen. By Gerhard von Gezschwitz. Erlangen: Verlag von Theod. Bläsing.

Die christliche Ethik. Von Ph. Theodor Culmann, Pfarrer zu Speyer. Erster Theil. Stuttgart: Druck und Verlag v. Joh. Fr. Steinkopf. The author died soon after the appearance of this the first part. Ethics is here treated from a philosophical point of view; and the philosophy is of the kind found in Jacob Böhme.

Evangelische Pastoraltheologie. Von Dr. Chr. Palmer. Zweite vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. Stuttgart: J. Fr. Steinkopf.

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